Nuclear Security Summit 2014: The Penitent Preachers

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By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

 This article was first published in the author’s monthly column on the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies website

Keywords: Nuclear Security Summit 2014, United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540, Nuclear Black Market, Prague Declaration

The Nuclear Security Summit (NSS) has a singular sweeping aim: to prevent nuclear terrorism around the globe. The third of the series, which began in 2010 as a sequel to President Obama’s 2009 Prague declaration, has proclaimed an incontestable three- pronged strategy:

  • Reduce the amount of dangerous nuclear material around the world.
  • Improve security of all nuclear material and radio active sources.
  • Improve international cooperation.

Since nuclear terrorism is largely related to the ready and, at times, willing sale of nuclear material, it is ironic that the Netherlands, which is the venue for the third and penultimate summit, is also the nation that was at the centre of the nuclear black market for the closing three decades of the last century. The Dutch nuclear industry was the font of the AQ Khan illicit nuclear bazaar. The fact that the metallurgist Henk Slebos, considered the most notorious of Khan’s confederates, was charged and convicted for smuggling nuclear material and technologies to Pakistan served only four months in jail is suggestive of gravitas attached to the initiative and indeed the conviction to fight nuclear terrorism (see IISS strategic dossier on nuclear black markets, 2007). The light sentence given to other collaborating entities and personnel in Germany, Switzerland, the UK, Japan, Malaysia and Turkey hardly constitutes a credible deterrent to future networks.

Pakistan is no exception, for, observing that Khan’s foreign accomplices remain free and the nuclear world having placed commerce above security, he on political grounds remains free too. The ambivalent approach that has so far been apparent on nuclear proliferation has prompted some cynics to even suggest that the policy to set-a-thief-to-catch-one does not quite work! But this would trivialize the dangers that nuclear terrorism actually present, which President Obama, in his now celebrated Prague speech, so eloquently beseeched the world to recognize, as the “most immediate and extreme threat posed to global security”. He announced an international effort to secure vulnerable nuclear material and vowed to break up international nuclear black markets, detect and intercept unlawful nuclear material in transit and to use financial tools to disrupt illicit nuclear trade. This declaration translated to the Nuclear Security Summit.

The first summit of 2010 held in Washington formulated the “Washington Work Plan” which proposed that the participating states make a commitment to voluntarily implement the Plan consistent with and without prejudice to national laws. It took a non-binding, volitional and uncompelling approach. The Plan tendered the following twelve proposals before the 43 participating states and three organisations:

  •       Reaffirm the fundamental responsibility of States, consistent with their respective       international obligations.
  •       Call on States to work cooperatively.
  •       Recognize that highly enriched uranium and separated plutonium require special       precautions.
  •       Endeavour to fully implement all existing nuclear security commitments and work       toward acceding to those not yet joined.
  •       Support the objectives of international nuclear security instruments.
  •       Reaffirm the essential role of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the                 international nuclear security framework.
  •       Recognize the role and contributions of the United Nations.
  •       Acknowledge the need for capacity building for nuclear security and cooperation      at bilateral, regional and multilateral levels.
  •       Recognize the need for cooperation among States to effectively prevent and               respond to incidents of illicit nuclear trafficking.
  •       Recognize the continuing role of nuclear industry in nuclear security.
  •       Support the implementation of strong nuclear security practices.
  •       Recognize that measures contributing to nuclear material security have value in         relation to the security of radioactive substances also.

The second edition of the Summit was held in Seoul, South Korea. 53 heads of State attended along with four other international organisations. It built on the objectives of the Washington Work Plan and concentrated on Cooperative measures to combat the threat of nuclear terrorism, protection of nuclear materials and related facilities and prevention of illicit trafficking of nuclear materials. It set about defining specific actions to be taken by states on a non mandatory basis. Three issues stand out in the joint communiqué that was released at the end of the Summit:

  •       Time lines were put out for progressing nuclear security objectives.
  •       Nuclear security and safety were to be managed without prejudice or jeopardy         to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.
  •       Radiological terrorism was to be the subject of more rigorous preventive                     measures.

Clearly, while the outcome of the Washington Summit was long on hope and a little economical on precision which Seoul sought to remedy, neither summit could obligate conformance to the declarations.

Now what of United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1540 which was adopted in 2004 and is universal in scope, mandatory in application and recognises non-state proliferation as a threat to global peace and obliges states to modify their internal legislation? Resolution 1540 was adopted by the UNSCR not just in response to the discovery of the Abdul Qadeer Khan proliferation network but also with the aim of preventing the acquisition of nuclear, biological, chemical and radiological weapons by terrorist groups and non-state actors. Besides, it is obligatory for all UN members, whether or not they support its aims. The Resolution is a significant evolution in the history of the UN for it attempted to reconcile individual sovereignty with the needs of global security. It has faced considerable flak because many states have criticised the resolution for being cumbersome and ill-adapted to their situations. The objection is to interference by the UN in individual states’ national sovereignty, in that it obliges member states to make internal legislative changes. Opposition is also to the belief that the 15 member Council had a mandate to usurp control and stewardship of global proliferation. And yet it is abundantly clear that if action is to be taken to combat nuclear terrorism then global coordination and regulation is necessary and the only entity that is acceptable and best positioned to undertake it is the UN.

The question that now begs an answer is why then the Nuclear Security Summit? Is it not duplicating, diluting and eroding the efforts of UNSCR 1540? In balance the Summit; a one Man’s vision which has gained some traction because of its non-obligatory appeal to the ‘enlightened self interest’ of its participants (measures such as creating particularised centres of excellence and internal regulatory bodies) and yet unattractive to some due to its origins, badgering nature and without a conviction of longevity (the next summit in 2016 is the last of the series almost as if a deadline has been drawn). On the other hand is UNSCR 1540 which addresses the same issues of the Summit and has similar if enlarged objectives; in addition it is mandatory and has international legality but lacks popularity because it is seen to imply a compact with America’s war on terror. The awkward paradox is that both Summit and UNSCR 1540 are in the same boat but wearing out each others exertions!

Perhaps ‘Penitent Preachers’ will find the endeavour far more focussed and rewarding if the Summit made support to and promotion of UNSCR 1540 the single point in the agenda for its final edition in 2016.

To Lift the Painted Veil: Transparency in Nuclear Policy as the first step towards Deterrent Stability

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By Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

 This article was first published in the author’s monthly column on the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies website

Lift not the painted veil which those who live call

life: ….(for) behind lurks Fear and Hope.

                                                                                    – Percy Bysshe Shelley

The Cold War Mantra

In September 1950, responding to a directive from the President of the USA to reexamine objectives in peace and war with the emergence of the nuclear weapons capability of the Soviet Union, the Secretaries of Defense and State tabled a report titled NSC-68. This report was, in general terms, to become the mantra that guided world order till the end of the Cold War and in particular formed the source that defined and drove doctrines for the use and proliferation of nuclear weapons. As a founding policy document of contemporary world order the memorandum contrasted the fundamental design of the Authoritarian State with that of the Free State. Briefly put, the coming clash was seen as a life and death struggle between the powers of ‘evil’ with that of ‘perfection’.

NSC-68 came at a time when the previous 35 years had witnessed some of the most cataclysmic events that history was subjected to; two devastating World Wars, two revolutions that mocked the global status quo (Russia and China), collapse of 5 empires and the decline and degeneration of two imperial powers. The dynamics that brought about these changes also wrought drastic transformation in power distribution with the elements of influence, weight and the means of mass nuclear destruction having decisively gravitated to the USA and the USSR. The belief that the USSR was motivated by a fanatic communist faith antithetical to that of the West and driven by ambitions of world domination provided the logic and a verdict that conflict and violence would become endemic. And thus was presented to the world a choice to either watch helplessly the end of civilization or take sides in a “just cause” to confront the possibility of Armageddon. World order rested upon a division along ideological lines, and more importantly to our study, the formulation of a self fulfilling logic for the use of nuclear weapons. The 1950s naissance of a nuclear theology was consequently cast in the mould of armed rivalry; its nature was characterized by friction and probing peripheral conflicts. The scheme that carved the world was Containment versus burgeoning Communism. In turn rationality gave way to the threat of catastrophic force as the basis of stability.

The Quest for a New Paradigm

Crumbling of the Soviet Union in the last decade of the twentieth century and the end of the Cold War killed this paradigm. In its wake, scholarly works suggested the emergence of one world and an end to the turbulent history of man’s ideological evolution. Some saw the emergence of a multi polar order and the arrival of China. Yet others saw in the First Iraq War, the continuing war in the Levant, the admission of former Soviet satellite nations into NATO and the splintering of Yugoslavia an emerging clash of civilizations marked by violent discord shaped by cultural and civilizational similitude. However, these illusions within a decade were dispelled and found little use in understanding and coming to grips with the realities of the post Cold War world as each of them represented a candour of its own. The paradigm of the day (if there is one) is the tensions of the multi polar; the tyranny of economics; the anarchy of expectations; and a polarization along religio-cultural lines all compacted in the cauldron of globalization in a state of continuous technology agitation.

China’s Two Faced Nuclear Policy

Uncertainties of contemporary times, rise of the irrational and the multilateral nature of nuclear relationships only served to enhance the role of nuclear weapons. What it did was to blur the lines between conventional and nuclear weapons at the same time it provided a warped incentive in asymmetric situations for the lesser State to reach first for the nuclear trigger. In dealing with 4th generation threats it underscored the significance of strategic non-nuclear weapons in adding pre-emptive teeth to a deterrent relationship.

The current situation has not left the Indian situation unimpaired. The two faced nature of the Sino-Pak nuclear relationship has put pressure on the No First Use (NFU) doctrine that that has shaped India’s policy and indeed its arsenal. For China’s stated NFU policy hides the First Use intent of Pakistan that the former has so assiduously nurtured. Forgetting the actuality of an enfeebled Pakistan civilian leadership incapable of action to remove the military finger from the nuclear trigger; the active involvement of non-state actors in military strategy and an alarming posture of an intention-to-use have the makings of a global nuclear nightmare. The Pak proxy gives to China doctrinal flexibility, it unfortunately also makes the severance of the Nuclear from the Conventional a thorny proposition that even China must know can boomerang on its aspirations.

Deterrent Stability: the First Step Transparency

We note thus far that nuclear relations in the region have been bedeviled by a persistent effort to combat the monsters that shrouds of covertness and perilous liaisons have cast; it has left us the unenviable task of, once again, permitting rationality to give way to the threat of catastrophic force as the basis of stability. It is time we saw the dangers of an Armageddon and embrace the opportunity that transparency presents as a first step towards deterrent stability and in the process to lift the precarious veil that is edging the Indo-Sino-Pak nuclear correlation to the precipice.

To Take the Road Less Travelled By*: Nuclear Risk Reduction Measures

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Transcript of a presentation made to the Chaophraya Dialogue in February 2012.

By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

Keywords: Nuclear Risk Assessment, South Asia Nuclearization, Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Anti-Ballistic Missile Defense System, NFU doctrine

The Problem

The real problem with nuclear weapons risk reduction is the ability to convince decision makers that no conceivable advantage can be achieved from a nuclear exchange; for, as long as one side believes that there is some value to be had through the deployment and use of nuclear weapons, uncertainties and imponderables creep in that sets into motion a chain reaction that continuously aggravates and raises the degree of risk.

Military planners are more than familiar with the fact that risk assessment is an imperative in the development of a strategic plan. The process of its generation is marked by the persistent motivation to not only eliminate uncertainties and bring about balance in the Objectives-Resource-Means equation but also to ensure that the probability of success and the benefits that accrue far outweigh the hazards of failure. However, the abiding conundrum is that the very nature of warfare is in opposition to such precision.

Nuclear Risk Assessment

When we enter the nuclear arena we must note that strategic imbalance is intrinsic to the Objectives-Resources-Means relationship. From the very start, the equation is irrevocably in a state of unstable equilibrium caused by the fact that whatever means are used the impact will invariably be to obliterate the very objectives or interests that were sought to be achieved. This is the reality of nuclear weapons. Its value lies in its non usage; its aim is, nuclear war avoidance; its futility is, in attempting to use it to attain political goals. 

Strategic Collaboration

Strategic collaboration with a potential enemy is not a concept that comes naturally to the military planner. Tradition is against it and the very idea of sovereignty militates at the thought of it. Nonetheless it can be no nation’s case to destroy the very purpose that polity set out to achieve. Nuclear weapons have put us on a razors edge in part because of our inability to control the manner in which political events and technology are driving the direction nuclear weapon policies and arsenals are headed. While technology invites covertness; the lethality, precision, stealth and time compression that it has wrought demands transparency. Demarcation between custodian and controller and central control are imperatives if at all the risks of an unintended exchange are to be averted and stability of a deterrent relationship assured. The belief that escalation control of a nuclear conflict is possible lacks conviction and therefore any attempt to conventionalise nuclear weapons has to be abhorred.

The Descent to Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW)

The absence of transparency manifests itself in ‘speculative bulges’ in the arsenal. The direction in which arsenals are headed with the induction of the ‘Nasr’, ‘Babur’ and the ‘Raad’ is a grim reminder of the upshot of ambiguity and opacity both in policy and control and the risks of a descent to nuclear war fighting becomes a near certainty.

Strategic planners in Pakistan suggest that nuclear weapons have an inalienable place in their military strategy and therefore a flexible response of both the conventional and the nuclear is the order of things. Also, ambiguities and the threat of first use are central to the ‘absence’ of a declared doctrine. Add to this is the actuality of an enfeebled civilian leadership incapable of action to remove the military finger from the nuclear trigger, the active involvement of non-state actors in military strategy and an alarming posture of an intention-to-use all have the makings of a nuclear nightmare in the offing.

Cardinal Principles Governing Risk Reduction

We are now in a position to enunciate some of the cardinal principles that govern risk reduction in the nuclear situation that obtains in the subcontinent:

  • Abiding belief in nuclear war avoidance.
  • Clarity in strategic underpinnings, establishment of coordination centres and a rejection of ambiguities.
  • Stability of the deterrent relationship.
  • Transparency in policy, technology intrusions, intent and alerts.
  • Abhorrence of a descent to tactical nuclear weapons, conventionalising and nuclear war fighting.
  • Centralised command and control with a clear demarcation between Custodian and Controller.

Against the backdrop of what ought to be, an examination of whether nuclear risk reduction measures (NRRM) currently address the rigorous demands of donning the mantle of nuclear weapon states that too in an adversarial predisposition and geographically co-located within a few minutes flight time from each other; the answer must come in the negative. What is striking is that despite several incidents over the last decade and a half that could have escalated to the nuclear level the security establishments on both sides have not set themselves to the task of preparing concrete perspectives on the issue of nuclear risk reduction barring endorsing the principle. Currently the only meaningful risk reduction measure in place is mutual notification of ballistic missile flight tests.

NRRM Measures

There are several NRRMs that can be put in place without in anyway radically altering the material situation. These may be identified as follows:

  • Making transparent strategic and doctrinal underpinnings of nuclear forces and the purpose of technological intrusions.
  • De-alerting of nuclear weapon systems; while this may not be easily verifiable, the process may begin by notifying at all times the alert state of nuclear forces.
  • Making transparent a minimalistic approach by declaring ‘how much is enough’.
  • Developing a common lexicon and understanding of nuclear concepts.
  • Rejecting short range nuclear missiles and the descent to tactical nuclear weapons.
  • Setting up of surveillance and risk reduction centres that provide communication and coordination for implementing these measures

The Value of Ambiguity

The policy of nuclear ambiguity was brought to prominence when Prime Minister Levi Eshkol in 1966 stated that ‘Israel would not be the first to introduce nuclear weapons into the region’. Four red lines were linked to its use. These included successful Arab military penetration; destruction of Israeli Air Force; cities attacked by WMD and use of N-Weapons.  It served as Israel’s ultimate guarantor of security.

The value of ambiguity lies in opacity of policy and an unwillingness to disclose status of the weapon program. When disclosure has occurred and a nation has declared its nuclear weapon status in an ambience of multilateralism, ambiguity loses value and increases the hazards of the unintended. For inherent to an ambiguous policy is its tendency to take advantage of risk aversion, a bedrock of a deterrent relationship (this underscores the Pakistan position).

Indistinctness in policy, when TNWs are in the arsenal immediately suggests that conventional principles apply. Resulting in actions that are contradictory to stated policies which in turn provide an incentive for speculative bulges in arsenal and for opting for a first strike capability/counter force capability on the part of the adversary.

Ambiguity has been used as an offset for conventional inferiority with the belief that control over escalation is possible. This is so obviously a fallacy due to the nature of the weapon. Also its effect in disrupting stability is apparent and the ability to bargain or negotiate is greatly diminished since the potential adversary begins with the assumption of a worst case and accordingly builds his arsenal. Ambiguity must thus be seen as an agent in direct opposition to achieving a stable deterrent relationship.

Technology intrusions coupled with ambiguity of intent increases the hazard quotient geometrically and will make the demand for transparency more urgent if a stable deterrent relationship is the aim.

ABMs
In theory the Anti Ballistic Missile is a defensive system, yet its introduction can not only provoke destabilisation in a deterrent relationship but also can provide the incentive for unpredictability. Where doctrinal underpinnings are similar and the basis of stability is mutually assured destruction, then ABMs would be a destabilising factor for a variety of reasons; chief amongst them is that it undermines the strategic underpinnings of the arsenal and it provides the incentive to launch a first strike.

However, in a situation where a No First Use policy is faced with ambiguity or a First Use situation or there is wide variance in approach to establishing a deterrent relationship, the acquisition of an ABM capability makes strategic sense because of the ‘failure conundrum’ and imponderables that play on the planners mind.

Conclusion

The only way to reduce the risks involved of a nuclear exchange is to convince decision makers that no conceivable advantage can accrue from its use. Its only purpose is to deter its own use. Any attempt to conventionalise the weapon runs the risk of not only decentralising control increasing the risk of unintended application, but also of losing escalatory control and destroying the purpose of polity.

The genii cannot be put back in the lamp, what can be done is to take the road less travelled by and put in place measures that promote transparency, understanding and  de-alerting of nuclear forces.

_________________________

*Frost, Robert. “Two roads diverge in a wood, and I took the one less travelled by, and that has made all the difference”.