Prognostication as a Conclusion 

The perils of prognostication are palpable, yet one draws inspiration from Keynes when he suggested (while prognosticating) that he “…would rather be vaguely right than precisely wrong”.

The problem for Iran with a nuclear breakout using safeguarded facilities and rapid translation to attaining a de-facto nuclear weapon status is, the high probability of early detection, which would invite a military strike on all known nuclear infrastructure. One way to avoid a strike and yet persist with the programme is to maintain an entirely covert parallel programme. The other is to divert low enriched uranium from safeguarded facilities (Natanz) to a clandestine enrichment plant to achieve weapon grade fuel. The decision to go one way or the other will not be the outcome of deliberate decision making; on the contrary it may come as a desperate reaction to the worsening internal conditions or just be a populist act swayed more by historical swagger and visceral antagonism. In the latter eventuality, the Islamists, the Monarchists and the Nationalists may find common truck. It is this will to perceived self eminence that draws strength from the past.

The episode of the 2007 American NIE on Iran and its divisive effect on the Islamic world is a telling occurrence in the clash between Persian distinctiveness and the Islamic identity. After all, which other historical event has brought the Arabs on the same side of the fence as Israel? Therefore to bank on the Islamic world to influence Iranian decision making is and will continue to be a pipe dream.

In 2008, with sanctions severely hurting, oil revenues at an all time low (which earlier contributed 80% of GDP) and practically all major global players ranged in opposition, or at least not with it, conventional wisdom would have suggested that the Ahmadinejad regime along with the clerical order was on the verge of imploding. But that did not happen despite the pressures and privations that inflicted the nation and the people. In fact, Ahmadinejad was re-elected to the presidency in 2009, the religious establishment came through unscathed and the Monarchists and the Nationalists were marginalised. The explanation lies in the separation and yet symbiotic relationship between Shi’ism and the political Islamist order, the two existing in mutual reinforcement against what was seen to be the common oppressor. This correlation goes back historically to the establishment of Shi’ism and how the consolidation of clerical power was a part of a dual system of the power of the State under the Saffavids.

The question of whether Iran will make the bomb is a vexed one. In balance are the unrelenting sanctions, the inexorable push to pariah status and the imminence of military action on the one hand, while on the other, is a chimerical power status that not only serves to satisfy civilizational urges but also fulfils its perceived destiny as the dominant regional player. And what of the other Gulf States and neighbours, particularly Saudi Arabia, which on 10^th February 2012 gave notice of its elaborate nuclear programme and did not rule out a weapons agenda?[vii] While this may have a domino effect on regional proliferation, it could also develop into a deterrent relationship in-region through the removal of nuclear inequity (an idea whose time may well have arrived). The difficulty with a resolution that takes such a tack is the conflict that it will arouse with the status quo powers that are more than likely to ensure that the current balance is not upset even if it means resort to a conventional clash. The more pressing anxiety is the coming of the next nuclear age when erosion of proliferation regimes presents increased probability of clandestine networks delivering the bomb to non-state actors, at which time prevention and pre-emption,  are the only rejoinders.

Despite the Byzantine nature of things, Iran has persevered with the belief that the most credible way to counter and buttress non-intervention in regional affairs is to attain nuclear weapon status. Notwithstanding this conviction, she has skilfully avoided a head on situation with the USA. Iran has also observed certain clear redlines when supporting militias in the Middle East in terms of hardware supplied and the groups supported. In their nuclear policy, Iran has found the means to challenge the USA in the latter’s contradictory approach to countering proliferation; of invading Iraq, cutting a deal with Pakistan, imposing sanctions on Iran, seeking a regime change in North Korea and indeed, turning a blind eye to Israel. In this unpredictable setting, nuclear weapons or even an unambiguous break out capability not only provides balance to a strategic posture but would also extract more concessions and more incentives from America and the West. The fact that Iran has progressed uranium enrichment levels from 3.5% to near 20% and has stockpiled over 1000 kg of low enriched uranium,[viii] while within the stipulations of the NPT, would suggest that Iran may well build for itself an unremitting ‘break out’ capability stopping a step short of weaponising and yet at the same time giving notice of a looming potential.