The Sometime Pickle of Civilizational Connects

By  Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar.

Published in the IPCS Web journal in the author’s Column The Strategist  and may be accessed athttp://ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5629

 

The Peloponnesian War (431- 404 BCE), was a significant event of the ancients as it reshaped the Hellenic world. A hegemonistic Athens and its trading vassals, on one side was challenged by Sparta backed by the xenophobic Peloponnesian League. In the end, the Spartan side came on top. But the central question that emerged was, what made like peoples (civilizationally) fight a long and debilitating war?…explanations rarely go beyond Graham Allison’s “what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta”; and yet what remains unexplored is the ‘invidiousness of civilizational hook ups’.

Through history, as many wars have been fought as there have been civilizationally connected peoples. The Mauryan campaigns of the 4th century BC began with war and conquest of the Nanda Empire; interestingly the protagonists shared a common progenitor. . The Crusades (1096-1291 AD) began with Pope Urban II’s for a war to recover the holy land from Muslim rule. It degenerated to a riot of pillage ending in the fall of Jerusalem and victory to the Muslims. The war ironically was fought between peoples of the “Word”. The interminable wars in Europe waged between 12th and 17th centuries AD were largely fought over family rivalries, prestige and succession. The Colonial Wars that found roots in piracy before expanding into a world-wide feuding network of discriminatory trade practices, was a confrontation between practitioners of ‘western civilization’ that culminated in the World Wars of the 20th century, fought for domination and imperial glory.

The farther back we look the more we note that despite there being civilizational ties nations went to bloody wars, rather than find alternatives. Was it because they knew each other too well? Or were causes due to the nature of nation-states involved, their creation, development and quest for self-sufficiency? What is clear is that no modern nation can lean on a unique history that is in itself self-explanatory. Because a civilization in its life span is faced by a succession of challenges that often fragment the whole resulting in each element providing solutions as best as they may. It brings about self-sustaining divisions that live, work and fight to the dictates of traditions common to them to the exclusion and often in conflict with the other elements. Against this backdrop how relevant and to what effect is the current government in India backing its civilizational ties with China to build a mutually beneficial relationship?

Colonial exhaustion and defeat of imperial powers in the 20th century gave rise to Communism in China and its evolution to a “centrally controlled market economy that tolerated political activity only by the Party”; it is the antithesis of development of a parliamentary democracy in India. Ironically, history attributes the entry of Mahayana Buddhism in 3 BCE from its home in India for the part it played in developing Chinese civilization and it’s implanting amongst the Sinic people. These civilizational bonds over the millennia grew as human interaction and trade flourished, first over land and then by sea.

Imperial competition in the 18th and 19th centuries spurred by search for resources, increasing demand and lure of easy wealth marked the advent of colonial empires and the breakdown of traditional linkages. Awkwardly, trade networks now were routed through the parent colonist. An unintended fallout of this disruption was nationalistic fervour that neither had the experience of managing affairs of the state nor could they see beyond the coloniser and his reviled formula of trade-settlement-conquest. The artificially stretched geography had effectively fragmented civilizational bonds and replaced it by concepts that came unstuck rather than coalesce.

In this milieu it must come as no surprise that China and India opted for self-government so profoundly different and with such a varied interpretation of what and who was the ‘self’ to be governed. While the former claimed exclusive authority of people freed of feudal and capitalistic exploitation and holding membership of the Chinese communist party, the latter derived its authority from a more abstract interpretation of what represented the will of the nation under one constitution. There are inconvenient anomalies to both concepts. That being as it may the reality is that China and India share borders that extends over 3500 kilometres ridden by “cartographic incongruities”. Concurrently historical events such as the invasion of Tibet, flight of the Dalai-lama to India, stoking of Maoist insurgencies in India, the lack of a consensual basis for boundary resolution be it the ‘Johnson, MacDonald or McMahon’ lines, a border war and the underlying looming strategic competition; have all served to stress relations.

Even the approach taken by the two nations to development and growth cannot be at greater odds. China since the mid-seventies has become the manufacturing hub of the world; while India since the mid-nineties has become the favoured destination for outsourcing of a range of services from software development and call centres to “back-room” services and sophisticated research reports for analysts and decision makers. India’s primary aim is of being a dominant knowledge power. But tensions remain, not just caused by legacy. For China it is the inability to reconcile a free market economy with a repressive authoritarian regime. She has chosen to distract her people through whipping up nationalistic passions and implementing aggressive revisionist policies; while for India it is her very population and the nature of its polity that tends to retard. Both have a common quest, to achieve and sustain great power status. China’s striving for dominance in the political arena is backed by a first-rate military power; challenged by the international system, it has turned a competitive face to relations with other powers. While India would appear to have chosen a cooperative slant, its exertion of power is through international bodies, its success at the Financial Action Task Force and to win support at the UN on its stand on climate change, renewable energy and terrorism are issues that have not gone unnoticed.

Given this state of play and the harsh fact that the principle of nationalism is almost always intimately linked to the idea of war it will take an act of great statesmanship between the two diverse Asian giants to bury their differences and build upon their hoary civilizational bonds. But even if this were to be so, the question that begs to be answered is: to whose benefit and to what end?

South Asia: Post Crisis Brief (Balakot)

Published by:

The Nuclear Crisis Group

Read the entire brief here: https://www.globalzero.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/06/South-Asia-Post-Crisis-Brief.pdf

Contributors to the dossier: Vice Admiral (ret.) Vijay Shankar, General (ret.) Jehangir Karamat, Dr. Manpreet Sethi, Sadia Tasleem,  Dr. Toby Dalton, and Dr. Vipin Narang.

Balakot: the Strike Across the Line

by

Vice Admiral (Ret.) Vijay Shankar

A former Chief Minister of the Indian State of Jammu and Kashmir in the immediate wake of the February 26, 2019 Balakot strike by the Indian Airforce remarked: “Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) hit Indian forces and claimed the attack. In turn, Indian forces hit JeM and owned that air strike.” The problem with this credulous statement, on the one hand, is that it persists in viewing a string of terrorist acts as one-offs; and on the other hand, it fails to discern the victim from the villain.

In distinguishing between victim of an act of terror and the terrorist, United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 51/210 of 1996 makes clear what defines the act: “Criminal acts intended or calculated to provoke a state of terror in the general public, a group of persons or particular persons for political purposes are in any circumstance unjustifiable, whatever the considerations of political, philosophical, ideological, racial, ethnic, religious or other nature that may be invoked to justify them.” Furthermore, the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy of 2006 enjoins member states “to refrain from organizing, instigating, facilitating, participating in, financing, encouraging or tolerating terrorist activities and to take…measures to ensure that…respective territories are not used for terrorist installations or training camps, or for the preparation or organization of terrorist acts intended to be committed against other States or their citizens.” The right to respond, pre-emptive or reactive, to an act of terror is enshrined in the same document.

Additionally, the Pulwama terror attack of February 14 being perceived as a ‘one-off’ is far more hazardous as it distorts any concept of response while at the same time skewing mass perception of the character of that act of terror. The Pulwama vehicular bombing must be seen as one of a series of terror attacks beginning with the assault on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, the atrocity of killing soldier’s families at Kaluchak in 2002, the terror attacks on Mumbai in 2008, the strikes on Pathankot and Uri in 2016 and now Pulwama. Incidentally, all these attacks were (as evidence indicates) planned in coordination with Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) and executed by the Pakistan-based internationally outlawed terror outfit, the JeM. Restraint-in-response, which characterized the Indian military rejoinder prior to the Uri terror assault, has been replaced by cross-Line of Control (LoC) punitive strikes that were undertaken to move on the offensive, surgically hit designated terror targets, and return to base; all with speed and precision. Retribution for Pulwama was delivered by airpower that blinded and then sliced through Pakistan air defenses to deliver their precision payloads deep in Pakistani territory to the terror infrastructure of the JeM at Balakot where over
300 new jihadi recruits reportedly were undergoing fidayeen training in preparation for attacks in India.  For Pakistan, the awkward reality was that its two major benefactors, China and Saudi Arabia, did not back it. Was this another nail in the coffin for the Pakistani strategy of nurturing Islamist terror groups and militants as instruments to bleed India? Is the myth of waging unconventional warfare against the Indian State with impunity under the umbrella of nuclear weapons now standing on thin ice?

The following day, the Pakistan Air Force mounted a retaliatory air strike, which was thwarted by Indian air defences. It was not clear what the Pakistani targets were since they were unable to either strike any installations or penetrate defenses. In the skirmish, one Indian Mig-21 was shot down and its pilot captured while the Indian Air Force claimed downing a Pakistani F-16. It is hypothetical to speculate what the Indian reaction may have been had the Pakistani force package reached their targets. Within 48 hours, the captured Indian pilot was returned. It is possible this act served to defuse the situation but it is not clear whether the return was achieved through internal decision-making or external pressure.

It may be premature to analyze the lessons to be learned from the Balakot air strikes, particularly at the tactical or the operational level as there would be many. However, a macro evaluation suggests four salient takeaways:

First, there has been a strategic revisit of the Indian policy of restraint-in-response to terror attacks on India or its assets anywhere (remember the attack on the Indian consulate at Mazar-i-Sharif in 2016) by the JeM or any other Pakistan-sponsored jihadi groups. Hitherto, thinking at the highest levels of India’s political leadership was influenced by the probability that any major trans-LoC strike using airpower would be deemed escalatory. Post-Balakot, the Indian military is less likely to be constrained by the Line or the border in conducting retaliatory precision strikes on non-military terror-related targets as long as it is clear that the Pakistan State is doctrinally, logistically, and materially behind these terror strikes.

Second, India is focused on targeting jihadi terror infrastructure. The dismantlement of those targets by Pakistan or by other means provides the first mechanism for negotiations between Delhi and Islamabad.

Third, the impact on other regional states and major international players not only set up a favourable environ for the furtherance of the campaign against terror but likewise energized Pakistan’s immediate neighbours, who are also victims of state-sponsored terror, to take similar offensive action.

Four, the growing precision and briskness of intelligence—whether human, electronic, cyber, space-based, or through interstate cooperation—has enhanced the ability to plan and conduct surgical strikes against terror targets.

Addressing the issue of how best to manage a future occurrence begins with the understanding that India’s pacific tolerance to terror attacks sponsored by Pakistan and emanating from their territory is not unlimited and will be rejoined by reactive or pre-emptive military action which may not be geographically restricted to Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. In this perspective, that the Pakistan Army have backed jihadist groups and shielded wanted terrorists like Hafiz Sayyed, Dawood Ibrahim, and Masood Azar are well recognised facts. The real problem is that this duplicity, notoriously dubbed the strategy of a “thousand cuts,” is part of the Pakistani establishment’s policy. To dismantle the terror infrastructure in Pakistan that target India, and to bring to book jihadi terror groups, such as JeM or Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT), would greatly serve the interest of averting the prospects of recurrence. In the long term, there is no getting away from the pressing need for civil control of the Pakistan deep state (ISI-military combine).

On the issue of the absence of escalation, two considerations may have played a part. First, the nature of the air strikes were designated by the Indian Government as “pre-emptive” air strikes directed against non-military terror infrastructure. The strikes were limited in scope, intensity, and time. Second, the terror averse international environment and the persuasive powers of the United States and Saudi Arabia appear to have been at play. Both states hold Pakistan’s economic jugular at a time when the Pakistani economy is in a quagmire. The reluctance of China either to support Pakistan or to get involved must have been a dampener to any thought by Pakistan to further escalate. From the nuclear stand point, there was neither rhetoric nor any reported attempt to reach for the trigger by either side. This may be an indication of a developing balance and perspicacity as to where nuclear thresholds lie on both sides.

The Balakot air strikes are far too recent for all verified facts to have emerged and, therefore, to stitch together an exhaustive analysis may not be a practical proposition currently. Yet the significance of the incident is very apparent, for it revolves around one notable condition of the international milieu: how long can the global community endure the presence of a state that nurtures and sponsors terrorism so much so that it is today considered the epicentre of global terrorism?

 

 

Ballistic Missile Defence: A Bulwark of Deterrence

by Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

This article is forthcoming in the March 2019 issue of Geopolitics http://www.geopolitics.in/

In the aftermath of the Six-Day war of 1967, there ensued a prolonged period of sporadic hostilities between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Syria and Iraq on the other. On 12 October, 1967, the Eilat, an Israeli Destroyer on routine patrol, was engaged in a surface action by Egyptian missile boats off Port Said. A crew member on the deck of the Eilat apparently did not understand what he was looking at. It was not a rocket; it was a Styx missile, the first of four that slammed into and sank the hapless destroyer. Of the incident, the Captain of the Eilat recorded “I stood there transfixed, watching the missile”. The 1971 Indian missile strikes on Karachi port installations and warships defending the harbour evoked a similar distressed response. It was another reminder of the need for effective defence against missile attacks.

And just as the ‘Defence’ came to grips with the nature of missile assaults through a combination of deception, soft and hard kill measures, the ‘Offence’ wrested the initiative through enhanced ranges, precision, speed, cruise altitude, deception, unpredictable targeting and more significantly by adopting a sub-orbital ballistic trajectory with a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle payload containing several warheads, each capable of being aimed to hit a different target.

Approach to Ballistic Missile Defence: Effectiveness

While the debate on whether or not India should test and deploy ballistic missile defences (BMD) is now largely settled, the important question of how effective such systems are likely to be remains ‘iffy’. The answer to this question depends on considerations such as type of defence, characteristics of the attacking missile, desired kill probability, standards for measure of success and lastly the economics of induction which will determine how secure and gapless coverage can be achieved.

Indian backers of BMD argue that trials have already proven the system to be effective. Critics, however, maintain that these trials are too few, unrealistic and structured-for- success; contention being that they do not in any way attempt to mimic the ‘fog’ and unpredictability that generally envelopes operational situations which will eventually have a bearing on measure of effectiveness. The quandary is that there is not enough empirical data to arrive at an objective assessment.

Given the contrapositions in the debate, it is necessary first to understand the features of a ballistic trajectory in order to discern opportunities available to the Defence.

The Ballistic Trajectory and State of Play

Assuming the missile’s range is long enough that it leaves the atmosphere; a ballistic missile’s trajectory is typically divided into three phases.  First, the boost phase, when the missile is under powered flight using its rocket booster.  Second, the midcourse glide, in which the missile coasts on a ballistic trajectory through outer space.  Third, the terminal phase, in which the missile or warheads re-enters the atmosphere and plunge towards its target at hypersonic speeds.  Each phase presents different options and problems for the Defence.

Hard-kill systems (measures that physically counterattack an incoming missile destroying/altering path of  its warhead) that operate within the atmosphere or above it such as the U.S. Army’s Patriot system, the U.S. Navy’s Aegis system, the Russian S-400 system and indeed the Indian BMD, a double-tiered system consisting of two land and sea-based interceptor missiles, namely the Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile for lower altitude interception. All these systems use radar for guidance and homing and most are equipped with high-explosive warheads while some use kinetic impact for destruction of the incoming missile. Aero-dynamic forces enable interceptor manoeuvring and “atmospheric filtering” resolve ambiguity posed by countermeasures.  In the 1991 Gulf War, the Patriot or PAC-2 interceptor missiles, reportedly, attempted to intercept 44 Iraqi Scud ballistic missiles. The U.S. Army by their own estimates (which varies wildly), claimed kill percentage of about 61%. However, technical analyses suggest that the actual intercept rate was nearer to zero. In the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. Army fielded the improved PAC3 BMD, evidence is mixed on whether the system actually performed since there had reportedly, been only two “kills” in seven launches.

Boost-Phase Interception

Boost-phase interception attempts to destroy missiles while they are still in powered flight.  This mode of defence, in concept, could use hard-kill interceptors, or beam weapons such as lasers.  Boost-phase defences have some significant advantages over midcourse or terminal interception. Importantly, destroying a missile during boost eliminates all of its warheads and therefore is most appropriate against missiles equipped with multiple warheads. In addition, the problem of countermeasures appears to be much less severe for boost-phase interceptors than it is in midcourse or terminal phase engagements. The difficulty facing boost-phase defence is, time for engagement that the hostile missile offers which at most is a few minutes; suggesting that a boost-phase interceptor be located relatively close to the attacking missile launch site. This consideration become critical when it comes to neutralising short ambit ballistic missiles which by virtue of limited range may have to be deployed in the tactical battle area such as Pakistan’s Nasr or their Hatf 1 and Hatf 2, missiles. The launch vehicle could be eliminated prior to missile launch by precision guided munitions or air to surface missiles.

Midcourse Interceptors

Long-range midcourse defence operates above the atmosphere (exo-atmospheric) and refers to that part of the target’s trajectory after its booster rocket has burned out but before it begins to re-enter the atmosphere. It aims at direct collision homing techniques during target travel through space.    Midcourse interception in principle provides wide area defence. At the same time exo-atmospheric mode of operation makes the Defence potentially vulnerable to a variety of countermeasures. A primary objective of such defences is countering nuclear-armed missiles. Very few nations have proven the efficacy of midcourse interceptors, for the real issue is not its theoretical viability or how well it works on a test range, but its operational effectiveness – that is, how well they can be expected to work given unpredictable circumstances in an environment where countermeasures are deployed. Unfortunately, very little open source information is available on the matter.

The Russian S-400 system would appear to have captured the wide area midcourse BMD market for reasons of effectiveness and economy. Its closest rival is the American Patriot PAC3; both systems claim a dual capability of shooting down aircraft and providing BMD. It would now help our analysis if consideration is given to the known attributes of the two systems. A comparison of technical parameters indicate that the S-400 can shoot down targets moving at a speed of 17 km/sec while the PAC-3 limit of target speed is 8 km/sec; in terms of simultaneous tracking and engagement the S-400 can track 160 targets and engage  72 targets simultaneously while the PAC3 can track125 and engage 36. Maximum tracking range for the S-400 is 600 km and kill range is 400 km while the PAC3 tracking and engagement range is far less at 180kms and 100kms respectively. The S-400’ altitude aperture is from a low of 10 metres to a high of 30 km while the Patriot’s altitude bracket is between 50 metres and 25 km. To achieve a kill probability of not less than 0.99, the S-400 will have to launch a salvo of 2 missiles while the Patriot, 3 missiles. It would now be apparent that in all vital attributes the S-400 outperforms the PAC3. Also, it is interesting to note that the Russian system has the capability to detect stealth aircrafts such as the US F-35 and Chinese J-20 which are characterized by a low radar signature. Five squadrons of the S-400 system are expected to be inducted into India’s inventory by 2020 at a cost of $ 5.43 billion.

India’s Rough Nuclearized Neighbourhood

A nuclear deterrent relationship is founded entirely on rationality. On the part of the ‘deteree’ there is rationality in the conviction of disproportionate risks of hostile action; and on the part of the deterrer rationality of purpose and transparency in confirming the reality of the risks involved in a manner that strategic miscalculations are avoided . The exceptional feature of this transaction is that the roles are reversible provided it is in the common interest to maintain stability in relationship. The rub when dealing with Pakistan is that political leadership is a charade that masks the real manipulators of power: the military establishment, who, as a rule do not expose themselves to diplomatic parleys and the tedium of negotiations.

India’s neighbourhood in nuclear security terms is significant for the two nuclear armed neighbours that quarter its Northern and Western borders. Both inimical to its interests; the former Machiavellian in its security relationship while the latter out-and-out pernicious and perhaps more alarmingly a nuclear surrogate whose arsenal and doctrine have been devised, tested and phrased in Beijing.

In all but two doctrinal precepts there does not appear to be great divergence between China’s and India’s Nuclear Doctrine. Where China deviates is on the subject of ‘the demonstration’ and ‘doctrinal dynamism.’ The former suggests, in the abstract, that nuclear weapons would be used, if credibility is ever questioned. This usage may not be against vital targets and yet will leave no doubts of intentions. While the latter opens up the nature of their alliances. In this frame of reference, the scripting of the Pakistan nuclear capability, transfer of nuclear technologies, developing their strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal, setting up of the Khushab I to IV weapon grade plutonium production reactors and the emergence of a first-strike capability becomes significant.

Thus, China’s doctrinal dynamism potentially permits a Janus-faced policy – the one that it presents to the world at large is that of the No-First-Use (NFU), minimalistic, rigid, restrained nuclear power while the other is to retain the First Use alternative through the Pakistan arsenal. This policy has placed nuclear force planners in a quandary; not to respond is to open India to a possible degradation of their Second Strike capability. China moulding Pakistan’s nuclear First Use facility, forgets the fact of an enfeebled Pakistan civilian leadership incapable of action to remove the military finger from the nuclear trigger; the active involvement of UN designated terrorists in military strategy and an alarming posture of an intention-to-use; all have the makings of a global nuclear nightmare.

Given the opacity of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear underpinnings, descent to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) and duplicity of policies, it has become increasingly prickly for India to either understand nuclear thinking in Islamabad or to find coherence between a mania for parity, the rush for stockpiling fissile material and the loosening of controls over nuclear weapons. More puzzling is the notion that the conventional imbalance between the two countries may be countered by Pakistan introducing TNWs as “another layer of deterrence” (ala NATO’s discredited formulation). Clearly in this strategic framework, the generation of India’s BMD cannot come as a surprise to any pundit of nuclear security.

The Indian BMD

India is in the advanced stage of developing and deploying a multi-tiered BMD system designed to achieve exo-atmospheric interception of short, intermediate, and intercontinental range ballistic missiles during midcourse flight interfaced with an endo-atmospheric hit-to-kill interceptor. The system consists of a two stage, solid propellant Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) missile in tandem with the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for high and low altitude interception, respectively. The PDV intercepts ballistic missiles at exo-atmospheric altitudes up to 150kms while the AAD missile achieves endo-atmospheric engagement within an altitude envelope of 15mtrs-30kms. The AAD is also effective against cruise missiles and short range ballistic missiles. The system is interfaced to a long range phased array tracking radar (Swordfish) which provides gapless surveillance up to 1500kms. The deployed system would consist of several launch vehicles, radars, Launch Control Centres grouped under a Mission Control Centre. All these are geographically distributed and connected by a secure communication network

The Russian S-400 Triumf BMD system to be inducted by India beginning 2020 (operational parameters discussed in some detail earlier) when married and deployed with existing endo-atmospheric systems such as the AAD or Barak 8 (joint Indo-Israeli production), will provide significant strategic performance upgrade to India’s BMD capability. Particularly in the face of China’s intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles of the JL2 and DF31A type; Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal of medium range ballistic missiles such as the ‘Ababeel’, cruise missiles such as the ‘Babur’ and tactical ballistic missiles of the ‘Nasr’ type. While capability to neutralise the ballistic missile threat from both India’s nuclear neighbours is credible, what may be questioned is the economics of the matter and how selective or otherwise can India be in providing BMD cover to counter force and counter value targets.

Impact on Deterrence

The point at issue that planners will raise is: in what manner does the Indian BMD serve the cause of deterrence? Cold-war theology that drove the bi-polar deterrent relationship between USA and the USSR hinged on an axiomatic logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and the strategic rationality (that both protagonists subscribed to) which provoked ‘predictable behaviour.’ Thus, in that era, the BMD became a de-stabilizing factor as it undermined the shared hostage situation that was central to MAD. Also, it set into motion dynamics for modernising and enlarging nuclear arsenals. It is in this sensibility that the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty of 1972 was considered ‘the bedrock of strategic nuclear stability.’

Answers may be found in the changing shape of geopolitics at the turn of the 21st century that not only fractured the former bi-polar equilibrium to multi-polar uncertainties, but also introduced reprobate nuclear armed states into the milieu, some of whom are not so readily convinced of the logic of MAD or the strategic rationality of ‘predictable behaviour.’ Pakistan finds itself in this category. The deterrence of such states poses a dilemma never faced before, for reasons of their often repeated capricious nuclear threats and intent-to-use policy, decentralized control of TNWs and their military strategy that finds unity with terrorists; all of which places pressures on states with stable and reposeful nuclear doctrines such as India. Consequently, for India, deterrence is not just a function of strategic rationality but, of persistent emphasis on credibility of the power to deny and the immense and exacting shock of response. It is to further this precept that the Indian BMD finds expression.