Globalization with Chinese Maritime Characteristics

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The Security Overlay

By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

 (Forthcoming in the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies Quarterly, New Delhi)

Keywords: China Maritime Strategy, Third Security Chain, Northern Passage, Access Denial, Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang Corridor

The ‘Uncertainty’ Paradigm

The end of the Cold War brought in its wake prognostication of the emergence of one world in which harmony, democracy, an end to conflict, and man’s ideological evolution was imagined. The grand formulation was that Western liberal democracy had prevailed.[1] Some saw a multipolar order and the arrival of China; others forecast a clash of civilisations.[2] However, these conjectures found little use in understanding the realities of the post Cold War world, as each represented a candour of its own. The paradigm of the day, I would posit, is ‘uncertainty,’ as marked by the tensions of multi polarity; tyranny of economics; anarchy of expectations; and a polarisation along religio-cultural lines, all compacted in the cauldron of globalization.

The West saw in globalization a process which transformed the world in their mould, through the adoption of Western values, free markets, the rule of law, flow of Western capital and embracing of democratic norms. Globalization with Chinese characteristics is about State capitalism, supremacy of central authority, controlled markets and currency and influence through power. It factored endemic instability[3], underscoring the premium on military power and the fundamental contradictions that existed, perceiving them as threatening the Chinese State and its dispensation, and as an impediment to growth and development. Against this backdrop, is the politics of competitive resource access which rationalizes the use of military power. It is in this perspective that Chinese maritime strategy must be gauged.

 Economic Power and China’s Case for ‘Lebensraum’

China’s quest to secure rights of passage on the sea is to insure against the uncertainties of access to resources. It has led her to the ‘Northern Passage.’[4] Significantly, the route avoids two sensitive ‘choke points,’ the Malacca Strait and the Suez Canal. China also theorises that the road to securing lines of communication is through a strategy of ‘Access Denial.’[5] The strategy was founded on China’s security concern with Taiwan where its logic is obvious. But, enabling such a strategy on a global scale invites confrontation.

Today China is the world’s largest exporter, its economy is second to the USA and she is the third largest energy consumer. When we look at the growth pattern of India since liberalization, we note a similar trend. Indeed, with one third of this growth being powered by trade to the East and China our largest trading partner, the requirement to secure these interests become vital. In this circumstance the race to garner resources by two very large economies is fraught. But the real alarm is that China seeks to influence and dominate international regulatory and security institutions without bringing about a change within, what I will call, her own ‘organic morphology.’ China’s disputed claims on the South China Sea; her handling of internal dissent; her proliferatory carousing with North Korea and Pakistan are cases that do not inspire confidence in change occurring within. The emergence of China from out of its defensive maritime perimeters, as defined by the first and second island chains, into the Indian Ocean is seen as the coming ‘Third Security Chain.’ Gone is the power bashfulness that marked the Deng era, in its place is the contemporary conviction that “the-world-needs-China-more-than-China-the-world”.

Evolution of China’s Maritime Strategy

China published its sixth Defence White Paper in January 2008. The paper notes that struggle for cornering strategic resources, dominating geographically vital areas and tenanting strategic locations have intensified. Power as a natural currency of politics remained the preferred instrument. Under these circumstances the portents for conflict are ever present and would therefore demand preparedness, modernization and strategic orientation of a nature that would serve to neutralize friction.[6] Central to the Paper is that “influence of military-security factors on international relations is mounting.” ‘Active Defence,’ embracing the development of bases overseas to launch strategy along with advanced assault and enhanced strike capabilities, remained the means. Doctrinal underpinnings to realise such capabilities and the development of ‘Access Denial and Control’ Strategy are now at the core of Chinese military thought.[7]

Two events of the 1990s have shaped Chinese strategy. From the Gulf War of 1991, China took home a reason for strategic pre-emption.[8] The second was the Taiwan crisis of 1995-1996, U.S. deployment of two carrier groups in the Strait embarrassingly infringed sovereignty. These episodes triggered the ‘Access Denial’ strategy. The development of capabilities, in material terms, operational precepts and strategic alliances threaten to upset the status quo. Operating from infrastructure cultivated in Sittwe and Aan in Myanmar, Hambantotta in Sri Lanka, Maroa in the Maldives and Gwadar in Pakistan gives legs to long range access denial.

Specific operational deployments to muscle her maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean may include: One carrier group; Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine on deterrent patrol; nuclear powered attack submarines on sea lines patrol with cooperating surface groups and maritime patrol aircrafts; long range maritime strike aircrafts operating from Aan or Gwadar; one amphibious brigade standby with transports on hand at one of the ‘string of pearls;’ and, a regiment of ASAT missiles along with cyber teams to wage information warfare that will seek to paralyze hostile operations.

To Counter an Enabled Theory    

            The principal demand of maritime operations is to attain a strategic position that would permit control of oceanic spaces. It therefore comes as no surprise that China develops forces and alliances necessary to realize an ‘access denial’ strategy. Consistent with theory is their shipbuilding programme of escorts and scouts to exercise control; and aircraft carriers assisted by strike and denial forces for security of control. Control and Security of Control is the classic model that China’s naval growth has been inspired by.

China has unambiguously articulated its three strategic objectives; stability, growth and regional pre eminence. The problem with such sweeping strategies specifically the coming ‘Third Security Chain’ superimposed on access denial is its blindness to recognize that we are dealing with a sea space that is the busiest of all the “vast commons.” The reluctance for collaboration makes the potential for friction high. The only consideration that could deter a collision is the ability of India to attain a strategic posture that serves to stabilize. India’s relationship with the USA provides opportunity to establish cooperative security in the region that could counterpoise China’s self-centred view of globalization.

—

End Notes

[1]Fukuayama Francis. “The End of History.” The National Interest, 16 (Summer 1989), pp 4, 18.

[2] Huntington. Samuel, P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of  World Order, Penguin Books, India 1997, pp 30-39.

[3] The World at War http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/index.html.The United Nations defines “major wars” as military conflicts inflicting 1,000 battlefield deaths per year. In 1965, there were 10 major wars under way. The new millennium began with much of the world consumed in armed conflict or cultivating an uncertain peace. Between 1989 and 2010, forty nine wars erupted. As of mid-2005, there were eight Major Wars under way [down from 15 at the end of 2003], with as many as two dozen “lesser” conflicts ongoing with varying degrees of intensity.

[4] Article by author titled “The Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang Corridor”, published in the September 2012 issue of the DSA. The Northern Passage was a fabled sea route theorised by adventurers, merchants and money chandlers over the last six centuries to

link the Pacific with the Atlantic Ocean. The Route lay through the Arctic archipelago the treacherous ice flows that frustrate passage across the Arctic Ocean. To put matters in perspective, as a trade corridor the distance from China to markets in Europe has been cut down to less than 8000 miles from 14,700 miles. In 2011 more than 18 commercial ships and in 2012 forty ships have made the now ice-free crossing.

[5] Security analysts  have examined China’s efforts to develop weapons systems that can retard or even stop a potential adversary from entering an area of interest. Dubbed “access-denial,” the aim of such a strategy is to use weapons that deter and should the need arise challenge or indeed prevent inimical forces from operating in conflict zones or oceanic areas of interest . The teeth of this strategy is an anti-ship missile. Such a missile, fired from land, sea, underwater or air can cause tremendous damage to an enemy surface vessel. While such technology isn’t new, the effective ranges of such weapons have increased tremendously, along with their accuracy, speed of delivery and precision. Defending against such systems is therefore a major problem for planners

[6] Ma Cheng-Kun,  PLA News Analysis, “Significance of 2008 China’s National Defense White Paper” no. 15, pp. 49-60

[7] Ibid  

[8] Lewis John Wilson and Litai Xue, “The Quest for a Modern Air Force” in Imagined Enemies China Prepares for Uncertain War,  Stanford University Press 2006, p237. General Liu Jingsong, a member of the 15th CPC Central Committee, he was also the PLA  Commander of the Shenyang and Lanzhou military regions and to him amongst others is attributed the opening of Equatorial Guinea 1995.

Poseidon’s Long View Across Time [*]

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 By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

 Abstract

Amphibious warfare has long been placed in the category of one of the more complex operations of armed conflict. Its knotty nature derives from its demand for intricate planning; a situation of full spectrum dominance; integration of every conceivable dimension of warfare; stealth in the contradictory environment of managing large forces with their huge logistic train; setting aside of some of the key principles of conventional warfare such as flexibility, economy of effort and mobility; transition of Command responsibilities at critical points in the operation; and most perilously, operating under conditions that are favourable to the enemy. Given that the deck tilts against success, it will be interesting to examine the nature of this combat manoeuvre through the lens of two historical battles that occurred with a time interregnum of more than two millennia. The intriguing reality of these episodes was that that they were played within the same geographical constraints of the Dardanelles and the essential struggle was between a maritime and a continental power. In both events the continental power prevailed.

Keywords: Amphibious warfare, Transhistorical analysis, Aegospotami 405 BCE, Thessalic versus Continental Strategy, The Dardanelles, Gallipoli, Kitchener

Download full article here: Shankar, Poseidon’s Long View Across Time

Excerpts:

Historical Sketch I: An Enactment from the Past-Aegospotami 405 BCE

Thessalic versus Continental Strategy, Powers of Antiquity Face Off

Ancient wars are more often shrouded in myth and through the years fashioned by popular imagination. But not so the Peloponnesian War, waged from 431 BCE to 404 BCE, between Athens and Sparta. The conflict’s scholastic significance does not lie in its protagonists or the events that transpired or even in the fact of it having been an archetypal war between a mercantile democracy and an agricultural aristocracy, but more because of the discipline with which its proceedings were recorded. To be sure, Thucydides precision is both dry and pithy and yet has relevance that transcends time. The strategies developed by the two warring States and their confederations (the coastal chain formed by the Delian League and the continental Spartan Allies which included Persia) were studies in contrast for Thessalic Athens, war plans were largely driven by a maritime strategy that strove to vanquish the Spartans through attrition, sanctions and peripheral campaigns waged from its far flung coastal bases in the Mediterranean, Aegean and the Black seas; while the Spartans fought to their strength and adopted a continental strategy that centred on invasion, armed alliances and striking at the heart of the enemy homeland. In an incisive and laconic analysis, the historian believed that what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta.[iii] The theatre of warfare extended from Sicily in the west to the Black Sea in the east, a span of 2000 kilometres across the Mediterranean and into the Black Sea. Ten major maritime engagements occurred during the 27 years of war each having a disproportionate impact on the progress of war on land (Thucydides’ history, unfortunately, ends in 411 BCE). However our focus is on the last engagement which involved an amphibious operation at Aegospotami across the Dardanelles (Hellespont) in September 405 BCE the outcome of this engagement saw the crumbling of Athenian sea power and the consequent severance of all sea lines of communication to its empire and its eventual capitulation within the year.

[…]

Run-up to Battle

The two sides spent the early part of the year maintaining, logistically and materially preparing, and honing the fighting potential of their fleets. Eventually in September Lysander, the Spartan fleet commander, decided to move into the Hellespont, partly to try and regain control of a number of cities lost in recent years and partly to try and block the Athenian logistic and economic life line emerging from the Black Sea. His first success came at Lampsacus (4 to 5 kilometres north of Lapseki, see Map 1), across the Hellespont, on the Asian shore which fell to a land assault.

When the Athenians discovered that Lysander had moved into the Hellespont, they followed with a fleet of 180 ships. They sailed up the Strait, and took up position at Aegospotami four to five kilometres across the Strait west of Lampsacus, where they established a base to progress operations. On the next morning the Athenians put out to sea and formed up in line of battle outside Lampsacus. Lysander did not oblige to come out of his haven and engage the enemy. Frustrated, the Athenians returned to their base on the beach at Aegospotami. Lysander sent some of his fastest ships to follow the Athenians for surveillance and intelligence gathering. For the next three days the same rite was replayed only with great tactical shrewdness, the Spartans through their intelligence effort reconnoitred the coastline, earmarked potential beaches for landing and significantly built a tactical picture of the Athenian fleet’s pattern of operations. On the fifth day Lysander manoeuvred into the operational area keeping a discrete distance from the Aegospotami beach.[iv]

Fragmented Command versus Spartan Unified Plan

The Athenian fleet was led by six admirals who in turn rotated command of the 180 ships of the fleet.[v] The Commander for the day was the relatively inexperienced Philocles, disjointed Command and an almost daily change in the methods and the graphics of control would have undoubtedly imposed unnecessary stresses on both man and material to the detriment of operational efficiency. Considerably less is known on the size of the Spartan fleet, it is assumed that the Spartan fleet was similar in size and capabilities to the Athenian fleet. Lysander’ plan envisaged a frontal engagement of the Athenian fleet at their moorings with a simultaneous amphibious landing to the north. The landing force was to move in a coordinated scything pincer manoeuvre which would crush Athenian forces between the land and the maritime prongs. It is this amphibious landing which is of particular note to our study since it involved a major surprise assault.

[…]

Analysis

Any analysis of this campaign will invariably sacrifice objectivity for want of precision in the records available. Yet, retrospection based on macro stimulants, proceedings as historically evident (sparse as they may be) and the reality of consequences permit constructing a picture that underscores the character and nature of amphibious warfare and the planning salients that provide a theoretical foundation for embarking on such operations. The attributes that contributed to success of Lysander’s amphibious assault may be distinguished as follows:[vi]

  • Clarity of objective against the backdrop of the larger strategic situation.
  • Nature and characteristics of the campaign at hand, enemy to be fought  and precision in mission definition.
  • Precise assessment of the balance of forces.
  • Perceptive choice of mounting port.
  • Focused intelligence gathering and development of a best course of action.
  • Judicious appraisal of natural elements and selection of landing beach.
  • Adroit and single minded leadership supported by meticulous planning and coordination.

Map 1. The Strait of Dardanelles (Hellespont) 

Source: This is a file from the Wikimedia Commons. Geographic locations in red have been inserted by the author, they are approximate. The Commons is a freely licensed media file repository. Source: This is a file from the Wikimedia Commons. Geographic locations in red have been inserted by the author, they are approximate. The Commons is a freely licensed media file repository                                                                                        

Historical Sketch II: The Amphibious Campaign at Gallipoli 1915

Conjunct Warfare

To the British Admiralty, amphibious operations were hardly a novel discipline of warfare. In fact as early as 1759 a theory and directive principles of what was termed ‘Conjunct Warfare’ had been propagated in a treatise entitled “Conjunct Expeditions: or Expeditions that have been carried on jointly by the Fleet and Army, with a commentary on Littoral Warfare.”[vii] As the treatise so eloquently puts it “the conjunct armament goes against the enemy like an arrow from a bow. It gives no warning where it is to come, and leaves no traces where it has passed. It must wound too where it hits, if rightly pointed at a vulnerable part. When this is done a new aim is directed. The enemy in the meantime, like a man in the dark labouring under an unwieldy shield, moves slowly to and fro, distracted and at a loss which way to guard against the stroke of the invisible hand.”[viii] Molyneux understood that a nation with superior sea power possessed the advantage of initiative and therefore could bring powerful forces against an enemy at a time and place of its choosing. He emphasised that surprise was a key element to an amphibious attack (obviously the author implied surprise of time and place rather than surprise of intent), calling it a “terrible sort of war that comes like thunder and lightning to some unprepared part of the World.” Despite his high opinion of the potential of amphibious landings, Molyneux recognised that they failed more often than they succeeded.[ix] He insisted that the main reason for failed amphibious missions, or miscarriages, in his words, was mismanagement of planning and execution. The most important aspects of this mismanagement was the lack of cooperation between navy and army commanders, want of application, deficiency of a system on which the operation is founded (‘doctrine’ in present day parlance) and significantly, the attitude of relegating this form of warfare to a lesser priority.[x] What is remarkable is how contemporary this analysis is.                                                                                                                                                   

[…]

 Analysis

The intellectual framework provided by Molyneux when he first propagated ‘Conjunct Warfare’ and the idea of a ‘strike by an invisible hand’ placed amphibious operations in the context of a ‘Manoeuvreist Approach.’ The key lay in the ability to project force from the sea in a manner that lends itself to such manoeuvreist precepts as surprise of time and place and out-flanking movements. As would be apparent from the narrative, the amphibious campaign to seize the Gallipoli peninsula and lay control of the Straits fell far short of the attributes that make for manoeuvre warfare despite the obvious advantages that weighed with the maritime power. ‘Muddle, mismanagement and useless sacrifice’ as mentioned earlier, were features of this campaign which rose to prominence as planning dithered, casualties mounted and the drive for control of the Straits visibly faltered, some logic may even conclude that one fed on the other. Yet, in order to bring some objectivity to the analysis, the same litmus tests that gave victory at Aegospotami in 405 BCE may be applied to the Gallipoli campaign primarily because the larger strategic objective of Control through the instrument of an amphibious landing were indistinguishable. The seven attributes that may therefore be placed in balance are:

  • The Objective: While the larger strategic aims were well conceived, it was the fragmented approach both in methods and time towards attaining it that was unconvincing. After all to force the Straits  through pure naval action and then within a month to fundamentally alter it to an army sized amphibious operation would not only suggest a radical strategic dither but also a failure of higher political and military decision making to fully appreciate what the alteration implied in terms of preparation, training and logistics. Kitchener’s ‘Campaign Instructions’ to his Commander-in-Chief lacked the strategic commitment necessary to see through an operation of this scale. Also, it was neither based on a thorough intelligence estimate nor on a realistic appreciation of the state of preparedness of the landing force. And then to break the momentum of the offensive by reinforcing the April landing only in the second week of August, long after energy of the thrust had petered out, would suggest a total lack of grasp of the ground situation.
  • Nature of Operations: The Nature of amphibious operations, as Molyneux with so much sagacity had pointed out, demanded comprehensiveness of planning and precision in execution. The most important aspects of management and control of operations was the critical need for cooperation between navy and army commanders, a system as a prerequisite on which the operation is founded (doctrine in present day parlance) and significantly, the attitude of awarding a place of primacy for this form of warfare; these were woefully lacking. By May 1915, within a month of launching operations it became clear that the hope of a short campaign was a pipe dream and success in the Dardanelles would require a far greater effort both in terms of resolve and preparation than the planners had ever contemplated.  Gross underestimation of the enemy can only have been credited to incompetence.
  • Balance of Forces: The balance of forces weighed up on the side of the Entente. Yet, due fragmented approach, poor planning and the inability to commit to and underwrite unity of Command; the advantages of capability and firepower could never be brought to bear.
  • Mounting Port and Training: The location of mounting ports in Egypt (Alexandria and Port Said) was ideal, for they were situated in the theatre of operations yet adequately displaced (600miles) from the amphibious objective area to ensure no enemy interference. Also base support and logistic facilities available in Egypt were comprehensive. Where the fatal flaw lay was in the  inadequacy of training of the amphibious force for what was envisaged to be speedy and inexpensive campaign. After all if the “essential course for Britain therefore, was to re-equip Russia and to rally the Balkan States against Austria and Turkey; and this could best be done by forcing the Straits and capturing Constantinople” (and Churchill concluded) that this was the “only prize which lies within reach this year. It can be won without unreasonable expense, and within a comparatively short time. But we must act now and on a scale which makes speedy success certain.”[xi] Evidently there was serious mismatch between the “essential course” and the preparation needed to realise it.
  • Appraisal of Elements and Selection of landing Beaches: Weather-wise April and August were fair weather months and well suited for amphibious operations. The selected beaches were appropriate for landing operations, however their geographic spread of less than 10 miles provided inadequate manoeuvring space for, what eventually amounted to, seven Divisions. The cramping of the invasion front permitted the Turkish defenders to operate on inner lines and concentrate there efforts which eventually stalled the invasion practically on the beaches.  
  • Intelligence: Periodic intelligence bulletins were made available to the MEF through out the campaign, however these were persistently of a field and a tactical level.[xii] The absence of strategic intelligence is obvious by the absence of information on the preparedness and combat readiness of the Turkish Army on the Peninsula; Paragraph 5 of Kitchener’s Campaign Instructions makes this apparent (see End Note 17). Also, the extent of complacency and the belief that a victory was to be got on the cheap was palpable in Churchill’s statements (see End Note 22). In addition the impact of naval gunfire (ranging from15 inch to 8inch guns[xiii]) while attempting to force the Straits was never ascertained as a result there was neither intelligence on damage assessment nor an appreciation of the state of Turkish morale at this crucial juncture of operations. In the absence of such intelligence, to abandon the plan, would suggest feeble resolve.
  • Planning, Leadership and Unity of Command: ‘Muddle, mismanagement and useless sacrifice’; the words used by the war correspondent Ashmead-Bartlett succinctly summed up the characteristics of direction and control of the campaign. Starting with Kitchener’s Campaign Instructions, planning at the highest level of decision making was muddled; the change in strategic impulse was neither justified nor carried with it the determination necessary to push for a decision. Also, the planning of an amphibious operation without adequate time for training and rehearsal provided the immediate recipe for disaster. Misconception of force requirements and Logistic planning was so derisory that within a month of the first landing (by May), the invasion was starved of munitions and reinforcements. Leadership’s belief in the success of operations was based on some abstract and baseless notions that the adversary’s fortitude and grit would crumble with the first salvo; this underestimation of the opponent’s operational tenacity was a cardinal failure. At the operational level, leadership was never in touch with the ground realities of the progress of the campaign and failed to appreciate the criticality of the principles of surprise, concentration of effort and coordination. Command at every level was disjointed and lacked unity of purpose. Relying on mere army-navy cooperation without unity of command particularly so in an amphibious operation is a clear formula for inefficiencies. For in a cooperative situation what is being provided is support bereft of precise allocation and definition of subordinate responsibilities along without a comprehensive command and control network to bind together the sea, land and air elements of the amphibious force.

[…]

The Common Thread that Binds Millennia

The history of warfare infrequently tolerates replication of campaigns. And yet to regard battles and armed struggles in isolation rather than a part of a larger panorama of conflicts often leads to erroneous inferences which do not in any way further the cause of refining strategies. Examination of the larger continuum or the strategic approach seeks to understand and employ the inter-relationship between economics, geography and military genius to pursue political goals; these goals, however, have an uncanny iterative character. Both the Battle of Aegospotami and the Gallipoli Campaign, though displaced in time by almost two and a half millennia, was trans-historical in commonality of aim and that was ‘Control of the Straits’. In the one case to bring about economic and logistic strangulation of the opponent while in the Gallipoli Campaign it was to bring about economic and logistic relief of a vital ally; both saw in the manoeuvre an efficient tool to bring about a speedy termination of the conflict. The Battle of Aegospotami was planned and implemented with consummate skill and its aim was fully achieved. The Gallipoli Campaign, on the other hand was a grand litany of ‘muddled planning, mismanaged leadership and appalling waste of life’. If one were to attempt to put a finger on the single critical feature that differentiated the two, it had to have been the leadership of Lysander who saw to it that unity of command was upheld at every stage of the battle; whether it was integrity of the plan, intelligence gathering or coordination of the amphibious assault with the seaborne offensive.

 The Indian Context, a Strategic Overview as a Conclusion

To the minds of many Indian military leaders, amphibious warfare remains a lesser known mystery; to merit theoretical examination at the Staff College and thereafter to be set aside as a costly conjecture that has little chance of success in the real world of operations. This is based on the premise that a frontal military assault out of the water with all the complications of forming up in and disembarking from boats, moving through surf and landing on a hostile beach with neither overwhelming force nor stealth nor saturation firepower by air and sea that could suppress shore defences; was futile. The Gallipoli disaster appeared to many military critics to seal this judgement to the extent that Liddell Hart believed that amphibious assaults had become impossible.[xiv] However the experience of the Normandy landings and the Pacific Campaign during the Second World War, the 1950 Inchon landing in South Korea and the 1982 Falklands war all suggested not only the viability of amphibious operations but also underscored its operational effectiveness.

The Indian maritime doctrine recognises amphibious warfare as an operation intrinsic to its capability.[xv] Amphibious operations could potentially find a central role in each of the ten conflict scenarios identified in the doctrine.[xvi] Postulating the relationship between doctrine and strategy, the document titled “India’s Maritime Military Strategy” elaborates that “Doctrine is a body of thought, and a knowledge base which underpins the development of strategy”.[xvii] While there can be no argument thus far, what is problematic is the ability to bridge and characterize the linkage between doctrine and the military resources that are built up in circumstances when the development of strategies remain a dark area. Viewed from another perspective, this amounts to the maintenance of an amphibious capability without defining and distinguishing a contract for use.

India today maintains a combat sea lift capability of one Brigade, this facility is being built up to a Division size ability (by 2020) in terms of specialised ships, command platforms, escorts, surveillance and strike elements along with logistic support ships. The questions then are:

  • Given a scenario, what best can be achieved by this amphibious force?
  • Have we spelt out (in elaboration of the ten conflict scenarios) the specific contingencies in terms of circumstance and geography for use?
  • Have we trained man and material and rehearsed for these contingencies?
  • Have strategies been developed, Instructions and plans formulated (strategic, operational and logistic) to confront these contingencies?
  • And lastly, are our command structures nimble enough to cope with the complexities of amphibious warfare, are they unified and is leadership at every level attuned to the unyielding demands of this form of warfare?

If the answer to any of these questions is in the negative or even conditional, then we have neither understood the quintessence of ‘Conjunct Warfare’ nor the perils of having to run the gauntlet of another Gallipoli.

Download full article here: Shankar, Poseidon’s Long View Across Time

End Notes

[*] From Greek mythology, Posiedon the God of the Seas had the power to stop time.

[ii] Molyneux, Thomas More, Conjunct Expeditions: or Expeditions that have been carried on Jointly by the Fleet and Army, with a commentary on Littoral Warfare published by R.J Dodsely, 1759, London as quoted by Aston G. G Brigadier General in Letters on Amphibious Wars. John Murray, Albemarle Street, London 1911 p 2.

[iii] Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. Penguin Books Ltd, England 1986, p 23.

[iv] Xenophon’s Hellenica 2.1.17-32 and Diodorus’ Library, 13.104.8-106.8.

[v] C. Ehrhardt, “Xenophon and Diodorus on Aegospotami”, in: Phoenix. Journal of the Classical Association of Canada 24 (1970), p 226; G. Wylie, “What really happened at Aegospotami”, in: L’Antiquité Classique 55 (1986), p 125-141.

[vi] These attributes are based on deductions and extrapolations made by the author; what is remarkable is how well these would fit into the planning of modern amphibious operations.

[vii] Molyneux, Thomas More, Conjunct Expeditions: or Expeditions that have been carried on Jointly by the Fleet and Army, with a commentary on Littoral Warfare published by R.J Dodsely, 1759, London as quoted by Aston G. G Brigadier General in Letters on Amphibious Wars. John Murray, Albemarle Street, London 1911 p 4.

[viii] Ibid. Molyneux’ treatise contains an exhaustive history of littoral warfare, its nature and value. Of equal importance is its analysis of the principles that govern the planning and execution of amphibious campaigns. Time has neither diminished its contemporary relevance nor provided an alternative to the theory that it develops.

[ix] Ibid Part I, 3-4 and Part II, 5-8.

[x] Ibid Part I, vii, 3-4, Part II, 8,46 and the general theme of Part II.

[xi] Aspinall-Oglander C.F. History of the Great War Military Operations Gallipoli Volume II. William Heinemann Ltd London 1932, p 61. Churchill in a memorandum to the Government justifying the Gallipoli campaign pointed out that the allies, by April 1915, had  regained 8 square miles of territory for a loss of  300,000 men on the Western front; almost as if to suggest that a victory at Gallipoli was available on the cheap!

[xiii] McMurtrie Francis E. Jane’s Fighting Ships 1939. Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd. London 1939, p 23-64, 175-206.

[xiv] Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War. Indiana University Press Bloomington 1973, p 256.

[xv] Indian Maritime Doctrine, INBR 8. Issued by Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Indian McMurtrie Francis E. Jane’s Fighting Ships 1939. Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd. London 1939, p 23-64, 175-206.

[xv] Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War. Indiana University Press Bloomington 1973, p 256.

[xv] Indian Maritime Doctrine, INBR 8. Issued by Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence Navy) 2004, p 81 and 114.

[xvi] Ibid, p 59. The ten conflict scenarios identified are: conflict in immediate neighborhood, operations in extended neighborhood, peacekeeping operations, conflict with an extra regional power, protecting persons of Indian origin, anti terrorist operations, fulfilling bilateral strategic obligations, preserving SLOCs, safeguarding Indian energy assets and humanitarian role.

[xvii] India’s Maritime Military Strategy. Issued by Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Indian Navy) 2007, p 6.

THE GRANDMASTER’S PAWN*: An Analysis of the China-Pakistan Nuclear Arsenals

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By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

Keywords: China Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy, Pakistan Nuclear Doctrine and Strategy, Indian Nuclear Force Planning, “How Much is Enough?” Deterrent Stability

Download complete article here: Shankar, The Grandmaster’s Pawn

Excerpts:

The Chinese Arsenal                                                                                                         A keen observer of international relations in the South and East Asian region soon comes to the conclusion that no endeavor to achieve deterrent stability, or to bring objectivity in an analysis of the Sino-Pak nuclear arsenals and their strategic underpinnings, is intelligible without perceiving them first as one; and then as separate. This virtual dichotomy challenges leadership at every step in bringing about equilibrium in strategic relationships. Unique to this tri-polar tangle is the collusive nature of the Sino-Pak liaison.

Ever since the 1950s it was amply clear and comprehensively demonstrated that China would use all stratagem at its disposal to not just embarrass but also to nip any perceived challenge that may emerge from India. The exasperation that they have caused on issues ranging from Tibet to the festering territorial differences in the North and North East; the irksome opposition to any opportunity that the international system may concede to India; their reaction to the recent Nuclear Suppliers Group waiver and their persistent rejoinder to Indo-Russian relations are cases in point. All this is despite the galloping trade links between the two.

Philosophical and Strategic underpinnings of Chinese Policy                            Search for reasons for this antagonism may be found in the philosophical and strategic underpinnings of Chinese policy. The first consideration is our understanding of China’s Grand Strategy. Chinese strategists define Grand Strategy as “the overall strategy of a nation or an alliance of nations in which they use their combined national strengths for political goals, particularly those related to security and development.”[1] What stands out in this definition is the importance of the alliance in achieving goals related to both security and development.

The complicity with Pakistan, whether it be for ends of economic growth or energy security (development of the deep water port at Gwadar at a precarious moment in the history of that nation when investment there is plunging southward is noteworthy) or, to realize their national goals by promoting a nuclear adversary to India; is all really an execution of their larger Grand Strategy to exploit an alliance in their favour, notwithstanding  norms of the international system or the proliferation that this enterprise would entail. The single minded ruthlessness to implement this policy has been the abiding leitmotif.

China’s strategic culture that has evolved over the years is the second lynchpin upon which their policies hinge. Central to it is the continuous friction between their civilizational heritage and the upheavals that moulded the communist state. Therefore, on the one face, we note that there is a stated aversion to conflict, while on the obverse, is an unyielding belief in realpolitik.

Their No First Use (NFU) pledge coupled with a persistent sponsoring of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program with its unabashed first strike connotations is a manifestation of this same dualism that pervades their doctrine and, when viewed in the larger perspective, a part of their ‘active defense.’ Then again, shades of Mao’s conviction that nuclear weapons were paper tigers and that strategic matters would be decided on mass and weight of the human element[2], has influenced the size of their arsenal. All this is symptomatic of their grasp of contemporary realities, the value of ambiguities and deception and their subscription to minimalism. Their ‘Assassin’s Mace’ strategy fits into this scheme of things well, where a superior force is vanquished by an inferior through stratagem that seeks to paralyze.

History will recall that the Sino-Pak alliance owes its parentage to an unlikely set of circumstances. The Cold War was at its height; then, in 1961 comes an ideological fissure between the two main communist actors over Soviet revisionist tendencies, causing an unbridgeable rift. Close on its heels comes the Sino-Indian War of 1962, the reasons for this conflict remain debatable, yet there can be no denying its impact on the over all balance of sub-continental power and the emergence of China as a cognizable player, independent of the Cold Warriors. Pakistan, which till then had been the southern containment link of CENTO, saw an opportunity in the larger fracas and wooed China through transfer of territories in the Karakoram tract (5800 sq. kms. of disputed territory) giving China access to their troubled Xinjiang Province through the Aksai Chin in 1963. This relationship over the years has concretized into firm economic, military and political ties, notwithstanding the vagaries of international public opinion. So much so, that in the nuclear field there is considerable evidence to suggest doctrinal symbiosis. An analogy in some respects may be drawn with the special relationship that existed during the Cold War between the USA and the UK.  Their doctrines were intertwined to an extent that they share a common nuclear arsenal (warheads for the Trident D4 and D5 class of submarine launched missiles is a case in point).

In a departure from the Western model for making strategic evaluations of first identifying ends, then conceptualizing methods and finally, generating means to achieve ends; China follow the Comprehensive National Power (CNP) route, where it sees impact of strategic events on its own endowment as primary. Therefore, in articulating its strategic objectives, in order of precedence, it has unambiguously identified three canons. The first is internal and external stability to its own gauge; the second is to sustain the current levels of economic growth at close to the double digit level; and lastly, to achieve regional pre-eminence. If there is a conflict of interest in the execution of the three then the superior canon prevails.[3]

The Doctrine                                                                                                                 China’s nuclear doctrine owes its soul to a book that was ordered by Chairman Mao in 1958 which appeared before the Communist Party of China in 1959 titled Guidelines for the Development of Nuclear Weapons.[4] There were seven crucial tenets to the doctrine stemming from Mao’s ‘paper tiger’ and minimalist appraisal of the nuclear question:

a) No First Use
b) Minimal Forces without Compromising Credibility
c) Centralized Command and Control
d) Assured Retaliation
e) Modernization and Survivability
f) The Value of Demonstration
g) Doctrinal Dynamism

In all but two of these precepts there does not appear to be great divergence from the Indian Nuclear Doctrine. Where there is a tangential move away is on the subject of ‘the demonstration’ and ‘doctrinal dynamism.’ The former suggests, in the abstract, that nuclear weapons would be used, if the credibility factor is ever questioned. This usage may not be against vital targets and yet will leave no doubts of their looming intentions. The latter implies a vast area of subjectivity and opens up the nature of their alliances. In this frame of reference, the scripting of the Pak nuclear capability and transfer of nuclear technologies, setting up of the Khushab I, II, III and IV reactors and the moulding of an emerging first-strike capability makes strategic sense. An alliance of this nature gives their doctrine unmatchable vigour and flexibility.

[…]

The Future

China has taken steps to put in place a very deliberate strategic orientation which is marked by a small but credible and survivable No First Use nuclear arsenal comprising of about 200 operationalized warheads. The structures it has created to adapt technology and infuse it into the arsenal are there to be seen in their nuclear academic institutions and the human resources that they have developed over the years (It is reported that during the devastating Central Chinese earthquake of 2008, over 160 Ph.D. academics and close to 7000 other technicians, all devoted to the physics package, were among the first to be evacuated from their complex at Mianyang).

Modernization of the arsenal is a continuum. China is focusing on increased ranges, rapid mobility and precision in control and targeting, the induction of MIRV’D warheads and operationalization of the JL2 SLBM is imminent. Efforts to reduce vulnerability of arsenal without compromising central control would be key to future developments. There is the matter of how American BMD would impact on the arsenal. Clearly there would be qualitative and quantitative changes to the arsenal, both for which, China already holds the potential as demonstrated by their ASAT capability. Their ‘Assassins Mace’ strategy will remain an abiding approach.[5]

As mentioned earlier, the issue of Taiwan and the future of the South China Sea imbroglio are significant to the larger arsenal development. If these are resolved with finesse, then China’s aspiration-capability gap will reduce. If not, this gap will increase. Their nurturing of a first strike capability in the arsenal of their alliance partner, Pakistan, will progress with rapidity and precision.

These prognostications may be summarized as under:

  • China’s arsenal will remain small but credible and survivable, numbers operationalized are likely to be less than 200 warheads (author’s estimate).
  • The US decision to deploy BMD in the South and East China Sea littorals may have two possible effects: If deployed it will bring qualitative and quantitative changes to China’s arsenal. Warheads are likely to be MIRV’d and the arsenal is likely to show a bulge; If not deployed, stability of deterrence would remain.
  • The third possibility is that US policy envisages deployment BMD as a part of the extended deterrence that targets rogue states; this would, from China’s point of view  amount to destabilising the existing deterrent relationship with the same impact on China’s arsenal as noted above.
  • If the Taiwan and the South and East China Sea Islands imbroglio is resolved with finesse then the aspirations – capabilities gap will reduce, if not the gap will increase with consequent instability in the region.
  • Technology intrusions into the arsenal affecting range, mobility, precision, C4ISR  and penetration will continue to be invited.
  • Reduced vulnerability of arsenal.
  • No arms race (dangers of the Soviet Model).
  • Internal economic, social development and global image will remain a priority.
  • Nurturing a first disarming nuclear strike capability in Pakistan providing doctrinal dynamism will remain a policy focus.

The Pakistan Arsenal

Pakistan’s quest for strategic parity with India is a part of the larger protracted conflict that has been integral to relations between the two nations since independence in 1947. Till the 1960s, her close alliance with the West as a part of CENTO, as mentioned in an earlier section, placed her in a situation that provided ready military assistance up to a conventional point. It was the Sino-Indian war of 1962 that provided an opportunity to up the ante. This opening began with territorial concessions and in this the-other’s- enemy-is-my-friend state of affairs, graduated to a close nuclear relationship. In time Pakistan’s nuclear program was practically scripted, tested and delivered by Beijing (in his book, If I am Assassinated, the late Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, whilst on death row, stated poignantly that if he was to be remembered for any act, it would be for the alliance that he had built with China) [6].

Strategic and Doctrinal Foundations     

Post the 1971 War which created Bangladesh, the Sino-Pak relationship took a new and decisive turn as far as nuclear cooperation went. In a paper presented at the Ottawa Dialogue, a Track 2 forum that brings together representatives from both India and Pakistan to discuss nuclear strategic and doctrinal issues, a Pakistani representative emphasized that “with the disparity of size and resource (sic) now established, and national salvation and pride deeply dented, there was only one way to go—the nuclear way.”[7]

Pakistan does not have a declared doctrine and there has been no clear articulation of its guiding principles. As early as 2001, Lt. General Khalid Kidwai, in a statement that was widely reported underscored Pakistan’s thresholds for the use of nuclear weapons. These he identified as military, economic, political and survival.[8] While these verges were some indication of Pakistan’s tolerance levels, the statement was quickly revoked and officially there remained no policy declaration on the grounds that any stated doctrine would create space for the conventional conflict, albeit under a nuclear overhang. In another statement, former Army Chief, General Aslam Beg, stated, “An attack by any nation on our nuclear arsenal will automatically trigger a nuclear strike on India”.[9] However bizarre this may sound it is apparent that Pakistan retains a certain irrational ambiguity in their policy to use nuclear weapons.[10]

In the 2010 Ottawa Dialogue report, Pakistani planners suggest that there is a possibility of nuclear weapons having an “inalienable” place in military strategy and therefore, to adopt an operational strategy of flexible response is a natural graduation from the conventional to the nuclear.  The second suggestion is that nuclear weapons are weapons to be used as devices of last resort. The third is that nuclear weapons are political weapons and “on the matrix of a larger power smaller power equation, such a capability provides to the smaller an unreserved strategic equivalence.” The fourth is a combination of the previous three which sees the nuclear weapon as a means to avoid conflict of any nature. Through ambiguities and a threat of first use, the absence of a declaratory policy is justified. In all this, it is the war fighting abilities of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal that remains the central theme of the various possibilities listed in the report. There is a persistent interplay between the conventional and the nuclear without any discriminating walls between their development or their usage.

The Pakistan establishment rejects the No First Use doctrine of India on the grounds of lack of belief in what has been declared.[11] Pakistan’s stated India-centricity and its integration of nuclear weapons in the larger military strategy are items of faith—this poses certain aberrations in the equation. If Pakistan does not subscribe or believe in India’s No First Use arsenal then it must logically be that First Use is what will drive their doctrine and secondly, a First Use nuclear weapon changes the paradigm from war avoidance to war fighting. This in itself brings about certain imbalances in a deterrent structure. The other issue is nation-centricity of an arsenal. Can a weapon be tailored for one nation? This is a moot question since a nuclear vector’s target is defined by the control authority. If one were to deduce from the various written material and spoken word emanating from the Pakistan establishment then their nuclear doctrine may be summarized as follows:

  • Pakistan has not abjured First Use of nuclear weapons. Their usage forms an integral part of military strategy.
  • Ambiguity in intentions and specificity in targeting governs force structuring and deployment.
  • Robust and sensitive command and control with the military playing both controller and custodian and an emphasis on survivability and preparedness. The current political internals and the significant presence of non-state actors make for a fragile nuclear establishment.
  • The acquisitory route (ex China) provides Pakistan with the ability to rapidly bring about technological transformations in their arsenal.
  • There is high probability of doctrinal linkages with China as indicated by the nature of cooperation, the transfers of vectors and the periodic  technological infusions that occur (again, the induction of the Nasr, Raad and Babur cruise missile are cases in point).
  • Ambiguity being central to the unstated doctrine brings with it certain elements of irrationality in their apparent nuclear policies. This obviously can result in confusion of intent causing speculative bulges in the arsenal of potential adversaries.
[…]

Impact on Indian Nuclear Force Planning: The Commonalities in the China India Doctrine

There are several areas of commonality in the declared doctrine of China when faced with the Indian nuclear doctrine. However, the significance of the doctrinal linkage between the Sino-Pak nuclear establishments cannot be ignored primarily because it provides China with a dual face to their nuclear posture and to their larger global image. At the same time, as China’s role in global affairs increases on the march to becoming a dominant player, this alliance may well impede progress. For the present, the doctrinal dynamism that collusion offers represents a very efficient straitjacket to India’s macro exertions.

To force planners, there is a need to understand, while sculpting responses, the critical impact of the alliance and how best the emerging global scenario can be leveraged to advantage. An examination of the areas of commonality in the doctrines may well provide some answers. These may be identified as follows:

  • The declared policy of No First Use
  • The long-held subscription to credible minimalism
  • The firm demarcation between controller and custodian of nuclear weapons and the rigid centralization of command authority
  • The hitherto rejection of conventionalizing the arsenal
  • The nature of the arsenal in terms of achieving credibility and denying vulnerability while assuring high survivability are all indicators towards emphasis on the submarine vector.

While the areas of commonality are clear to see and their potential for emphasizing mutuality are apparent, there are certain critical variations which cannot be lost sight of and must be factored into any equation that seeks to bring about equilibrium to nuclear forces. The first of these is, under what conditions would China be willing to forego the doctrinal vigour and flexibility that the Sino-Pak alliance gives? Secondly, China has always believed in the concept of comprehensive national power. In this calculus while there are many factors which play a role, nuclear forces in themselves are of a lesser priority than economic growth.[12] Can this factor and its manipulation play a role in bringing about stability in the three cornered nuclear tangle? Weakening of the Sino-Pak alliance is clearly an issue that would provide a plus to deterrence solidity. This last remains a pressure point that could be worked on.

The impact of the United States BMD program on the nuclear settings is suggestive of the larger multilateral nature of the nuclear equations of the day.  If the United States persists in going ahead with a global BMD program it would set into motion a chain reaction of China modernizing its forces both in quantity and in quality which in turn would have an impact on the capability of the Indian arsenal placing demands on technology intrusion setting off an acquisitory spike in the Pakistan arsenal. At the same time, the idea of the US BMD program targeting rogue states only is not a convincing enough argument. A BMD system can shift target almost at will, thereby, affecting the stability of the nuclear equilibrium and impacting force planning.

Ambiguity, which is such an essential part of the Pakistan doctrine and its arsenal, is a dangerous state of affairs from the Indian point of view. It encourages the speculative bulge in order to address the conundrum which is posed by the probability of the failure of the deterrent strategy. The game-changer in such circumstances is increased and more invasive transparency on all sides.

There is a larger consideration that cannot be easily overlooked and that is of the explosive cocktail that is the current internal and external situation of Pakistan and its exasperation as the withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan in 2014 nears.  The American War on Terror is being waged on both sides of the Durand Line. The Pakistan military’s involvement and its lack of conviction are now a reasonably well established fact.[13] There are growing apprehensions that elements in the military either lack the will to side with the US led forces or, in a worst case situation, may actively abet the transfer of not just technology but nuclear hardware to the Jihadists. The recent strikes on nuclear establishments, as mentioned earlier, and the inexplicable disappearances of key nuclear scientists, not to mention those who had recorded liaisons with the Al Qaeda, [14] remain seriously alarming episodes that do not inspire any confidence in the existing control that the Pakistan government claims to exercise over its arsenal. The hazards of nuclear weapons in extremist hands are apparent. This places serious demands on Indian force planners to develop a capability to pre-empt and to preclude such an occurrence. Given the imminent acquisition of the nuclear-tipped Babur, and the disarming strike capability that it endows, there is a pressing need to develop survivable and rapid-response mobile land vectors and compress the program for operationalizing the third leg of the triad—the submarine launch ballistic missile. In addition conventional measures to put in place surveillance facilities to detect preparation of a disarming strike and to preempt and neutralize it with precision guided munitions must form an essential part of the conventional counter-strike capability.

Conclusion 

Examination of the Chinese and Pakistan nuclear arsenals have made apparent the deliberate strategic acquisitory links and, more importantly, the symbiotic relationship between the two nuclear doctrines. On the one hand China’s dualistic approach permits her to chisel a Janus-faced policy—the one that she presents to the world at large is that of the No-First-Use, minimalistic, rigid, controlled nuclear power while the other is to retain the First Use alternative through the Pakistan arsenal. This policy has placed nuclear force planners in a quandary; not to respond is to open India to a possible failure of their second strike. The second predicament that planners in the quest for stability are confronted with is that technology intrusions into the arsenal through the acquisitory route invites covertness, but the consequent lethality and time compression that it brings about demands transparency; however, with the Pakistan apparent policy of ambiguity and deception, the methods of bringing about transparency remains trapped between the dangers of stepping closer to the abyss and the demands of policy. Yet, the future for China may force her to deny this past if her role as a global player is ever to attain integrity.

In chess, the Grandmaster understands the versatility of the pawn whether it is to defend, to protect on the offense, to transmute into the most powerful piece on the 64-squared chequered board or significantly, to sacrifice, with an eye on the larger objective of a checkmate. China must see that her global economic objective is cause enough to let go of the pawn.

Download complete article here: Shankar, The Grandmaster’s Pawn

[*] In chess the eight unassuming pawns in the hands of a skilled player present a formidable force. Their value lies in their sacrificial worth in trade-offs, the incentive—to be the Queen. Theoretically this could occur in 5 moves, a virtue that is not shared by any of the other pieces. In groups, they protect even as they counter attack. In medieval times each pawn had a distinctive character by nomenclature. Significantly, the King pawn was called the “money changer” while the Queen pawn the “doctor.”

[1] Cleary, Christine A. “Culture, Srategy and Security” p. 15, in Bolt P. and Willner A. (Eds.) China’s Nuclear Future, (Viva Books: New Delhi) 2008, pp. 13-38 and United States Department of Defence (issued by the Office of the Secretary of Defense,) “The Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,” 2008, p.8-12.

[2] Shu Guang Zhang “China’s Strategic Culture and the Cold War Confrontations” p. 271 in Reviewing the Cold War: Approaches, Interpretations and Theory, Westadd, OA (Ed.) (Frank Cass Publishers: London) 2000, pp. 258-280.

[3] Cleary, Christine A. “Culture, Srategy and Security” p. 16, in Bolt P. and Willner A. (Eds.) China’s Nuclear Future, (Viva Books: New Delhi) 2008.

[4] Chongpin Lin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition within Evolution, (Lexington: Lexington Books) 1988, p. 144.

[5] Ma, Cheng Kun, PLA News Analysis, Institute of PLA Research, FHK College, NDU, Taiwan, 2009, pp. 145-147.

[6] Bhutto, Z.A. If I am Assassinated, (Vikas: New Delhi) 1979.

[7] Chaudhary, Shahzad, “The Matter of Nuclear Doctrine,” presented at The Ottawa Dialogue, 19 Jun 2010, Copenhagen. See report on proceedings.

[8] Iqbal, Nadeem “Economic Threat may push Pakistan to go Nuclear” Asia Times Online, 6 Feb 2002, Accessed 2 Jul 2010, <http://www.atimes.com/ind-pak/DB06Df02.html.> In quoting General Kidwai, Nadeem Iqbal cites a report on Pakistan’s nuclear policy, released in January 2002, prepared by nuclear physicists Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini of Landau Network, Italy, an arms-control institution regularly consulted by the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

[9] General Aslam Beg in an interview to Cathy Gannon of the Associated Press, 14 May 2006. Quoted in “Pak Nukes Meant Only for India,” Times of India, 14 May 2006. Accessed 1 Jul 2010. <http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/us/Pak-nukes-meant-only-for-India-/articleshow/1528897.cms> The article states: “It doesn’t matter who attempts to take out Pakistan’s nuclear assets the US, Israel or any other country Pakistan will attack India in retaliation. This bizarre, hair-trigger nuclear stance is central to Pakistan’s deterrence theory and was conveyed to New Delhi by Islamabad when it suspected India and Israel of collaborating to take out its nuclear assets, a top retired Pakistani general has revealed.”

[10] Chaudhary, Shahzad, “The Matter of Nuclear Doctrine,” presented at The Ottawa Dialogue. 19 Jun 2010, Copenhagen. See report on proceedings.

[11] Ibid

[12] Cleary, Christine A. “Culture, Srategy and Security” p. 16, in Bolt P. and Willner A. (Eds.) China’s Nuclear Future, (Viva Books: New Delhi) 2008.

[13] Wikileaks.org is replete with reported episodes of a breakdown of confidence in the Pakistan military’s will to fight the war on terror.

[14] The International Institute for Strategic Studies, Nuclear Blackmarkets: Pakistan, AQ Khan and the Rise of Proliferation Networks (Arundel House: London) 2007, p.99.