Tag Archives: Nuclear Detterence

Counterforce: a Threat to Nuclear Deterrence Stability

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Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

(Published in the IPCS web journal. Available at the following link:  http://ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5829 )

Early atomic bombs were crude city-annihilators. Their ability to bring enormous and horrific destruction to the civilian domain was demonstrated by the USA on 06 August 1945 when the Japanese city of Hiroshima was devastated; and if that were not enough, a second atomic weapon was detonated over the city of Nagasaki three days later. The two caused 214,000 primary fatalities to a combined population of 613,000 and an unknowable number of secondary and tertiary casualties.

Targeting Concepts

The use of nuclear weapons is governed by two basic targeting concepts: “Counterforce” and “Countervalue”. The former emphasizes strikes on military forces both nuclear and conventional, their infrastructure and logistics; while the latter focuses on economic targets and population centres. A Countervalue doctrine is limited in complexity and demands relatively simpler capabilities. During the Cold-War It led to a rather macabre belief that “assurance of mass destruction” would bring about a balance-of-terror which in turn guaranteed stability. It led to an amassing of arsenals whose aggregate yield could destroy the world many times over. The Counterforce doctrine, on the other hand, suggests that nuclear war could be limited and nuclear forces could be used to disarm the adversary of nuclear weapons; almost as if, the side adopting a Counterforce doctrine controls retaliation by the victim.

Both targeting concepts lose sight of a cardinal principle of international relations; that war has political purpose. Destruction of purpose debases the application of force to a savage all-obliterating clash. Ironically, we note today how nuclear armed states are, adopting postures that increase prospects of the use of nuclear weapons in armed conflicts.

Bernard Brodie, in 1946, provided an intellectual framework for avoiding nuclear war. In his seminal work The Absolute Weapon (New York, Harcourt Brace, 1946, P76) he suggested: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose”.  Brodie recognised that the possibility of ‘total destruction’ inherent in the use of nuclear weapons had made victory unachievable, at the same time it’s political value lay in the threat it posed to manipulate an adversary’s mind.

Evolution of Nuclear Weapons & Political Purpose

In examining the evolution of the nuclear deterrence theory, we note there is an allegorical tendency to correlate the nature of war with the changing characteristics of the nuclear weapon. War, as Clausewitz pointed out, has an enduring nature that is defined by four continuities: a political dimension, a human dimension as characterised by military genius, pervasiveness of uncertainty and the contest of opposing resolve. All of these exist within an historical, social and political context. While the dynamics that govern characteristics of nuclear weapons, is in the main, influenced by human ability to harness technology. Regardless, it is apparent that if either political purpose is lost or the human dimension is removed; then war itself is deprived of meaning.

 Given man’s facility to exploit technology, nuclear weapons have evolved in three distinct phases: first, from a weapon of use to an instrument that assured a balance of terror. Second, the threat of mutually guaranteed destruction developed into a contrivance for bargaining and devising compromises. Third, it comes full circle to a bizarre situation that today attempts to again justify nuclear war fighting. Such a progression of the weapon has lost sight of the political and human impact of use.

The Counterforce Strategic Narrative

For a nation, a strategic narrative is a lodestone to avoid a return to a trauma of the past around which the narrative was built and accepted. Its essence is often reflected in simple but pithy mantras such as “War on Terror”, “Mutually Assured Destruction” or “Counterforce doctrine”. The narrative that governs policies of nuclear armed states has, largely, been stimulated by that which emerged in the USA and been systematised in the wake of the first nuclear attacks, through the Cold-War and in its aftermath of a multi-polar world.  

In today’s strategic milieu, the lines between nuclear arsenals and conventional weapons have dangerously become intertwined as new offensive technologies such as precision hypersonic glide vehicles are introduced that pose a potent threat to the security of nuclear weapons and the stability of a deterrent relationship. The narrative in turn urges a “nuclear counterforce” strategy which determines policy and fashions a first-strike strategic posture.  And so we note with some alarm, that a nuclear weapon state when confronted by another may decide to use precision nuclear or conventional counterforce in a first strike to annul the possibility of being a victim of a nuclear attack. In this context the “reported” Russian policy Escalate to De-escalate and the US deployment of low yield nuclear weapons is confounding as it presumes total domination of the escalation ladder. 

The blurring of conventional and nuclear deterrence is apparent by the increasing integration of conventional and nuclear warfighting doctrines.  The US 2018 Nuclear Posture Review stresses the possibility of nuclear weapon use in response to non-nuclear attacks is a case in point. The long held view that nuclear weapons are exceptional has been set aside and in its place a dramatic escalation to nuclear warfighting is advocated. That, such use could provoke an unpredictable set of nuclear responses has been, eerily, blanked-out. Concepts that promote ‘first use’ of nuclear weapons are not new, for tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) were deployed with decentralised release authority during the Cold War. Recognising the catastrophic hazards of pre-delegation,  Presidential Nuclear Initiatives  attempted to remove all TNWs from the battlefield.

Conclusion

Counterforce strategies intrinsically translate to heightened nuclear risks as it prompts a ‘first strike’. It is also a flawed premise that response to nuclear escalation can ever be predictable and controlled. To the contrary, foreclosure of the option to use nuclear weapons first would not only enhance the stability of deterrence and reduce the role played by nuclear weapons in security policy; but also provide greater political legitimacy. Therefore, to adopt a ‘No-First-Use’ nuclear-policy provides sagacity to a troubled world in its deference for greater security and, indeed, for survival.

The Challenge of a Multi-Polar Nuclear Age

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Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

The article has been published in the IPCS Web Journal in the authors column The Strategist and is available at http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5819

Of Parity, Assured Destruction & Mistrust

For the last 77 years, since the USA first detonated nuclear weapons and annihilated the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, an eerie ambivalence has prevailed concerning their use. On the one hand some scholars and practitioners are convinced of the myth of usable nuclear weapons; while on the other, governments are devising policies for use . In the meanwhile, Russia toys with the idea of escalating to nuclear warfare in order to de-escalate on-going conflict; while China designs a strategy to provide greater flexibility in the use of nuclear forces.

Significantly, the first nuclear attacks also defined the basis of nuclear stability. Relationship between bellicose nuclear armed states was marked by three characteristics: quest for parity in arsenals, certitude of mutual destruction and a bizarre level of mistrust that drove states to adopt grotesque stratagems. Just how abominable nuclear war plans could be was pointed out by Noam Chomsky (the renowned pacifist). US nuclear posture, he said, called “for the delivery of 3200 nuclear weapons to 1060 targets in Russia, China, and allied countries,” all together impervious to the fact that nuclear weapons destroyed political purpose. General Butler, a former Commander-in-Chief of US Strategic Command put it succinctly when he renounced the current nuclear programs and systems as a death warrant for humanity.

 Flawed New START

The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) was signed 08 April, 2010, by the US and Russia. The instrument was a continuum of a bipartisan process to reduce nuclear arsenals. The two parties agreed in 2021, to extend the Treaty by five years. The key provision of the agreement limits nuclear warheads, delivery vectors and launchers and institutes a system of verification.

The Accord is, however, amiss both conceptually and in its substance. Conceptually it is neither inclusive of all nuclear armed states nor does it identify “mistrust” as a key factor that stokes scepticism. While in substance it fails to recognise that all nuclear weapons, including tactical, are weapons in the same category; for when used they have the potential to escalate to mass destruction. In addition it pays no heed to the fact that warheads held in reserve can very quickly be deployed. But where the treaty is fatally flawed is its inability to institute measures that diminish intent “to-use” by demanding all nuclear armed nations to abjure “First Use” of nuclear weapons as an essential doctrinal-point that allays perils of nuclear devastation.

Nuclear Weapons an Umbrella for Conventional War

Just how consequential this last consideration can be has been demonstrated In the course of the Ukraine conflict. Russia has obliquely threatened use of nuclear weapons to provide an umbrella for its war. This has turned the Cold-War idea of deterrence on its head as Moscow uses the deterrence value of its nuclear arsenal not to protect Russia but rather to provide space for conventional action. The Kremlin introduced an explicit nuclear dimension through its various declarations. On 18 February 2022, Russia conducted manoeuvres of its nuclear forces prior incursion into Ukraine. The event left little doubt that choice of timing was linked to the impending crisis. On 24 February, Moscow warned NATO in a declaration that there would be unprecedented consequences should a third state attempt to “obstruct” Russia’s designs. The Russian president went further on 27 February, announcing that Russia’s nuclear forces had been placed on “special alert”. Such public announcement regarding nuclear forces was last proclaimed by the United States during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov later noted, cryptically, that a third world war would be “nuclear”.

The Bluff of Extended Deterrence

In this milieu, the very idea of “extended nuclear deterrence” takes an outlandish turn. The logic of guarantee against a nuclear attack on a third nation implies that the guarantor launch a retaliatory nuclear strike and accept the consequences irrespective of circumstance, extent of convergence of interests or degree of mutuality. This, as recent events in Ukraine has exposed, is not rational.

Extended nuclear deterrence demands both guarantor and beneficiary accept the same conditions of nuclear use, magnitude of response, norms for escalation and share the same strategic interests. Since none of these propositions are indubitable, the substance of extended nuclear deterrence is ultimately dependent on the guarantor accepting catastrophic consequences on behalf of a third party. Nations under this canopy might want to re-consider the credibility of extended nuclear deterrence in the contemporary strategic circumstance. Reliance on the nuclear deterrent capabilities of a major power is much more an “act of clutching at a straw” than a reflection of reality. This is the dilemma of extended nuclear deterrence.

Prospects of Nuclear Stability – A Revisit

Many factors that deterred military conflict during the Cold War and after have weakened. The growing parity of arsenal, absence of moderating pressures and power imbalances between states have exposed the underlying stresses within the global system and increased the probability of conflict.

Russia’s case is symptomatic of the current anarchic state of affairs. Having lost its economic, technological, and political heft of the Soviet era; it retains great power aspirations, demands exceptionalism and clings to nuclear superpower status. Its nuclear arsenal is a key component of leverage, for it endows immunity from military pressure and the leeway to pursue an independent foreign policy.

Nuclear deterrence today can only work in conjunction with agreements, limitations and transparency. Without which, it brings antagonistic powers to the brink of nuclear war in a crisis. In the present fragile condition of deterrent relationships the prospects of nuclear stability amongst the nine nuclear armed nations will remain forlorn.

The Challenge

Cold-War nuclear paradigms can no further be tweaked to provide an illusion of stability to the nine nuclear armed states. Priority should be given to identifying methods to dispel ‘mistrust’, while advancing the idea that globally, nuclear surety is neither served by ‘parity’ in arsenals nor ‘assurance’ of total devastation. The former has brought into play a multi-polar encore of an arms race, while the latter is a return to barbaric times when extinction was propagated as a solution.

Global affairs of-the-day is a paradox. Economics and interdependence are the engines of power and yet there is reluctance to step back from military situations such as what we see in Ukraine. Nuclear weapons cannot be reduced to a gamblers game of “dare”. But to remove it from arsenals is neither practicable nor are nations ready to wean themselves from an instrument of power that nurtured them. The answer lies in transparency shadowed by withdrawal from this calamitous obsession through a general adoption of a policy of ‘No-First-Use’ of nuclear weapons. This is a first step towards disarmament.

Ballistic Missile Defence: A Bulwark of Deterrence

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by Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

This article is forthcoming in the March 2019 issue of Geopolitics http://www.geopolitics.in/

In the aftermath of the Six-Day war of 1967, there ensued a prolonged period of sporadic hostilities between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Syria and Iraq on the other. On 12 October, 1967, the Eilat, an Israeli Destroyer on routine patrol, was engaged in a surface action by Egyptian missile boats off Port Said. A crew member on the deck of the Eilat apparently did not understand what he was looking at. It was not a rocket; it was a Styx missile, the first of four that slammed into and sank the hapless destroyer. Of the incident, the Captain of the Eilat recorded “I stood there transfixed, watching the missile”. The 1971 Indian missile strikes on Karachi port installations and warships defending the harbour evoked a similar distressed response. It was another reminder of the need for effective defence against missile attacks.

And just as the ‘Defence’ came to grips with the nature of missile assaults through a combination of deception, soft and hard kill measures, the ‘Offence’ wrested the initiative through enhanced ranges, precision, speed, cruise altitude, deception, unpredictable targeting and more significantly by adopting a sub-orbital ballistic trajectory with a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle payload containing several warheads, each capable of being aimed to hit a different target.

Approach to Ballistic Missile Defence: Effectiveness

While the debate on whether or not India should test and deploy ballistic missile defences (BMD) is now largely settled, the important question of how effective such systems are likely to be remains ‘iffy’. The answer to this question depends on considerations such as type of defence, characteristics of the attacking missile, desired kill probability, standards for measure of success and lastly the economics of induction which will determine how secure and gapless coverage can be achieved.

Indian backers of BMD argue that trials have already proven the system to be effective. Critics, however, maintain that these trials are too few, unrealistic and structured-for- success; contention being that they do not in any way attempt to mimic the ‘fog’ and unpredictability that generally envelopes operational situations which will eventually have a bearing on measure of effectiveness. The quandary is that there is not enough empirical data to arrive at an objective assessment.

Given the contrapositions in the debate, it is necessary first to understand the features of a ballistic trajectory in order to discern opportunities available to the Defence.

The Ballistic Trajectory and State of Play

Assuming the missile’s range is long enough that it leaves the atmosphere; a ballistic missile’s trajectory is typically divided into three phases.  First, the boost phase, when the missile is under powered flight using its rocket booster.  Second, the midcourse glide, in which the missile coasts on a ballistic trajectory through outer space.  Third, the terminal phase, in which the missile or warheads re-enters the atmosphere and plunge towards its target at hypersonic speeds.  Each phase presents different options and problems for the Defence.

Hard-kill systems (measures that physically counterattack an incoming missile destroying/altering path of  its warhead) that operate within the atmosphere or above it such as the U.S. Army’s Patriot system, the U.S. Navy’s Aegis system, the Russian S-400 system and indeed the Indian BMD, a double-tiered system consisting of two land and sea-based interceptor missiles, namely the Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile for lower altitude interception. All these systems use radar for guidance and homing and most are equipped with high-explosive warheads while some use kinetic impact for destruction of the incoming missile. Aero-dynamic forces enable interceptor manoeuvring and “atmospheric filtering” resolve ambiguity posed by countermeasures.  In the 1991 Gulf War, the Patriot or PAC-2 interceptor missiles, reportedly, attempted to intercept 44 Iraqi Scud ballistic missiles. The U.S. Army by their own estimates (which varies wildly), claimed kill percentage of about 61%. However, technical analyses suggest that the actual intercept rate was nearer to zero. In the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. Army fielded the improved PAC3 BMD, evidence is mixed on whether the system actually performed since there had reportedly, been only two “kills” in seven launches.

Boost-Phase Interception

Boost-phase interception attempts to destroy missiles while they are still in powered flight.  This mode of defence, in concept, could use hard-kill interceptors, or beam weapons such as lasers.  Boost-phase defences have some significant advantages over midcourse or terminal interception. Importantly, destroying a missile during boost eliminates all of its warheads and therefore is most appropriate against missiles equipped with multiple warheads. In addition, the problem of countermeasures appears to be much less severe for boost-phase interceptors than it is in midcourse or terminal phase engagements. The difficulty facing boost-phase defence is, time for engagement that the hostile missile offers which at most is a few minutes; suggesting that a boost-phase interceptor be located relatively close to the attacking missile launch site. This consideration become critical when it comes to neutralising short ambit ballistic missiles which by virtue of limited range may have to be deployed in the tactical battle area such as Pakistan’s Nasr or their Hatf 1 and Hatf 2, missiles. The launch vehicle could be eliminated prior to missile launch by precision guided munitions or air to surface missiles.

Midcourse Interceptors

Long-range midcourse defence operates above the atmosphere (exo-atmospheric) and refers to that part of the target’s trajectory after its booster rocket has burned out but before it begins to re-enter the atmosphere. It aims at direct collision homing techniques during target travel through space.    Midcourse interception in principle provides wide area defence. At the same time exo-atmospheric mode of operation makes the Defence potentially vulnerable to a variety of countermeasures. A primary objective of such defences is countering nuclear-armed missiles. Very few nations have proven the efficacy of midcourse interceptors, for the real issue is not its theoretical viability or how well it works on a test range, but its operational effectiveness – that is, how well they can be expected to work given unpredictable circumstances in an environment where countermeasures are deployed. Unfortunately, very little open source information is available on the matter.

The Russian S-400 system would appear to have captured the wide area midcourse BMD market for reasons of effectiveness and economy. Its closest rival is the American Patriot PAC3; both systems claim a dual capability of shooting down aircraft and providing BMD. It would now help our analysis if consideration is given to the known attributes of the two systems. A comparison of technical parameters indicate that the S-400 can shoot down targets moving at a speed of 17 km/sec while the PAC-3 limit of target speed is 8 km/sec; in terms of simultaneous tracking and engagement the S-400 can track 160 targets and engage  72 targets simultaneously while the PAC3 can track125 and engage 36. Maximum tracking range for the S-400 is 600 km and kill range is 400 km while the PAC3 tracking and engagement range is far less at 180kms and 100kms respectively. The S-400’ altitude aperture is from a low of 10 metres to a high of 30 km while the Patriot’s altitude bracket is between 50 metres and 25 km. To achieve a kill probability of not less than 0.99, the S-400 will have to launch a salvo of 2 missiles while the Patriot, 3 missiles. It would now be apparent that in all vital attributes the S-400 outperforms the PAC3. Also, it is interesting to note that the Russian system has the capability to detect stealth aircrafts such as the US F-35 and Chinese J-20 which are characterized by a low radar signature. Five squadrons of the S-400 system are expected to be inducted into India’s inventory by 2020 at a cost of $ 5.43 billion.

India’s Rough Nuclearized Neighbourhood

A nuclear deterrent relationship is founded entirely on rationality. On the part of the ‘deteree’ there is rationality in the conviction of disproportionate risks of hostile action; and on the part of the deterrer rationality of purpose and transparency in confirming the reality of the risks involved in a manner that strategic miscalculations are avoided . The exceptional feature of this transaction is that the roles are reversible provided it is in the common interest to maintain stability in relationship. The rub when dealing with Pakistan is that political leadership is a charade that masks the real manipulators of power: the military establishment, who, as a rule do not expose themselves to diplomatic parleys and the tedium of negotiations.

India’s neighbourhood in nuclear security terms is significant for the two nuclear armed neighbours that quarter its Northern and Western borders. Both inimical to its interests; the former Machiavellian in its security relationship while the latter out-and-out pernicious and perhaps more alarmingly a nuclear surrogate whose arsenal and doctrine have been devised, tested and phrased in Beijing.

In all but two doctrinal precepts there does not appear to be great divergence between China’s and India’s Nuclear Doctrine. Where China deviates is on the subject of ‘the demonstration’ and ‘doctrinal dynamism.’ The former suggests, in the abstract, that nuclear weapons would be used, if credibility is ever questioned. This usage may not be against vital targets and yet will leave no doubts of intentions. While the latter opens up the nature of their alliances. In this frame of reference, the scripting of the Pakistan nuclear capability, transfer of nuclear technologies, developing their strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal, setting up of the Khushab I to IV weapon grade plutonium production reactors and the emergence of a first-strike capability becomes significant.

Thus, China’s doctrinal dynamism potentially permits a Janus-faced policy – the one that it presents to the world at large is that of the No-First-Use (NFU), minimalistic, rigid, restrained nuclear power while the other is to retain the First Use alternative through the Pakistan arsenal. This policy has placed nuclear force planners in a quandary; not to respond is to open India to a possible degradation of their Second Strike capability. China moulding Pakistan’s nuclear First Use facility, forgets the fact of an enfeebled Pakistan civilian leadership incapable of action to remove the military finger from the nuclear trigger; the active involvement of UN designated terrorists in military strategy and an alarming posture of an intention-to-use; all have the makings of a global nuclear nightmare.

Given the opacity of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear underpinnings, descent to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) and duplicity of policies, it has become increasingly prickly for India to either understand nuclear thinking in Islamabad or to find coherence between a mania for parity, the rush for stockpiling fissile material and the loosening of controls over nuclear weapons. More puzzling is the notion that the conventional imbalance between the two countries may be countered by Pakistan introducing TNWs as “another layer of deterrence” (ala NATO’s discredited formulation). Clearly in this strategic framework, the generation of India’s BMD cannot come as a surprise to any pundit of nuclear security.

The Indian BMD

India is in the advanced stage of developing and deploying a multi-tiered BMD system designed to achieve exo-atmospheric interception of short, intermediate, and intercontinental range ballistic missiles during midcourse flight interfaced with an endo-atmospheric hit-to-kill interceptor. The system consists of a two stage, solid propellant Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) missile in tandem with the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for high and low altitude interception, respectively. The PDV intercepts ballistic missiles at exo-atmospheric altitudes up to 150kms while the AAD missile achieves endo-atmospheric engagement within an altitude envelope of 15mtrs-30kms. The AAD is also effective against cruise missiles and short range ballistic missiles. The system is interfaced to a long range phased array tracking radar (Swordfish) which provides gapless surveillance up to 1500kms. The deployed system would consist of several launch vehicles, radars, Launch Control Centres grouped under a Mission Control Centre. All these are geographically distributed and connected by a secure communication network

The Russian S-400 Triumf BMD system to be inducted by India beginning 2020 (operational parameters discussed in some detail earlier) when married and deployed with existing endo-atmospheric systems such as the AAD or Barak 8 (joint Indo-Israeli production), will provide significant strategic performance upgrade to India’s BMD capability. Particularly in the face of China’s intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles of the JL2 and DF31A type; Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal of medium range ballistic missiles such as the ‘Ababeel’, cruise missiles such as the ‘Babur’ and tactical ballistic missiles of the ‘Nasr’ type. While capability to neutralise the ballistic missile threat from both India’s nuclear neighbours is credible, what may be questioned is the economics of the matter and how selective or otherwise can India be in providing BMD cover to counter force and counter value targets.

Impact on Deterrence

The point at issue that planners will raise is: in what manner does the Indian BMD serve the cause of deterrence? Cold-war theology that drove the bi-polar deterrent relationship between USA and the USSR hinged on an axiomatic logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and the strategic rationality (that both protagonists subscribed to) which provoked ‘predictable behaviour.’ Thus, in that era, the BMD became a de-stabilizing factor as it undermined the shared hostage situation that was central to MAD. Also, it set into motion dynamics for modernising and enlarging nuclear arsenals. It is in this sensibility that the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty of 1972 was considered ‘the bedrock of strategic nuclear stability.’

Answers may be found in the changing shape of geopolitics at the turn of the 21st century that not only fractured the former bi-polar equilibrium to multi-polar uncertainties, but also introduced reprobate nuclear armed states into the milieu, some of whom are not so readily convinced of the logic of MAD or the strategic rationality of ‘predictable behaviour.’ Pakistan finds itself in this category. The deterrence of such states poses a dilemma never faced before, for reasons of their often repeated capricious nuclear threats and intent-to-use policy, decentralized control of TNWs and their military strategy that finds unity with terrorists; all of which places pressures on states with stable and reposeful nuclear doctrines such as India. Consequently, for India, deterrence is not just a function of strategic rationality but, of persistent emphasis on credibility of the power to deny and the immense and exacting shock of response. It is to further this precept that the Indian BMD finds expression.