Category Archives: Maritime Security

Coastal Security: To Keep the Homeland out of Harm’s Way

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By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

Abstract

Coastal Security is a harmonious extension of state policy whose purpose is protection against ingress of inimical man and material. Its progression is managed by unified control driven by global sharing of information, surveillance and a comprehensive interdiction system. The litmus test to ascertain credibility of the system lies firstly, in the extent to which we have a cohesive unified strategy in place and developed a joint surveillance and pre-emption capability; and secondly, whether we have made the local seas present an insuperable obstacle to every foe that seeks to penetrate. The Fortress of Murud Janjira did precisely so.

Keywords: Coastal Security, 26/11 Mumbai Terror Attacks, Nuclear Trafficking, Anti-terror legislation, Operational plans and communication, Murud Janjira.

Download full article here: Shankar_Coastal Security  

Excerpts

The Legend of Murud Janjeera

A little more than a nautical mile west of the coastal fishing village of Rajapuri in the Raigad district of Maharashtra stands the imposing Island fortress of Murud Janjeera. Built in 1490 by the local fishing community to ward off pirates, captured and enlarged by the Siddi mercenary Commander of the Ahmadnagar kings, the now brooding stone citadel was amongst the largest of that era. Repeatedly laid siege to by the Dutch, Portuguese, Marathas and the East India Company; its 19 bastions, 572 cannons and forty feet walls remained defiant and impregnable through history.[i] It was not till 1776, when the now independent Siddi’s led by Siddi Sat were defeated by the Marathas led by Chimnaji the brother of Peshwa Baji Rao I in the Battle of Riwas, that the unassailable fortress lost its doughty distinction. As a part of the battle reparations the Siddis were confined to this citadel. The immediate up shot was that the strategic significance of the fortress was annulled and the balance of sea power in the region disrupted. The legend will not be complete without deducing a theoretical abstraction that “the Fort, its eminence abroad and the resolve within had made the local seas present an insuperable physical obstacle to every foe that sought to penetrate”.

A Theory for Coastal Security           

As with any endeavour before we start upon an enquiry into coastal security in India, we seek a road map which will indicate to us at a glance what exactly are the waters we have to cover and what are its leading characteristics which determine its nature and general form so as to arrive at practical conclusions. The maritime domain is of such complexity that beyond the territorial waters of a state,[ii] only conventions exist to regulate, seize, search or even monitor the activities of vessels.[iii] Measures taken to sequester or impose control in international waters are normally unilateral and, predictably, run contrary to partisan interpretations of these conventions. Put pithily, what works on the high seas is that “might gives right”. Within the territorial seas what prevails are the laws of the State, to be put into operation by a plethora of disparate yet distinct agencies of government. But the predicament is that the medium that pervades does not tolerate distinction; both the high seas and the coast are washed by the same waters. So it scarcely needs saying that a segregated approach to providing comprehensive security across a fused medium is condemned to failure.

The second insidious feature that dominates the coastal arena is the effects of globalization and its hand-maidens the free flow of ideas, material and personnel. In addition to releasing entrepreneurial creativity and generating wealth it confers upon small groups’ disproportionate destructive and disruptive power. Access to this power and mobilizing it across the waters for illicit use involves exploiting the malgovernance of the High Seas and the fragmented nature of control within the Territorial Sea. A modus operandi which leaves frustratingly tiny footprints. The narrative of the assault on Mumbai on 26 November 2008 (26/11) and its chronology is well documented. What is not so well known is the evolution of the operational plan and the tell-tales that this process may have left for a discerning unified establishment to perceive and act upon.

Coastal security is firstly, about protection of the State from terrorists, non state actors and other dangerous people with violent intent (hereafter collectively referred to as terrorists) gaining access to the mainland using the sea route; and secondly, preventing the ingress of illicit hazardous material across territorial seas on to our shores. The fortifying process essentially begins with access to global information webs, establishment of wide area surveillance and intelligence networks and a three dimensional air-sea-land interdiction system. A pre requisite is for Command and Control of the entire process and the forces involved coming under a unified head irrespective of the Ministry of origin or the administrative department to which assets belong. Pursuits of diplomacy are obliged at all times be in harmony with the process.

So we arrive at our theory that Coastal Security is a harmonious extension of state policy whose purpose is protection against ingress of inimical man and material and its progression is managed by unified control driven by global sharing of information, surveillance and a comprehensive interdiction system. The American PATRIOT Act of 2001 provides a prototypical expansion of the Theory.[iv]

Sculpting the Approach: 26/11 as the Paradigm

Having now come upon a theory, it will be appropriate to fashion an exemplar and establish fundamental precepts that go into developing a counter to infiltration, penetration or assault plan in order to validate our theory. The events leading up to 26/11 provides a prime example of what could have gone into the planning and preparation of the assault founded on facts that are today available in the public domain. For it is out of such an analysis, that will emerge an approach to protect the State from the seaward ingress of inimical forces and illicit materials. It will also throw the spotlight on footprints and tell tales that our own intelligence and surveillance must stalk, and so also help define a strategy in order to defend and respond as we deter.

At the outset three assumptions are necessary. Firstly, for hostile ingress of any nature there are five essential steps that would have to be gone through by the perpetrators:

  • Planning and Reconnaissance
  •  Generation of an Operational Plan and Communications
  •  Logistics and Preparation
  •  Recruitment and Training
  •  Execution

Based on the extent to which the run up to the event can be reconstructed, experience tells us that these five steps, which may be called the Hostile Ingress and Terrorist Strike Process (HITSP), could be spaced over anywhere up to 18 months with Reconnaissance and the Provision of Logistics taking the bulk of time. Also, Planning is an individualistic activity restricted to a few and maybe conducted at a location distant from the target. The Second assumption is that between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ targets, there are no surprise targets and the Third assumption is that ‘wild cat’ unplanned assaults do not give the desired destructive benefit to the assailants.

A Footprint Matrix has been constructed below (Figure 1) with the 5-step HITSP as augments marked by red stars (Planning and Reconnaissance have been separated). On the X-axis the ‘Persistence’ of a footprint is graded on a scale of 1 to 5, while on the Y-axis, ‘Detectability’ is also graded on the same scale. The notional size of the footprint is determined in terms of these two factors, both of which are more cognitive than absolute. The smallest footprint is the least detectable and of least persistence, graded at (1, 1) and the most prominent at (5, 5).

Fig 1: The Detectability & Persistence Footprint Matrix[v] 

 Source: Author 

Slide1

The matrix tells us the areas we need to concentrate on in order to achieve the elusive goal of deterring, defending and responding to terrorist acts. As will be noted, four zones have been established, these are the Opaque Zone, the Transitory Zone, the Transparent Zone and the Murky Zone. The Process has been assessed for Persistence and Detectability levels and plotted within the four zones, which to the planner provide areas of focus. Obviously, when we deal with the Transitory Zone and the Murky Zone, the returns for effort are extremely small yet they provide early warning. Often due to long gestation periods and a high false alarm probability, the difficulties associated with maintaining prolonged states of vigil may cause the guard to drop, and vital footprints to be lost in a mass of information. These, therefore, are Zones well suited for electronic surveillance and computer aided collation, analysis and dissemination.

The Transitory Zone provides opportunities that are not present in the other quadrants, primarily because the period of reconnaissance, while sporadic, has not only to be comprehensive but at some stage must involve the leading protagonists, some of whom maybe quite alien to the area of operation (Abu Ismail, of 26/11 notoriety, hailed from Dera Ismail Khan in the North West Frontier province is a case in point). The Reconnaissance stage is an activity conducted very early in the plan and as in any operational plan, the scope for errors are the maximum at this stage and therefore surveillance that is kept by way of civil measures would in all probabilities record  footprints. The fact that David Headley (alias Daood Gilani, a Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) operative) had been a regular visitor to Mumbai since early 2008 is symptomatic of such tell-tales.

When confronted with the Murky Zone one sees a picture and a pattern that in hindsight is 6/6 and yet Persistence in the Murky Zone of the operational plan is most significant and therefore, had the fact that the Master of Kuber, Sri Amar Singh Solanki been profiled after his incarceration in Pakistan, so also the movements of Kuber kept track of, 26/11 could well have been nipped during the execution phase. Intelligence, however sketchy, provided on 18th November 2008, indicated the What, Where and When components (nautical parlance) that is, the position of the mother vessel and time; both parameters provided the basis for mounting scouting operations, yet this was not done on grounds that intelligence was not “actionable”. Consequently in the absence of deployed forces either at the point of divergence or convergence Kuber had a free run. Also, the most vulnerable period of movement from sea to shore observed by local fishermen at Colaba and reported to the police ought to have been given the due import that it deserved.

The Opaque Zone if exploited, gives us the maximum benefit for it not only deters attack but action in this zone is pre-emptive in nature; it demands comprehensive knowledge of, and information on man and material that potentially could be used for a strike. This must be backed by all-embracing intelligence networks, field operatives and most importantly, the will to take anticipatory action before a potential incident. Here we must also understand that such pre-emptive actions may have ramifications of an international nature and the State must be disposed to take that risk. Investments in the Opaque Zone will have to be based on steps initiated on a multilateral basis and through ruthless elimination of potential personnel who could pose a hazard. The complexities of operating in the Opaque Zone is there for a planner to see, it poses great challenges, it will demand heavy investments of both man and finances and will yield the best rewards.

Moving into the Transparent Zone, while both Persistence and Detectability are high, they necessitate an internal scheme that is not only comprehensive but transcends the travails of Centre-State relations, ill-defined demarcation between agencies and most significantly, the resolve to cut across boundaries that have been drawn for administrative rather than operational purposes. The movement of logistics, creation of safe havens, handling munitions and that too with great discretion is no simple task.  It is perhaps for this reason that the sea-route with back-up operating in international waters, can by the very nature of the medium, avoid check-posts and regulatory mechanisms that one finds on land. Of course the disadvantages are equally irksome since the environment is hostile, probability of failure due to a variety of reasons is ever present and movement from sea to shore is relatively slow and a vulnerable period. The Transparent Zone provides for not only early warning but exposes the militant operation over both space and time. Logistics and Preparation is neither momentary nor is it undetectable since it involves creation of safe havens, movement of munitions, hazardous material and hit personnel close to the target area. And yet their exposure is subject to the weakest link and least attended virtue of the defensive shield; that of municipal regulation, citizenry awareness and unrelenting deployment of patrols and scouts. The vulnerability of the execution phase lies in the fact that it conforms to a rigid plan; while in most terrorist strikes there is an element of flexibility, exercising the flexibility option would normally result in failure of the strike or marginal success. And therefore the very rigidity of the execution phase provides opportunity to detect and respond.

In the absence of a general theory of terrorism on account of its many roots, motivations, manifestations and intent it is a priori impossible. However, at the heart of terrorist activity lie two critical characteristics; firstly a total disregard to legality of method and secondly it is inspired by a sustained programme of large scale planned and premeditated violence. Intelligence gathering and analysis targeting events related to these two characteristics consequently plays a pivotal role in putting in place counters. It is this relationship in the intelligence scheme that will discern actionable intelligence from a mass of information.

[…]

Conclusion                                                                                                      

Our review of the current state of the coastal defence scheme and the security it provides would appear to project a disjointed image of a contrivance that depends more on a massed approach to security through the induction of numbers (in terms of human resources as well as surveillance means). While it is true that there is logic in numbers, yet the adversary is one who has perfected the art of visualising the cracks in the system. Obviously with more disparate elements involved, more cracks are there to slip in between. On 26/11, ten men with small arms came in two inflatable boats and held our financial capital to ransom for sixty hours.  The mayhem in terms of loss of lives apart, the Mumbai Stock Exchange closed down for the same period resulting in trading disruption of close to USD 9 billion per day. And this is the essence of the disproportionality that has been conferred. ‘Mass’ pitted against ‘Knowledge’ invariably results in victory to the latter.

The covenant between religion and the terrorist is a volatile one. It is neither appeased by bargains nor is it broken by modernity. Indeed it has fused the ideology that drives them with the source of their being (this may explain the suicide bomber). Under these conditions the only route that can succeed is the promise of failure for which, the answer lies in adopting a unified strategy both in form and content. The Footprint Matrix provides an instrument to channelize national effort. We concentrate on any one Zone at the peril of missing out on the others. Persistence is the key and adoption of large scale electronic means for profiling, surveilling, collating and analyses is a necessity.

The nuclear dimension is potentially, the most destructive present danger. While a nuclear strike may present a very complex planning task, our adversaries have shown themselves to be up to the most challenging, the most improbable and yes, the most diabolic. The establishments’ facility to deter, defend and respond will test its will to the extreme.

There appears to be an absence of a guiding national strategy and a coalescing doctrine which seeks to marshal all disparate resources controlled by State and Centre under integrated Command. If our primary strategic goal is to protect against dangerous people and the ingress of illicit hazardous material then this goal must serve to transform the existing organizational and material structures. The litmus test to ascertain credibility lies firstly, in the extent to which we have a cohesive unified strategy in place and developed a joint surveillance and pre-emption capability. And secondly, as the Fortress of Murud Janjira did, have we made the local seas present an insuperable obstacle to every foe that seeks to penetrate? Clearly the answers on both counts must remain in the negative.

End Notes

[i] Hoiberg, Dale & Ramchandani, Students’ Britannica India. Publishers Popular Prakashan 2000, p 403. http://www.maharashtratourism.gov.in/MTDC/HTML/MaharashtraTourism/Forts

[ii] Territorial Seas were first defined in the 18th century as 3 nautical miles, the maximum range of a cannon shot. A workable formula was found by Cornelius Bynkershoek in his De dominio maris (1702), restricting maritime dominion to the actual distance within which cannon range could effectively protect it. This became universally adopted and developed into the three-mile limit.

[iii] See United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. The Convention on the High Seas is an international treaty created to codify the rules of international law relating to the high seas, otherwise known as international waters. The treaty was one of four treaties created at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). The treaty was signed 29 April 1958 and entered into force 30 September 1962. As of 2013, the treaty had been ratified by 63 states. Oceans, seas, and waters outside of national jurisdiction are also referred to as the high seas or, in Latin, mare liberum (meaning free seas).

[iv] A public law in the USA enacted in October 2001, Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT Act) to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.

[v] The matrix was first presented by the Author at “The Seminar on Coastal Security” hosted by the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, in November 2009.

The War in Shadows

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By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

Download full article here: The_War_in_Shadows_Shankar

Abstract

A century ago it was Japan’s uncompromising and resolute political culture, superior operational savvy, doctrinal cohesion and tactical preparation that permitted comprehensive strategic success in a Fleet on Fleet clash over the Russian challenge, in the process upsetting the status quo. Today the emergence of China falls into a similar mould. It has the political will, the economic power and the selective military capability to challenge and revise the status quo. But the nature of War has changed. In this era calibrated escalation of power antagonisms, pressure diplomacy, economic influence and coercion as opposed to a destructive conflict find more favour as political tools. The current situation in Syria, Iran, West Asia, North Korea, weaponizing of space, disruptive control of cyber space, resource capturing and indeed the South China Sea imbroglio are marked by a ‘War in Shadows’ where the principal tools are persuasive in their threat to dent the adversaries comprehensive power. In all cases there is not just a compelling military posture that notifies antagonists but also one that reassures allies.

Excerpts:

Consequences of Strategic Enlargement: Battle of Tsushima 1905

            On 08 February 1904 Admiral Heihachiro Togo fired the first salvo in the Russo-Japanese War with a surprise attack on the Russian Far Eastern Fleet harboured at Port Arthur. In one strategic stroke the Russian Fleet was annihilated and the balance of maritime power in the North West Pacific careened in favour of Japan. The attack preceded a formal declaration of War. Termination of the conflict occurred under equally stunning circumstances when Russia’s Baltic Fleet, now seconded to retrieve the balance of power, was routed a year and a half later in the Battle of Tsushima.[i]

The war grew directly out of competing imperialism in Korea and Manchuria between, what was rated as, a first rate European Power pitted against a developing ‘second’ rate Oriental Power. What astounded the West was that the latter emerged victorious with consummate ease despite strong European alliances on both sides.  Unnoticed was Japan’s national tenacity driven by a deep sense of veneration of the State, the Samurai spirit and ethos of militarism which nurtured a fiercely nationalistic political culture. It also propelled its extension into “Greater East Asia” for strategic security and resource access. Few in Japanese government circles of that day dissented with Baron Hayashi’s severe resolve (so reminiscent of China’s contemporary status): “If new warships are considered necessary we must, at any cost, build them; if the organisation of the army is inadequate we must start rectifying it from now, if need be our entire military system must be changed. At present Japan must keep calm and sit tight so as to lull suspicions against her; during this time the foundations of national power must be consolidated; and we must watch and wait for the opportunity in the Orient that will surely come one day. When this day arrives Japan will decide her own fate.”[ii] Victory in the Russo-Japanese War announced Japan’s day for Great Power status had arrived.

But there was a more significant impact of Japanese enlargement of its sphere of influence which coincided with the draw down of European naval power from their many overseas commitments in the run up to the looming conflict in Europe. Of more than six major powers exploiting the geo political situation in the Far East during the period of the Russo-Japanese War, all but the United States and Japan remained in the ring to contend for mastery of the Pacific. This fact was not only recognised by the two protagonists, but also set in motion a phase of intense strategic engagement that sought to remedy the imbalance caused by the termination of Russia’s ambitions in the region. The Root-Takahari Agreement of 1908 between the United States and Japan went so far as to delineate spheres of accepted influence.[iii]

The world at large and navies in particular drew important lessons from the Russo-Japanese War and the Tsushima action. Consequences of the encounter were felt at three different levels which were to usher a new era in strategic thought and concepts in maritime war fighting. Firstly, at the politico-strategic level the emergence of a new power centre had to be accompanied not just by recognition but also with strategic engagement, realistic accommodation backed by balance if friction and hostility was to be avoided. Secondly, at the Operational level the pivot of maritime power had shifted to the all-big-gun fast and accurate Dreadnought type platform. Lastly, at the tactical level doctrines and training provided the key to success in engagement.

[…]

The War in Shadows

             Strategic maritime thought and its manifestations in the twenty first century have long supplanted the Mahanian concept of Command of the sea which envisaged a life and death fleet-on-fleet mortal struggle for domination.[iv] Corbett’s formulation, adapted for the present, of ‘Control-for-Causes’ is far more sophisticated and appropriate to contemporary geo political circumstances.[v] Its application will have far reaching relevance in an era when calibrated escalation of power antagonism, pressure diplomacy, economic influence and coercion as opposed to a destructive and economically debilitating conflict finds favour as a political tool.

The current situation in Syria, Iran, West Asia, North Korea, weaponising of space, access denial strategies, disruptive control of cyber space and indeed the South China Sea imbroglio are marked by just such a ‘War in Shadows’ where the principal tools are persuasive in their threat to dent the adversaries comprehensive power. In all cases there is not just a compelling military posture that notifies antagonists but also one that reassures Allies. Decisive action seen as the clash of battle fleets, which naval strategists of the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth century considered the key to all strategical problems at sea is today displaced by the interplay and competition of the comprehensive national power of states.

In concept, the comprehensive capability of a country to pursue its strategic objectives through freedom of action internally and externally defines its national power. In achieving this freedom of action, three core factors play a disproportionate part. The first and primary of these is strategic capability in all dimensions. Second, is the resolve of the nation to power as underscored by the will of its people and leadership. And lastly, is the state’s ability to face up to and manipulate strategic outcomes. Klaus Knorr, an American academic influenced greatly by the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War, while putting forth an analysis of the war making potential of states, went beyond the characteristics of economic and military potential to include such components as “the will to fight” and “administrative capacity.” He defined national power as the aggregate of a state’s economic capability, its administrative competitiveness in terms of the influence it was willing to bring to bear globally and its readiness to use its military in order to bring about favourable conclusions.[vi] The Ray Cline expression, though one that emerged during the height of the cold war, moves away from the Second World War mould and introduces soft power attributes. It placed before the statesman the natural subjectivity which arises, when dealing with strategic factors and the will and vigour of people; at the same time it did not lose sight of the hard objective factors that contribute to power. This blend of the abstract with the realist’s point of view is its most abiding virtue. The other significant feature of the latter paradigm is that it sees power through the eyes of the international system or a potential adversary.[vii] Dealing in abstract matters related to the correlation of power was a fresh and sophisticated approach.

This then is the nature of the ‘War in Shadows’. If, now, we search for a practical expression we need go no further than the current situation in Iran. The nature of war that we are currently witness to does not readily fall into any mould other than one in ‘Shadows’. Covert action, cyber attacks and political alienation sufficiently reinforced by economic sanctions and intrusive nuclear inspections on the one hand, has unleashed globally disruptive nationalism on the other. The South China Sea imbroglio is another manifestation of a ‘War in Shadows’; the rise of a new hegemon in China and the slow decline of the current Principal, the USA stimulates the former to develop forces and alliances necessary to realize its grand strategy which China has unambiguously articulated as: stability of dispensation, unimpeded resource access to spur growth and regional pre eminence.[viii]

[…]

 A Conclusion: Challenges and Policy Urge the Strategic Entente

            India’s interests in the region is strategic, enduring and diversifying just as China’s is while that of the sole superpower’s and her allies cannot be set aside. What form this strategic rivalry will take and the substance of it will perhaps only be clear when the dust of USA’s involvement in Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq settles down. However there is considerable congruence of interests between USA (and its Allies), Japan and India which provides a substructure for strategic entente.

The challenge before Indian Planners begins with an understanding of the significance of China’s rise. Just as Japan, a century ago in the post Tsushima era, propelled herself into “Greater East Asia” in the quest for strategic security, great power status and resource access; China’s move into the Indian Ocean may be seen as analogous. Divergences from the analogy lie in the fact that there are other competing stake holders (which includes India, Japan, Russia the USA and allies) in the region and significantly the change in the nature of warfare. The probability of a Fleet on Fleet conflict when there is balance in the correlation of power is low but friction and tensions are more than likely to take the ‘War in Shadows’ form. So the first task before the Planner is to ensure the building of an entente with like minded nations and the second is to structure and deploy forces such that the balance of power is not upset and the resolve to confront the ‘War in Shadows’ is not weak. From this strategic posture leadership may attempt to identify areas of common and overlapping interests with China and to enhance cooperation in these areas. The new found strategic Indo-US relationship provides leverage to promote the areas that lie in the domain of vitally common interest of the entente, such as guaranteed energy security, safety of production facilities, protection of transportation infrastructure and the right to unimpeded passage. The stake holders also share a common sensitivity to terrorism emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan area. Measures to arrest it may translate to joint naval patrols working in tandem with littoral states and the use of commercial and diplomatic clout to rein-in maverick states. The relationship that oil producers have with their consumers is a symbiotic one; this interdependence also provides the basis of a new framework which could be driven by action to promote security to both consumer and producer in such a manner that stability becomes of interest to all parties.

Participation of the stake holders in forums such as India Africa Forum Summits (IAFS) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) would give relevance and substance to these institutions. After all not to include the main actors with governing stakes in the area, not withstanding the fact that China, Japan, Russia and the USA are extra regional powers, is to denude these associations of context. This may cue the next logical step to give regulatory teeth to these institutions. Given the stakes that China has in her own development and her security concerns, there are adequate signals to suggest that India needs to pull out of the state of paranoia that she transits through every time that China collaborates with Pakistan and replace it with  an understanding of and preparedness for the ‘War in Shadows’ on the one hand, while on the other a willingness to leverage its burgeoning trade with China which is expected to reach $100 billion by 2015. In this deepening of commercial relations lies the germ of friction resolution.

Download full article here: The_War_in_Shadows_Shankar

End Notes

[i] Chant, Holmes and Koenig, Two Centuries of Warfare-Tsushima. Octopus Books Ltd, London 1978, pp 187-209.

[ii] Kennedy Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Vintage Books, New York 1989, pp 208- 209. Baron Hayashi Gonsuke a career diplomat from the samurai tradition was a career diplomat and the resident minister of Japan in the court of the Qing.

[iii] Gould, Lewis L. The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, University Press of Kansas 1992, pp 268.

[iv] Mahan A.T , The Influence of Sea Power on History the theme of Command of the Sea is a recurrent theme through the text.

[v] Corbett Julian. S, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Longmans Green and Co. New York 1911, pp 110-121.

[vi] Knorr, Klaus. The Power of Nations: The Political Economics of International Relations. Basic Books 1975. Definition and expansion of the National Power of a State is the central theme of the book.

[vii] Cline, S. Ray, ‘World Power Assessment: A Calculus for Strategic Drift’ Washington: Center for Strategic and International studies, Georgetown University,1975, pp 11.

[viii] Ma Cheng-Kun, PLA News Analysis, Significance of  2008 China’s National Defence White Paper No. 15,  pp 49-60.

 

Aircraft Carriers: The Pivot in Maritime Power Equations

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By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

This article is forthcoming in the September 2013 issue of Geopolitics

Keywords: Indian Air Craft Carrier Program, INS Vishal, INS Viraat, INS Vikrant, Sino-India relations, India Maritime Strategy, Third Island Chain, Indian Maritime Strategy

Download full article here

Excerpts

 ….to provide the very unity of its objectives directed upon the sea [i]

 The Design of a Thesis

 If we are to form an opinion on the current state of reality and to act upon it with any impact, some sort of a thesis is necessary. The end of the Cold War and the paradigm that it represented brought in its wake scholarly works that sought to prognosticate what future international relations and order held. Wide ranging theories were advanced from the emergence of one world in which harmony, democracy and an end to conflict were prophesized, and with it an end to a turbulent history of man’s ideological evolution with the grand terminal formulation that western liberal democracy had prevailed.[ii] Some saw the emergence of a multi polar order and the arrival of China not withstanding the warts of Tiananmen. Yet others saw in the First Iraq War, the continuing war in the Levant, the admission of former Soviet satellite nations into NATO and the splintering of Yugoslavia an emerging clash of civilisations marked by violent discord shaped by cultural, religious and civilisational similitude.[iii] However, these illusions were, within a decade, dispelled and found little use in understanding and coming to grips with the realities of the post Cold War world as each of them represented a candour of its own. Some of the symptoms that have emerged are an increased and vicious securing of spheres of power and economic influence as exemplified by China in Africa and her claims of the South China Sea; the competition between autocracy and liberalism; an older religious struggle between radical Islam and secular cultures; and the inability to regulate the anarchic flow of technologies and information. As these struggles are played out the first casualty in the post Cold War era is the still born hope of a benign and enlightened world order.

Endemic instability world wide is characterized by the number of armed conflicts that erupted between the periods 1989 to 2010 which total forty nine.[iv] The nature of these wars, more than anything else, reflected what I term the ‘Uncertainty Paradigm’ for they ranged from wars of liberation and freedom to insurgencies, civil wars, racial-ethnic-religious wars, proxy wars, interventions and wars motivated by the urge to corner economic resources. In all cases it was either the perpetuation of a dispensation, political ambitions, or the fear of economic deprivation that was at work below the surface. If that were not enough to underscore the fragility, gravity and self-centeredness of the international system, in the same period the United States of America alone has militarily intervened in foreign countries on 11 occasions; more often than at any time in history.[v]

So too when thinking of maritime affairs a touchstone only places in perspective the events that we are confronted with, provides a pattern and a context within which a strategy may be devised and force structures put in place to come to terms with an uncertain future. China’s quest to secure efficiently rights of passage on the sea to fuel her thirst for markets, energy, primary produce and commodities has led her to the ‘Northern Passage’[vi] as a trade corridor. The distance from China to markets in Europe has been cut down to less than 8000 miles from 14,700 miles. Significantly the route avoids two sensitive ‘choke points’ the Malacca Strait and the Suez Canal. Today the Arctic passage is a near reality, yet her resource and energy jugular that runs across the Indian Ocean continues to bulge and throb. China therefore theorises that the road to securing these sea lines of communication is through a strategy of ‘Access Denial.’[vii] The denial paradigm was founded on lessons of the 1991 Gulf War and security concern in relation to Taiwan. It saw in the Gulf War a reason for pre-emption against build up in-region of inimical combat potential. Logistic preparation was perceived as the first salvo of a conflict. During the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, U.S. deployment of two carrier groups to the region remains in Chinese memory as an embarrassing infringement of sovereignty.[viii] The value and logic of an access denial strategy is obvious in reference to Taiwan. But enabling such a strategy when the intent of logistic preparations may be ambiguous and scope and space are enlarged must clearly tax strategists’ world wide and suggest the uncertainty of stability. It is these circumstances that impel the quest for a strategic posture that not only seeks to balance but also shape the future. Given the correlation of forces, for India it is the Ocean that holds the key.

 Oceans and Economic Power: China as the Strategic Competitor

Among the multifarious factors that characterize and influence the development of nations an ever increasing role is being played by its maritime power. The realization of such power is at the heart of making effective use of the world’s oceans. Higher the level of development of the economy greater will be the consequences assumed by the world oceans as an inexhaustible source of energy, raw materials, food and most critically as a medium for the movement of trade, materials, petroleum products and indeed of personnel; so also the portents for discord. Close to 90 per cent of global trade is borne by hulls at sea. It is no secret that to this very day, maritime power is a key catalyst of economic growth.

The change in China from a closed centrally planned system to a market oriented one from the late 1970s to the present must be seen as having been enabled, in good measure, by vigorous promotion of maritime power. So much so that by 2010 it became the world’s largest exporter, its economy at $9.8 trillion is only second to the USA and with an oil consumption of 8.2 million bbl/day she is the third largest consumer in the world (2009 estimates). When we look at the growth pattern of India since liberalization, (which can be pegged to have started on 24th July 1991 with the Narsimha Rao government’s package of industrial reforms along with a new open door policy on inward investment) we note a similar trend with respect to consumption patterns, energy demands, exports and trade. Indeed with one third of this growth being powered by trade to the East (in 2012 trade with ASEAN nations was pegged at $80 billion), the requirement to secure these interests become all the more vital. Already the 2011 figures make China our largest trading partner ($ 70 billion). Security of this trend will be a key to development of India. At the same instant, in the race to garner limited resources for the development of two very large economies the scope for friction looms large.

The reasons many countries view China with trepidation today are similar on the surface to their reaction to the rise of Japan in the 1970s and 80s and yet rooted in very different forces. China, too, uses a competing economic model, albeit with a difference (the very phrase used is an oxymoron) – “state capitalism” – that challenges conventional economic ideologies. In many ways, China also behaves in a mercantilist fashion. It keeps its currency controlled so its exports can out-compete those from other countries, and it corners natural resources for its insatiable growth by methods that are reminiscent of colonial dealings, not that the West did not in the past indulge in more vicious practices.  China is succeeding based on ideas that are anathema to those of the likes of the father of modern economics, Adam Smith, and his theories of the ‘invisible hand’ and the self regulating nature of the ideal economy.[ix] The concerns with China is provoked by its manifest urge to use comprehensive national power to challenge and change the existing global political, economic and security structures without bringing about a change within her own biological morphology. It is not as if these structures are not due for an overhaul but it is the knuckle duster methods that she has chosen to employ and the reluctance to participate in cooperative security and economic arrangements that provide the potential  for discord.

China’s claims on the South China Sea as a territorial sea; her handling of dissent within in Tibet and Tiananmen; her proliferatory carousing with rogue states such as North Korea and Pakistan are cases, amongst others, that do not inspire confidence in change occurring within that nation without turbulence. We also note with some foreboding, the emergence of China from out of its, largely, defensive maritime perimeters as defined by the first and second island chain strategies into the Indian Ocean region as a major stakeholder. To this end, it has through diplomacy and economic inducements established bases in Sittwe, Hambantota, Gwadar and Marao in the Maldives. The geographic and strategic significance of these posts were apparent in the past and are equally vital today, whether for purposes of control, regulating, providing havens or assuring security to energy and resource lines. Sittwe and Gwadar also provide the front end for piping energy into China. These long term strategic investments by China maybe seen as the coming of the ‘Third Island Chain’.

Articulating its strategic objectives in order of precedence China has unambiguously identified three canons, the first of which is internal and external stability to its own gauge; the second is to sustain the current levels of its economic growth and lastly to achieve regional pre-eminence. Gone is the ‘power bashfulness’ that marked the Deng era, in its place is a cockiness that is discernible in the contemporary conviction that “the world needs China more than China the world”. This frame of reference gives form to the ‘Access Denial Strategy’. When projected in consonance with the Third Island Chain, one cannot but note that denial would apply not just to the region of purpose, but also to the points of origin and to the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) along which energy, trade and resources are moved. The waters and littorals of the Indian Ocean and specifically the West Pacific Ocean and the Bay of Bengal (together here after termed as the Eastern Ocean) will now become the region where this strategy will be played out.  The Dilemma for planners is in the absence of a security oriented cooperative impulse, such sweeping strategies (specifically the coming ‘Third Island Chain’ superimposed on a long range Access Denial Strategy), is it’s blindness to recognize that, as historically never before, we are in fact dealing with a sea space that, in Mahan’s words, is the busiest of all the “vast commons.” The reluctance for collaboration makes the potential for friction high.

China, in the 18th century under the Qing dynasty enjoyed a golden age. It was a period of shengshi, an age of prosperity. Currently some Chinese nationalists say that, thanks to the Communist Party and its economic prowess, another shengshi has arrived.[x] In 2010 China became the world’s biggest manufacturer, a position that the US had held for most of the 20th century. By 2020, it has been forecast, that China could become the world’s largest economy. Significant to political influence is its matching economic and military growth. Power, changes the very character of nations and its people and of their standing in the comity of nations. It places primacy to their beliefs and interests in the international milieu giving it new drive to shape global affairs in a manner that is self promoting. This search for geopolitical space that the emergence of a new cognizable revisionist power precipitates, historically, global instability and tensions. Add to this that the principle of nationalism is inextricably linked, both in theory and practice, with the concept of war,[xi] then, we are faced with a situation when the military dimension of power will potentially throw up conflictual circumstances that will have to be contended with. Against this backdrop, when the politics of competitive resource access is put into the same pot as survival and development of State, to which is added the blunt character of military power, we have before us the recipe for conflict. It is against this canvas of competitive resource access and strategic uncertainty that the development and structuring of Indian maritime power must be gauged.  

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India: A Theory of Maritime Warfare and a Basis for Structuring the Fleet   

            A fourfold classification of maritime forces has dominated naval thought since the Second World War. The grouping is largely functional and task oriented. The differentiation comprises of aircraft carriers, strike units and denial forces, escorts and scouts, and auxiliaries (the last include logistic and other support ships such as landing ships, mine layers, sweepers, tenders etc). In addition contemporary thought has given strategic nuclear forces a restraining role to define and demarcate the limits within which conventional forces operate.

Through the years there have been other concepts governing the constitution of the Fleet and its development, often driven by well reasoned logic and at other times motivated by nothing beyond the instantaneous intimidation. That being as it may, clearly the make up of fleets must logically be a material articulation of the strategic concepts and ideas that prevail. The principal demand of the theory of naval war is to attain a strategic posture that would permit control of oceanic spaces in order to progress and influence the course of conflict. Against this frame of reference the fundamental obligation is therefore to provide the means to seize and exercise that control (it therefore comes as no surprise that China develops forces necessary to realize ‘access denial’). Pursuing this line of argument, the rational formulation that remains consistent with our theory of naval warfare is that upon the escorts and scouts depends our ability to exercise control over the objective maritime space or of Sea Lines of Communication; while on the Aircraft Carrier group and its intrinsic air power assisted by strike and denial forces depends the security of control. It is here that the true impact of the Aircraft Carrier is felt. Control and Security of Control is the relationship that operationally links all maritime forces with the Aircraft Carrier.

It may be argued that the best means of achieving control is to incapacitate the adversary’s ability to interfere.  It would then appear that even in the maritime environment the doctrine of destroying the enemy’s armed forces reasserts itself as the paramount objective. This is what must concern the planner to the extreme; that is, should we not concentrate our maritime exertions with the singular aim of dealing that knock out punch. But the maritime environment and the vastness of the hydrosphere that we choose to influence is of a nature that force compromises will have to be made that depletes the escort forces in order to pull away the carrier group to seek out and destroy the adversary’s denial and strike elements. At the same time the antagonist may hardly be expected to be so accommodating as to expose his main forces in unfavorable circumstances. As Corbett so eloquently put it “the more closely he induces us to concentrate in the face of his fleet, the more he frees the sea for the circulation of his own trade, and the more he exposes ours to cruiser raids.”[xii]

Indeed, there is no correct solution to this dilemma of how best in time, space and most economically, can sea control be established as this would often be dictated by the relative strength, structure and constitution of the fleet, intentions and the geographic character of the theatre of operations which favors one or the other protagonist. However, we may draw a general conclusion that the object of maritime power is to establish control over a predesignated area for a desired period of time. The process may be preceded by strikes against the foe and actions to deny that sea space. The consequence of control may either be operations to secure the object on land or an assurance of passage on that sea area in order to further the war effort. To achieve this state efficiently it is necessary that maritime power be equipped with the appropriate mix of vessels specially adapted for the purpose.

We have thus far noted that our theory of maritime warfare is governed by the ability to control maritime space and put it to use that furthers the national effort. However it is the conditions of use of sea power and the nature of twenty first century conflicts  that is now of significance.

Why the Aircraft Carrier

We have thus far seen how geostrategic uncertainty, growth of China as a strategic competitor and its military posture have together precipitated a theory of military maritime preparedness that suggests the building of a capability that could deny and then control maritime spaces. But what is the real world answer to the question why the Aircraft Carrier? What value does a hundred year old operational concept have in an age of ballistic missiles, satellite surveillance, global drones and cyber warfare? How does the Carrier support a strategy that aims at wresting the initiative in the Indian Ocean in a competitive face-off? And how do a few squadrons of aircraft based on sea mobile platforms impact regional events disproportionately?

Maritime combat air operations in a century has transited from the first hesitant heavier than air flight to wide area domain transparency and control but this evolution was bumpy and far from convincing. The main stumbling block in the minds of strategists was, had gunnery, that had been the gauge of naval power for nearly five centuries, reached a state of decline that it could be unseated and supplanted by air power? At start the latter’s vulnerability, fragility and inefficiency did not inspire the same certainty that technology prophesised. The rise of airpower at the turn of the twentieth century was therefore neither obvious nor was it readily accepted as anything more than an insignificant power tool. While much of this line of thinking was driven by the traditional gunnery biases and the investments already made in the ‘Dreadnought’ programmes;[xiii] there remained the undeniable capability that the seaborne aircraft brought to the theatre of operations: they could deliver payloads further than naval guns could with greater mobility, rapidity and flexibility; at the same time the parent platform could more readily keep pace with combat technologies as represented by its suite of  aircrafts and tailor them for designated tasks. In the shipbuilder’s lexicon, the Aircraft Carrier is an open architecture weapon system with well-understood interfaces and parameters.[xiv]

It is tactically true that contemporary missile armed ships, submarines and shore based long range missiles including Anti Ship Ballistic Missiles pose a threat to the Carrier, as they do to all vessels. However, superior surveillance, cooperative engagement capability, mobility (a Carrier Group can move nearly 1000 kms in a day), range and payload of its aircrafts give it the upper hand in any tactical scenario. The Carrier, through the devise of its aircrafts, can hold an enemy ship or target at safe distances and then neutralize it by “standing off” and delivering a lethal strike.  It can, depending upon circumstances either degrade enemy surveillance and command and control or altogether inhibit the capability to counter attack. The impact of a Carrier Group on operations and the centrality that it assumes in control of maritime space may be summarised as follows:

  • Control of maritime space and assuring its security for any length of time is impossible without a standoff capability and this is provided by the Carrier Group.
  • Functional diversity that the Carrier Group can bring to bear include: deterrence, support of amphibious operations, land attack missions, wide area domain awareness, command and control of large forces and personnel evacuation.
  • The Carrier Group can sustain the conditions for long term offensive presence and power projection. It can, during the adversary’s preparation and build up phase deny free access to his bases.
  • The operational agility, firepower and flexibility that the Carrier Group provides to the Commander is unmatched by any other maritime force.
  • As opposed to land forces and ground based air forces, maritime power particularly the Carrier Group represents the most potent yet the least intrusive of military power because it operates in and from international waters.

[…]

Conclusion

The ultimate reality of the international system is the place that power enjoys in the scheme of assuring stability in relations between nations. Uncertainty in international relations queers the pitch, in view of the expanded space of possibles. China has unambiguously articulated three canons that make for its strategic objectives; stability, growth and regional pre eminence. In the absence of a security oriented cooperative impulse, the problem with such sweeping strategies specifically the coming ‘Third Island Chain’ superimposed on a long range power projection and access denial is its blindness to recognize that, we are in fact dealing with a sea space that is the busiest of all the “vast commons”. The reluctance for collaboration makes the potential for friction high.

Contemporary challenges in our areas of interest is dominated by what direction China’s rise will take, of significance is that the potential for a collision is a reality and the only consideration that could deter it, is the ability to attain a strategic posture that serves to stabilize. The ready availability of the Aircraft Carrier and its complimentary group is central to any power equation and in consequence to stability.

End Notes

[i] Mahan. Alfred T, The Influence of Seapower on History. Hill and Wang 1957. ‘Unity of aim directed upon the sea’ is a recurring theme that finds articulation in Chapters 1, 9 and 11.

[ii]Fukuayama Francis. “The End of History.” The National Interest, 16 (Summer 1989), pp 4, 18.

[iii] Huntington. Samuel, P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of  World Order, Penguin Books, India 1997, pp 30-39.

[iv] The World at War http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/index.html.The United Nations defines “major wars” as military conflicts inflicting 1,000 battlefield deaths per year. In 1965, there were 10 major wars under way. The new millennium began with much of the world consumed in armed conflict or cultivating an uncertain peace. As of mid-2005, there were eight Major Wars under way [down from 15 at the end of 2003], with as many as two dozen “lesser” conflicts ongoing with varrying degrees of intensity.

[v] Occasions of US military intervention 1989 – 2010 :

1989 – Panama, 1991 – Iraq, 1992 – Somalia,1994 – Haiti, 1995-96 –  Bosnia, 1998 – Iraq, 1999 – Kosovo, 2001 – Afghanistan, 2003 – Iraq, 2009 – Pakistan (Drones), 2010 – Libya .

[vi] Article by author titled “The Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang Corridor”, published in the September 2012 issue of the DSA. The Northern Passage was a fabled sea route theorised by adventurers, merchants and money chandlers over the last six centuries to

link the Pacific with the Atlantic Ocean. The Route lay through the Arctic archipelago the treacherous ice flows that frustrate passage across the Arctic Ocean.

[vii] Security analysts  have examined China’s efforts to develop weapons systems that can retard or even stop a potential adversary from entering an area of interest. Dubbed “access-denial,” the aim of such a strategy is to use weapons that deter and should the need arise challenge or indeed prevent inimical forces from operating in conlict zones or oceanic areas of interest . The teeth of this strategy is an anti-ship missile. Such a missile, fired from land, sea, underwater or air can cause tremendous damage to an enemy surface vessel. While such technology isn’t new, the effective ranges of such weapons have increased tremendously, along with their accuracy, speed of delivery and precision. Defending against such systems is therefore a major problem for planners

[viii] Lewis John Wilson and Litai Xue, “The Quest for a Modern Air Force” in Imagined Enemies China Prepares for Uncertain War,  Stanford University Press 2006, p237. General Liu Jingsong, a member of the 15th CPC Central Committee, he was also the PLA  Commander of the Shenyang and Lanzhou military regions and to him amongst others is attributed the opening of Equatorial Guinea 1995.

[ix] Smith Adam , The Wealth of Nations.

[x] The Economist, June 25th – July 1st 2011, special report China.

[xi] Howard, Michael. The Lessons of History, Yale University Press New Haven and London, p39.

[xii] Corbett, Julian. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Longmans, Green and CO, London 1911, p.115

[xiii] Friedman, Norman (1978). Battleship Design and Development 1905–1945. Conway Maritime Press p19-21.

[xiv] Clancy, Tom. Carrier, Berkeley Books, New York 1999, p 4.