Author Archives: strategicdialogues

Syria: “loosening the blood-dimmed tide”*

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Arundhati Ghose

This article was first published in the August 2012 issue of Defence and Security Alert. 

An anniversary issue gives one an opportunity to step back from viewing the ebb and flow of the current and to take a wider view from a not-too-distant shore, and to try and read the portents of the welling of the sea, the threatening of a tidal wave. A ‘tide’, for some accuracy, has been variously described primarily as ‘the alternate rising and falling of the sea due to the attraction of the moon and sun’ and ‘a powerful surge of feeling or trend of events.’ Today, events in the Middle East in general, and in Syria in particular, is viewed  by most commentators mainly through immediate and bloody events, with different interpretations of these events by countries with differing goals. India’s votes in the UN, with the Arab League and the West in the Security Council and abstaining in the vote in the General Assembly, have been judged from this perspective, reflective of a short or medium term judgement of India’s interests. But what if the tide swells and spreads, what if it becomes a global tsunami and the “Syrian moment’, as it were, becomes as portentous as the assassination, almost a hundred years ago, in Sarajevo? The likelihood is no longer only a probability; there are currents that would seem to make this a near and ‘blood-dimmed’ certainty.

Without going into pre-history, which one would have to if the issues were related purely to religious sectarian rivalries, or indeed only political and ideological ones, (after all, it has long been conventional wisdom that the next world wide war would start in the Middle East)-it would have to be admitted that the faultlines becoming apparent today might be traced to  years more recent, when ambitions for power and control began to be stoked by the sudden and almost unexpected wealth created by the first oil shock in the 1970s and the interventions by outside powers upset delicate balances in complex regional rivalries. What started as diplomatic jostling for leadership  within the Ummah between Saudi Arabia, made newly powerful not merely by immense oil wealth but  by its courting as a power in global affairs by the established old powers of the West, and the Iran of the Shah who saw a revival of dreams of the Persian Empire of old, injected the concept of ‘political Islam’ into international discourse. The use of ‘political Islam’ to oust the failing Soviet rule over Afghanistan, encouraged in part by the Iranian revolution that saw the establishment of a purely theocratic State, engendered the arming and funding of disparate groups, which were led to believe they were in the vanguard of defending Islam against the atheist. As the Soviet Union withdrew, these groups were lauded as ‘mujahideen’ victors of the war for Islam.

Into this fragile situation, the second Gulf  War and the invasion of Iraq led to consequences which are today determining the outlines of the current crises- in the Arab world in general and in Syria in particular. Whether the US could have, should have or whether it ignored the possibility of these consequences is not the issue here: there is no doubt the there were at least three major consequences which unsettled such stability as had existed in the region before the invasion. These were , at a level, the  so-called Arab Spring, the hardening of the Shia-Sunni divide within the Ummah and the  emergence of Iran as a regional power.

According to some  influential Arab commentators, the ease with which Saddam Hussein’s regime was dismantled-with foreign intervention, to be sure, was an important factor in the impulses which resulted in the revolt of the peoples of Tunisia, Egypt and Libya-three neighbouring but very different countries – against the dictatorial though secular regimes in these countries. Iraq had also been a ‘secular’ country, though a Sunni minority formed the elite in power and the majority Shia were ruthlessly suppressed.  The equally ruthless dismantling of the structures of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq by the American occupation forces, turned Iraq into a Shia majority country closely allied to Iran. The introduction of religion, specifically the Sunni Muslim Brotherhood into the governing structures of these countries was also presaged by the changes in Iraq. The new element making the mixture more complex has been the use of the social media when mainstream media faced controls; this has caused concerns in other States, and not only those of centralized States such as China.

All these trends have coalesced in Syria, where the Shia-Sunni divide has divided the Arab world and threatens to spill over world-wide. Turkey, which had envisaged a leadership role for itself following the early days after the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt, presenting itself as a ‘model’ of a democratic, modern Islamic State, has found its support for the Sunni rebels in Syria being challenged not only among its Alevi (Alawite-Shia) minority- 15% of its population, but threats from Syrian Kurds who have been trying to make common cause with the Turkish Kurds (20% of its population). Syria is reported to have ceded control over several areas in its north to its Kurds, with the latter raising the Kurdish flag over governmental buildings. Turkey has reportedly joined Arab Sunni States like Saudi Arabia and Qatar in funding and arming and providing ‘safe havens’ for the opposition ‘rebels.’ There are credible reports that many of these ‘rebels’ are not Syrian, but an unholy mix of  Sunni  Chechens. Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Yemenis, with groups of al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood among the more organized elements in the otherwise  disorganized Free Syrian Army. It cannot be discounted that the Kurds are similarly supported by Syria and Iran. Shia Iraq has its own problems with its Kurds, but the country has been more supportive of Arab Shia Syria than other Sunni members of the Arab League. Sunnis and Alawites are already fighting in Lebanon with Hezbollah threatening armed retaliation if Syria were to be attacked and Jordan is on the edge.

Syria’s strongest regional supporter is, of course, Iran. The strengthening of Iran is also a direct consequence of the collapse of the Sunni led regime of Saddam Hussein. That the current hostilities between both major sects poses a threat to Islamic unity, vis-à-vis the US and the West for Iran, and from movements to topple established regimes from Saudi Arabia, seems to have been recognized by both countries; the recent personal invitation to the Iranian President from the Saudi King to the emergency session of the OIC, the high level composition of the Iranian delegation, the seating of Ahmedinejad on the right of King Abdullah might indicate some back-room efforts to stabilize the situation. Iran is also reported to have announced that it had a proposal to sort out the situation in Syria at (at the time of writing) the forthcoming NAM Summit to be held in Iran would seem to be a pointer in this direction. However, given that the situation has now several non-regional countries and non-state actors involved, any such attempt might be difficult to implement.

Iran of course faces challenges on two fronts- in the Syrian situation and, long predating even the invasion of Iraq, with Israel, the US and the West over  Iran’s alleged determination to develop nuclear weapons. Today, whether for domestic political reasons or not, Israel appears to be straining at the leash to mount an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities; faced with an impending election, the US, in an effort to restrain such a disastrous step, has tightened sanctions on Iran almost effectively isolating Iran economically. In Syria, the US sees an opportunity to weaken Iran further and has supported the Sunni Arabs and Turkey, even threatening military action in the event Syria uses or even moves its chemical weapons, in addition to other support already being extended to the so-called ‘rebels’. Action against Syria under the aegis of the UN has been effectively stalled by vetoes by both Russia and China. Apart from Russia’s close friendship with Syria, the experience of NATO action in Libya and its fear of Chechen militants becoming empowered to act in Central Asia, the many initiatives taken by Russia would seem to signal a more assertive global role by Putin’s Russia. China has been less active, but has consistently opposed the involvement of outside powers to effect regime change using the UN for military action. Some China watchers feel that China is being cautious , as officially, at least, it has cited the Libyan case; it is possible that it would change its stance once its change of guard is smoothly accomplished in October. Others feel that not withstanding its global stature, there is a degree of nervousness about possible external incitement in its restive provinces of Tibet and Xinjiang. Whatever the reasons, the world is gradually becoming divided as the impact of the trends in the Middle East as a whole but in Syria in particular, starts spilling over outside the region, even into Africa.

The tide has started lapping at our shores; Malaysia has suspended its diplomatic relations with Syria after the OIC suspended Syria’s membership and Pakistan, where sectarian violence is endemic, and which has been seen by many commentators as the epicentre for the export of terrorists, has seen a rise in the hunting down of minorities especially Shias. Indeed, India’s stake in stability in the region has increased manifold.

The Syrian crisis cannot be easily disentangled from the ones facing Iran; if one looks at some of the albeit worst case scenarios, any military action against Iran or against Syria even be declaring ‘no-fly zones as proposed by France, would have major global spill-over effects. The forces that have been loosed would almost certainly spread to territories outside the Middle East. This would also be the case if the perilous geopolitical situation described earlier, continues at the current bloody levels. Taking an overview of the situation, it appears that, unlike other recent crises-Iraq and Afghanistan, the major powers are no longer the major determinant of a possible solution: today, most US positions seem to be taken in the throes of Presidential election fever, tempered into trying to ensure that while Iran can be weakened by a Syrian implosion with the provision of a limited number of arms to the ‘rebels’, Israeli hawks need to be restrained from actually attacking Iran. The UK and France are merely mischief-makers, with little power to act on their own; given the stalemate in the Security Council, they (and Turkey) may try to energise NATO, as in the case with Libya. In the Lybian case, however, the centrality of the West in settling disputes in the Middle East had already started to erode, presaged by the split within NATO on the issue of Iraq. Russia and China may have the veto, but China is unlikely to get directly involved, given its clashing ideological and economic interests in the region and Russia is hardly likely to have the stamina of facing down the West and the Sunni world alone. The crucial countries in a possible solution are Iran and Saudi Arabia.

The forces of extremist groups which were let loose in Afghanistan, have gained in power and ambition. India has been subject to their vicious depredation for decades. There is no doubt that in addition to India’s own economic interests and its expatriate population in the Gulf, the dangers of a Global War of Terror would pose extreme challenges to India’s security, should it, as it is bound to, if the worst case scenarios happen- unless India, having first-hand experience of dealing with these forces, at least tries to do more that merely ride out the storm. One possible direction could be for India to mediate between Iran and Saudi Arabia- the countries that have the power to limit the stalemate or escalation.  It is just possible that, notwithstanding the public action of the OIC, given the unusual cordiality of the interaction between the King of Saudi Arabia and the Iranian President at the OIC meeting in Riyadh, some deal was negotiated; at the very least, it is clear that both countries would see a continuation of the Syrian crisis as being harmful to themselves and to the Ummah. All India would need to do would be to support the initiative and press for its implementation-on whatever lines agreed to – by both countries. If there is any give on the part of both, and, India could use the challenges she faces at the moment in the current situation, as bilateral leverages for encouragement, other countries, the US and Russia, for example ,could also be asked to support an Iranian-Saudi led solution.

If we fail, there is near certainty that the war will go global- and unlike any of the earlier World Wars, it will be a war without clearly defined armies, State against State, State against non-State actors and non-state actors against other similar groups with no loyalties except to their own ambitions. It will be a war without end.

[*] W.B.Yeats: The Second Coming

“Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world,

The blood-dimmed tide is loosed, and everywhere

The ceremony of innocence is drowned;

The best lack all conviction, while the worst

Are full of passionate intensity.”

About the Author:

Ambassador Arundhati Ghose joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1963. She worked in various capacities in the Embassies of India in Austria, Bangladesh, Belgium and The Netherlands; and as Ambassador of India to the Republic of Korea, Ambassador and Permanent Representative to UNESCO; Ambassador of India to Egypt; Ambassador and Permanent Representative of India to UN Offices in Geneva, and the Conference on Disarmament. After retiring from the foreign service in November 1997, Ambassador Ghose served as Member, UPSC (1998-2004); Member and Chairman of UN Secretary General’s Disarmament Advisory Board (1998-2001); Member from India on Committee for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2004-2005); Member of Executive Council, IDSA (2004-2007) and functioned for two years as Chairman of its Programme Committee and as member of the task force on non-proliferation and disarmament set up by the MEA in 2007. She is currently Adjunct Fellow at the National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore and on the editorial Board of the journal Faultlines, New Delhi. The Ambassador has contributed chapters to books and articles in journals and newspapers on nuclear issues, disarmament and has been invited to speak at various fora on these and related topics. 

The Soldier and the Mantri (*): Civil-Military Relations in India

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Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

Keywords: Civil-Military Relations in India, Henderson-Brooks and Bhagat Report, “The Soldier and the State,” Societal Values and Military Imperatives

Download full article here: Shankar, Civil Military Relations

Excerpts:

The Curzon-Kitchener Imbroglio

Between April 1904 and August 1905, an intriguing incident occurred in the governance of the Raj, the tremors of which are felt to this day. The then Viceroy Lord Curzon, emphasizing the need for dual control of the Army of India, deposed before the Secretary of State, at Whitehall, imputing that the Commander-in-Chief, Lord Kitchener was “subverting the military authority of the Government of India” (almost as if) “to substitute it with a military autocracy in the person of the Commander-in-Chief.” This was in response to Kitchener having bypassed the Viceroy and placing a minute before the home Government where he described the Army system in India, as being productive of “enormous delay and endless discussion, while the military member of the (Viceroy’s Executive) Council rather than the Commander-in-Chief, was really omnipotent in military matters.” He further remarked that “no needed reform can be initiated and no useful measure be adopted without being subjected to vexatious and, for the most part, unnecessary criticism, not merely as regards the financial effect of the proposal but as to its desirability or necessity from a purely military point of view.” [i] In the event, both Viceroy Curzon and the Military Member of his Council, Sir Elles, on receipt of the Imperial Government’s direction subordinating the Military Member to the Commander-in-Chief, resigned.

Indeed times are different, the Government then was an imperial one, India was a colony to be exploited, its material capital defended and the monarchy was at its zenith. Yet, the Viceroy’s largely unencumbered authority was challenged successfully, to all intent and purpose, by the military face of British India. Curzon had shot his bolt when he emphasised superior dual control of the army which in effect asserted operational control bereft of accountability; while Kitchener of Sudan brought to the debate indisputable military experience and underscored the criticality of unity of command without which the army would be condemned to bureaucratic meddling and operational impotence (the ultimate check and strategic orientation, at any rate, would remain with the Secretary of State and the India Council at Whitehall).

Delving into the Commander-in-Chief’s mind, it was clearly the closed loop of the ‘responsibility-accountability and therefore authority’ chain that was in danger of being subverted and replaced by a skewed system that neither had the competence to fully understand the utilisation of the military and yet exercised operational control over it, nor the tradition to stand accountable for its actions. It is this hapless legacy that periodically surfaces whenever independent India has been faced with a situation when the application or even the preparedness and posture of military power could perhaps have provided resolution or, indeed, deterred an armed conflagration.

The Nature of the Indian Military: The Sum of Misplaced Fears 

Independent India was founded on the belief that the Anglo Indian services (which included the Military and the Indian Civil Service that conventional wisdom suggested was the steel frame of empire) was neither Indian, nor civil, nor provided service of any import to India.[ii] The civil services in this setting was nimble enough to morph into the Indian Administrative Service and in time to politicize and adapt to a context that nurtured sycophancy, redefined the idea of authority sans accountability and found virtue in the ills of a fragmented society.[iii] In all this forgetting the words of Lord Wavell when he declared “The English would be remembered, he believed, not by this institution or that, but by the ideal they left behind of what a district officer should be (of providing justice and sympathy to the Indian peasant).”[iv]

The military on the other hand, noting that its strength lay in its apolitical tradition, professionalism and of loyalty to colours and constitution did not make any attempt to either deconstruct its ethical foundation (to India’s benefit) or seek to play a more enduring role in  nation building and in national security decision making (to its abiding distress). In the causation of a newly independent nation confronted by a variety of mortal security challenges the latter lack of impulse posed an awkward dilemma which as events unfolded, only served to elbow the military establishment to the status of an a ‘attached’ office, to be heard only when consulted shorn of any part in strategic decision making. Why this came to pass is a question that is not easily answered, but clearly two dynamics were at play, the first was the misguided fear of a ‘Kitchener redux’ and therefore the misplaced trepidation of military control of the state and the second was a flawed belief that civilian control of the military not only implied superior dual control by the politico-bureaucratic alliance but also a self fashioned conviction that military matters were essentially of execution and had little to do with policy making or strategic planning.

A General Theory – Societal Values and Military Imperatives

Civil-military relations describe the correlation between society and the military institutions founded to safeguard it from threats both external and internal. Clausewitz, very insightfully, saw in military activity an orientation that was not only directed at “material force” alone; but also saw an impetus towards “moral forces which give it life” by which is meant all the psychological factors which include civil-military relations that in fact emphasise that military activity is a continuation of policy by other means.[v]  In a more comprehensible and narrow sense civil-military relations portrays the association between the political dispensation of a society and its military establishment.

Even in theory, this correlation generates two dynamics that shape military institutions. The first of these is  characterized by societal values that tend to make military action increasingly ineffective as that social order becomes ever more liberal;  while the second dynamic is one that shape military institutions purely by violent functional imperatives that provide the logic for arming forces and using it either to coerce or in hostile action. The intensity with which these two forces collide is determined largely by the extent to which security needs bear on societal values. Balance is not an inevitability in this conflict.[vi] The dilemma of civil-military relations is to seek stability within this framework.

To illustrate, if we were to analyse the civil-military correlation in India and in China against two attributes of efficiency and coherence of response we would find that in India’s case, where societal values overshadow all else, the nation is often swayed by its democratic mores, cultural traditions, historical and pluralistic ideals to fully realise the significance of its military as a direct consequence of which there is a persistent undertone of friction and unease in the relationship which fails to recognise that the professional soldier is in fact a subordinate and supporting partner of the statesman. In turn, this manifests as a lack of cohesion, tardiness in response and a general inefficiency in attaining a decisive strategic posture, the aftermath of the terror attack on parliament and 26/11 are symptomatic; while in China it is the intensity of security concerns that prevail, as a result of which central authority in the civil-military connect is far less polarised and enjoys heightened focus, the rapid adoption of strategies such as ‘Access Denial’, ‘The Assassin’s Mace’ and an anti satellite programme are indicative.

The Indian Context an Atypical Paradigm

The military in the Indian context is uncharacteristic for a variety of reasons. If two were to be singled out these would be; firstly, its apolitical training and tradition of allegiance to flag and constitution and secondly, its lack of vigorous involvement in the independence struggle which in the main was driven by a political movement motivated by rules made by the colonists and holding non-violent beliefs . Yet in Clement Atlee’s words lie an awkward irony; he reportedly stated that the two most important reasons for the haste with which the British left India were “the Indian National armies activities of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, which weakened the very foundation of the British Empire in India, and the Royal Indian Navy mutiny which made the British realise that the Indian armed forces could no longer be trusted to prop up the British.” [vii] The disproportionate impact of such an underplayed role ought to have suggested to our founding fathers the enormous power potential that a well harnessed military represented rather than rekindling anxieties of a Kitchener encore. A direct consequence of the latter disquiet was the deliberate putting in place structures that that kept the military far removed from strategic security decision making.

[…]

The Quest for Definition

The essence of civil-military relations is the energy that it potentially gives to policy. Recognising this Sun Tzu (544-496 BC) the Chinese military general, strategist and philosopher declared that “order or synergy within a State’s (security) organisation provides it with “Shih” translated to mean ‘force’, ‘authority’, influence or ‘energy’; an essential ingredient for success while disorder spells failure.”[ix] The arena for civil-military relations is strategic and its burden is the potential or, indeed, the actual application of force with violence that it may entail in order to achieve political ends. For the establishment to be in denial of both domain and purpose of the correlation is to effectively stunt the drive and advancement of the State to its rightful place amongst nations.

The narrative, of this much misread dimension, of nation building in India begins with the circumstances of independence. Bellicose imperial legacy of the previous two centuries and the calamitous effects of military adventurism in Europe and East Asia in the first half of the twentieth century had left in Prime Minister Nehru an abiding undertone of aversion to matters military. This despite the fact that within the first year of nationhood the Indian army had in Jammu and Kashmir assured that the instrument of accession was championed, the Pakistan army and tribal militias vacated in a bitterly fought campaign and a Line of Control established; while in September 1948 Operation ‘Polo’ was launched to integrate the princely State of Hyderabad into the Indian Union. But it must be said that to a very large extent resolute action and control of the military (with discerning understanding of the correlation between the civil and military) was exercised in both instances by the exertions of Vallabhai Patel, the then Home and Deputy Prime Minister.[x]

At independence, Mountbatten’s legacy was a three tiered control edifice for civil-military correlation with the Prime Minister and his cabinet at the apex and the Defence Ministers Committee along with the Chiefs of Staff Committee forming the other two tiers. This structure, unsurprisingly, took inspiration from the then defunct ‘Committee of Imperial Defence’ to form the Defence Committee of the Cabinet (chaired by the PM with the Chiefs of Staff as members along with key ministers and secretaries) with the declared purpose of creating a structure that could not only provide civil-military correlation and cater for the needs of higher defence management but also to develop a strategic vision, formulate military strategy, and provide planning support to implement strategy and realise vision.[xi] Theoretically it was to be supported by the Defence Minister’s Committee, the Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Joint Planning Committee and the Joint Intelligence Committee. In concept this presented a very robust civil-military framework. However, by 1949 the controlling element of the structure, the Defence Committee of the cabinet became defunct leaving the supporting elements headless and, perhaps more critically, putting a ceiling on their ambit as defined by the operational level.

[…]

As India trundled into the 1950s to find itself on a canvas that was dominated by the two ‘Cold Warriors’ it was armed with little else than the towering character of Nehru, his romanticism over the virtues of non-alignment and its teeming millions. Despite the gloom of failing economic policies (growth during the decade averaged a dismal 3%), the depressing prognosis of a nuclear holocaust and disturbing militaristic concerns in the region; it was critical to come to grips with two distinct problems both of which had significant bearing on security policies. First, the existing world order was unwilling to stomach a hypocritical approach to taking sides in the cold war between the power blocs and the many proxy wars that it had fired up.  Second, the simmering unresolved border question with both China and Pakistan on account of historical aberrations that formed a part of baggage of the partition award. Though the predicaments appeared separate they were in fact linked by the precedence India conferred on her own statehood, sovereignty and national interests. Flawed civil-military relations saw to it that neither was reverential adherence to the forlorn non-aligned policy corrected nor was there a serious attempt at exploiting early opportunities to resolving the border question.[xii]  In addition, given that there was far less tolerance amongst states to the asymmetries of power, there were no long or even short term strategic military options placed before civilian authority.

Against this backdrop a controversial episode that underscored the state of civil-military relations comes centre stage when the army Chief General K.S. Thimayya offered to resign in September 1959. Thimayya’s resignation was sparked off by a disagreement with Defence Minister V.K. Krishna Menon over the promotion of senior army officers. However, the archival evidence now available shows that the reasons for the resignation ran deeper. Just a few weeks before the affair, Indian and Chinese forces had clashed along the eastern frontiers. To counter the growing threat from China, Thimayya wanted the political leadership to consider seriously the proposal mooted by President Ayub Khan for joint defence arrangements between India and Pakistan. Nehru had previously turned this down, as it would imply forsaking non-alignment. Menon, too, was opposed to this course. Thimayya broached this matter and others directly with the prime minister and was assured that he would discuss the issues with Menon. When things did not progress, Thimayya sent his resignation. The prime minister naturally saw this as a step to force his hand on policy issues. Nehru managed to persuade Thimayya to withdraw his resignation without giving him any assurances. But by this time the issue had been leaked to the press. When questioned in Parliament, Nehru played it down as arising out of temperamental differences. Nonetheless, Nehru’s concerns were obvious when he stressed that ‘civil authority is and must remain supreme.’ [xiii] Palpably in this setting, that ‘civil authority’ meant unilateralism, was implicit.

Unilateralism in the formulation of military strategy botched calamitously in the 1962 war against China. It brought into stark contrast the relative efficiency with which the First Kashmir War was planned, coordinated and waged and so too the competence with which civil-military planning and action brought about the integration of Hyderabad into the Union. The Government of the day faced harsh criticism despite enjoying an overwhelming majority. The primary condemnation was the woeful neglect of defence preparedness, an unreal approach to international relations, particularly with China, and the dangerous inadequacies of higher defence management significantly the intrusive, extemporized and incompetent manner in which civil-military relations had evolved. President Radhakrishnan went on to censure the Nehru government declaring that they had been “crude and negligent about preparations.” Lack of preparedness of the military was blamed on the Defence Minister who had to demit office. Nehru assured the Rajya Sabha on 09 November 1962 (during the three week lull in fighting) “People have been shocked, all of us have been shocked, by the events that occurred from 20 October onwards, especially of the first few days, and the reverses we suffered. So I hope there will be an inquiry so as to find out what mistakes or errors were committed and who were responsible for them.”[xiv]

The Chief of Army Staff, who was designated to conduct the inquiry, labelled it as an ‘Operational Review’ and set five terms of reference. First, adequacy and potential of training for high altitude warfare; second, material and equipment appropriateness; third, system of command; fourth, physical fitness of troops and lastly, capacity of Commanders to influence the men under their Command.

Going by the scope of an ‘Operations Review’ and the terms of reference handed down, these would suggest that the aim of the convening authority was to deliberately limit and strait-jacket the investigators to the operational level of the conflict. This may even have been understandable, given that the Army Chief had been deliberately relegated to that level. However, conventional wisdom and military analytical tradition will advocate the need to start a scrutiny of this nature with an understanding of the political direction, strategic posture, preparation and higher military decision making in the run-up to war and its prosecution.  Leaving the Inquiry divorced from the functioning and decision making at service headquarters, ministry of defence and indeed by the cabinet of ministers headed by the Prime Minister (where decisions on strategic orientation and the political direction of the war were made), was not only to castrate the Inquiry, but was also to insinuate that all was well in the realm of higher defence management and civil-military relations. Facts had made it pretty apparent that it was here that an inquiry was most needed. The Supreme Commander’s terse censure of the Prime Minister and his Government had underscored where the fault lines ran.

The inquiry took the form of the Henderson Brooks and Bhagat Report which was presented to the new Defence Minister Mr Y.B. Chavan on 02 July 1963. Earlier in April, in reply to a question in Parliament, he affirmed that Army Headquarters had already instituted measures to implement the lessons to be learned based on the terms of reference of the report. These included quality of planning, air-land cooperation, training for high altitude warfare, depth of officer man relationship, focused intelligence service and the creation of a chain of strategic airfields.[xv] What was conspicuous in its omission was a statement on the blemishes in higher defence management, the failings in the political direction of the war and ‘courtiership’ being promoted in the military. He also mentioned that the contents of the report in its entirety were not being disclosed for considerations of security.

On 02 September 1963, an intriguing statement was made by the Defence Minister in Parliament, he disclosed that the Inquiry Committee had not confined its investigations to operations alone but had also examined the “developments and events prior to hostilities as also the plans, posture and the strength of the Army at the outbreak of hostility.” Further, that a detailed review of the actual operations had been carried out “with reference to terrain, strategy, tactics and deployment of troops.” He also summarised the main recommendations of the report sticking to the terms of reference (which by now was well known) and later (on 09 September) in a statement on defence preparedness, he confirmed that changes were underway which encompassed expansion, reorganisation, modernisation, development of comprehensive infrastructure and enhancing operational efficiency. The value and effectiveness of these sweeping changes were soon to be confirmed during the wars of 1965 and 1971 against Pakistan.[xvi]

What remained disturbingly unanswered was the out-of-mandate areas that the report addressed with regard to “developments and events prior to hostilities, strategic posture and plans, which must be taken to have included civil-military relations, higher defence management, decision making and the political direction of war.” In 1963 to divulge these may well have compromised national security, but to persist through time is to invite long shadows to loom over the military establishment.[xvii]

[…]

Download full article here:  Shankar, Civil Military Relations

[*] Mantri is a word of Sanskrit origin meaning sage, it is used for a variety of public offices. It is also the root of the English word mandarin for an official of the Chinese empire.

[i] “The Curzon-Kitchener Controversy,” Outlook, 19 August, 1905, pp. 941-2. Free access online via www.unz.org and The Gazette of India Extraordinary, 23 June 1905, available online.

[ii] Nehru, Jawaharlal. “Glimpses of World History” Lindsay and Drummond Ltd. 1949, pg 94.

[iii] The late PN Haksar, doyen of the IAS and a close confidant of the Nehru family in the keynote address to the Naval Higher Command College in 1988, speaking on civil military relations suggested that the “only progression for a bureaucrat was if he hitched his wagon to a politician” whether this was said in resignation, matter of factly or as an objective reality was never entirely clear, yet what was, was that the apolitical nature of the Administrative Services as a governing principle had suffered a premature cardiac arrest.

[iv] Mason,Phillip. “The Men Who Ruled India”, Pan Books 1985, pg 399.

[v] Clausewitz, Carl Von. “On War” Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. Princeton University Press 1976, pgs 86, 87 and 137.

[vi] Huntington, Samuel P. “The Soldier and the State”. Harvard University Press 1957, the interplay between societal values and the functional imperatives of the military is a recurrent theme in Part 1 between pgs. 2 and 102.

[vii]The Tribune on line edition, February 12 2006. Clement Atlee the British Prime Minister who presided over India’s Independence in conversation with PV Chuckraborty, Governor of West Bengal in 1956 as extracted from a letter written by the latter on 30 March 1976.

[viii] Corbett Julian S. “Some Principles of Maritime Strategy”, Longmans Green and Co. New York, Bombay and Calcutta 1911, pg 8.

[ix] Sun Tzu, “The Art of War”. Translated by Samuel B. Griffith, Oxford University Press, New York 1963, pg 92-93.

[x] Gandhi, Rajmohan, “Patel: A Life,” Navjivan Publishing House, Ahmedabad 1990, pgs. 455 and 480.

[xi] Integrated Defence Staff website, www.ids.nic.in/history.htm, Accessed in October 2012.

[xii] Offer made by Premier Zhao en Lai in a letter to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1959, “The Sino-Indian Boundary Question (enlarged edition)”, Foreign Language Press, Peking, 1962, pgs 47-50.

[xiii] Srinath Raghavan, “War and Peace in Modern India: A Strategic History of the Nehru Years”. Permanent Black, Ranikhet, 2010, pg 267-269.

[xiv] Noorani, AG, “Publish the 1962 War Report Now”, The Hindu, e-paper, 12 July 2012, Opinion.

[xv] Arpi,Claude, The War of 1962: Henderson Brooks-Bhagat Report, Indian Defence Review Vol 26.1 Jan-Mar 2011.

[xvi] Ibid

[xvii] Extracted from author’s own article titled “The Ghosts of Henderson Brooks and Bhagat” first published in the September 2012 issue of Defence and Security Alerts.

Sea-based thinking: The new basis for our Revolution in Social and Military Affairs

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By

Dr. V. Siddhartha

The Need For a New Geopolitical Perspective

China began to lay its plans for geo-political land-based dominance when it defeated us in 1962 (we forget—as always—that this event occurred a mere dozen years after the post-revolution order under Mao Tse Tung consolidated itself in China), became a nuclear-weapon power in 1964 and broad-based its strategic relationship with Pakistan shortly thereafter.  To be sure, the pace of this drive for dominance was slowed by China’s disputes and rivalry with (the then) Soviet Union. But never was this objective changed, notwithstanding the disaster of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ and the several other crudities of the Mao era. The United States recognized early-on the eventual emergence of China as Number One, so much so that it aligned with Pakistan in 1971, so as not to jeopardise Pakistan’s crucial help to US plans to ‘open to China.’

The demise of the Soviet Union has accelerated China’s plans and programmes to fill the “vacuum of political dominance” felt to varying degrees with the sequential collapse of Japanese, Dutch, French, British and US power in the region from Indonesia through South East Asia to Myanmar. China’s grand vision of land-based dominance is to be actuated by extensive high-speed rail links, attendant communication spines, power networks and oil pipelines along a great arc from South East Asia up through Southern China, turning through North-Western China, out across the southern flank of the CIS to the Caspian Sea and beyond. These are the New Silk Roads for which plans will fructify by 2020.[1] The recent rescue of the beleaguered South East Asian currencies by China has signaled that the Renminbi is being set to replace the Yen and to coequal the Dollar and the Euro in a world monetary triad to underpin the global economic-military power triad of US-Europe-China. The resulting physical and banking infrastructure will render hostage to China’s will, India’s relations—trade, economic, technological, military and political—with nearly forty countries to India’s North, West and South-East.

Any attempt by India to “muscle into” this China driven land-based geopolitical project will be held firmly in check through the two surrogate prongs of the Chinese land pincer on India: Pakistan-Iran to the West; Bangladesh-Myanmar to the East. China will not waste its own economic and military resources to contain India—we are not important enough to China to warrant its expenditure of that much attention.

The only geostrategic room left to India is the Sea. Indira Gandhi’s uncanny feel for the geo-strategically important—and fortuitous circumstance—enabled India to establish itself as pioneer investor in the Indian Ocean; erect a station on Antarctica and do several other things in good time in ocean exploration and development. These measures have so far prevented the established maritime powers from imposing restrictive regimes on India in the oceans in general and in the Indian Ocean in particular.

Although the base that has thus been established in the seas around us is a good one, its full development and strategic use is vulnerable to the myopia of our defensive, reactive, constricted, almost apologetic, land-based thinking. The needed revolution that has to occur in our military affairs is the shift from land-based to sea-based thinking. A particularly effective way to drive home this perspective is to view the Indian landmass from the North looking South.

To oversimplify (but not by too much), if the land-based arc from Singapore through to Europe is going to be China’s arena of dominance, the one from Singapore through to Cape Town, along the Indian Ocean littoral is the geo-strategic space needed for India’s geo-cultural-economic renewal. Many assets—military and non-military—will need to be developed and deployed in that space, with the Indian Navy as its military core. We barely have till 2020 to fill-out that geo-strategic space.[2]

Epilogue

“Vice Admiral V.K. Chandraskatta, fleet commander…came from a country with a warrior tradition little known outside its own borders, Indians had stopped Alexabder the Great, blunted his army, wounded the Macedonian conqueror, perhaps fatally, and put an end to his expansion, an accomplishment the Persians and the Egyptians had singularly failed to do. Indian troops had fought alongside Montgomery in the defeat of Rommel—and had crushed the Japanese Army at Imphal.

Vice Admiral V.K. Chandraskatta sat on his leather chair on the flag bridge of the carrier Viraat…just for his country to be self-sufficient in food had taken-how long? Twenty-five years. And that had come only as charity of sorts, the result of Western agro-science whose success grated on many minds, as though his country, ancient and learned, couldn’t make its own destiny. Even successful charity could be a burden on the national soul.

The ‘New World Order’ said that his country could not. India was denied entry into the race to greatness by those very nations that had run the race and then shut it down lest others catch up.

But the entire Indian Navy had only forty-three Harrier FRS-51 fighters. He had but thirty at sea on both Viraat and Vikrant, and that did not equal the numbers of capability aboard a single American carrier. All because they had entered the race first, won it, and then declared the games closed, Chandraskatta told himself…it simply wasn’t fair”

(From Tom Clancy’s “Debt of Honour” Harper Collins, 1994)

About the Author
Dr.V. Siddhartha served during 2007-09 on invitation of the Secretary General of the United Nations as a member of the Experts Group in New York of the Committee on UN Security Council Resolution 1540.  An Emeritus Scientist in DRDO, he retired in 2004 after working directly with four Scientific Advisers to the Minister of Defence over nearly twenty years. Dr. Siddhartha has been twice Consultant to the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, on export control and S&T issues in international security, and on the Indian WMD Act, 2005.  A PhD from the Imperial College of Science & Technology, London, Siddhartha was a member of the pioneering Systems Planning and Analysis Group (SPAG) of ISRO, Bangalore over 1974-82.

[1] See also Batuk Vora, “China plans to transform ‘Eurasia,’” Mainstream, February 28, 1998. This article summarizes the essential elements of China’s ‘land bridge’ project extensively elaborated at the International Symposium on Economic Development of the Regions along the New Euro-Asian Continental Bridge, Beijing, May 7-9, 1996.

[2] For a concise survey of the architecture of the space see: Satish Chandra, Arunachalam and Suryanarayanan “The Indian Ocean and its Islands, Strategic, Scientific and Historical Perspectives,” Sage Publications, New Delhi, 1993.