Strategic Maritime Challenge of China: To Steer the Stream of Time


Vice Admiral (retd.) Vijay Shankar 

This article is forthcoming in the December issue of Geopolitics

The Language of War

Within an international system that hovers between a facade of order and anarchy, differentiated pace of growth in national power among states engenders rivalry over access to resources, control of technology, flow of commerce and entry to markets; resulting in friction amongst competitors and making  the threat of armed conflict  a reality (Mackinder). At the same time, abstractions of national honour, prestige and other national interests that separate the state from its citizenry are often at odds with the violence of, as Clausewitz so brilliantly put it, the “Language” of War. Experience of the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Bangladesh and of the other conflicts of the second half of the twentieth century will suggest that perceptions of the people, that come face-to-face with the “language” of war, prevail. Add to this the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with their intrinsic menace of ending political purpose and we have the coming of indirect, relatively scaled down version of conventional wars albeit with high destructive potential fought in the penumbric shadows of a nuclear holocaust.

Verge Powers

The targeting of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs in August 1945 marked a watershed in the history of warfare, for it placed in doubt viability of the human race should a war with atomic weaponry ever be fought (Kennedy, Paul). And as the decades that followed witnessed  transformation in the ebb and flow of national power, former great powers such as Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Japan gave way to the rise of the Soviet Union, a military giant  economically deprived and unbalanced; and the United States of America. The surge in the latter’s economy due wartime production and expenditure was of a magnitude near 100% in GDP. While a bi-polar world had arrived, it was abundantly clear that there was only one economic super power. For in a matter of less than half a century the grinding politico-socio-military confrontation (not forgetting the ever-so frequent nuclear brinkmanship) left a fragmented and exhausted USSR vanquished by the ‘cold war’ it’s national power in tatters while it’s relegation to the ranks of the second rate seriously dented Rodina-ma (mother Russia’s) pride.

What is emerging today is a fluctuating plurality of on-the-verge-great powers. These Verge Powers are counselled at times and coerced at others, by the lone super power, the USA. In this setting the United States retains dominant influence over its European and Pacific allies, but finds itself in confrontation with China and Russia; while Germany, Japan, Australia and India; also Verge Powers, find an intuitive affinity towards the democratic covey led by America.

Power Transformations: Familiar Cadence

There is empirical evidence to suggest that the global economic crisis of the 1930s that in part set off the Second World War was at conclusion responsible for thrusting the US into astonishingly favourable strategic circumstances. This situation not only triggered the Cold War but ultimately in the late 1980s, forced the melt-down of the Soviet empire and set into motion another fall and rise in global power structure. The characteristics of the economic crisis of the thirties ring a cadence now familiar to contemporary conditions – discontent at the biases that govern international economic systems, protectionism, unfair trade practices, one-sided competition, restricted access to resources, creation of proprietary mercantile routes and nationalistic policies; all in contradiction to the demands of an increasingly globalised and networked world.

And those that subscribe to the belief that nations having had their fill of globally ruinous violence cannot be so irrational as to embark on power politics that increase the probabilities of more devastating wars, have only to study the strategic trends of the last three decades of the post-Cold War era to determine that power transformations will continue to occur and as long as it transpires within an international order that is influenced by uneven growth and shrinking natural resources, the quest for power will invariably be linked to the generation of military capabilities that can secure this mechanism.

Challenges in the Maritime Domain

The maritime domain has not been sequestered from change. It is discernable by the disorderly expectations of Verge Powers and the increasing tensions between the demand for economic integration and the stresses of fractured political divisions. These nations are persistently confronted by the need to reconcile internal pressures with intrusive external impulses at a time when the economics of raw military power and its efficacy to engineer desired political outcomes is in question. While most of the Verge Powers have sought resolution and correctives within the framework of the existing international order, China and to some extent Russia are anomalies that have angled for and conspired to re-write the rule book. India’s primary challenge comes from China.

China’s rising comprehensive power has generated an internal impulse to military growth and unilateral expansionism in its immediate neighbourhood in the South and East China Seas and its extended regions of economic interests. It has developed and put in place strategies that target the maritime domain to assure a favourable outcome to what it perceives to be a strategic competition for resources and control of the seaways. The consequences of China activating artifices such as the Anti-Access and Area Denial strategy and geo-political manoeuvres to constitute proprietary sources of raw materials, their ports of dispatch and control of routes euphemistically called the maritime silk route and the establishing the String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean Region evokes increasing shared anxieties and resistance by players in the same strategic settings. Debt traps that have been set by China to inveigle some of the hapless littorals of the Indian Ocean of their maritime facilities are symptomatic of a new form of colonial adventures. The paradoxical effects of China’s contrivances are to undermine its own strategic standing, hasten counter balancing alignments and urge a global logic of cooperative politics over imperial strategies.

The Challenge of China

In the 18th century, China under the Qing dynasty enjoyed a golden age. It was a period of shengshi, an age of prosperity. Currently some Chinese nationalists say, thanks to the Communist Party and its economic prowess, another shengshi has arrived. Power, historically has changed the very character of nations as it transforms their outlook towards the world and places primacy to their beliefs and interests giving it new drive to shape global affairs in a manner that promotes their well-being. This search for geopolitical space that the emergence of a new revisionist power precipitates has been the cause for instability and tensions. Add to this that the principle of nationalism is inextricably linked, both in theory and practice, with war. We are, in the circumstance, faced with a situation when the military dimension of power will throw up conflicts. In this context the slogan of the Qing “the dream of a prosperous country and a strong army” has new connotations.

China’s most recent Defence White Paper and current strategic posture announces the arrival of a self-confident China recognizing its own growing economic and military prowess. It perceives the first two decades of this century of being a period of strategic opportunity which China has sought to capitalize on through its loaded economic policies, financial enticements, and military coercion. Beijing’s intended strategy of “a more active defence” places a premium on managing regional disputes, maritime combat preparedness and a thrust to attain first rate cyber warfare capability. At the same time, criticality of containment of various internal fissures that growth has precipitated remains on top of the agenda. Their posture significantly points out that struggles for cornering strategic resources, dominating geographically vital areas and tenanting strategic locations have, in fact, intensified. In this context the ‘one belt one road’ initiative provides the strategic sinews to their larger geopolitical ambitions. Control of proprietary maritime routes backed by vast economic investments in Africa, Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka South East and Central Asia furnishes the framework within which resources of the region could be cornered and secured. Beijing goes on to underscore Power as a natural currency for politics and suggests that portents for friction are ever present and would therefore necessitate military preparedness, modernization and an orientation that advocates strategic readiness.

China’s claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea; her territorial aggressiveness; her handling of dissent within Tibet and Sinkiang; her proliferatory carousing with maverick states such as North Korea and Pakistan are cases, amongst others, that do not inspire confidence in change occurring within that nation without turbulence. Progressively, China appears to be challenging not just today’s economic orthodoxy, but the world’s political and security framework as well without bringing about a change within her own political morphology.

Defining the Strategic Space

With uncertainty driving geopolitical dynamics, the first imperative for India is to bring about policy coherence between strategic space, growth and security interests. It begins by defining the geographical contours within which a strategy can be developed to contend with challenges identified. The broad parameters of this definition must factor in the regions from where trade originates, energy lines run, sea lines of communication pass, narrows therein and potential allies. In this context the sea space encompassing the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific provides the canvas. This Oceanic body is dominated by ten important choke points and narrows. In essence the theatre gives to global trade efficient maritime routes and sea lines of communication that power the region’s growth. It accounts for over 70% of global trade, 60% of energy flow and is home to more than 50% of the world’s population; it also provides the context within which Indian maritime strategy must operate.

Determinants of Force Planning

The quest for strategic leverage in the maritime domain is founded on an oceanic vision backed by the development of a posture that characterizes our resolve to fulfil the quest. Inspiration may take the form of a policy declaration in relation to a geographic region such as the ‘Look East (and now) Act East Policy’, the ‘India Africa Forum Summit’, ratification of the UNCLOS and formation of alliances. Policy provides a frame of reference that not only has wide-ranging application but will remain central for purposes of force planning to develop a strategic posture.

Current membership of the original ten ASEAN grouping plus 6 is symptomatic of the shifting centre of gravity of geopolitics to the East. From a security angle, the inclusion of India, USA, Russia, Japan and South Korea in addition to China provides the rationale for strategic equilibrium. India and China along with ASEAN are set to become the world’s largest economic bloc. The grouping is expected to account for about 27 per cent of Global GDP and will very quickly overtake the EU and USA economies. The buoyancy of the Indo-ASEAN relationship is backed by surging trade figures which is slated to hit USD 100 billion in the current year. With such burgeoning stakes strategic rebalancing in the region comes as a natural consequence and provides the settings for establishing strong and stable security ties. The expansion of the ASEAN and the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum are suggestive of the littoral’s aspirations to counter balance the looming presence of China. USA’s presence will dominate activities in the region in the immediate and middle term. Flash points such as territorial claims both in the maritime and continental domain will remain a source of friction that would necessarily demand military capabilities and an orientation that assures mutual restraint. Having thus brought about a modicum of coherence between security dynamics, strategic space and growth, it would now be appropriate to derive objectives of a Denial Strategy as applicable to the larger Indian Maritime Military Strategy.

A Denial Strategy

Denial seeks to contest and discredit the ability of regional or extra regional countries to unilaterally project military power to secure their interests either through aggression or through other destabilizing activities. The instrument to achieve denial is by convincingly raising the cost of military intervention through the use or threat of use of methods that are asymmetrical in form and decisive in substance. The strategy’s first impulse is to avoid a hot conflict. To ‘contest and discredit’ would suggest a clear understanding of where the centre of gravity of power projection forces lie. In China’s case, it is the triumvirate of the Aircraft Carrier; nuclear attack submarine force that provides teeth to their denial capability and security of the narrows and of its ‘string of pearls’. Lastly the threat of ‘use of force’ must not only be credible but also the ‘value exchange’ in terms of potential losses must weigh against the power projecting force. At the heart of the Denial Strategy is deterrence and cooperative security.

The Quadrilateral Cooperative Security Dialogue                                                                                                

India, through restraint, pluralistic and popular form of governance has established itself as a responsible State that upholds the status quo yet invites change through democratic forces. Its rise, in the main, is not only welcomed but is seen as a harmonizing happening that could counterpoise China. But, of the uncertainties that influence regional stability, it is China a stated revisionist autocratic power that will impact globally. Particularly so, in the maritime domain where it appears to be challenging global political and security order.

The next step would logically be to establish a strategic framework in the maritime domain which includes the concerned Verge Powers and the USA if we are to contend with the challenges that are present. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has evolved in response to increased Chinese revisionist trends and the need to lend stability in the Indo-Pacific. The founding countries United States, Japan, India and Australia driven by a concept of co-operative security, launched the idea in 2007. The alliance however appeared a non-starter with early withdrawal of Australia. It has been recently revived to counter China’s intrusive military power and its unrelenting thrust for an exceptionable proprietary mercantile empire stretching across the region.

The only historical parallel to the Quad is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Established to contain Soviet expansionism, counter the revival of nationalist militarism and uphold advocacy of European integration, three remarkable articles are at the core of its Charter:  Article 2, lays the under structure for non-military cooperation. Article 3, provided for cooperation in military preparedness while  in Article 5, the new allies agreed “an armed attack against one or more of them be considered an attack against all”. The Charter of the Quad is yet to be fleshed out; but conceivably, it will have three objectives. The first, to reinforce a rule-based regional Order that rejects nationalistic militarism of the kind that has emerged . Second, to promote a liberal trading regime and freedom of navigation, essential to secure passage of close to 60% of global trade. The third, to provide security assurances; however, just as behind the scenes machinations from Beijing splintered the Quad at inception, the entente faces similar fragmenting stresses that threaten the whole. India is locked into a long standing border dispute with China. Similarly, Japan has maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas while China’s new Air Defence Identification Zone provides the recipe for mutual interference in the air. Australia on the other hand depends on China for approximately 22 % of trade. And there is China’s assignee, the nuclear armed North Korea whose influence cannot be set aside.

As the Quad pushes to get their initiative to fly, success will likely hinge on how they hold their ground against pressure from China, nature of the security architecture and an understanding of the peril-to-the-whole. Key to the structure will be the constitution of Charter in terms of identifying the geographic entity within which it would operate, investments in cooperative security and apportioning responsibilities.

To Steer the Stream of Time

Bismarck suggested that great powers travel on the “Stream of Time” which they can neither create nor direct but upon which they can “steer with more or less skill”. How they emerge from that voyage depends to a large degree upon the wisdom of leadership. Bismarck’s sombre thoughts lead us back to our fundamental inquiry – whether motivation for conflict lies in the turbulence of the ‘Stream of Time’ or in the quest for power or piety is a moot question, but how India and the Verge Powers steer the stream is the crisis that leadership will have to contend with.



Deen Aaya*

(*Religion Cometh; the Anthem of the Tehreek-i-Labbaik Pakistan)


Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

(Article published in the authors column “The Strategist” on the IPCS website, available at the following link

The impact of organised religion on nations has historically been a sense of contrived significance, but in essence has neither refined society nor elevated power status. In the case of civilizational encounters, the vanquished looked backwards for spiritual succour while succumbing to the influences of the aggressor; in the process dogmas and rituals replaced inventiveness, as the spirit that propelled development calcified (Toynbee, 1957). This state is symptomatic of a society in the throes of derangement. A failed response to the challenges of plurality and vigour of competing belief systems is thus marked by religious masquerade and a despairing choice inspired by fundamental ideologies. In the past the Egyptiac world, Judaism and Christianity have succumbed to this fanatic impulse. Early Islam was spiritually tolerant of civilizations that it considered allied to as ‘People of the Book.’ It is no coincidence that this very period saw Islamic civilization flourish. Contemporary political Islamic movements are, however, marked by failed responses; the more radical, the more unforgiving towards the idea of plurality and renewal.

In the recently concluded elections to the Pakistan National Assembly the Tehreek-i-Labbaik (TLP) polled nearly two and a quarter million votes (Election Commission of Pakistan) making it the fifth largest political party in that country. While this may not have readily translated to seats in the National Assembly, what it stands for is “street power” of the radical Islam variety. Regaling the event their chief, Allama Khadim Husain Rizvi narrated a grisly electoral episode from Nawabshah, a district in Sindh. “We were singing our anthem Deen Aaya, when the Peoples Party (PPP) camp started playing their electioneering jingles; We asked them to stop because our hymn was in veneration of Allah, but their leader spurned our entreaty. Imagine Allah’s wrath, for that very night the PPP leader breathed his last. The next morning it was God’s will that all of the PPP followers switched their loyalty to the TLP!”

TLP shot to prominence when it opposed the 2016 hanging of Mumtaz Qadri, convicted in 2011 of assassinating the Governor of Pakistan’s Punjab province. Born in 1966 in Attock  Punjab,  Rizvi a self-acclaimed Barelvi cleric, was in government in the department of religious affairs, the auqaf . He was soon removed for radical activism. A paraplegic, he became deeply involved in organising public support for harsher and more invasive blasphemy laws. In November 2017 his siege of Islamabad for this cause paralysed the Capital for over three weeks. The Government and its law enforcement agencies made an abortive attempt to curb the mayhem but only succeeded in spreading protests to all the major cities. It was the Army Chief’s personal intervention that defused the situation with the offer of unconditional capitulation of the State to more severe blasphemy laws, sacking of Federal minister for law Zahid Hamid and the release of all prisoners taken. The siege of Islamabad was lifted. Allama Khadim Husain Rizvi had arrived; it is reported with a “little” help from the army.

Karachi was a distant frontier for the TLP whose home grounds were the radical madrassas of South Punjab (Bhawalpur, Multan, Mianwali, Dera Ghazi Khan etc.) Their electoral gains in Karachi owed largely to pulpit intimidation, violence and menacing politics. The city, latterly dominated by the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM) represents Pakistan’s Urdu-speaking mohajir, immigrant community. The odious “mohajir” moniker was dropped from its name and replaced by the less unpalatable Muttahida (United). The MQM is known for its muscular methods in Karachi, it had in the past controlled the vote in the inner city and its immediate urban enclaves through a grid that organized the city’s underworld. Aided by the Army, the TLP broke up these networks. The mosque became the platform from where the message of redemption was hammered home, in a manner and scale, not seen since the call for jihad to fight the American invasion of Afghanistan. The argument now was that since people of Karachi had committed crime and violence for mortal reasons, atonement in the eyes of God was only possible if these same people took up Allah’s cause by volunteering their time and labour for the TLP. An irreverent ‘Anschluss’ between the deep state, piety and politics now paved the way for electoral success of the Army’s willing protégé, Imran and his Pakistan Tehreek-i-Insaf .

Central to the strategy was infusing politics with ritual, a messianic propagation of the Barelvi belief system and of the TLP’s near-prophet-like-paraplegic-leader and his ‘mystical’ powers over followers.  The irony is that of the two Sunni sects, the Barelvi was seen as the more reticent and less prone to militancy than the orthodox Salafist-driven Deobandis. Meanwhile, the legend of how deen has managed to purify and chasten non-believers flourishes despite being in mortal conflict with what makes for a democratic state. The question at the core is what makes Pakistan more susceptible to ideological blackmail from such extreme shades of the religious right?

Ideological blackmail is prevalent when a myth of Islam-in-danger becomes the testament. To fully appreciate this phenomenon one goes back in recent history to Partition. The disproportionate security apparatus that Pakistan inherited and the communal basis of award (33% of the military as opposed to 18% demography, 23% landmass and 18% of financial assets) fuelled the idea that communal hatred and perpetual hostility towards India was innate to the separation of the Muslim nation. Also, an army under the banner of Islam was an imperative to forge unity and guard both ideological and geographic frontiers of the fledgling State. That the concept not only gained salience but is also an abiding characteristic of the strategic culture that the Army has carefully nurtured is today the idea of Pakistan.

.           And in August 2018, when the Dutch politician, Geert Wilders comes along and announces that he would hold a Prophet Mohammed cartoon contest that was a thinly veiled attempt to attack and provoke one of Wilders’ favourite whipping-boys, Islam; the TLP seized the opportunity to once again show its strength. On cue, lakhs of TLP supporters made their way to Islamabad to demand Pakistan sever diplomatic ties with the Netherlands or face a repeat of the siege of the capital. Why did Wilders call off the contest? It could not have been for economic reasons since GDP of the Netherlands at $830 billion is almost threefold of Pakistan’s; while bi-lateral trade is less than $1.2b, nor could it be any influence that Islamabad wields for they have little of that (there was of course the threat of Jihadi violence). The probable cause for cancellation was perhaps the fragile situation in Afghanistan which James Mattis explained as “co-existence of violence and progress” against a backdrop of stability. President Ashraf Ghani was less cryptic when he offered an unconditional peace proposal to the Taliban; a ceasefire, recognition of the Taliban, elections afresh and a constitutional review. Any disruption of this process, in US perspective, may have provided space for exceptionable Chinese and Russian interference. So it could be that it was the US that reined-in Wilders. At any rate the cancellation served to enhance Khadim Rizvi’s notional power across continents and the reality that his ideas found resonance with leaders and elites in mainstream political parties. That this has happened raises the question how close to being an extremist state is Pakistan?

            And as we ponder the question of how-close-indeed; comes Deen and the news that the Pakistan Supreme Court has sacked Atif Mian, a Princeton economist from the PM’s Economic Advisory Council for being an Ahmadi and in quick succession lifted the international ban on the terror proscribed Hafeez Sayeed’s outfit the Jamaat ud Dawa.

The Dilemma of a Threshold

In nuclear policy parlance, ‘threshold’ indicates when and under what conditions leadership may resort to the use of nuclear weapons


Vice Admiral (retd.) Vijay Shankar

(Published in the author’s column “The Strategist” on the IPCS website and available at

The nuclear planner is acutely involved in analysis of when and under what political conditions opposing leadership (military or otherwise) may resort to the employment of nuclear weapons. For nations with a policy of No-First-Use (NFU), the answer is “in response to the first-use (FU) of a nuclear weapon under conditions as stipulated in the doctrine.” However between nuclear armed nations, the one with a FU policy is faced with a more complex set of issues which will invariably raise the question “are political ends served with first-use of nuclear weapons knowing that an escalatory response may well be massive and place value targets in its cross hair.” Does first-strike come paired with the ability to offset a nuclear response? Indeed there is the theoretical possibility that the first strike may altogether neutralise the opposition’s capability of nuclear response; but this, as the evolution of nuclear thought and development of nuclear arsenals have shown, is a fantasy. Even the smallest retaliation in a nuclear exchange targeting a city will imply horrific destruction that the first striker must contend with. To put matters in perspective consider the following: the destructive potential of a nuclear weapon say a 20 kiloton nuclear weapon airburst targeting a city such as Karachi (in 2017 Karachi’s metropolitan area population was estimated at 23 million) with a population density of 24,000 per square kilometre will result in at least 8,00,000 primary casualties and another 12,00,000 secondary (statistics approximate based on casualty curves, Abraham Henry, Nuclear Weapons and War, 1984).  Or, one only has to recall the geographic extent and casualties of the 1986 “Chernobyl” power plant disaster to appreciate that the hazards of a nuclear encounter are not abstract notions. The radiation fallout spread from Scandinavia to the Black sea, over 116,000 people were affected while Belarus has since shown a 2400% annual increase in the incidents of thyroid cancer.

The capability to respond unfailingly and credibly lies at the heart of a deterrent strategy driven by a NFU policy. Faced with the certainty of appalling destruction in response to a nuclear adventure, why an aggressor should contemplate a first-use of nuclear weapons remains bizarre since it is at odds with the very idea of survival. Whatever may be the conditions of the conflict; the approach of such a threshold when one or the other protagonist may reach for the nuclear trigger must not only be transparent but be declared so that a return to normalcy becomes viable.

The strategic irony of dealing with Pakistan is that not only is it armed with nuclear weapons, but also forewarns ‘first-use’ shorn of a declared doctrine. The weapon, as recent statements from their establishment suggest, is “India specific” and the development of their nuclear arsenal is to deter India’s conventional forces from offensive operations through the use of tactical nuclear weapons (!) and should that elicit a massive response then that would be countered by an assured “limited” (?) second strike capability (a conversation with Khalid Kidwai, 2015). The latter, in their view, serves to “stabilise” the former; never you mind what or who caused the primary provocation. The doctrine remains under a cloak of ambiguity emboldened by the belief in a, yet to be developed, sea-based second strike launched from conventional submarines.

The first deduction that may be made from such a policy is that Pakistan has adopted a nuclear war-fighting doctrine notwithstanding a dangerous absence of technology necessary to provide intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (ISR) and command and control on land, at sea and in the air. The second deduction is, between their first and second strike Pakistan is convinced of surviving massive retaliation with its second strike intact. Is this a reasonable assumption or is it more bravado than sense? The third understanding is, when such a nuclear doctrine remains cloaked in ambiguity the separation between the Nuclear and principles that govern conventional warfare are blurred. This attains a catastrophic bent significantly when conventional principles such as surprise and deception are integrated into a first or a second strike plan, for the unsaid implication is that Pakistan, in some woolly manner, holds sway over the escalatory dynamic.

In all this what alarms is the lowering of the nuclear threshold while exposing the weapon to unintended use in its movement into the tactical battle area and the truancy of centralised command and control. Also, the deterrent value of the weapon from the standpoint of both time and space is narrowed if not foreclosed. Two more issues need to be recognised relating to the vexed geography of the Indo-Pak situation; the Line of Control (LoC) demarcates extent of geographic control over disputed territory in Jammu and Kashmir, to advocate creating a nuclear wasteland in territorial hankerings does not quite make strategic sense. It is equally clear that, among nations that share common borders, a nuclear exchange will spread devastation irrespective of man-made boundaries.

In the early stages of Pakistan weaponizing its nuclear capability it had, indeed, gestured to where its nuclear threshold lay. As could be deciphered, first-use of nuclear weapons was predicated on four thresholds:  large territorial setbacks, comprehensive military attrition, economic collapse and political precariousness. The deterrent logic these thresholds described was really quite unmistakeable for they also provided to Pakistan a context for maintaining conventional power. However, this rationality flew in the face of the acquisition of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs). The perception widely held among commentators in India is that the four threshold doctrine has since been trashed. “Full-spectrum deterrence” is what Pakistan today makes its arsenal out to be. Central to this doctrine is the integration of TNWs with conventional forces and a callow belief that the nuclear escalatory ladder is in control of the first striker. This abstruse doctrinal tangle suggests that Pakistan not only fails to take account of India’s nuclear response but is also convinced of their ability to initiate a nuclear war and survive unscathed from the encounter.

To establish where Pakistan’s nuclear threshold lies conceptually is a baffling task. However, for Pakistan to escalate to the nuclear dimension in response to an Indian conventional riposte to a major terror assault traced to GHQ Rawalpindi cannot be consistent with their “full spectrum” doctrine since the riposte does not come as a result of the latters failed conventional action which is the “first tier” of the spectrum. Rather, in this frame of reference, the nuclear first-use threshold must be assessed in the context of political realities, state policy that finds unity with jihadists and military capability. An ambiguous nuclear doctrine in these circumstances cannot alone determine the nuclear threshold; what it can do is calibrate the uncertainty that it imposes and in the process limit both extent and intensity of the riposte.

Nuclear thresholds are neither fixed by geography nor by time but determined more by severity and purpose of military action, which by some national gauge or a combination of triggers, will lead to the decision that a threshold has been breached. As may be deduced from Pakistan’s peace-time nuclear posture, lack of high-technology-persistent-ISR, absence of a cyber and outer-space capability, and the fragility of the second strike, their nuclear threshold may not lie at the low end of the scale. Reason being the first tier of the spectrum may not have quite ruptured in the early stage of a crisis while the second strike remains unfledged. And yet it is equally clear that threat of nuclear use has been brought out of the backdrop to a position from where nuclear deterrence becomes a looming immediacy.