There is undoubtedly considerable gap between China’s ambitions of realizing great power status and her current capabilities, so too the seriousness of internal stresses and inequities, the hazards that further deep penetration reforms may pose to the social fabric of the nation and the dangers of strategic miscalculations; there is no denying the will of the CCP and the relentless nature of their pursuit to global leadership. There remain however four crucial determinants which will dictate the course of China’s ambitions in the Indian Ocean region. These are:

(a) What form reconciliation of the Taiwan imbroglio will take and with what finesse     China will resolve her South China Sea territorial disputes. If either are conflictual it   will have far reaching negative impact on their ambitions in the Indian Ocean region.

(b) Energy security is greatly influenced by global markets, technological innovations   and is sensitive to geo political turbulences in the oil producing regions. A slowdown in economic growth will prove a serious dampener to long term designs.

(c) The coming ‘Third Island Chain’ covering the Indian Ocean region is hardly suggestive of a cooperative approach to security. Such unilateral strategies will invariably give rise to friction between the main stakeholders which may result in actions that are unfavourable for growth .

(d) Internal stresses and the growing economic gap in society are fissures that are not easily bridged, particularly if current growth rates are to be maintained. Pace of reforms and its penetration may all add up to turbulences in the core.

Chinese leadership had in the early nineties given guidance to their security strategies through the instrument of the ‘24 Character strategy’ and have allocated resources to pursue a military transformation from Mass to Mobility and Precision. Force structuring would not only be capable of securing the Second Island Chain but would look to projecting power in a broader regional sense and for global objectives. However this is subject to the determinants listed above. In any event the absence of a true sea control capability and its continued presence through the deployment of carrier groups in areas of interest is unlikely to be a reality for the next two decades. The absence of moves to establish cooperative stabilizing structures in areas where the stakeholders are many hold the portents for friction. Given such a delicate situation, Admiral Zheng He would have in all probabilities opted for a solution marked by mutuality and accommodation.