Category Archives: Nuclear Issues

The Elephant and the Dilemma of Nuclear Force Planning

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By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

This article was first published by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in April 2013.

Keywords: South Asia Nuclearization, Sino-Pak relations, India’s Nuclear Doctrine, Deterrence Stability, Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program

One of the open secrets of the Indian security establishment is the evolution of its nuclear weapons capability. The process did not follow any established norms that guide the discernment of theory into a security strategy or the rendition of technology into a nuclear stockpile. Rather, its development was driven by a single-point politico-scientific coterie stirred by the Department of Atomic Energy (DAE) and Defence Research and Development Organisation (DRDO) combine. The leadership neither saw strategic significance in a more eclectic approach nor clarity that a theory did not endanger political ideology or scientific savvy, but was an instrument to fertilise both.

From Indian folklore, a story is told of six blind men and an elephant. The allegory underscores the limits of individual perceptions when left in stove pipes without an integrating hypothesis. Viewed in perspective of the enormous destructive power of the nuclear weapon, now in the hands of the new “destroyer of worlds”, it presented a terrifying and unspeakable nature of the truth, much as the elephant to the blind. To marry political issues and technological capabilities with military operational practices was the unheeded scream of the previous quarter of a century.

It was only after Pokhran II in 1998 and the Kargil episode that the real nature of nuclear weapons was emphasized and the imperative of military involvement dawned on the establishment. This realisation took the form of a declared nuclear doctrine with a classified section that drew a roadmap for enabling and operationalizing a ‘No First Use’ doctrine. Born of the desire not to repeat the Cold War experience, and a belief in Brodie’s maxim that nuclear weapons had changed the nature of warfare; nuclear war avoidance became primary to the political objective. While this critical discernment was slow in the offing and the product of a tangled approach, there can be no denying its rational strength and its progression.

A deterrent relationship is a balance founded on rationality. On the part of the ‘deterree’, there is rationality in the conviction of disproportionate risks of hostile action; and on the part of the ‘deterrer’, there is rationality of purpose and transparency in confirming the reality of the risks involved in a manner that strategic miscalculations are avoided. The exceptional feature of this transaction is that the roles are reversible, provided it is in the common interest to maintain stability, and this is where the sub-continental rub lies when the search for equilibrium is one-sided.

Pakistan’s quest for nuclear weapons is visceral in urge, India-specific in intent and ‘at-any-cost’ in motivation. It serves to explicate (and vindicate) the bizarre extent of the AQ Khan network’s exertions, and its clandestine nuclear links with China and North Korea. Therefore, unique and intriguing to the nuclear cauldron is the tri-polar nature of the playing field, with China and Pakistan in a collusive arrangement. Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program was conceived, designed, and tested by Beijing from the mid-1970s onwards. In conjunction with all this is the rapid pace at which the Khushab reactors (II and III in particular) have come on-line and weapon grade plutonium is being extracted with active and persistent Chinese aid. Collaboration, technological updates, the breakneck build-up of fissile material and production and extraction facilities may even suggest a doctrinal co-relation, which any deterrent relationship overlooks at the peril of its constancy.

No meaningful scrutiny of the sub-continental nuclear situation can avoid looking at the internal workings of Pakistan. What has caused this situation is the fixation with achieving military parity with India, and the precarious cocktail that the establishment has brewed in nurturing fundamentalist and terrorist organisations as instruments of their policies in Afghanistan and Kashmir. This policy has blown back to the extent that it is more than plausible that elements of the nuclear arsenal could well fall into extremist hands, aided by sympathetic rogue elements in the military. The recent happenings at Abbottabad, the Plutonium rush, the assault on PNS Mehran, the conventionalising of the Hatf-9 missile, the descent to tactical nuclear weapons, and the continued opacity of strategic underpinnings of their nuclear programme defies rationality and does not in any way engender confidence in the prospects for stability. Added to all this is US Secretary of State Kerry’s recent insinuation in Beijing of Pakistan’s nuclear links with North Korea (while oddly down playing China’s role) that attached nuclear perfidy to an already vexed situation. Such ‘hare’ like nimbleness in nuclear matters, as Michael Krepon has termed it, could also suggest an incredulous belief on the part of Pakistani leadership in being able to control the escalatory nuclear ladder. This they must know is a fallacy, given the yawning power asymmetry that exists.

We stand today on the cusp of a ‘Strangelovesque’ situation caused in part by the reluctance to control the manner in which technology and political events are driving the direction in which arsenals are headed, and in part due to lack of transparency. This is the predicament that is faced by nuclear force planners. There does not appear to be any other answer than to readjust nuclear postures, turn back the clock on tactical nuclear weapons, and retune doctrines with the aim of bringing about balance in posture. Policy must accommodate the reality of the tri-polar situation and the need for ‘convincing reassurances’ on the matter of rogue players.

(Written as part of a collection of commentaries by various scholars on Nuclearization in South Asia, hosted by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies. To follow the rest of the debate, visit: http://www.ipcs.org/article/india/india-pakistan-and-the-nuclear-race-the-elephant-and-the-3881.html)

THE COURSE FROM CYRUS TO TAQQIYA*: Iran’s ‘National Character’ and the Current Nuclear Crisis

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 Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

Abstract:

The question of whether Iran will make the bomb is a vexed one. In balance are the unrelenting sanctions, the inexorable push to pariah status and the imminence of military action on the one hand, while on the other, is a chimerical power status that not only serves to satisfy civilizational urges but also fulfils its perceived destiny as the dominant regional player. This article examines the impact of Iran’s “national character,” as inferred through the prism of history and contemporary polity, on the current nuclear crisis and thereafter scans the larger strategic context that Iran is faced with. The article concludes with a short-term prognostication.

Keywords: Asymmetric warfare, Break-out capability, Dualism in central authority, IAEA and Iran, Iran nuclear program and proliferation, Iran strategic context, National character, Persian vs. Islamic identity, US 2007 NIE, US-Iran relations.

Download full article here: Shankar, The Course from Cyrus to Taqqiya

Excerpts:  

Introduction: The Weight and Substance of History

In 539 BCE, one of the most successful yet extraordinary sieges in the history of warfare was brought to conclusion when Cyrus the Great invested Babylon. Cyrus was an emperor of a mould that the ancient world had not witnessed. Rather than a head-on against an impregnable yet magnificent fortification, he chose not just the timing (to penetrate the city defences during a period of night long festivities and revelry) but also to harness nature by diverting the Euphrates as it coursed through the city and entering when the river level fell below its walls unchallenged. The city, historians report, fell without any significant resistance.[i] Babylon was the Jewel in Cyrus’s crown. His Achaemenid Empire now spanned from the Indus in the East to Sardis and Lydia in Asia Minor and Egypt in the West. What characterised Cyrus’ empire and gave it distinct features that set it apart from the empires of antiquity was its tolerance, its abhorrence of barbarity and pillage and most importantly the setting up of a humane organisational and administrative core. All this was embodied in training and Persian polity,[ii] which was sensitive to the historical and diverse cultural context within which the Empire flourished and drew sustenance.

 The golden period of Cyrus the Great was followed by a cycle of continuous turmoil when Persia was overrun frequently and had its territorial contours ravaged and reshaped through the centuries. Invaded and occupied by Greeks, Parthians, Sassanids, Ottomans, Arabs, Mongols and often drawn into and distressed by the affairs and struggles of great powers, Persia has tenuously held on to its past and its civilizational identity. The Islamic conquest of the land (633-656 AD), however, marked a turning point in the history of Persia for it not only vigorously introduced a new subjugating spiritual persuasion, but also influenced the rulers’ temporal right to make laws. Significantly it fractured the cultural soul of the people. The social dynamics that were set into motion were dominated by an abiding tension between the deep rooted Persian distinctiveness and the new Islamic identity; this stimulus is most apparent in its dealings with other nations and remains to this day.

  After a near millennium of occupation and political turmoil, the Saffavid dynasty (1501-1736 AD) reunified Persia proclaiming Shi’a Islam as the ordained religion of the Empire.[iii] Persia during this period underwent a revival; some historians credit the Saffavids for founding the modern State of Iran giving shape to its geographic frontiers[iv] and controlling the day-to-day influence of religion to an extent unknown in other Islamic lands.[v]

By the middle of the 16th century the Saffavid rule had passed its zenith. Lavish life styles, slowdown in economic activity, poor governance, uncontrolled rebellions, insecure frontiers and the territorial opportunities that Persia’s imperial rivals (Russian Czars and the Ottomans) saw in the anarchic situation within, all contributed to the disintegration of the empire. A warlord from Khorasan, Nadir Shah, restored some semblance of order when in 1736 he deposed the last of the Saffavids and crowned himself Shah. However his oppressive reign was short lived and once again gave way to a period of internal strife and civil war.

[…]

Scars of History on ‘National Character’

The ‘rhythm of a continuous civilization’ of cycles of disintegration and growth[vi] has not left Iran unscarred. The rallies and routs that its people have been witness to through history have had four significant effects:

  • Firstly it has left the body politic fractured between ‘Monarchists’, ‘Islamists’ and the ‘Nationalists.’
  • Secondly, it has generated abiding tensions between Persian and Islamic identities the former repelling the latter not only in the idea of an Islamic world state but also the distinction between Arab culture and Persian tradition.
  • The establishment of Shi’ism in Persia and the consolidation of Clerical power was a subtext to a dual system of authority.
  •  Lastly, the inability to reconcile the geographic fact of an ancient civilization surrounded by Arab States (more a result of recent colonial delineation consequent to the breakdown of the Ottoman Empire). This conflicting reality juxtaposed with periods of subjugation, works in contradiction with self images of past pre-eminence.

The factors discussed thus far have left an unerring impression on the Iranian psyche, their cultural values and indeed traits of “national character.” The focus of this article is to examine the impact of Iran’s “national character” as inferred (without meaning to create a caricature of a cultural stereotype and thereafter develop a theory found on it) on the current nuclear crisis and touch upon the larger strategic context that it is faced with and then flesh out an argument that would serve to prognosticate the future.

[…]

Prognostication as a Conclusion 

The perils of prognostication are palpable, yet one draws inspiration from Keynes when he suggested (while prognosticating) that he “…would rather be vaguely right than precisely wrong”.

The problem for Iran with a nuclear breakout using safeguarded facilities and rapid translation to attaining a de-facto nuclear weapon status is, the high probability of early detection, which would invite a military strike on all known nuclear infrastructure. One way to avoid a strike and yet persist with the programme is to maintain an entirely covert parallel programme. The other is to divert low enriched uranium from safeguarded facilities (Natanz) to a clandestine enrichment plant to achieve weapon grade fuel. The decision to go one way or the other will not be the outcome of deliberate decision making; on the contrary it may come as a desperate reaction to the worsening internal conditions or just be a populist act swayed more by historical swagger and visceral antagonism. In the latter eventuality, the Islamists, the Monarchists and the Nationalists may find common truck. It is this will to perceived self eminence that draws strength from the past.

The episode of the 2007 American NIE on Iran and its divisive effect on the Islamic world is a telling occurrence in the clash between Persian distinctiveness and the Islamic identity. After all, which other historical event has brought the Arabs on the same side of the fence as Israel? Therefore to bank on the Islamic world to influence Iranian decision making is and will continue to be a pipe dream.

In 2008, with sanctions severely hurting, oil revenues at an all time low (which earlier contributed 80% of GDP) and practically all major global players ranged in opposition, or at least not with it, conventional wisdom would have suggested that the Ahmadinejad regime along with the clerical order was on the verge of imploding. But that did not happen despite the pressures and privations that inflicted the nation and the people. In fact, Ahmadinejad was re-elected to the presidency in 2009, the religious establishment came through unscathed and the Monarchists and the Nationalists were marginalised. The explanation lies in the separation and yet symbiotic relationship between Shi’ism and the political Islamist order, the two existing in mutual reinforcement against what was seen to be the common oppressor. This correlation goes back historically to the establishment of Shi’ism and how the consolidation of clerical power was a part of a dual system of the power of the State under the Saffavids.

The question of whether Iran will make the bomb is a vexed one. In balance are the unrelenting sanctions, the inexorable push to pariah status and the imminence of military action on the one hand, while on the other, is a chimerical power status that not only serves to satisfy civilizational urges but also fulfils its perceived destiny as the dominant regional player. And what of the other Gulf States and neighbours, particularly Saudi Arabia, which on 10th February 2012 gave notice of its elaborate nuclear programme and did not rule out a weapons agenda?[vii] While this may have a domino effect on regional proliferation, it could also develop into a deterrent relationship in-region through the removal of nuclear inequity (an idea whose time may well have arrived). The difficulty with a resolution that takes such a tack is the conflict that it will arouse with the status quo powers that are more than likely to ensure that the current balance is not upset even if it means resort to a conventional clash. The more pressing anxiety is the coming of the next nuclear age when erosion of proliferation regimes presents increased probability of clandestine networks delivering the bomb to non-state actors, at which time prevention and pre-emption,  are the only rejoinders.

Despite the Byzantine nature of things, Iran has persevered with the belief that the most credible way to counter and buttress non-intervention in regional affairs is to attain nuclear weapon status. Notwithstanding this conviction, she has skilfully avoided a head on situation with the USA. Iran has also observed certain clear redlines when supporting militias in the Middle East in terms of hardware supplied and the groups supported. In their nuclear policy, Iran has found the means to challenge the USA in the latter’s contradictory approach to countering proliferation; of invading Iraq, cutting a deal with Pakistan, imposing sanctions on Iran, seeking a regime change in North Korea and indeed, turning a blind eye to Israel. In this unpredictable setting, nuclear weapons or even an unambiguous break out capability not only provides balance to a strategic posture but would also extract more concessions and more incentives from America and the West. The fact that Iran has progressed uranium enrichment levels from 3.5% to near 20% and has stockpiled over 1000 kg of low enriched uranium,[viii] while within the stipulations of the NPT, would suggest that Iran may well build for itself an unremitting ‘break out’ capability stopping a step short of weaponising and yet at the same time giving notice of a looming potential.                                                                             

Download full article here: Shankar, The Course from Cyrus to Taqqiya

[*] From Shi’ite theology; would suggest deception for a just cause. Taqqiya in concept means to protect oneself or those under one’s care from harm. Similar ethical tenets are to be found in other religious texts including those of Hinduism, Judaism and Confucianism. The idea is driven by a non-binaristic approach to ethical obligations in extreme circumstances.

[i] ‘Cyropaedia of Xenophon; The Life of Cyrus the Great’. The siege of Babylon Book 7, Section 5 (7.5.1 to 7.5.70)

[ii] Ibid 1.2.15 “….Thus the elders form a college every member of which has passed through the full circle of noble learning; and this is that Persian polity and that Persian training which in their belief, can win them the flower of excellence”.

[iii] Savory R, ‘Iran under the Saffavid’s, Cambridge, UK, 1980.

[iv] Aksin, Somel Selcuk, Historical Dictionary of the Ottoman Empire, Scarecrow Press Inc. 2003, pg 306. Treaty of Zuhab 17 May 1639, was an accord signed between the Ottoman and Saffavid Empires demarcating and dividing disputed territories.

[v] Amir, Said Arjoman, ‘The Turban for the Crown’ the Islamic revolution in Iran, Oxford University Press, pg12.

[vi] Toynbee J. Arnold. A Study of History, Abridgement of Volumes I-VI by DC Sommervell pg 360-368. Oxford University Press New York 1950.

[vii] As quoted by Saudi Prince Turki al-Faisal in Webb, Susan, “Saudi Arabia going Nuclear—Why no Uproar?” peoplesworld.org, 10 Feb 2012.

[viii] Albright, David ; Stricker, Andrea and Walrond,Christina. “ISIS Analysis of IAEA Iran Safeguards Report, 25 May 2012”.

Staring Down an Abyss(*): Prospects of Nuclear Deterrent Stability in the Sino-South Asian Region

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Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar 

Keywords: Nuclear deterrent stability, China, “How Much is Enough?” India’s Nuclear Doctrine

Download full article here: Shankar, Staring Down an Abyss

Excerpts:

The Nuclear Motive

Nuclearisation of the South Asian region was driven by forces that were vastly different from that which resulted in the apocalyptical human tragedies of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The first four nuclear weapon states built their arsenal with a war-fighting logic which led to strategies that not only propagated the first use but also conventionalized the weapon, with the perverse belief that control of escalation was within their means. The uninhibited intrusion of technologies gave to them the power to obliterate the world many times over in a  ‘Strangelovesque[i]’ parody that mocked life.

Motivation for the Sino-Indo-Pak arsenals was more by the need for an impermeable defensive shield that took inspiration from Brodie’s aphorism that nuclear weapons had changed the very character of warfare with war avoidance rather than waging being the political objective. India’s nuclear doctrine evolved from four guiding norms. The first was that the nation would not be the first to use nuclear weapons. The second, a nuclear first strike would invite an assured massive retaliation. There was a third equally critical unwritten faith and that was, under no circumstance would the weapon be conventionalized. The final canon, it is significant to note, developed in the time of the Cold War and yet remained uniquely divorced from the one norm that characterized that war, that is, the illogical faith that a nuclear war was not only wageable but also winnable. This last principle matured into an iron cast division between the Controller of the weapon and its Custodian.

The decision not to conventionalize, was based on circumstances unique to the Indian State. India’s nuclear program was conceived and executed through a techno-political decision made in 1948, which resulted in the establishment of the Indian Atomic Energy Commission. From then onwards through the 1974 euphemistic peaceful nuclear explosion and the near quarter century of dithering till India declared herself a nuclear weapon state in 1998, the agenda was driven by a techno-politico-bureaucratic nexus. The paradox was the absence of formal military involvement in the nuclear establishment till after 1998. Significantly, no other nuclear weapon state has embarked on a weapons program without the direct and persistent involvement of the military. All this was a direct consequence of the post partition aberration in higher defence management which suffered from a misplaced trepidation of military control of the state and the flawed belief that civilian control of the military not only implied superior dual control by the politico-bureaucratic alliance but also a self fashioned conviction that military matters were essentially of execution and had little to do with policy making or strategic planning. It was not till 1999 when the Kargil review committee and the consequent group of ministers reviewed national security in its entirety, that substantial changes to higher defence management in India were put in place. The institution of the Strategic Forces Command and its Commander in Chief along with a doctrine to operationalise the deterrent were amongst the salient reforms.

Of the techno-politico-bureaucratic nexus it must be said that even before the articulation of the nuclear doctrine it never sought a conventional role for nuclear weapons. Whether this strategic orientation was by instinct, design, by tradition or an innate fear of the power of the military is really not germaine to our study; what it did do was to create a distinctive approach to the entire process of operationalising the deterrent, for it played a decisive role in separating Controller from the Custodian. Viewed from a different perspective this last feature expressed the conviction that, between nuclear armed antagonists, the use of nuclear weapons sets into motion an uncontrollable chain of mass destruction that not only defies manipulation but also obliterates the very purpose of polity.

[…]

India’s Nuclear Doctrine

India’s nuclear doctrine was made public on 4th January 2003. The doctrine presents two perspectives. The first part deals with ‘Form’ with nuclear exchange avoidance and minimality as governing considerations. Sensitivity to the multilateral nature of settings and yet not show a diffidence to the existential nuclear challenges that marked the regional scenario; was intrinsic to policy. Credibility as a function of surveillance, effectiveness, readiness and survivability completed the structure. The doctrine provided for alternatives and a guarantee that the second strike would cause unacceptable damage. Also included are certain philosophical goals that underscored belief in the ultimate humanity of things.

The second part of the doctrine deals with substance, with operationalising the deterrent and Command and Control as the main themes. Development of the ‘triad’ is so structured that credibility was neither compromised nor readiness undermined. As mentioned earlier a clear division is made between the Controller and Custodian with multiple redundancy and dual release authorization at every level. Command of the arsenal under all circumstances remains under a political prerogative with comprehensive alternatives provided for the nuclear command authority. To recapitulate the salient features of the Indian nuclear doctrine are listed below:-

  • Nuclear weapons are political tools,
  • The nuclear policy follows a ‘Punishment Strategy’. Its governing principle would be No First Use.
  • Retaliation to a first strike would be massive and would cause unacceptable damage.
  • The use of chemical, biological or other WMD may invite nuclear option.
  • Nuclear weapons will not be used against non nuclear weapon states.
  • A unilateral moratorium against nuclear testing and continued stringent controls over proliferation.
  • The goal of global nuclear disarmament remains.

As mentioned earlier, a deterrent relationship is founded entirely on rationality. On the part of the deteree there is rationality in the conviction of disproportionate risks and on the side of the deterrer rationality of purpose and transparency in confirming the reality of risks. The exceptional feature of this cognitive transaction is that the roles are reversible with the crucial proviso that it is in the common interest to maintain equilibrium in the relationship. The determinants of a durable deterrent co-relation are for the association to withstand three pressures that are an abiding feature of contemporary politics in the region:

  • The deterrent must be stable by which is implied the doctrinaire underpinnings; command, control and arsenal stewardship must be unwavering and transparent. Inconsistencies and opacity promotes unpredictability, a speculative bulge in the arsenal or the temptation for pre-emptive action.
  • Crisis stability entails the abhorrence of a predilection to reach for the nuclear trigger at first provocation. In this context decision time must give adequate leeway for recognition of having arrived at a ‘redline’ through transparency and unambiguous signaling.
  •  Technological intrusions place the planner on the horns of a dilemma. As a rule technology’s impact on the arsenal and command and control systems serves to compress time and increase overall effectiveness. This intrusion is inevitable. What is undesirable is that it also invites covertness whereas its impact demands transparency.

The three dynamics above have a common thread which could be exploited to enhance stability. This common thread is the need for transparency. During the cold war the two protagonists managed these dynamics through the brute power of the arsenal, dangerous tripwire readiness and incessant provocative deployment. Any solution on these lines is neither exceptional nor tenable and from a contemporary point of view ludicrous. If stability is the aim then clarity and precision in mutual dealings provide the opportunity to develop and solidify the deterrent relationship.

Stresses on Deterrent Stability

There is an entire range of factors that influence stability of a deterrent relationship but those that disproportionately prevail are what will be discussed in the ensuing paragraphs. We begin with the strategic environment and its external dimension. A single hyper power marks the global situation in the wake of the curtains coming down on the Cold War. In addition, the trends of globalization which technology and the mushrooming of democracies has ushered in, makes for the very concept of nation states in terms of their absolute sovereignty a shaky proposition. Three very obvious inconsistencies remain an abiding source of friction for a sovereign nation within the international system. In fact it makes a mockery of the individual nature of a state’s power and its interests. These three maybe summarized as follows:

  • The internal dimension of sovereignty encourages centralism at a point in history when more plurality and democracy is demanded.
  • Sovereignty in its external avatar makes inconceivable international laws and universal regulations yet it is precisely the opposite that globalization requires.
  • Given the vast differentials in military and economic power, sovereignty in terms of supremacy of state remains a chimerical concept. This is vitiated by the networked and globalized nature of the contemporary situation.

Centralism, the absence of plurality and the vast disparity in economic and military power are all symptomatic of the situation in the region. Add to the equation a defacto military center of power that has persisted in the use of non-state actors in pursuit of its ‘national interests’[ii] and the portents of instability become more than apparent. The impact of these contradictory forces taken together not only makes for an unstable relationship, but also brings in a measure of nuclear multilateralism on account of the chain reaction that is set into motion in an action-reaction situation. While the lone hyper power would seek to control the action-reaction predicament, the other poles in the global scenario would seek advantage in it. The fact of the Sino-Pak collusion in the nuclear field is one such manifestation while the NPG waiver is another symptom of the same. The necessity is to cause strategic equilibrium in a manner in which the realities of the regional situation interplays with the external environment. The one virtue that would serve to bring about balance is transparency.

The next consideration is internal pulls and pressures that the protagonists are subject to. These often defy rationality and tend to serve an agenda that loses sight of purpose of the nuclear deterrent, that is, nuclear war avoidance and, as has been stated by the governments, a repugnance for a nuclear arms race in the cold war mode. Unfortunately, the effect of these internal dynamics is not just to enlarge the arsenal but to drive it in a direction that is neither predictable nor over which controls exist.

The impending mounting of nuclear warheads on the Babur cruise missiles, the work in progress of arming conventional submarines with nuclear tipped missiles are cases in point which do not in anyway uphold stability of a deterrent relationship. Additionally they do not conform to any strategic or doctrinal underpinnings (whose goal is nuclear war avoidance). Far more disturbing is Pakistan’s declared policy to employ non-state actors[iii] as an essential part of their military strategy. Given the fact that both control and custody of the nuclear arsenal is resident with the military and complicity with terrorist organizations such as the Lashkar-e-Tayyiba is an indispensable part of their gambit, the probability of a failure of orthodox command and control (as conventional wisdom understands it) is cataclysmically high. Such a state of affairs hardly engenders confidence in a deterrent relationship remaining stable. Add to this cauldron the impending operationalising of tactical nuclear weapons and you have the nightmare morph into reality.

“How Much is Enough?” and the Philosophy of Avoidance

Security anxieties that plague the region are fed on a staple of historical suspicions, absence of trust and a stultifying and obsessive paranoia. It places before the planner a lopsided and unbalanced ‘failure conundrum,’ having the potential to spur ‘speculative bulges’ in stockpile of fissile material and in the arsenal all in search of an answer to that open ended inscrutable question of ‘how much is enough?’ Logic for numbers may be found provided the strategic underpinnings that govern the development of the arsenal are kept verifiably transparent. One such logic to cap arsenals is graphically illustrated below:

[…]

Conclusion: Out Staring an Abyss

The challenge before us is clear. To put the genie back into the bottle is neither realistic nor a proposition that merits serious consideration. Areas that could be addressed begin with dispelling the veil of opacity that surrounds the nuclear deterrent. Technology intrusions that have put the arsenal on a hair trigger must be subjected to a safety catch through the instruments of transparency and the removal of ambiguities in strategic underpinnings. NCA to NCA communications must be conditioned by institutional verification measures that evaluate and exchange risks and alert status. It is only such devices that will enable strategic restraint to be realized in the region. While these remain the broad objectives, the first series of steps on the road to stability maybe specifically identified as follows:

  • Transparency in strategic underpinnings (including collusion) through the declaration of doctrinal canons must be made unambiguously clear.
  • Command and Control of the deterrent must differentiate between the custodian and the controller as also between the conventional and the nuclear without entertaining the possibility of non-state actors being a part of the overall strategy.
  • Technological intrusions must be made transparent both with a rationale and the impact on arsenals particularly so when the dangers of conventionalizing of the nuclear weapon becomes manifest.
  • Alert status of the deterrent at all times must be communicated. Logic for stockpile or fissile material and numbers and nature of arsenal will serve to eliminate the dangers of speculative bulges.

Thus far nuclear relations in the region have been bedeviled by a persistent effort to combat the monsters that the shroud of covertness has cast; it has left us the unenviable task of out staring an abyss. Nietzche in the circumstance would have advised an assault  on the first causes – dispel opacity.

Download full article here: Shankar, Staring Down an Abyss

_____________

[*] Nietzche F. Beyond good and evil, Chapter IV: Apophthegms and Interludes. He who fights with monsters should be careful lest he thereby become a monster. And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee.

[i] Dr Strangelove was a Hollywood satire directed by Stanley Kubrick set in the nineteen sixties. The insanity of the tripwire readiness of the American nuclear establishment to initiate a process that sets of a chain reaction which culminates in a nuclear holocaust. The real tragedy in this spoof was the dangers of decentralization and pre delegation, so to the inabilities to control escalation. The irony was that there was no real provocation.

[ii] US Secretary of State cable-30 Nov. BBC.co.uk/news. Wikileaks key issues

[iii]    General Kayani’s statements with respect to Pakistan’s army’s support to militants as quoted in The Hindu 02 Dec., 2010