Category Archives: Maritime Security

Warship Building and the Professional Patron

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“…all carpenters, blacksmiths and other artificers are prohibited being employed in the building of boats…” [1]

By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

Keywords: Indian Warship building, Indigenous Shipbuilding, Higher Defence Management and Shipbuilding, Indian Maritime Doctrine, Naval Design Bureau

This article was first published in the April 2013 issue of Geopolitics Magazine

Death of Private Indian Shipbuilding—An Improbable Preamble
In November 1788 an intriguing order was passed by the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company. On the one hand it sounded the death knell for private shipbuilding activities in Bengal; while on the other, it underscored the strategic linkage between economic power as a function of British colonial venture, and the challenges that an opposing maritime capability may pose to it.[2] Specifically, it prohibited ship construction of any nature on pain of physical punishment and forfeiture of properties; but far more insidious was the systematic obliteration of a vocation and the skills intrinsic to it by targeting blacksmiths, carpenters and artificers who were singled out for special retribution.[3] The shipbuilding industry, through this instrument passed into the hands of the colonists, worked to its bidding and grew under its decree. Whether it was the shipyard at Bombay or Calcutta, their purpose was to service The Company’s enterprise, and in time the Crown’s imperial ambitions.

Ancient India was one of the leading maritime nations of the day. The tidal dock at Lothal which dates to 2300 BCE stands in testimony to the vibrancy of the tradition. It had colonies in Cambodia, Java, Sumatra, Borneo and Socotra. Indian traders had established settlements in Southern China, in the Malayan Peninsula, in Arabia and in Egypt. Through the Persians and Arabs, India had cultivated trade relations with the Roman Empire. There is also a treatise named Yukti Kalpa Taru,[4] offering a technocratic exposition on the art of shipbuilding. It sets forth minute details about the various types of ships, their sizes and the materials from which they were built. Such a vast undertaking could never have occurred without a close union between a deliberate imperial policy and a nautical strategy to realise it.[5]

Significant to early Indian maritime endeavour was the mercantile pursuit that drove shipbuilding. The nature of hulls—deep and bulkhead free—was designed for carriage of cargo rather than for survival in action damage. Even the colonisation of South East Asia was more on account of a migratory stimulus than one urged by conquest. This outlook changed with the coming of Vasco da Gama and his fleet of four small vessels. The difference was the Papal Bull that he carried and the cannons onboard that sought to enforce the edict that it proclaimed. [6]

Linkage between Policy and Strategy
The events mentioned above (The Papal Bull and the Regulation of 1788) are sinister in intent. But, from the colonizer’s perspective the first event articulates the critical prerequisite to link and formulate Strategy around Policy; while the second is symptomatic of strategic suppression of a potential adversary. Nations develop power in all its dimensions to assure the well being of the State, security of the Nation and the development of its people. If this be, in the broadest of terms, the existential theory of a State, then national strategies are formulated to chart a long term course in order to seize and exploit (peacefully in the main) the opportunities that the global environment offers and, where perceived distortions to their concept of sovereignty exists, to iron out and bring about a favourable outcome. In this context the nation’s strategic posture is a declaration, more by deed than words, of its orientation, will and intent. The strategic posture purports to mould and shape a future that would benefit its larger objectives of development. The process is always fraught with the hazards of conflicting interests and therefore it demands the weight of the nation’s comprehensive power, both soft and hard, to uphold posture.

It was Clausewitz who first noted an area of darkness when it came to characterizing the complex relationship between national strategy and the military resources that were needed to muscle and enable that strategy. He perceived this region of obscurity as one caused by a lack of an understanding of the nature of power and the need to sculpt it in a manner that it promoted national strategy. Specifically within the framework of the military as a tool he identified this as a failure to distinguish between the maintenance of armed forces and their use in pursuit of larger objectives.[7] This quandary was not unique to Clausewitz’s period as the dilemma continues to contemporary times when the momentum that propels the development of armed forces builds logic of growth that defies purpose and is often self fulfilling.

The absence of a cogent theory which integrates the promotion, nurturing and maintenance of force (and indeed naval forces) with a convincing contract for use is one of the first imperatives that the State must seek to reconcile. From this resolution emerges the concept of ‘Strategic Poise’. India’s armed forces have traditionally evolved to cope with operational scenarios. At genesis this may have been attributed to the military’s role in creation and upholding colonial empire, however post independence to have deliberately brought about a separation between the armed forces and the strategic decision making process was a paradox that defied norms of nation building progression. The operational canvas (inexplicable not to have been apparent), is a transient that abhors futuristic force planning. So it was year-after-every-five-year the planner was condemned to an exercise that perceived possible threats and acquiring/building force structures that attempted to cope with those threats. It was, therefore, the immediate intimidation of the changing global scenario that drove plans and consequently resulted in the accretion of forces. Unfortunately, this inspiration of the instantaneous intimidation was the pretender that served to fill the strategic space. The significant pitfall that plagued the operational perspective was the continuous struggle to catch up and keep pace with a future that the planner neither sought to shape nor forecast and contend with. The malaise of our current strategic situation is the emerging time, technology and planning gap in the materialization of appropriate force structures that work to shape the future. The case of our strategic maritime posture and the resources needed to promote it as a function of declared policy is the study in point. Such a strategic approach, primarily, derives from two critical characteristics of the international system. The first of these is the endemic instability of protagonists involved in the system; whether it is their politics, national interests, alliances or even their historical antagonisms which when interacts with the larger global settings causes’ friction, a sense of deprivation and generates a chemistry of volatility. The second is the function of a state as a sovereign entity that is charged with guardianship of certain specific and at times unique set of values sometimes contrary and at others in opposition to the macro system.

In bringing this section of our debate to a conclusion, the words of the Admiral of the Russian Fleet, S.G. Gorshkov, when addressing the issue of linking Policy with Strategy of building a powerful oceanic fleet, are particularly significant. “A most important factor that was taken into consideration was a firm recognition of the alignment of forces in the world arena, the strategic situation existing in the oceanic theatres… the prospects of developing naval technology and weapons and also the economic potential of our country.”[8]

 Maritime Orientation
Strategic maritime orientation derives from policy and encompasses a theory of naval war, force planning and warship production, consistent with both policy and theory. From the maritime perspective the overarching policies that would drive both planning and construction ought to be the ‘Look East Policy’, ‘The India-Africa Forum Summit’, a yet to be articulated maritime energy security policy and a potential maritime security concord with Japan and the USA. The common thread in all these security compacts will be the ability to control far flung oceanic spaces and, should the need arise, deny access to these very spaces driven by a collaborative logic.

A fourfold classification of maritime forces has dominated naval thought since the Second World War. The grouping is largely functional and task oriented. The differentiation comprises of aircraft carriers, strike units, escorts and scouts, denial forces and auxiliaries (the last include logistic and other support and coastal security ships such as patrol vessels, seaward defence boats, mine layers, sweepers, tenders etc). In addition contemporary thought has given strategic nuclear forces a restraining role to define and demarcate the limits within which conventional forces operate. The constitution of fleets must logically be a material articulation of the strategic concepts and ideas that prevail. The principal demand of the theory of naval war, as deliberated earlier, is to attain a strategic position that would permit control of oceanic spaces or deny these spaces depending on circumstances and the correlation of forces. Against this frame of reference the fundamental obligation is therefore to provide the means to seize and exercise that control. Pursuing this line of argument, the rational formulation that remains consistent with our theory of naval warfare is that upon the escorts and scouts depends our ability to exercise control over  sea area; while on the aircraft carrier group assisted by strike and denial forces depends the security of control. Control and Security of Control is the relationship that operationally links all maritime forces and therefore must lie at the heart of the force generation programme.

Higher Defence Management and Shipbuilding
Higher defence management in India suffers from two critical flaws that impact unfavorably on the ability to adopt a strategic approach to maritime force planning and naval ship construction. The first of these is the lack of sincere integration of Naval Headquarters (actually Service Headquarters) with the Ministry of Defence (MoD) such that it would be a part of the Government apex decision making structure. This condition exists despite recommendations of the Group of Ministers report for reforming the National Security Apparatus submitted in February 2001. The disjoint has led to establishments such as the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO, a part of the MoD) failing in their primary task of attaining self reliance in weapon systems without being answerable or indeed accountable to Service Headquarters and, downstream, to the shipbuilding programmes. The Navy on its part has no say in the matter other than to propose continued reliance on imported systems, the adjudication of which is presided over by the most unlikely and ill suited of agents—the bureaucracy in the MoD headed by the Defence Secretary. Consequently, delays, inefficiencies and sub-par decisions then become normal to the process.

The second debilitating flaw is another set of bizarre impediments that come to play when a comprehensively considered case from Naval Headquarters is meaninglessly put through multiple layers in the three departments under the MoD as well as its finance wing and then to the Finance Ministry before reappearing on the Minister’s table. These Kafkaesque processes not only mock maritime force modernization but also compromise attaining a strategic posture.

The Indigenous Enigma
Since the licensed production of the first major war vessel of the ‘Leander’ class, INS Nilgiri in the 1960s, Indian naval shipbuilding has come some distance, contributing much of the platform requirements for maritime forces. India is one of the few countries in the world to have the capability to compose all types of warships—aircraft carriers, nuclear and conventional submarines, destroyers, frigates, and corvettes among others. Over 90 warships have so far been indigenously constructed, with thirty more major ships being at various stages of build. However, beneath this inspiring number lie some fundamental weaknesses. The conundrum is embedded in what is meant by ‘indigenizing.’ To illustrate, in warship construction the thumb rule goes something like this: materials (steel etc.) contributes 70 % by weight, but only 10 % of cost, while the payload and propulsion plant which adds just 25 % by weight, contributes over 60 % of the cost. Therefore if by indigenising is meant sourcing materials locally then an argument can be made that the warship under construction is 70 % home-grown! This misleading notion manifests in the form of huge project delays and cost overruns; for the key to efficient warship building lies in an autonomous design capability (which does not weigh at all) and self reliance in access of pay load, both of which are weak areas in India’s shipbuilding narrative. The problems associated with the lack of accountability of the DRDO, reliance on import of payload, bureaucratic processes and the flaws in higher defence decision making have been dealt with in the previous section. What it does is to complicate and setback an already undermined situation.

India’s overall shipbuilding industry comprises of 27 shipyards, of which 6 are under central government control, 2 under state government and 19 in the private sector domain. All these shipyards are however not responsible for naval construction. Of the six shipyards under the central government, four are dedicated defence Public Sector Undertaking shipyards—Mazagon Dock Ltd (MDL), Garden Reach and Shipbuilders and Engineers (GRSE), Goa Shipyard Ltd (GSL) and Hindustan Shipyard Ltd (HSL).These shipyards come under the administrative control of the Ministry of Defence (MoD) and are at the core of Indian naval construction. Few other shipyards, notably the government-owned Cochin Shipyard Ltd (CSL), and private-owned Pipavav Yard (recently been awarded construction of five naval off shore patrol vessels) and the Larsen and Tubro yard (involved in the construction of submarine pressure hulls) are also involved in warship construction. Among all the shipyards, the MDL is by far the leading warship builder in India, having constructed all major types of naval ships excluding the aircraft carrier. The CSL, which comes under the Ministry of Shipping, is presently building India’s first ever indigenous aircraft carrier. Compared to the public sector shipyards, the private shipyards are relatively new to warship building with neither design competence nor autonomy in access to payload; this is not to mean that that the Government shipyards have design or payload access. Planning and professional directorates at Naval Headquarters led by the Directorate of Staff Requirements are accountable for defining staff requirements of the ship, evaluation and selection of payload which sets into motion design work. Design for naval warships, particularly major war vessels, are generated by the naval design bureau, a department under Naval Headquarters staffed by naval architects who are responsible for generating design drawings (from concept to detailed design, based on which ship build is enabled). So far so good, but behind the façade of a vast design agency are a set of small back offices which are manned by a bank of consultant designers from collaborating foreign shipyards and teams from the original payload manufacturers who are, in fact, the intellect behind the creation of the detailed design drawings. For example, in the case of the first indigenous aircraft carrier (IAC-1)[9], Fincantieri, an Italian firm, provides total design support for the hull and its fitting out, while the Northern Design Bureau (Russian) along with Mikoyan make available aggregate design back up for the aviation facilities. While it is a statement of fact that a certain design involvement of equipment manufacturers is inevitable while generating detailed drawings, the problem arises at commencement, where the preliminary phase of design consultancy is sought and remains active through fitting out and trials at the design bureau. At this time there emerges a duality in the process since such consultancy is most beneficial in the Yard where the ship is being constructed and accountability on realisation of the ship or a specific system can be squarely apportioned. In sum, we have a design consultant controlled by a ‘super’ design agency who, in turn, dominates the Indian ship building yard which neither has design competence nor control over selection of pay load or other equipment and yet carries the burden of liability for performance. It does not take a management guru to suggest that when design competence is weak and control over payload remains in the hands of equipment manufacturers out of the country, then both design expertise and consultancy must reside in the shipyards.

Shipbuilding Programme: The Resource Mismatch
Major shipbuilding programmes (does not include Auxiliaries, minor war vessels and aircrafts) for the next two decades include the following:

  • Two Indigenous Aircraft Carriers at $5 billion each.
  • Seven Project 15A/B Guided Missile Destroyers at $750 million each.
  • Seven Project 17A Multi Role Frigates at $650 million each.
  • Three Arihant class SSBNs at $ 1 billion (?) each.
  • Three Nuclear powered attack submarines at $900 million (?) each.
  • Six Scorpene class conventional submarines at $600 million each.
  • Three Landing Platform Dock at $400 million each.

The total of capital expenditure on these projects spread over a period of two decades is approximately $30 billion. Allowing for another $10 billion expenditure on other units and aircrafts would suggest, assuming planar cash outflow over the period, an annual outlay of $2 billion. This figure, when placed in perspective of the Navy’s share of the defence budget, $6.74 billion, amounts to almost 30% of the Naval budget, putting intense pressure on the other budgetary heads, making management of the Navy untenable, suggesting a major mismatch between Policy and the Resources demanded to power Strategy.[10] This would be redolent of a need to question the a priori; that is, is there a cogent theory that links the promotion and nurturing of a maritime force with an accepted contract for its use? In other words does the Strategic approach have national recognition?

Three documents issued by the Navy intended to provide a strategic frame work for growth and development of maritime forces titled ‘The Indian Maritime Doctrine’, ‘The Future Indian Navy’ and India’s ‘Maritime Military Strategy’ neither have the ratification nor the blessings of the Government of India or in fact the MoD,[11] which ought to answer the preceding poser and underscore the wittingly left gap between Policy and Strategy.

To Run the Gauntlet: a Conclusion
The Chairman and Managing Director of one of India’s PSU shipyards in a moment of misplaced vainglory proclaimed that his “order books had been full for the last fourteen years.”[12] His memory had to be jogged that the Yard had not delivered a single warship over the same period! This anecdote is symptomatic of the hobbled state of shipbuilding in India. The root cause lies in the lack of integration of the professional patron, the Navy, into the highest decision making structure that appropriates and dispenses warship building tasks. Left in the dilettante hands of the MoD the casual participation of the bureaucrat leads to, as mentioned elsewhere, Kafkaesque progressions that confounds maritime force modernization. There also exists the perverse anomaly of an approved shipbuilding programme strangled by the hesitancy to commit resources; not for want of capital since the defence budget as a part of GDP is at a low of barely 1.79%, but more for lack of resolve and discernment of the demands of a strategic approach, its linkage to growth and the nature of power play in contemporary geopolitics. The need for public-private partnership and initiatives which unshackle the PSU Yards from the tyranny of MoD control and devolution of design expertise from the central bureau to the Yards, along with selective empowerment to choose payload within the restraints of Staff Requirements becomes an imperative. The yards in this context will need to be given the freedom to seek out investments to enhance capacity if at all timely order-book-execution is to be achieved.

To run the gauntlet in India’s charge to suffuse maritime strategic space within the self centric power structures of contemporary world order, we have no option but to bring about a make over in orientation. Its ideational foundation rests on espousing a strategic approach and is enabled by transforming the shipbuilding edifice through the mantra of ‘integration of the professional patron into higher defence decision making, provision of matching resources to reconcile strategy with policy and to unshackle the Yards and enthuse it with autonomy.’

End Notes

[1] The order from the Select Committee of the House of Commons on the Affairs of the East India Company (Google eBook) Published in Great Britain  Author, Select Committee on the Affairs of the East India Company, East India Company (London)  Publisher: Cambray, 1810.

[2] Ibid

[3] Ibid Clause four of the original document.

[4] An 11th Century AD compilation by Bhoja Narapati.

[5] Kautilya. Arthashastra. Translation by Rangarajan L.N. Penguin Classics, India 1990, p 53, 87, 546-548.

[6] The Aeterni regis Papal Bull of 21 June 1481 by Pope Sixtus IV granted the Canary Islands to Spain and further discoveries in Africa to Portugal. The Inter Caetera Papal Bull of 04 May 1493 granted most New World discoveries to Spain. Problems cropped up over time with these arrangements, and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 07 June 1494 attempted to settle some of these difficulties, formalizing some of the implicit understandings of the earlier Papal Bulls. The Treaty of Tordesillas settled on what came to be called the Tordesillas Meridian running through the Atlantic and separating it into the Western and Eastern Hemispheres, giving rights of  exploitation of these regions to Spain and Portugal.

[7] Howard, Michael.Causes of War Pg 102. Harvard University Press 1980.

[8] Gorshkov S.G. The Sea Power of the State. Pergamon Press Ltd., Oxford, England 1979, p179.

[9] Indigenous Aircraft Carrier (IAC)) is a class of two aircraft carriers being built for the Indian Navy by Cochin Shipyard Limited (CSL), they are the largest warships as well as the first aircraft carriers to be designed and built in India. The first ship of the class INS Vikrant will displace about 40,000 metric tons, 262 metres (860 ft) long, configured for Short take-off but arrested recovery (STOBAR) and have a tailored air group of up to 30 to 40 aircrafts. Expected delivery date originally scheduled for 2014 is now slated for 2017.

[10] For the year 2013-14, the Navy’s share was 18% of the entire defence budget of $37.45 billion.

[11] All three documents have been authored by the Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defence (Navy) in 2004, 2006 and 2007 respectively and remain to date unratified.

[12] Personal exchange with the author.

Globalization with Chinese Maritime Characteristics

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The Security Overlay

By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

 (Forthcoming in the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies Quarterly, New Delhi)

Keywords: China Maritime Strategy, Third Security Chain, Northern Passage, Access Denial, Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang Corridor

The ‘Uncertainty’ Paradigm

The end of the Cold War brought in its wake prognostication of the emergence of one world in which harmony, democracy, an end to conflict, and man’s ideological evolution was imagined. The grand formulation was that Western liberal democracy had prevailed.[1] Some saw a multipolar order and the arrival of China; others forecast a clash of civilisations.[2] However, these conjectures found little use in understanding the realities of the post Cold War world, as each represented a candour of its own. The paradigm of the day, I would posit, is ‘uncertainty,’ as marked by the tensions of multi polarity; tyranny of economics; anarchy of expectations; and a polarisation along religio-cultural lines, all compacted in the cauldron of globalization.

The West saw in globalization a process which transformed the world in their mould, through the adoption of Western values, free markets, the rule of law, flow of Western capital and embracing of democratic norms. Globalization with Chinese characteristics is about State capitalism, supremacy of central authority, controlled markets and currency and influence through power. It factored endemic instability[3], underscoring the premium on military power and the fundamental contradictions that existed, perceiving them as threatening the Chinese State and its dispensation, and as an impediment to growth and development. Against this backdrop, is the politics of competitive resource access which rationalizes the use of military power. It is in this perspective that Chinese maritime strategy must be gauged.

 Economic Power and China’s Case for ‘Lebensraum’

China’s quest to secure rights of passage on the sea is to insure against the uncertainties of access to resources. It has led her to the ‘Northern Passage.’[4] Significantly, the route avoids two sensitive ‘choke points,’ the Malacca Strait and the Suez Canal. China also theorises that the road to securing lines of communication is through a strategy of ‘Access Denial.’[5] The strategy was founded on China’s security concern with Taiwan where its logic is obvious. But, enabling such a strategy on a global scale invites confrontation.

Today China is the world’s largest exporter, its economy is second to the USA and she is the third largest energy consumer. When we look at the growth pattern of India since liberalization, we note a similar trend. Indeed, with one third of this growth being powered by trade to the East and China our largest trading partner, the requirement to secure these interests become vital. In this circumstance the race to garner resources by two very large economies is fraught. But the real alarm is that China seeks to influence and dominate international regulatory and security institutions without bringing about a change within, what I will call, her own ‘organic morphology.’ China’s disputed claims on the South China Sea; her handling of internal dissent; her proliferatory carousing with North Korea and Pakistan are cases that do not inspire confidence in change occurring within. The emergence of China from out of its defensive maritime perimeters, as defined by the first and second island chains, into the Indian Ocean is seen as the coming ‘Third Security Chain.’ Gone is the power bashfulness that marked the Deng era, in its place is the contemporary conviction that “the-world-needs-China-more-than-China-the-world”.

Evolution of China’s Maritime Strategy

China published its sixth Defence White Paper in January 2008. The paper notes that struggle for cornering strategic resources, dominating geographically vital areas and tenanting strategic locations have intensified. Power as a natural currency of politics remained the preferred instrument. Under these circumstances the portents for conflict are ever present and would therefore demand preparedness, modernization and strategic orientation of a nature that would serve to neutralize friction.[6] Central to the Paper is that “influence of military-security factors on international relations is mounting.” ‘Active Defence,’ embracing the development of bases overseas to launch strategy along with advanced assault and enhanced strike capabilities, remained the means. Doctrinal underpinnings to realise such capabilities and the development of ‘Access Denial and Control’ Strategy are now at the core of Chinese military thought.[7]

Two events of the 1990s have shaped Chinese strategy. From the Gulf War of 1991, China took home a reason for strategic pre-emption.[8] The second was the Taiwan crisis of 1995-1996, U.S. deployment of two carrier groups in the Strait embarrassingly infringed sovereignty. These episodes triggered the ‘Access Denial’ strategy. The development of capabilities, in material terms, operational precepts and strategic alliances threaten to upset the status quo. Operating from infrastructure cultivated in Sittwe and Aan in Myanmar, Hambantotta in Sri Lanka, Maroa in the Maldives and Gwadar in Pakistan gives legs to long range access denial.

Specific operational deployments to muscle her maritime strategy in the Indian Ocean may include: One carrier group; Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine on deterrent patrol; nuclear powered attack submarines on sea lines patrol with cooperating surface groups and maritime patrol aircrafts; long range maritime strike aircrafts operating from Aan or Gwadar; one amphibious brigade standby with transports on hand at one of the ‘string of pearls;’ and, a regiment of ASAT missiles along with cyber teams to wage information warfare that will seek to paralyze hostile operations.

To Counter an Enabled Theory    

            The principal demand of maritime operations is to attain a strategic position that would permit control of oceanic spaces. It therefore comes as no surprise that China develops forces and alliances necessary to realize an ‘access denial’ strategy. Consistent with theory is their shipbuilding programme of escorts and scouts to exercise control; and aircraft carriers assisted by strike and denial forces for security of control. Control and Security of Control is the classic model that China’s naval growth has been inspired by.

China has unambiguously articulated its three strategic objectives; stability, growth and regional pre eminence. The problem with such sweeping strategies specifically the coming ‘Third Security Chain’ superimposed on access denial is its blindness to recognize that we are dealing with a sea space that is the busiest of all the “vast commons.” The reluctance for collaboration makes the potential for friction high. The only consideration that could deter a collision is the ability of India to attain a strategic posture that serves to stabilize. India’s relationship with the USA provides opportunity to establish cooperative security in the region that could counterpoise China’s self-centred view of globalization.

—

End Notes

[1]Fukuayama Francis. “The End of History.” The National Interest, 16 (Summer 1989), pp 4, 18.

[2] Huntington. Samuel, P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of  World Order, Penguin Books, India 1997, pp 30-39.

[3] The World at War http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/index.html.The United Nations defines “major wars” as military conflicts inflicting 1,000 battlefield deaths per year. In 1965, there were 10 major wars under way. The new millennium began with much of the world consumed in armed conflict or cultivating an uncertain peace. Between 1989 and 2010, forty nine wars erupted. As of mid-2005, there were eight Major Wars under way [down from 15 at the end of 2003], with as many as two dozen “lesser” conflicts ongoing with varying degrees of intensity.

[4] Article by author titled “The Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang Corridor”, published in the September 2012 issue of the DSA. The Northern Passage was a fabled sea route theorised by adventurers, merchants and money chandlers over the last six centuries to

link the Pacific with the Atlantic Ocean. The Route lay through the Arctic archipelago the treacherous ice flows that frustrate passage across the Arctic Ocean. To put matters in perspective, as a trade corridor the distance from China to markets in Europe has been cut down to less than 8000 miles from 14,700 miles. In 2011 more than 18 commercial ships and in 2012 forty ships have made the now ice-free crossing.

[5] Security analysts  have examined China’s efforts to develop weapons systems that can retard or even stop a potential adversary from entering an area of interest. Dubbed “access-denial,” the aim of such a strategy is to use weapons that deter and should the need arise challenge or indeed prevent inimical forces from operating in conflict zones or oceanic areas of interest . The teeth of this strategy is an anti-ship missile. Such a missile, fired from land, sea, underwater or air can cause tremendous damage to an enemy surface vessel. While such technology isn’t new, the effective ranges of such weapons have increased tremendously, along with their accuracy, speed of delivery and precision. Defending against such systems is therefore a major problem for planners

[6] Ma Cheng-Kun,  PLA News Analysis, “Significance of 2008 China’s National Defense White Paper” no. 15, pp. 49-60

[7] Ibid  

[8] Lewis John Wilson and Litai Xue, “The Quest for a Modern Air Force” in Imagined Enemies China Prepares for Uncertain War,  Stanford University Press 2006, p237. General Liu Jingsong, a member of the 15th CPC Central Committee, he was also the PLA  Commander of the Shenyang and Lanzhou military regions and to him amongst others is attributed the opening of Equatorial Guinea 1995.

Poseidon’s Long View Across Time [*]

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 By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

 Abstract

Amphibious warfare has long been placed in the category of one of the more complex operations of armed conflict. Its knotty nature derives from its demand for intricate planning; a situation of full spectrum dominance; integration of every conceivable dimension of warfare; stealth in the contradictory environment of managing large forces with their huge logistic train; setting aside of some of the key principles of conventional warfare such as flexibility, economy of effort and mobility; transition of Command responsibilities at critical points in the operation; and most perilously, operating under conditions that are favourable to the enemy. Given that the deck tilts against success, it will be interesting to examine the nature of this combat manoeuvre through the lens of two historical battles that occurred with a time interregnum of more than two millennia. The intriguing reality of these episodes was that that they were played within the same geographical constraints of the Dardanelles and the essential struggle was between a maritime and a continental power. In both events the continental power prevailed.

Keywords: Amphibious warfare, Transhistorical analysis, Aegospotami 405 BCE, Thessalic versus Continental Strategy, The Dardanelles, Gallipoli, Kitchener

Download full article here: Shankar, Poseidon’s Long View Across Time

Excerpts:

Historical Sketch I: An Enactment from the Past-Aegospotami 405 BCE

Thessalic versus Continental Strategy, Powers of Antiquity Face Off

Ancient wars are more often shrouded in myth and through the years fashioned by popular imagination. But not so the Peloponnesian War, waged from 431 BCE to 404 BCE, between Athens and Sparta. The conflict’s scholastic significance does not lie in its protagonists or the events that transpired or even in the fact of it having been an archetypal war between a mercantile democracy and an agricultural aristocracy, but more because of the discipline with which its proceedings were recorded. To be sure, Thucydides precision is both dry and pithy and yet has relevance that transcends time. The strategies developed by the two warring States and their confederations (the coastal chain formed by the Delian League and the continental Spartan Allies which included Persia) were studies in contrast for Thessalic Athens, war plans were largely driven by a maritime strategy that strove to vanquish the Spartans through attrition, sanctions and peripheral campaigns waged from its far flung coastal bases in the Mediterranean, Aegean and the Black seas; while the Spartans fought to their strength and adopted a continental strategy that centred on invasion, armed alliances and striking at the heart of the enemy homeland. In an incisive and laconic analysis, the historian believed that what made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta.[iii] The theatre of warfare extended from Sicily in the west to the Black Sea in the east, a span of 2000 kilometres across the Mediterranean and into the Black Sea. Ten major maritime engagements occurred during the 27 years of war each having a disproportionate impact on the progress of war on land (Thucydides’ history, unfortunately, ends in 411 BCE). However our focus is on the last engagement which involved an amphibious operation at Aegospotami across the Dardanelles (Hellespont) in September 405 BCE the outcome of this engagement saw the crumbling of Athenian sea power and the consequent severance of all sea lines of communication to its empire and its eventual capitulation within the year.

[…]

Run-up to Battle

The two sides spent the early part of the year maintaining, logistically and materially preparing, and honing the fighting potential of their fleets. Eventually in September Lysander, the Spartan fleet commander, decided to move into the Hellespont, partly to try and regain control of a number of cities lost in recent years and partly to try and block the Athenian logistic and economic life line emerging from the Black Sea. His first success came at Lampsacus (4 to 5 kilometres north of Lapseki, see Map 1), across the Hellespont, on the Asian shore which fell to a land assault.

When the Athenians discovered that Lysander had moved into the Hellespont, they followed with a fleet of 180 ships. They sailed up the Strait, and took up position at Aegospotami four to five kilometres across the Strait west of Lampsacus, where they established a base to progress operations. On the next morning the Athenians put out to sea and formed up in line of battle outside Lampsacus. Lysander did not oblige to come out of his haven and engage the enemy. Frustrated, the Athenians returned to their base on the beach at Aegospotami. Lysander sent some of his fastest ships to follow the Athenians for surveillance and intelligence gathering. For the next three days the same rite was replayed only with great tactical shrewdness, the Spartans through their intelligence effort reconnoitred the coastline, earmarked potential beaches for landing and significantly built a tactical picture of the Athenian fleet’s pattern of operations. On the fifth day Lysander manoeuvred into the operational area keeping a discrete distance from the Aegospotami beach.[iv]

Fragmented Command versus Spartan Unified Plan

The Athenian fleet was led by six admirals who in turn rotated command of the 180 ships of the fleet.[v] The Commander for the day was the relatively inexperienced Philocles, disjointed Command and an almost daily change in the methods and the graphics of control would have undoubtedly imposed unnecessary stresses on both man and material to the detriment of operational efficiency. Considerably less is known on the size of the Spartan fleet, it is assumed that the Spartan fleet was similar in size and capabilities to the Athenian fleet. Lysander’ plan envisaged a frontal engagement of the Athenian fleet at their moorings with a simultaneous amphibious landing to the north. The landing force was to move in a coordinated scything pincer manoeuvre which would crush Athenian forces between the land and the maritime prongs. It is this amphibious landing which is of particular note to our study since it involved a major surprise assault.

[…]

Analysis

Any analysis of this campaign will invariably sacrifice objectivity for want of precision in the records available. Yet, retrospection based on macro stimulants, proceedings as historically evident (sparse as they may be) and the reality of consequences permit constructing a picture that underscores the character and nature of amphibious warfare and the planning salients that provide a theoretical foundation for embarking on such operations. The attributes that contributed to success of Lysander’s amphibious assault may be distinguished as follows:[vi]

  • Clarity of objective against the backdrop of the larger strategic situation.
  • Nature and characteristics of the campaign at hand, enemy to be fought  and precision in mission definition.
  • Precise assessment of the balance of forces.
  • Perceptive choice of mounting port.
  • Focused intelligence gathering and development of a best course of action.
  • Judicious appraisal of natural elements and selection of landing beach.
  • Adroit and single minded leadership supported by meticulous planning and coordination.

Map 1. The Strait of Dardanelles (Hellespont) 

Source: This is a file from the Wikimedia Commons. Geographic locations in red have been inserted by the author, they are approximate. The Commons is a freely licensed media file repository. Source: This is a file from the Wikimedia Commons. Geographic locations in red have been inserted by the author, they are approximate. The Commons is a freely licensed media file repository                                                                                        

Historical Sketch II: The Amphibious Campaign at Gallipoli 1915

Conjunct Warfare

To the British Admiralty, amphibious operations were hardly a novel discipline of warfare. In fact as early as 1759 a theory and directive principles of what was termed ‘Conjunct Warfare’ had been propagated in a treatise entitled “Conjunct Expeditions: or Expeditions that have been carried on jointly by the Fleet and Army, with a commentary on Littoral Warfare.”[vii] As the treatise so eloquently puts it “the conjunct armament goes against the enemy like an arrow from a bow. It gives no warning where it is to come, and leaves no traces where it has passed. It must wound too where it hits, if rightly pointed at a vulnerable part. When this is done a new aim is directed. The enemy in the meantime, like a man in the dark labouring under an unwieldy shield, moves slowly to and fro, distracted and at a loss which way to guard against the stroke of the invisible hand.”[viii] Molyneux understood that a nation with superior sea power possessed the advantage of initiative and therefore could bring powerful forces against an enemy at a time and place of its choosing. He emphasised that surprise was a key element to an amphibious attack (obviously the author implied surprise of time and place rather than surprise of intent), calling it a “terrible sort of war that comes like thunder and lightning to some unprepared part of the World.” Despite his high opinion of the potential of amphibious landings, Molyneux recognised that they failed more often than they succeeded.[ix] He insisted that the main reason for failed amphibious missions, or miscarriages, in his words, was mismanagement of planning and execution. The most important aspects of this mismanagement was the lack of cooperation between navy and army commanders, want of application, deficiency of a system on which the operation is founded (‘doctrine’ in present day parlance) and significantly, the attitude of relegating this form of warfare to a lesser priority.[x] What is remarkable is how contemporary this analysis is.                                                                                                                                                   

[…]

 Analysis

The intellectual framework provided by Molyneux when he first propagated ‘Conjunct Warfare’ and the idea of a ‘strike by an invisible hand’ placed amphibious operations in the context of a ‘Manoeuvreist Approach.’ The key lay in the ability to project force from the sea in a manner that lends itself to such manoeuvreist precepts as surprise of time and place and out-flanking movements. As would be apparent from the narrative, the amphibious campaign to seize the Gallipoli peninsula and lay control of the Straits fell far short of the attributes that make for manoeuvre warfare despite the obvious advantages that weighed with the maritime power. ‘Muddle, mismanagement and useless sacrifice’ as mentioned earlier, were features of this campaign which rose to prominence as planning dithered, casualties mounted and the drive for control of the Straits visibly faltered, some logic may even conclude that one fed on the other. Yet, in order to bring some objectivity to the analysis, the same litmus tests that gave victory at Aegospotami in 405 BCE may be applied to the Gallipoli campaign primarily because the larger strategic objective of Control through the instrument of an amphibious landing were indistinguishable. The seven attributes that may therefore be placed in balance are:

  • The Objective: While the larger strategic aims were well conceived, it was the fragmented approach both in methods and time towards attaining it that was unconvincing. After all to force the Straits  through pure naval action and then within a month to fundamentally alter it to an army sized amphibious operation would not only suggest a radical strategic dither but also a failure of higher political and military decision making to fully appreciate what the alteration implied in terms of preparation, training and logistics. Kitchener’s ‘Campaign Instructions’ to his Commander-in-Chief lacked the strategic commitment necessary to see through an operation of this scale. Also, it was neither based on a thorough intelligence estimate nor on a realistic appreciation of the state of preparedness of the landing force. And then to break the momentum of the offensive by reinforcing the April landing only in the second week of August, long after energy of the thrust had petered out, would suggest a total lack of grasp of the ground situation.
  • Nature of Operations: The Nature of amphibious operations, as Molyneux with so much sagacity had pointed out, demanded comprehensiveness of planning and precision in execution. The most important aspects of management and control of operations was the critical need for cooperation between navy and army commanders, a system as a prerequisite on which the operation is founded (doctrine in present day parlance) and significantly, the attitude of awarding a place of primacy for this form of warfare; these were woefully lacking. By May 1915, within a month of launching operations it became clear that the hope of a short campaign was a pipe dream and success in the Dardanelles would require a far greater effort both in terms of resolve and preparation than the planners had ever contemplated.  Gross underestimation of the enemy can only have been credited to incompetence.
  • Balance of Forces: The balance of forces weighed up on the side of the Entente. Yet, due fragmented approach, poor planning and the inability to commit to and underwrite unity of Command; the advantages of capability and firepower could never be brought to bear.
  • Mounting Port and Training: The location of mounting ports in Egypt (Alexandria and Port Said) was ideal, for they were situated in the theatre of operations yet adequately displaced (600miles) from the amphibious objective area to ensure no enemy interference. Also base support and logistic facilities available in Egypt were comprehensive. Where the fatal flaw lay was in the  inadequacy of training of the amphibious force for what was envisaged to be speedy and inexpensive campaign. After all if the “essential course for Britain therefore, was to re-equip Russia and to rally the Balkan States against Austria and Turkey; and this could best be done by forcing the Straits and capturing Constantinople” (and Churchill concluded) that this was the “only prize which lies within reach this year. It can be won without unreasonable expense, and within a comparatively short time. But we must act now and on a scale which makes speedy success certain.”[xi] Evidently there was serious mismatch between the “essential course” and the preparation needed to realise it.
  • Appraisal of Elements and Selection of landing Beaches: Weather-wise April and August were fair weather months and well suited for amphibious operations. The selected beaches were appropriate for landing operations, however their geographic spread of less than 10 miles provided inadequate manoeuvring space for, what eventually amounted to, seven Divisions. The cramping of the invasion front permitted the Turkish defenders to operate on inner lines and concentrate there efforts which eventually stalled the invasion practically on the beaches.  
  • Intelligence: Periodic intelligence bulletins were made available to the MEF through out the campaign, however these were persistently of a field and a tactical level.[xii] The absence of strategic intelligence is obvious by the absence of information on the preparedness and combat readiness of the Turkish Army on the Peninsula; Paragraph 5 of Kitchener’s Campaign Instructions makes this apparent (see End Note 17). Also, the extent of complacency and the belief that a victory was to be got on the cheap was palpable in Churchill’s statements (see End Note 22). In addition the impact of naval gunfire (ranging from15 inch to 8inch guns[xiii]) while attempting to force the Straits was never ascertained as a result there was neither intelligence on damage assessment nor an appreciation of the state of Turkish morale at this crucial juncture of operations. In the absence of such intelligence, to abandon the plan, would suggest feeble resolve.
  • Planning, Leadership and Unity of Command: ‘Muddle, mismanagement and useless sacrifice’; the words used by the war correspondent Ashmead-Bartlett succinctly summed up the characteristics of direction and control of the campaign. Starting with Kitchener’s Campaign Instructions, planning at the highest level of decision making was muddled; the change in strategic impulse was neither justified nor carried with it the determination necessary to push for a decision. Also, the planning of an amphibious operation without adequate time for training and rehearsal provided the immediate recipe for disaster. Misconception of force requirements and Logistic planning was so derisory that within a month of the first landing (by May), the invasion was starved of munitions and reinforcements. Leadership’s belief in the success of operations was based on some abstract and baseless notions that the adversary’s fortitude and grit would crumble with the first salvo; this underestimation of the opponent’s operational tenacity was a cardinal failure. At the operational level, leadership was never in touch with the ground realities of the progress of the campaign and failed to appreciate the criticality of the principles of surprise, concentration of effort and coordination. Command at every level was disjointed and lacked unity of purpose. Relying on mere army-navy cooperation without unity of command particularly so in an amphibious operation is a clear formula for inefficiencies. For in a cooperative situation what is being provided is support bereft of precise allocation and definition of subordinate responsibilities along without a comprehensive command and control network to bind together the sea, land and air elements of the amphibious force.

[…]

The Common Thread that Binds Millennia

The history of warfare infrequently tolerates replication of campaigns. And yet to regard battles and armed struggles in isolation rather than a part of a larger panorama of conflicts often leads to erroneous inferences which do not in any way further the cause of refining strategies. Examination of the larger continuum or the strategic approach seeks to understand and employ the inter-relationship between economics, geography and military genius to pursue political goals; these goals, however, have an uncanny iterative character. Both the Battle of Aegospotami and the Gallipoli Campaign, though displaced in time by almost two and a half millennia, was trans-historical in commonality of aim and that was ‘Control of the Straits’. In the one case to bring about economic and logistic strangulation of the opponent while in the Gallipoli Campaign it was to bring about economic and logistic relief of a vital ally; both saw in the manoeuvre an efficient tool to bring about a speedy termination of the conflict. The Battle of Aegospotami was planned and implemented with consummate skill and its aim was fully achieved. The Gallipoli Campaign, on the other hand was a grand litany of ‘muddled planning, mismanaged leadership and appalling waste of life’. If one were to attempt to put a finger on the single critical feature that differentiated the two, it had to have been the leadership of Lysander who saw to it that unity of command was upheld at every stage of the battle; whether it was integrity of the plan, intelligence gathering or coordination of the amphibious assault with the seaborne offensive.

 The Indian Context, a Strategic Overview as a Conclusion

To the minds of many Indian military leaders, amphibious warfare remains a lesser known mystery; to merit theoretical examination at the Staff College and thereafter to be set aside as a costly conjecture that has little chance of success in the real world of operations. This is based on the premise that a frontal military assault out of the water with all the complications of forming up in and disembarking from boats, moving through surf and landing on a hostile beach with neither overwhelming force nor stealth nor saturation firepower by air and sea that could suppress shore defences; was futile. The Gallipoli disaster appeared to many military critics to seal this judgement to the extent that Liddell Hart believed that amphibious assaults had become impossible.[xiv] However the experience of the Normandy landings and the Pacific Campaign during the Second World War, the 1950 Inchon landing in South Korea and the 1982 Falklands war all suggested not only the viability of amphibious operations but also underscored its operational effectiveness.

The Indian maritime doctrine recognises amphibious warfare as an operation intrinsic to its capability.[xv] Amphibious operations could potentially find a central role in each of the ten conflict scenarios identified in the doctrine.[xvi] Postulating the relationship between doctrine and strategy, the document titled “India’s Maritime Military Strategy” elaborates that “Doctrine is a body of thought, and a knowledge base which underpins the development of strategy”.[xvii] While there can be no argument thus far, what is problematic is the ability to bridge and characterize the linkage between doctrine and the military resources that are built up in circumstances when the development of strategies remain a dark area. Viewed from another perspective, this amounts to the maintenance of an amphibious capability without defining and distinguishing a contract for use.

India today maintains a combat sea lift capability of one Brigade, this facility is being built up to a Division size ability (by 2020) in terms of specialised ships, command platforms, escorts, surveillance and strike elements along with logistic support ships. The questions then are:

  • Given a scenario, what best can be achieved by this amphibious force?
  • Have we spelt out (in elaboration of the ten conflict scenarios) the specific contingencies in terms of circumstance and geography for use?
  • Have we trained man and material and rehearsed for these contingencies?
  • Have strategies been developed, Instructions and plans formulated (strategic, operational and logistic) to confront these contingencies?
  • And lastly, are our command structures nimble enough to cope with the complexities of amphibious warfare, are they unified and is leadership at every level attuned to the unyielding demands of this form of warfare?

If the answer to any of these questions is in the negative or even conditional, then we have neither understood the quintessence of ‘Conjunct Warfare’ nor the perils of having to run the gauntlet of another Gallipoli.

Download full article here: Shankar, Poseidon’s Long View Across Time

End Notes

[*] From Greek mythology, Posiedon the God of the Seas had the power to stop time.

[ii] Molyneux, Thomas More, Conjunct Expeditions: or Expeditions that have been carried on Jointly by the Fleet and Army, with a commentary on Littoral Warfare published by R.J Dodsely, 1759, London as quoted by Aston G. G Brigadier General in Letters on Amphibious Wars. John Murray, Albemarle Street, London 1911 p 2.

[iii] Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War. Penguin Books Ltd, England 1986, p 23.

[iv] Xenophon’s Hellenica 2.1.17-32 and Diodorus’ Library, 13.104.8-106.8.

[v] C. Ehrhardt, “Xenophon and Diodorus on Aegospotami”, in: Phoenix. Journal of the Classical Association of Canada 24 (1970), p 226; G. Wylie, “What really happened at Aegospotami”, in: L’Antiquité Classique 55 (1986), p 125-141.

[vi] These attributes are based on deductions and extrapolations made by the author; what is remarkable is how well these would fit into the planning of modern amphibious operations.

[vii] Molyneux, Thomas More, Conjunct Expeditions: or Expeditions that have been carried on Jointly by the Fleet and Army, with a commentary on Littoral Warfare published by R.J Dodsely, 1759, London as quoted by Aston G. G Brigadier General in Letters on Amphibious Wars. John Murray, Albemarle Street, London 1911 p 4.

[viii] Ibid. Molyneux’ treatise contains an exhaustive history of littoral warfare, its nature and value. Of equal importance is its analysis of the principles that govern the planning and execution of amphibious campaigns. Time has neither diminished its contemporary relevance nor provided an alternative to the theory that it develops.

[ix] Ibid Part I, 3-4 and Part II, 5-8.

[x] Ibid Part I, vii, 3-4, Part II, 8,46 and the general theme of Part II.

[xi] Aspinall-Oglander C.F. History of the Great War Military Operations Gallipoli Volume II. William Heinemann Ltd London 1932, p 61. Churchill in a memorandum to the Government justifying the Gallipoli campaign pointed out that the allies, by April 1915, had  regained 8 square miles of territory for a loss of  300,000 men on the Western front; almost as if to suggest that a victory at Gallipoli was available on the cheap!

[xiii] McMurtrie Francis E. Jane’s Fighting Ships 1939. Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd. London 1939, p 23-64, 175-206.

[xiv] Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War. Indiana University Press Bloomington 1973, p 256.

[xv] Indian Maritime Doctrine, INBR 8. Issued by Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Indian McMurtrie Francis E. Jane’s Fighting Ships 1939. Sampson Low, Marston & Co., Ltd. London 1939, p 23-64, 175-206.

[xv] Weigley, Russell F. The American Way of War. Indiana University Press Bloomington 1973, p 256.

[xv] Indian Maritime Doctrine, INBR 8. Issued by Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence Navy) 2004, p 81 and 114.

[xvi] Ibid, p 59. The ten conflict scenarios identified are: conflict in immediate neighborhood, operations in extended neighborhood, peacekeeping operations, conflict with an extra regional power, protecting persons of Indian origin, anti terrorist operations, fulfilling bilateral strategic obligations, preserving SLOCs, safeguarding Indian energy assets and humanitarian role.

[xvii] India’s Maritime Military Strategy. Issued by Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence (Indian Navy) 2007, p 6.