Category Archives: Non-State Actors

The Mantri, the Mercenary and Military Leadership

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Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

(Published in the IPCS web journal in my column the Strategist available at http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5859)

Imbalance in Politico-Military Affairs

The First World War, within four months of its ill-conceived purpose, bungled to a bloody horrific grind on the Western Front. The Allies and their colonial armies had by that time suffered a million casualties. Britain’s 40-year-old First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill, believed he had the solution to the noxious massacre in the trenches. He fancied himself a military strategist, abandoning his earlier capricious plan to invade Germany from the Baltic Sea, he now championed opening a second front against Turkey, seize Istanbul and gain control of the Straits linking the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and Russia, thus, knocking the Ottoman out of the war which in turn would persuade all Balkan states to join the Allies. This fanciful chain of desired events was neither backed by any serious analysis nor did it enjoy the luxury of overwhelming superiority in theatre. Even an understanding of the operational realities of an amphibious assault of the magnitude envisaged, was lacking. As for strategic assumptions made, there were none and therefore review of operations and possible alternative courses of action were non-existent. The ensuing campaign was driven more by hopes and revulsion at the carnage on the Western Front.

The ill-fated Dardanelles-Campaign began on 19 February 1915. In the event not only was a bulk of the British and French fleet lost in the action but over 65,000 troops were slaughtered in the Campaign and the Allies routed in a grisly bloodbath.  Our ‘Strategist’ was guilty of grossly overestimating the capabilities of his own force and underestimating the complexity of amphibious operations. He, fatally, derided the motivation of the Turks defending their homeland. Churchill was sacked for incompetence.  

Grand Theory and the Operational Art

War, as Clausewitz postulated, was the use of military force to achieve political aims. However, modern militaries during the process of developing military plans in support of policy  are loathe to take risks that do not hold high the probability of success. This in turn leads to a skewed situation when unachievable policy aims are set out. And here lies the intrinsic antagonism that exists in politico-military affairs; when a military solution is a product of compromises, the outcome leaves political objectives sorely wanting. Quite obviously, when both polity and military leadership are combined in one authority, the blend makes for disastrous consequences.

Waging war requires institutions that can address problems that lie along the politico-military interface. Politicians need to listen to the military and take heed that the “sweep of an arm in a scything arc across the width of a small scale chart (map) spanning mountains, rivers and seas with little insight of own and enemy capabilities; the elements; force readiness; morale, logistics  or indeed outcomes – does not a strategic offensive make”. This stark statement is a reminder of the disastrous gap between grand theory and the operational art. Instances abound in history when a politician steered-approach led to strategic blunders; conduct of World War II by Hitler, America in Vietnam, the 20-year conflict in Afghanistan are recent examples of wars when politico-military balance  had gone awry. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 is of particular significance for not only were political policies with external-security ramifications made without military involvement, but leadership surrounded itself with pliable and incompetent defence advisors. So-much-so that when the crunch came, the Army was routed; the Navy remained within its havens; while the Air Force contemplated torching its forward deployed fighter aircrafts.

In the run-up to war, civilian leadership must not only have superior authority but also the sagacity to entertain alternate ideas that provide decision-avenues short of armed conflagration. And if the recourse to arms is advanced then it must never be terminal. After all War is a political tool and not an end; its effectiveness must be judged in a politico-diplomatic-strategic context.

Enter the Mercenary

Limited armed interventions, since the Second World War, have often demanded deployment of light forces over short duration with a feature of dubiety in identity of aggressor. In such circumstances mercenaries have been hired and deployed for circumscribed tasks under ‘hard- hold’. They conduct military operations in foreign conflict zones to bring about a desired outcome. If the employer state fails to achieve the desired end, then…the event is denied. These delinquent methods, in this day and age, are not only internationally condemnable but also run the risk of starting an unintended and uncontrolled war.

There is no expert consensus on who exactly is a “mercenary.” Those in the industry, their clients, and some outside experts spurn the “M” word owing to the associated stigma, and give these private-sector fighters new labels: private military contractors, military service providers and even operational contractors. Since the re-emergence of this new ‘sham warrior’ class in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and elsewhere in the African continent one is at a loss to explain their purpose and efficacy in war, irrespective of the opposition or the perceived outcome.

The deployment of a mixture of conscription and mercenary services in the Russian military dates back to at least the 18th century (Parit, Makers of Modern Strategy, p 356) with a view to  ‘stiffen-the-spine’ of a poorly  motivated serf army. However, by the 20th century the idea of brutal press-ganged armies backed by a core of mercenaries gave way to professional and career oriented armies from the citizenry. The national military was subject to international accountability.

The Curious Case of the Wagner Group

The “Wagner Group” must be seen as a new phenomenon, primarily because their control or lack of it defies any formal structure, their mass is that of a regular army (reportedly, 50,000 strong) but allegiance questionable. Clearly the Wagner is more on the lines of a “have-army-will-travel”. The Group, a private Russian military company set-up in 2014 on terms that remain unknown, is led by its co-founder Mr Yevgeny Prigozhin a businessman, reportedly with connections and ambitions. Till recently tasked with fighting Kremlin’s land-war in the Donbas theatre of East Ukraine the Group had indefinite yet conditional access to the Russian military infrastructure. Enigmatic in concept and cloaked in a purpose that remains nebulous; it’s Command and Control structure remains utterly confused. What is clear is that relations between the Russian military and the Wagner is a tenuous one with exclusive control emanating from the highest political circle in the Kremlin (this inference comes in the wake of the manner in which their mutiny ended in a fizzle).

Despite its ambiguous existence, the Group has operated around the globe, from Syria to the Central African Republic; Nigeria and in West Asia in furtherance of Russia’s foreign policy and commercial objectives. Its commission includes clandestine armed missions and subversion; toppling ‘irksome’ regimes and security to private business interests. The group maintains close ties to the country’s intelligence services and it is probable that they work in tandem with the SVR (Sluzhba Vneshni Razvedkii) the Russian external spy agency. As for its legal status it obviously was created with the intrinsic capability to operate on the fringes of the constraints of the International Law of War.

The mutinous failure of the Group in eastern Ukraine, in particular in the Bakhmut sector, must have caused a total re-think of the employment of such an ill-disciplined army when pitted against a well-trained and motivated Ukrainian force. Most abidingly ludicrous was the rebellious media image of Mr Prigozhin, fully outfitted in an undersized combat helmet, bulging out of the seams of his bullet proof jacket fulminating over the lack of equipment and logistics that the Russian State had promised him to wage the land war. It spoke volumes of the motivation of a mercenary militia to fight.

Military Judgement and Leadership

Constitutional authority of the Supreme Commander will always be vested in civilian hands (in democracies), it is a matter of how this authority is made too pervasive and often assumed by agents below in the political hierarchy. Such armchair strategists are shielded from the professional simply because the latter is officially prohibited from entering into a public debate; leaving military leadership often saddled with half-baked strategic decisions, driven by “hopes, fears and ambitions” rather than by experience and seasoned judgement.

Prerogatives and duties of a political office in charge of the military must not enter the domain of “military judgement” where knowledge and motivations are at play; both assuredly a product of experience. Political savvy must essentially discern the line between strategic direction and the extent to which military means can aid in achieving that purpose. While, of the military leader, it is objectivity that is demanded; whether in pursuit of a strategic goal, attaining a desired posture, or indeed in weapons and platform selection. Military leadership first studies the nature of the threatening armed conflict and then seeks to rationalise an operational strategy that optimises means with effectiveness across the spectrum of warfare.

Chilling Trend of our Times

Modern strategic thought has no logic or grammar that gives description to private wars. The mercenary fights for any state or nation without regard to political interests, cause or even outcome…as long as the wages are good. The return of the mercenary and his access to the highest bidder; be he a politician, oligarch or a multinational corporation is one of the most dangerous and unpredictable trends of our times. Today, when the Mantri is engulfed by arm-chair strategists and ‘think-tanks’ preaching the need for interventions that invite low intensity “less-than-military” operations, the implications of a market for armed forces in global affairs is most perilous. For in an unregulated situation, the means of waging war being extended to entities that can afford-it, spells  anarchy to global order.

Epilogue :The Russian Mercenary Chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin was reportedly killed in a mid air crash on 23 August 2023. Prigozhin had led a brief armed mutiny against the Russian State earlier this year. The plane, a private “Embraer Legacy 600” crashed north of Moscow killing all 10 people on board.

No Responsible Steward of Nuclear Weapons This

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By Vice Admiral (retd.) Vijay Shankar

Two seemingly disparate incidents in recent days hold the portents for unsettling times. The first was, the “absconder General” and erstwhile Pakistan President Musharraf’s declaration on 05 December 2017, of not only his cosy ties with the proscribed head of the terror organisation Lashkar-e-Tayyeba (LeT) Hafiz Sayeed; but more worrisome, the open invitation to the latter’s political party the Milli Muslim League to join Musharraf’s Pakistan Awami Ittehad (PAI). The second incident is, President Trump while launching his administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS), asserted, “Pakistan must demonstrate it is a responsible steward of its nuclear assets… while taking decisive action against terrorist groups operating on their territory.” The NSS, it will be remembered provides strategic guidance to US security agencies for developing policies and implementing them.

Rationally, no nuclear policy, by nature of the weapon involved, can conceivably be inclusive of terror groups. And yet the strategic predicament posed by Pakistan is perverse, for their policy on select terror groups such as the LeT has always been that they are instruments of state policy. The absurd reason proffered is their zeal to fight the external enemies of Pakistan while undermining fissiparous religious elements within.

The question now remains: when militants fundamentally inimical to the Indian State (Israel and the US too) shed the need for subterfuge and quite openly enter Pakistan national politics, is “responsible nuclear stewardship” a prospect at all? Rather, does not this new dimension of political cosiness make for a nuclear nightmare, where an opaque nuclear arsenal under military control is guided by a strategy that not only finds unity with state licensed terror groups but has now unveiled a future for terrorists in politics? Indeed the nuclear nightmare has moved that much closer.

Now, consider this: Pakistan promotes a terrorist strike in India and in order to counter conventional retaliation uses tactical nuclear weapons and then in order to degrade nuclear retaliation launches a full blown counter-force or counter- value strike. This is an awkward but realistic recognition of the logic that drives Pakistan’s nuclear policy.

Cyril Almeida, a columnist for the Dawn newspaper commenting on the reason why the army will not clampdown on terror groups that hurt India suggested that the problem was “the boys (meaning the army) wouldn’t agree, you could see why: you can’t squeeze your asset at the behest of the enemy the asset was recruited to fight against.”

What if the political mainstreaming of jihadists enlarges and gains nation wide acceptance and, while doing so, creates a state and movement largely motivated by fundamental politico-religious ideology? The Taliban and its five year rule in Afghanistan attempted precisely this and failed because a creed that sought a particular kind of Islamic revival through suppression of all else, was but a return to medievalism. A regime of this nature quite wontedly spewed elements that saw salvation only in the destruction of contemporary order. The image of Mullah Omar appearing on the roof of a building in Kandhar 1996 shrouded in the relic of “the Cloak of the Prophet Mohammed,” while other mullahs proclaimed him Amir-ul Momineen the Commander of the Faithful, will remain a watershed moment for the ideology. It placed in perspective the unquestionable authority of the Amir as the people’s voice was made increasingly irreconcilable with Sharia, as was regard for human rights and the rule of law. In this ‘divinely ordained’ disposition, the savage destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas as symbol of an end to idolatry, came as no surprise. As events unfolded it also brought to the fore how modernity and the political mainstreaming of jihadists is a doomed enterprise.

And what of “responsible stewardship” of nuclear assets? We have thus far argued the hazards of a political future for terrorists in Pakistan. In this reality, given access to a nuclear arsenal, do we not perceive its utilisation to prosecute jihadi objectives? The Pakistan military hardly minces its words on the use of jihadists and the latter’s correlation with their nuclear policy (Pakistan Army Green Book 2004-2015). And what is the Pakistan sponsored terror objective other than to weaken the secular fabric of the Indian state, subvert society and to bring about enabling conditions for secession of Kashmir. It is not a coincidence that these very same objectives find recurring mention in the strategic aims of the military in Pakistan.

In the nine years after 26/11, terror attacks in India originating from across its western borders persist, however with a difference that principal control from Pakistan has devolved to decentralised and often scattered control. Targets are relatively less sensational, albeit these attacks are executed with no less brutality or with diminished politically motivation. Musharraf’s invitation for militant groups such as the LeT to join the political mainstream in Pakistan will have changed all that for the worse.

Pakistan, decidedly, has legitimate security interests, but when these interests are revisionist in nature, be it an aggressive quest for strategic depth in Afghanistan or attempting to destabilise India through the use of state sponsored terrorists or even to suggest that there is a nuclear dimension to these dynamics is to plead a stimulus much deeper than a politico-ideological pledge. For to challenge India or, in Afghanistan, the United States, is to withdraw from what makes for contemporary order. What is emerging and must be recognized is that with Pakistan there is a virulence that ought not to be allowed to thrive under the duplicitous belief that it can be both legatee of international largesse and continue to cavort with jihadists.

 

 

 

 

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Aberrated Strategies: of “Snakes in the Backyard”

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Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

In the immediate aftermath of the 26/11 terrorist assault on Mumbai a grisly prayer was being intoned in many of the two lakh mosques of Pakistan. The Qunut-e-Nazla, prayer in times of war was accompanied by a fervent imprecation that Al-Qaeda and the Pakistan Army fight India jointly. The verity of this statement is borne out by Azaz Syed in his recently published ‘tell-all’ book Secrets of Pakistan’s War on Al-Qaeda (Al-Abbas International: 2014, p.69); the aim of the linkage was the creation of an Al-Qaeda State in Pakistan in the wake of a nuclear war between India and Pakistan.

The link between sub-conventional warfare and nuclear war fighting is at best a tenuous one. Conceptually no nuclear policy, by the very nature of the weapon involved, can conceivably be inclusive of terror groups. And yet the strategic predicament posed by Pakistan is perverse, for their stratagem on select terror groups is that they are instruments of state policy. Now, consider this: Pakistan promotes a terrorist strike in India and in order to counter conventional retaliation uses tactical nuclear weapons and then in order to degrade massive retaliation launches a full blown counter force or counter value strike. This extreme chain of events would suggest the reality of a self fulfilling logic of nuclear apocalypse.

A Pakistan, controlled by a military-ISI-jihadi combine, is plagued by an obsession for parity with India and an inspiration that wallows in the idea of India as a threat in perpetuity (in great part to provide a reason for the army’s pretentious existence). One is spoilt for choice when discerning instances of Pakistan’s military-intelligence links with terrorist groups: it began at partition when tribal lashkars along with regulars invaded Kashmir; the clumsy and doomed Operation Gibraltar in 1965; State-sponsored insurgencies in the Kashmir valley during the 1980s and 90s; war following invasion of Kargil in 1999; failed attack on the Indian Parliament; the Kaluchak massacre of 2002; Mumbai assault of November 2008; and the continuing low level insurgency across the LOC, the latest manifestation of which was the failed assault on the Pathankot airbase on 02 January 2016, coordinated with the failed attack on the Indian consulate at Maza-e-Sharif in Afghanistan on 03 January 2016.

For India to suffer the violent effects of covert action in silence makes for poor internal as well as external policy. It is here that Pakistan will have to pay for Indian restraint (now frayed to the extreme), which in turn places before the Indian planner a host of considerations and a set of possible responses which includes covert action against targets across the LOC or border known to have liaison with jihadi forces. Planners will do well to heed that it is Pakistan’s policy that has to be targeted; more specifically it is control of that nation by the ‘Deep State,’  by which is implied the sway of the military-intelligence-jihadi combine, which must be subordinated.

Recently, the author engaged US Secretary of State Kerry’s International Security Advisory Board (on Strategic Stability chaired by Dr. Raymond Jeanloz) in dialogue on sub-continental strategic stability. During the deliberations which began with a thirty minute presentation by the author followed by an hour and a half discussion with the group, two issues became apparent. First, the State Department group was split down the centre as to what defined strategic stability. The proposition on one side was the cold war paradigm that perceived stability through the ‘nuclear equilibrium’ prism; of survival through a nuclear first strike and then retaliating massively. A mirrored rationality of survivability and credibility of retaliation was of essence. The equilibrium between nuclear weapon states, from this perspective, was given surety by developing a nuclear war fighting capability and retaining a ‘limited nuclear option’ at hair-trigger notice to control the escalatory ladder. This “Strangelovesque” advocacy appeared to disregard the fact that limits on use of nuclear weapons (by the nature of the weapon) defied escalatory control. Second, the group also perceived the potential of terrorists being armed with nuclear devices justifying collaboration with Pakistan at any cost; this presented a strategic irony since it was the Pakistan Deep State that made terror groups an instrument of state policy in the first place

On the other side of the divide was the group that saw, in the contracting role of the US in Afghanistan, diminishing utility of Pakistan. The sense that emerged was the need for strategic recalibration of their Pakistan policy. A common discernment in this group was that time had come to contend with the deep state in Pakistan for its’ duplicity throughout America’s war on terror beginning with the evacuation of jihadis at Kunduz, providing a haven for the al Qaeda, giving vital intelligence to the various terror organisations, screening the AQ Khan network or indeed, providing sanctuary to Osama bin Laden. This group also found definition in a holistic analysis of the various determinants that contributed to strategic stability (in line with the authors presentation). The determinants ranged from historical wholeness to geographic recognition; politico-social-religio conformity to economic friction; purpose and adequacy of military power to the quest for a stasis and lastly the correlation between leadership. The question then reduced to what manner, intensity and degree did the interplay of determinants influence interstate relationship? While it was generally accepted that transactions between determinants could either spell a proclivity towards a symbiotic approach in relations or it could persistently precipitate friction and conflict; in both cases the basis of outcomes were largely predicated on discernability and rationality of both polity and leadership.

Unfortunately, the South Asian context is blurred by three contumacious factors. First, Pakistan’s cultivated reluctance to accept the anthropological reality of their identity as sub-continental Muslims, the preferred fiction is in favour of Arab or central Asian descent rather than the truth of the vast majority being descendants of converts; this poses a unique dilemma when leveraging civilizational empathy as the basis of amity. Second, military power without political accountability is views itself as the sacred keeper and absolute champion of national interests; this presents an awkward predicament as to who is in charge when dealing with that State. But the most impious obstacle promoted by the deep state is its one track agenda of hostility towards India as the basis of its ascendancy. After all, if the question is put to the Pakistan establishment whether they accept a regime of strategic stability, the answer will most certainly be in the affirmative with the caveat that control of the nation remain in the hands of the military-intelligence-jihadist nexus.

The strategic nuclear ‘self fulfilling logic’ mentioned earlier cannot be the basis of doing business with Pakistan. For far too long the world, particularly the US, has taken an ambiguous and at times set double standards for terror groups and their sponsors. What needs to be recognised is that terrorism emanating from Pakistan is, unequivocally a global scourge; no other interests can justify their continuation; for as former US secretary of state Hilary Clinton famously put it Islamabad could not keep “snakes” in its backyard to strike its neighbours. “It’s like that old story – you can’t keep snakes in your backyard and expect them only to bite your neighbours. Eventually those snakes are going to turn on whoever has them in the backyard.” The establishment that promotes it as an instrument of State policy must be targeted internationally through exacting sanctions while the perpetrators of terror along with their handlers and infra structure must be struck by covert military action.