Ballistic Missile Defence: A Bulwark of Deterrence

by Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

This article is forthcoming in the March 2019 issue of Geopolitics http://www.geopolitics.in/

In the aftermath of the Six-Day war of 1967, there ensued a prolonged period of sporadic hostilities between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Syria and Iraq on the other. On 12 October, 1967, the Eilat, an Israeli Destroyer on routine patrol, was engaged in a surface action by Egyptian missile boats off Port Said. A crew member on the deck of the Eilat apparently did not understand what he was looking at. It was not a rocket; it was a Styx missile, the first of four that slammed into and sank the hapless destroyer. Of the incident, the Captain of the Eilat recorded “I stood there transfixed, watching the missile”. The 1971 Indian missile strikes on Karachi port installations and warships defending the harbour evoked a similar distressed response. It was another reminder of the need for effective defence against missile attacks.

And just as the ‘Defence’ came to grips with the nature of missile assaults through a combination of deception, soft and hard kill measures, the ‘Offence’ wrested the initiative through enhanced ranges, precision, speed, cruise altitude, deception, unpredictable targeting and more significantly by adopting a sub-orbital ballistic trajectory with a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle payload containing several warheads, each capable of being aimed to hit a different target.

Approach to Ballistic Missile Defence: Effectiveness

While the debate on whether or not India should test and deploy ballistic missile defences (BMD) is now largely settled, the important question of how effective such systems are likely to be remains ‘iffy’. The answer to this question depends on considerations such as type of defence, characteristics of the attacking missile, desired kill probability, standards for measure of success and lastly the economics of induction which will determine how secure and gapless coverage can be achieved.

Indian backers of BMD argue that trials have already proven the system to be effective. Critics, however, maintain that these trials are too few, unrealistic and structured-for- success; contention being that they do not in any way attempt to mimic the ‘fog’ and unpredictability that generally envelopes operational situations which will eventually have a bearing on measure of effectiveness. The quandary is that there is not enough empirical data to arrive at an objective assessment.

Given the contrapositions in the debate, it is necessary first to understand the features of a ballistic trajectory in order to discern opportunities available to the Defence.

The Ballistic Trajectory and State of Play

Assuming the missile’s range is long enough that it leaves the atmosphere; a ballistic missile’s trajectory is typically divided into three phases.  First, the boost phase, when the missile is under powered flight using its rocket booster.  Second, the midcourse glide, in which the missile coasts on a ballistic trajectory through outer space.  Third, the terminal phase, in which the missile or warheads re-enters the atmosphere and plunge towards its target at hypersonic speeds.  Each phase presents different options and problems for the Defence.

Hard-kill systems (measures that physically counterattack an incoming missile destroying/altering path of  its warhead) that operate within the atmosphere or above it such as the U.S. Army’s Patriot system, the U.S. Navy’s Aegis system, the Russian S-400 system and indeed the Indian BMD, a double-tiered system consisting of two land and sea-based interceptor missiles, namely the Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile for lower altitude interception. All these systems use radar for guidance and homing and most are equipped with high-explosive warheads while some use kinetic impact for destruction of the incoming missile. Aero-dynamic forces enable interceptor manoeuvring and “atmospheric filtering” resolve ambiguity posed by countermeasures.  In the 1991 Gulf War, the Patriot or PAC-2 interceptor missiles, reportedly, attempted to intercept 44 Iraqi Scud ballistic missiles. The U.S. Army by their own estimates (which varies wildly), claimed kill percentage of about 61%. However, technical analyses suggest that the actual intercept rate was nearer to zero. In the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. Army fielded the improved PAC3 BMD, evidence is mixed on whether the system actually performed since there had reportedly, been only two “kills” in seven launches.

Boost-Phase Interception

Boost-phase interception attempts to destroy missiles while they are still in powered flight.  This mode of defence, in concept, could use hard-kill interceptors, or beam weapons such as lasers.  Boost-phase defences have some significant advantages over midcourse or terminal interception. Importantly, destroying a missile during boost eliminates all of its warheads and therefore is most appropriate against missiles equipped with multiple warheads. In addition, the problem of countermeasures appears to be much less severe for boost-phase interceptors than it is in midcourse or terminal phase engagements. The difficulty facing boost-phase defence is, time for engagement that the hostile missile offers which at most is a few minutes; suggesting that a boost-phase interceptor be located relatively close to the attacking missile launch site. This consideration become critical when it comes to neutralising short ambit ballistic missiles which by virtue of limited range may have to be deployed in the tactical battle area such as Pakistan’s Nasr or their Hatf 1 and Hatf 2, missiles. The launch vehicle could be eliminated prior to missile launch by precision guided munitions or air to surface missiles.

Midcourse Interceptors

Long-range midcourse defence operates above the atmosphere (exo-atmospheric) and refers to that part of the target’s trajectory after its booster rocket has burned out but before it begins to re-enter the atmosphere. It aims at direct collision homing techniques during target travel through space.    Midcourse interception in principle provides wide area defence. At the same time exo-atmospheric mode of operation makes the Defence potentially vulnerable to a variety of countermeasures. A primary objective of such defences is countering nuclear-armed missiles. Very few nations have proven the efficacy of midcourse interceptors, for the real issue is not its theoretical viability or how well it works on a test range, but its operational effectiveness – that is, how well they can be expected to work given unpredictable circumstances in an environment where countermeasures are deployed. Unfortunately, very little open source information is available on the matter.

The Russian S-400 system would appear to have captured the wide area midcourse BMD market for reasons of effectiveness and economy. Its closest rival is the American Patriot PAC3; both systems claim a dual capability of shooting down aircraft and providing BMD. It would now help our analysis if consideration is given to the known attributes of the two systems. A comparison of technical parameters indicate that the S-400 can shoot down targets moving at a speed of 17 km/sec while the PAC-3 limit of target speed is 8 km/sec; in terms of simultaneous tracking and engagement the S-400 can track 160 targets and engage  72 targets simultaneously while the PAC3 can track125 and engage 36. Maximum tracking range for the S-400 is 600 km and kill range is 400 km while the PAC3 tracking and engagement range is far less at 180kms and 100kms respectively. The S-400’ altitude aperture is from a low of 10 metres to a high of 30 km while the Patriot’s altitude bracket is between 50 metres and 25 km. To achieve a kill probability of not less than 0.99, the S-400 will have to launch a salvo of 2 missiles while the Patriot, 3 missiles. It would now be apparent that in all vital attributes the S-400 outperforms the PAC3. Also, it is interesting to note that the Russian system has the capability to detect stealth aircrafts such as the US F-35 and Chinese J-20 which are characterized by a low radar signature. Five squadrons of the S-400 system are expected to be inducted into India’s inventory by 2020 at a cost of $ 5.43 billion.

India’s Rough Nuclearized Neighbourhood

A nuclear deterrent relationship is founded entirely on rationality. On the part of the ‘deteree’ there is rationality in the conviction of disproportionate risks of hostile action; and on the part of the deterrer rationality of purpose and transparency in confirming the reality of the risks involved in a manner that strategic miscalculations are avoided . The exceptional feature of this transaction is that the roles are reversible provided it is in the common interest to maintain stability in relationship. The rub when dealing with Pakistan is that political leadership is a charade that masks the real manipulators of power: the military establishment, who, as a rule do not expose themselves to diplomatic parleys and the tedium of negotiations.

India’s neighbourhood in nuclear security terms is significant for the two nuclear armed neighbours that quarter its Northern and Western borders. Both inimical to its interests; the former Machiavellian in its security relationship while the latter out-and-out pernicious and perhaps more alarmingly a nuclear surrogate whose arsenal and doctrine have been devised, tested and phrased in Beijing.

In all but two doctrinal precepts there does not appear to be great divergence between China’s and India’s Nuclear Doctrine. Where China deviates is on the subject of ‘the demonstration’ and ‘doctrinal dynamism.’ The former suggests, in the abstract, that nuclear weapons would be used, if credibility is ever questioned. This usage may not be against vital targets and yet will leave no doubts of intentions. While the latter opens up the nature of their alliances. In this frame of reference, the scripting of the Pakistan nuclear capability, transfer of nuclear technologies, developing their strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal, setting up of the Khushab I to IV weapon grade plutonium production reactors and the emergence of a first-strike capability becomes significant.

Thus, China’s doctrinal dynamism potentially permits a Janus-faced policy – the one that it presents to the world at large is that of the No-First-Use (NFU), minimalistic, rigid, restrained nuclear power while the other is to retain the First Use alternative through the Pakistan arsenal. This policy has placed nuclear force planners in a quandary; not to respond is to open India to a possible degradation of their Second Strike capability. China moulding Pakistan’s nuclear First Use facility, forgets the fact of an enfeebled Pakistan civilian leadership incapable of action to remove the military finger from the nuclear trigger; the active involvement of UN designated terrorists in military strategy and an alarming posture of an intention-to-use; all have the makings of a global nuclear nightmare.

Given the opacity of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear underpinnings, descent to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) and duplicity of policies, it has become increasingly prickly for India to either understand nuclear thinking in Islamabad or to find coherence between a mania for parity, the rush for stockpiling fissile material and the loosening of controls over nuclear weapons. More puzzling is the notion that the conventional imbalance between the two countries may be countered by Pakistan introducing TNWs as “another layer of deterrence” (ala NATO’s discredited formulation). Clearly in this strategic framework, the generation of India’s BMD cannot come as a surprise to any pundit of nuclear security.

The Indian BMD

India is in the advanced stage of developing and deploying a multi-tiered BMD system designed to achieve exo-atmospheric interception of short, intermediate, and intercontinental range ballistic missiles during midcourse flight interfaced with an endo-atmospheric hit-to-kill interceptor. The system consists of a two stage, solid propellant Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) missile in tandem with the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for high and low altitude interception, respectively. The PDV intercepts ballistic missiles at exo-atmospheric altitudes up to 150kms while the AAD missile achieves endo-atmospheric engagement within an altitude envelope of 15mtrs-30kms. The AAD is also effective against cruise missiles and short range ballistic missiles. The system is interfaced to a long range phased array tracking radar (Swordfish) which provides gapless surveillance up to 1500kms. The deployed system would consist of several launch vehicles, radars, Launch Control Centres grouped under a Mission Control Centre. All these are geographically distributed and connected by a secure communication network

The Russian S-400 Triumf BMD system to be inducted by India beginning 2020 (operational parameters discussed in some detail earlier) when married and deployed with existing endo-atmospheric systems such as the AAD or Barak 8 (joint Indo-Israeli production), will provide significant strategic performance upgrade to India’s BMD capability. Particularly in the face of China’s intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles of the JL2 and DF31A type; Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal of medium range ballistic missiles such as the ‘Ababeel’, cruise missiles such as the ‘Babur’ and tactical ballistic missiles of the ‘Nasr’ type. While capability to neutralise the ballistic missile threat from both India’s nuclear neighbours is credible, what may be questioned is the economics of the matter and how selective or otherwise can India be in providing BMD cover to counter force and counter value targets.

Impact on Deterrence

The point at issue that planners will raise is: in what manner does the Indian BMD serve the cause of deterrence? Cold-war theology that drove the bi-polar deterrent relationship between USA and the USSR hinged on an axiomatic logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and the strategic rationality (that both protagonists subscribed to) which provoked ‘predictable behaviour.’ Thus, in that era, the BMD became a de-stabilizing factor as it undermined the shared hostage situation that was central to MAD. Also, it set into motion dynamics for modernising and enlarging nuclear arsenals. It is in this sensibility that the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty of 1972 was considered ‘the bedrock of strategic nuclear stability.’

Answers may be found in the changing shape of geopolitics at the turn of the 21st century that not only fractured the former bi-polar equilibrium to multi-polar uncertainties, but also introduced reprobate nuclear armed states into the milieu, some of whom are not so readily convinced of the logic of MAD or the strategic rationality of ‘predictable behaviour.’ Pakistan finds itself in this category. The deterrence of such states poses a dilemma never faced before, for reasons of their often repeated capricious nuclear threats and intent-to-use policy, decentralized control of TNWs and their military strategy that finds unity with terrorists; all of which places pressures on states with stable and reposeful nuclear doctrines such as India. Consequently, for India, deterrence is not just a function of strategic rationality but, of persistent emphasis on credibility of the power to deny and the immense and exacting shock of response. It is to further this precept that the Indian BMD finds expression.

 

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Uranium constraints in Pakistan: How many nuclear weapons does Pakistan have?

A guest post by:

Lalitha Sundaresan* and Kaveri Ashok

This article was first published in CURRENT SCIENCE, VOL. 115, NO. 6, 25 SEPTEMBER 2018.

For full text click Current Science Paper Print Version

Abstract

Uranium constraints in Pakistan: how many nuclear weapons does Pakistan have? Lalitha Sundaresan* and Kaveri Ashok It is generally accepted that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme relies on domestic supplies of uranium. Although constraints on uranium supply in Pakistan are recognized, this is often not taken into account when estimating the amount of fissile material that Pakistan may have produced. In simple words, most assessments of Pakistan’s fissile materials and arsenal size fail to look at the supply and demand situations in Pakistan in an integrated way. This paper attempts to rectify this lacuna by taking a combined look at the supply and demand situations for uranium in Pakistan. It specifically addresses issues of how shortages in supply or increases in demand will affect the allocation of available uranium resources for meeting various military and civilian needs.

For full text click Current Science Paper Print Version

*Lalitha Sundaresan is in the National Institute of Advanced Studies, IISc Campus, Bengaluru 560 012, India and Kaveri Ashok is in the Center for Science, Technology and Policy, Bengaluru 560 094, India. For correspondence e-mail: sundaresan.lalitha@nias.res.in

Deen Aaya*

(*Religion Cometh; the Anthem of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan)

by

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

(Article published in the authors column “The Strategist” on the IPCS website, available at the following link http://ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5516)

The impact of organised religion on nations has historically been a sense of contrived significance, but in essence has neither refined society nor elevated power status. In the case of civilizational encounters, the vanquished looked backwards for spiritual succour while succumbing to the influences of the aggressor; in the process dogmas and rituals replaced inventiveness, as the spirit that propelled development calcified (Toynbee, 1957). This state is symptomatic of a society in the throes of derangement. A failed response to the challenges of plurality and vigour of competing belief systems is thus marked by religious masquerade and a despairing choice inspired by fundamental ideologies. In the past the Egyptiac world, Judaism and Christianity have succumbed to this fanatic impulse. Early Islam was spiritually tolerant of civilizations that it considered allied to as ‘People of the Book.’ It is no coincidence that this very period saw Islamic civilization flourish. Contemporary political Islamic movements are, however, marked by failed responses; the more radical, the more unforgiving towards the idea of plurality and renewal.

In the recently concluded elections to the Pakistan National Assembly the Tehreek-i-Labbaik (TLP) polled nearly two and a quarter million votes (Election Commission of Pakistan) making it the fifth largest political party in that country. While this may not have readily translated to seats in the National Assembly, what it stands for is “street power” of the radical Islam variety. Regaling the event their chief, Allama Khadim Husain Rizvi narrated a grisly electoral episode from Nawabshah, a district in Sindh. “We were singing our anthem Deen Aaya, when the Peoples Party (PPP) camp started playing their electioneering jingles; We asked them to stop because our hymn was in veneration of Allah, but their leader spurned our entreaty. Imagine Allah’s wrath, for that very night the PPP leader breathed his last. The next morning it was God’s will that all of the PPP followers switched their loyalty to the TLP!”

TLP shot to prominence when it opposed the 2016 hanging of Mumtaz Qadri, convicted in 2011 of assassinating the Governor of Pakistan’s Punjab province. Born in 1966 in Attock  Punjab,  Rizvi a self-acclaimed Barelvi cleric, was in government in the department of religious affairs, the auqaf . He was soon removed for radical activism. A paraplegic, he became deeply involved in organising public support for harsher and more invasive blasphemy laws. In November 2017 his siege of Islamabad for this cause paralysed the Capital for over three weeks. The Government and its law enforcement agencies made an abortive attempt to curb the mayhem but only succeeded in spreading protests to all the major cities. It was the Army Chief’s personal intervention that defused the situation with the offer of unconditional capitulation of the State to more severe blasphemy laws, sacking of Federal minister for law Zahid Hamid and the release of all prisoners taken. The siege of Islamabad was lifted. Allama Khadim Husain Rizvi had arrived; it is reported with a “little” help from the army.

Karachi was a distant frontier for the TLP whose home grounds were the radical madrassas of South Punjab (Bhawalpur, Multan, Mianwali, Dera Ghazi Khan etc.) Their electoral gains in Karachi owed largely to pulpit intimidation, violence and menacing politics. The city, latterly dominated by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) represents Pakistan’s Urdu-speaking mohajir, immigrant community. The odious “mohajir” moniker was dropped from its name and replaced by the less unpalatable Muttahida (United). The MQM is known for its muscular methods in Karachi, it had in the past controlled the vote in the inner city and its immediate urban enclaves through a grid that organized the city’s underworld. Aided by the Army, the TLP broke up these networks. The mosque became the platform from where the message of redemption was hammered home, in a manner and scale, not seen since the call for jihad to fight the American invasion of Afghanistan. The argument now was that since people of Karachi had committed crime and violence for mortal reasons, atonement in the eyes of God was only possible if these same people took up Allah’s cause by volunteering their time and labour for the TLP. An irreverent ‘Anschluss’ between the deep state, piety and politics now paved the way for electoral success of the Army’s willing protégé, Imran and his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf .

Central to the strategy was infusing politics with ritual, a messianic propagation of the Barelvi belief system and of the TLP’s near-prophet-like-paraplegic-leader and his ‘mystical’ powers over followers.  The irony is that of the two Sunni sects, the Barelvi was seen as the more reticent and less prone to militancy than the orthodox Salafist-driven Deobandis. Meanwhile, the legend of how deen has managed to purify and chasten non-believers flourishes despite being in mortal conflict with what makes for a democratic state. The question at the core is what makes Pakistan more susceptible to ideological blackmail from such extreme shades of the religious right?

Ideological blackmail is prevalent when a myth of Islam-in-danger becomes the testament. To fully appreciate this phenomenon one goes back in recent history to Partition. The disproportionate security apparatus that Pakistan inherited and the communal basis of award (33% of the military as opposed to 18% demography, 23% landmass and 18% of financial assets) fueled the idea that communal hatred and perpetual hostility towards India was innate to the separation of the Muslim nation. Also, an army under the banner of Islam was an imperative to forge unity and guard both ideological and geographic frontiers of the fledgling State. That the concept not only gained salience but is also an abiding characteristic of the strategic culture that the Army has carefully nurtured is today the idea of Pakistan.

         And in August 2018, when the Dutch politician, Geert Wilders comes along and announces that he would hold a Prophet Mohammed cartoon contest that was a thinly veiled attempt to attack and provoke one of Wilders’ favourite whipping-boys, Islam; the TLP seized the opportunity to once again show its strength. On cue, lakhs of TLP supporters made their way to Islamabad to demand Pakistan sever diplomatic ties with the Netherlands or face a repeat of the siege of the capital. Why did Wilders call off the contest? It could not have been for economic reasons since GDP of the Netherlands at $830 billion is almost threefold of Pakistan’s; while bi-lateral trade is less than $1.2b, nor could it be any influence that Islamabad wields for they have little of that (there was of course the threat of Jihadi violence). The probable cause for cancellation was perhaps the fragile situation in Afghanistan which James Mattis explained as “co-existence of violence and progress” against a backdrop of stability. President Ashraf Ghani was less cryptic when he offered an unconditional peace proposal to the Taliban; a ceasefire, recognition of the Taliban, elections afresh and a constitutional review. Any disruption of this process, in US perspective, may have provided space for exceptionable Chinese and Russian interference. So it could be that it was the US that reined-in Wilders. At any rate the cancellation served to enhance Khadim Rizvi’s notional power across continents and the reality that his ideas found resonance with leaders and elites in mainstream political parties. That this has happened raises the question how close to being an extremist state is Pakistan?

            And as we ponder the question of how-close-indeed; comes Deen and the news that the Pakistan Supreme Court has sacked Atif Mian, a Princeton economist from the PM’s Economic Advisory Council for being an Ahmadi and in quick succession lifted the international ban on the terror proscribed Hafeez Sayeed’s outfit the Jamaat ud Dawa.