The Strategic Evolution of the Indian Naval Fleet Air Arm

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By Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

Keywords: Indian Naval Fleet Arm, Indian Naval Force Structuring, UAV Carriers, Indian Naval Strategic Planning, INS Vikrant, Robotics, Operational Dilemmas, Unifying Theory

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Excerpts:

In the Beginning, an Absence of a Unifying Theory

In 1946, with impending Indian independence looming large, the interim Prime Minister Nehru commissioned a British adviser Mr Wansborough Jones to recommend the scientific and organisational measures required to make India a self supporting defence entity. This Report was preceded by the AV Hill Report of 1944 and succeeded by the Blackett Report of 1948. It is hardly the names that are important, however what is significant is the intellectual insights that motivated these reports which in turn influenced the evolution of the Navy and in particular the Fleet Air Arm.[i]

By specialisation the first was a defence scientist, the second a bureaucrat while the third an operational research analyst; what they lacked in common was the absence of professional and empirical acumen. And so predictably central to what drove their appraisal was compromise of needs, optimization of Commonwealth surpluses and, curiously, economising on security through a strange faith in collectivism despite the specific vision which saw India as a “self supporting defence entity” and even if it meant playing down threats and challenges that reality presented. All three reports lacked a unifying theory that linked strategic thought with force planning.  Then again in contrast was the Vice Admiral Godfrey (C-in-C of the Royal Indian Navy) Plan of 1944 which outlined a strategic vision of energy security, sea denial capability, sea control of western and eastern approaches to the North Indian Ocean and selective maritime air strike and reconnaissance capability in support of surface forces.[ii] Force development was envisaged over a ten year period in two phases, Phase 1 foresaw surface forces for escort and patrol missions while Phase 2 visualized a Denial and Control capability. Intrinsic to Phase 2 was an air component with surveillance and strike potential. By 1948, the Plan was pruned, by Vice Admiral Edward Parry the then Commander in Chief and Chief of the Naval Staff, to a 47 ship Navy from 69 ships, centred on two aircraft carriers. Indian Naval Plans Paper 1 owes its origin to a compromise between the articulations of the five worthies mentioned earlier; the non professionals as represented by the scientist-bureaucrat-analyst combine on the one hand while the Godfrey-Parry professional bloc as tailored by the British Admiralty depicted the experts view. In any case the blue print for the Plan was drafted in Whitehall.

The appropriate level of resources that ought to be dedicated to national security is naturally a subject of debate. However, what is an imperative is a comprehensive methodology that helps the planner to identify national interests and objectives which are the ends of policy and how best resources and national assets can be mobilised to achieve these in the face of challenges and threats. From this a plan of action must emerge and the necessary military posture attained to support the plan. This codifies what may be termed as the ‘strategic approach’.[iii] Such a slant was absent.

Skewed Planning and Incoherent Acquisitions

The contrary pulls within planning, unsurprisingly, tilted towards an illusory faith in compromised security, a civil-military disconnect and a misplaced conviction in internationalism. Politically it was a statesmanlike like expression of a war weary leadership which saw in the post war global order notional prospects for pacifism.  But militarily it left the defence forces and in particular the Navy with a ‘moth eaten’ second hand force structure made up of disparate units bereft of a guiding strategic soul and predisposed to an all consuming dependence.

Planning gone seriously awry and the onset of strategic insomnia was never more obvious than in the early years and particularly so in the future of Indian Naval Aviation. The acquisition of two aircraft carriers, which were originally envisaged to form the core of a sea control potential, and maritime patrol and strike capability to compliment the carrier group were placed on the ‘back burner’. Reasons ranged from lack of resources, outbreak of the Korean war to British reluctance to release second hand carriers.[iv] None of these arguements made for a strategic rationale since alternate sources or indigenous or joint ventures were never examined, neither were innovative solutions such as conversion or reconstitution of a cruiser or commercial hull explored; after all most early World War II aircraft carriers were based on reconstitution of warships or merchantmen hulls.[v] Between the two World Wars Britain, France, Japan and the USA reconstituted over 12 existing warship hulls to aircraft carriers. While in the immediate run up to the Second World War and up to 1943 Britain alone refitted over 30 merchantmen hulls for duties as Escort Carriers of the “Ruler” and “Archer” class. These Carriers displaced 10,000 to 15,000 tons, some were equipped with arrester gear and “accelerators” (the forerunner of the catapult) all were capable of operating frontline naval combat aircrafts of that era. While USA, in the same period converted 13 mercantile hulls to the “Charger” and “Long Island” class Escort Aircraft Carriers; displacing about 10,000 tons capable of carrying 30 fighters aircrafts.[vi]

What is being posited is that there was no material reason not to pursue the Professional Plan. Besides the technological gap in the late 1940s was relatively less wide as compared to the 1960s and ship conversion of the nature discussed earlier was well within the technical capabilities of our major shipyards.[vii] The downstream effect of such a strategic decision would have given the vital energy needed for our warship building and collateral industries to stand on its feet. In its place was an incoherent training and recruitment scheme alongside a shore based aviation acquisition plan that relegated naval aviation to auxiliary status and directionless expansion such as target towing and communications link aircrafts (all of which could have better been done by the Air force and may have even sown the seeds of jointness).[viii] How else does one explain the possession and basing of Sealand amphibious aircrafts at Cochin when their most advantageous operational utilisation was in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands; in the event, through the Sealand’s service life, they were never deployed in the islands.

[…]

Four Operational Dilemmas

The coming of age of Indian naval aviation runs concurrent with four key operational developments. The first is that technological advances, contrary to conditions that prevailed for most of the last century, are in a continuous state of outpacing operational thought. As a consequence of which the planner must seek not just to make accurate technological forecasts and capture appropriate technologies but also to expound operational concepts that would best exploit these technologies. The second dilemma is centred on the ability to offset mass by precision; this poses a very real problem to the practitioner since hardware now had to not only convincingly dispel any “fog of war” but also come to advantageous grips with the possibility of failure. The third is the emerging transparency of the battle space which reduces the scope for cardinal principles of surprise, concentration and mobility of forces to be applied in an operational engagement with any probability of success; it also increases the significance of doctrinal integrity. The last quandary is the enlarging gap between the offense and the defence which invariably makes a persuasive case to take the offensive in all circumstances.

The future will persistently be beset by the challenges posed by the four operational dilemmas. These will have to be resolved and tempered keeping in mind a contrary pull that demands naval aviation embrace affordability. Affordability is generally driven by three elements – the acquisition cost to develop and buy platforms, the operating and maintenance cost to bring the full weight of the fleet air arm to bear over their entire service life and most importantly, priority in force planning.

The Robotic Revolution

On 09 October 1903 a curious editorial appeared in the New York Times; it prophesised that “The flying machine which might really fly might be evolved by the combined and continuous efforts of mathematicians and mechanicians in from one to 10 million years.” Yet that very same day, two brothers who owned a bicycle shop in Ohio started assembling the very first aeroplane. Seven years later the first flying machine flew off a wooden platform built on the bows of the USS Birmingham.[ix] The era of naval aviation was not only at hand but had achieved it with silence, surreptitiousness, with capricious rapidity and transformatory impact that we have come to associate technology with. So it is with robotics which has so unerringly crept into every aspect of naval aviation that from complimenting manned flights it is on the cusp of replacing the man in the cockpit.

Contemporary unmanned systems entering into the fleet are potentially capable of undertaking the entire spectrum of combat tasks. For instance, the role of long range maritime surveillance and patrol is being taken over by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) such as the Heron (currently in service with the Indian Navy, payload 250 kg, endurance 30-52 hours, all up weight 1 ton) and the US Global Hawk. The latter with a wingspan of 35 metres and an all up weight of over 10 tons it has an endurance of over 24 hours, while carrying 3,000 pounds of electro-optical, infrared and synthetic aperture radar sensors, at heights of over 65,000 feet, the system provides persistent maritime surveillance, intelligence gathering, data collection and dissemination at theatre level. To its abiding advantage, the UAV is not restricted by crew fatigue, rigorous and costly safety considerations, it is economical and awkward issues related to risk taking do not come to play. While these long range UAVs operate from a land bases, the Navy is also working to integrate many of its ships at sea to operate smaller systems like the Searcher and the Nishant. Able to take off and land autonomously from any warship with a small deck, its payload includes thermal imagers, radar, high-powered video cameras and a laser designator that can fix targets to be struck by the mother ship’s weapons or by a cooperating armed UAV or manned fighter. With a range of over 200 miles, the surveillance zone of the surface force is greatly multiplied.

The centrepiece of future plans for unmanned systems at sea must be steered to carrier-launched surveillance and strike fighters. This type of robotic plane is specially designed to take on and take over the human pilot roles. Without a cockpit, and in some cases, even no tail fins and planes, such systems vary drastically from our traditional notions of an aeroplane. But these same attributes theoretically give them capabilities well beyond even some of the latest manned strike fighters. Designed to be especially stealthy for the more hazardous roles such as enemy air defence penetration, they potentially can launch precision guided munitions, can be handed over between different remote human operators at extended ranges and provide for prolonged periods (30-50 hours) on scouting tasks. They also promise to lighten the stress on human operators.

For all the anticipation that such possibilities generate, it is important to realize that technology is only at the nascent stage of a robotic revolution at sea. Indeed, just as the first navy planes started out in the auxiliary role and soon found a place in practically every operational and tactical task at sea, so too do we note a similar expansion of combat roles with unmanned systems. A more critical issue is that despite the relentless advancement of robotics and its application to combat disciplines, there are no signs that technology will end the central role of the man at sea any time soon. The specifics of the human role may be altered; just as most navy warplanes today don’t have tail gunners, air engineers, signallers or navigators; but  the demand on human skills remains crucial for planning, control, forecasting and technology application.

 Future Strategic Fleet Air Arm Force Structuring: A Conclusion

The ultimate reality of the international system is the place that power, enjoys in the scheme of assuring stability in relations between nations. Uncertainty in international relations queers the pitch, in view of the expanded space of possibles. In an earlier section we had noted the quintessential link between strategic policy and the framing of a theory for force structuring.  But as austerity and inflation continue to bite into the defence budget and make more complex the four operational dilemmas as symbolised by the race between technology and operational concepts; the balance between mass and precision; transparency of the battle space demanding doctrinal integrity and the growing ascendancy of offensive power, we may accept that the rationale for maritime air power remains sound. But the planner must bite the bullet when it comes to the generation of an operationally judicious mix of robotic capabilities along with manned aircraft to provide optimal operational orientation; if it means the coming of smaller, more numerous UAV Carriers supported by shore based long range unmanned patrol air crafts, then the planner must embrace this future.   

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End Notes

[i] Hiranandani GM. Transition to Triumph, NHQ New Delhi and Lancer New Delhi 2000, Pg 4-6.

[ii] Ibid, Pg 3.

[iii]  Monograph by author titled Strategic Posture in the Eastern Ocean: The Incoherent Shoals. United Service Institution of India New Delhi 2011, P7.

[iv] Transition to Triumph, Pg 262.

[v] Jane’s Fighting Ships 1939. London Samson Low, Marson & Co Ltd Naval Publishers. Pgs 38-42, 183, 315, 489.

[vi] Jane’s Fighting Ships 1943-4. Pgs 35-36, 457.

[vii] In 1948 the Scindia shipyard, later nationalised in 1961 as the Hindustan Shipyard Ltd., post independence built India’s first indigenous cargo ship the Jal Usha displacing 8000 tons.

[viii] Transition to Triumph, Pg 262.

[ix] Singer Peter, W. Washington Post, Opinion 06 December 2011.

The Paradox of Power: The Case for an Integrated Response Doctrine to Counter Cross Border Insurgency

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 by

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

This commentary was first published on the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) website in September 2013.

Keywords: Cross-border incursions, Proportional response, “Strategy of a Thousand Cuts,” Terrorism as an Instrument of State Policy, “focoism,” Indo-Pak border surveillance

Abstract:

It is no accident that Pakistan has learnt to exploit our traditional mode of politico-military analysis and response to border incursions. Apologists within India make a slanted argument that the problem of Pakistan sponsored insurgency is essentially political and  attacks on the Indian armed forces are more an effort to break the political process by provoking armed conflict, forgetting that it is the very institution that sponsors cross border insurgency that also controls the political process. Tragically inaction or inadequacy of response, as experience has shown, will cause the worst escalation. 

The Inadequacy of Proportional Response

The Pakistan army has relentlessly pursued its Politico-Military-Militant strategy of a “thousand cuts” to keep the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir on the boil and in consequence erode the will to federate. While success in this endeavour has been denied Pakistan, it has, for reasons not quite convincing, kept the response from the Indian side proportional, reactive and tactically restrained. This, Pakistan has achieved despite the fact of sponsoring the primary provocation. Ironically the balance of power is so heavily skewed towards India that it is a paradox that the “cuts” persist varying only in terms of gore.

Given the context and nature of the strategy that relies on bleeding India through the use of irregulars; the low risk, low cost and high return (to the Pakistan cause) of the stratagem and the enduring security predicament that it precipitates leaves the planner in a state of disquiet. In dealing with contrivance of this brand, leadership often makes flawed strategic choices because they are “misled by common sense”[1]. Attempting to restrict action through a one sided belief in the inviolability of the border or Line of Control (LoC) or defend it through a combination of diplomacy, economics and proportional reaction leaves the antagonist to decide where, when and how to inflict the fated forthcoming ‘cut’. Also, the sense of proportionality is hollow and often inconsequential since purpose and value are so distinctly in variance.

The Perpetual Imbalance

Normally in dealing with a conservative nation, strategic objectives do not present an existential peril and interests are governed by rationality, then a comprehensive strategy consists of sustained political, economic and diplomatic engagement backed by a military posture that supports the strategy. However, Pakistan is no normal conservative state; and, as Imtiaz Gul, the Pakistani journalist and author, has with so much distress emphasized “the perpetual imbalances in the civilian military equation continues to distort the political landscape.” The Army’s obsessive rivalry against India provides the reason for supremacy in affairs of state and the promotion of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. [2]

The dialectic of an asymmetric conflict is unique in that it is not just one of opposing wills, but, on the weaker side, of radical ideology and brutality in the application of force with protracted low level violence against civilian targets being the preferred tool. In these circumstances to restrain response from taking castigatory action is to effectively deny physical censure, concede the legitimacy of the assault and to invite the next ‘cut’. India’s counterinsurgency efforts in, not just Kashmir, but across India are not unlike the Latin American response to “focoism” [3] earnest, naïve, aggressive and impatient without an effective three pronged doctrine to challenge ideological inspiration, deter and punish the sponsor while at the same time eliminate the terrorist perpetrator. It must therefore come as no surprise that low intensity of conflict has endured in Kashmir for quarter of a century.

The Case for Escalation

Contemporary conditions in Kashmir are appropriate to enable the three pronged doctrine mainly because the ideological stimulant of an identity in religious terms rather than national is today, jaded. At origin, in the late 1980s when Pakistan’s strategy to equip, train and launch the indigenous Kashmiri militants began, the insurrection had a home brewed basis; today the fighters have been supplanted by itinerant and rootless Jihadists. These aliens neither share the ideology nor the beliefs of the Kashmiri. This single consideration must be taken advantage of vigorously through education and economic stimulants and is being done with some success, since the lure of Pakistan is hardly attractive, it’s politics lies in militant and sectarian tatters, it’s economic prospects uninviting and its fundamental beliefs exposed and universally objectionable. So much so that the prospects of an Indian political solution in Kashmir never seemed more bright while Pakistan’s involvement, never more vulnerable. However the problem lies not in the politics of that State but in the fractious control that the army exercises in the affairs of that nation.

It is no accident that Pakistan has learnt to exploit our traditional mode of politico military analysis and response to border incursions. Apologists within India make a slanted argument that the problem of Pakistan sponsored insurgency is essentially political and the attacks on the Indian armed forces are more an effort to break the political process by provoking armed conflict; forgetting that it is the very institution that sponsors cross border insurgency that also controls the political process. It is nobody’s case that military success must precede the political process for, indeed, the two are inseparable; however it is equally clear that political reconciliation cannot co-exist when strategies that seek to bleed are at play. The aim of the Response Doctrine is to bring about the ambience for a political process by raising the strategic cost (militarily, economically and diplomatically) to Pakistan of its maverick policies. Such being the case, the Indian military response must be so tuned as to introduce an escalatory factor that deepens the intensity of  response and enlarges the dimension of operations that in a calibrated manner emphasises the conventional weight that it carries and consequently deters intrusions.

As the function of military power in international politics undergoes fundamental change on account of its disproportionate growth in relation to most of the objectives in dispute,[4] so must the doctrines that drive it. There is often confusion in the establishment when instinctive conservatism controls the usage of an armed force dedicated to the principles of unlimited war fought by massive forces. Obviously such forces combating insurgents will result in poor efficiency of engagement. Under these conditions to persistently reason that escalation will invoke the philosophical abstraction of the Clausewitzian extreme is to deny an essential tool of state craft; that is, to develop integrated force response doctrines and reorganise specially equipped and trained personnel for the task of retaining focus, impact and precision of response.

Framework for Riposte

The Indian Army has absorbed and consolidated considerable experience in counter insurgency operations based on combating insurrection in the Punjab and the North Eastern states. But the nature of these operations was different since the dominant consideration was that you were dealing with your own citizenry and not foreign sponsored and trained elements being used as an instrument of an adversarial State’s policy. However the lessons of the past were that success against irregular forces depends on first class surveillance and intelligence; on effective coordination of political, administrative and military resources and training of local constabulary. These lessons remain true in countering the “strategy of a thousand cuts” with a distinctness introduced by the fact that the insurgents are in the main aliens, their sponsors a nation inimical to India and they operate from outside the territories of India.

This at once suggests a layered frame work for the riposte, it begins with the creation and enabling of an ‘Intelligence Region’ that concentrates its effort along the border, Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) and LoC to a depth that covers launch pads, training areas, logistic and financial support and cover posts; this network is to be supported by national technical resources and global intelligence complex both national and international. The second layer is the ‘Surveillance and Tracking Area’ which extends from the border or LoC fencing and AGPL extending radially outward across the border and the LoC up to probable launch pads and cover posts, this Zone is to be under electronic and optical surveillance continually by airborne scouts, unmanned aerial vehicles and ground based cross spectrum means all operating from the Indian side of the frontier. The business layer is the ‘Kill Zone’ which starts at the LoC/border and extends inward to the fence and a little beyond which may be deemed to extend to a depth of three to five kilometres within which integrated force by air and land must rapidly be brought to bear. Beyond this Zone within the country, it will be left to ground forces to interdict the intruding insurgents. Coordination between the three layers must be swift and precise. Time in ‘Kill Zone’ will be short, between five to fifteen minutes demanding near immediate acquisition and brisk neutralization of targets. Engagements in this layer will be characterized by integration of forces, decisive command and control, speed and lethality.

Contours of a Response Doctrine: Conclusion

In framing a Response Doctrine the primary linkage is between executive actions on the frontier with the authority that has delegated these powers (the Cabinet Committee on Security, CCS, in India) to the Operational Commander. The doctrine must be guided by a set of principles governing armed action when two or more Services and other cooperating agencies are operating together in order to ensure impact and effectiveness of command in joint response operations. This body of response precepts is predetermined and established by the CCS. The doctrine must articulate guidance, directives, procedures, information flow and define command responsibilities in the three layered zones (mentioned earlier) and relationship within these zones for the conduct of integrated response operations. It must also address material issues earmarking forces available to the Commander including counter insurgency aircrafts, UAVs and Special Forces describing operational concepts and accomplishment of support tasks. Of essence to the response scheme and to assure doctrinaire credibility is time sensitivity of actions. To this end the agglomerate of operational/tactical knowledge will need be put into pre planned contingency matrices generating integrated execution plans in the ‘Surveillance and Tracking Area’ and the ‘Kill Zone’.

Devising its response, India has the entire spectrum of conventional and technical choices to deter cross border insurgency and bear down on the intruder; this is the only advantage that the victim enjoys. The resolve with which such a doctrine is enabled is the real challenge for it paves the way to political resolution. Tragically inaction or inadequacy of response, as Kargil, the Parliament assault and 26/11 have shown, will cause the worst escalation.

 

End Notes

[1] Shy, John.  Jomini, Makers of Modern Strategy P 168. Edited by Peter Paret Princeton University Press, 1986.

[2] Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, Viking Penguin 2009, P 181, 183.

[3] Custers, Peter Dr. The Legacy of Che Guevara: Internationalism Today Sri Lanka Guardian, February 24, 2010. The central of principle Focoism  is that militancy and terrorist acts by cadres of small, fast-moving paramilitary groups can provide a focus (in Spanish, foco) for popular discontent against a sitting regime, and thereby lead a general insurrection.

[4] Kissinger, Henry A. American Strategic Doctrine and Diplomacy, The Theory and Practice of War,  P 276. Edited by Michael Howard, Indiana Unversity Press 1965/1975.

Aircraft Carriers: The Pivot in Maritime Power Equations

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By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

This article is forthcoming in the September 2013 issue of Geopolitics

Keywords: Indian Air Craft Carrier Program, INS Vishal, INS Viraat, INS Vikrant, Sino-India relations, India Maritime Strategy, Third Island Chain, Indian Maritime Strategy

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Excerpts

 ….to provide the very unity of its objectives directed upon the sea [i]

 The Design of a Thesis

 If we are to form an opinion on the current state of reality and to act upon it with any impact, some sort of a thesis is necessary. The end of the Cold War and the paradigm that it represented brought in its wake scholarly works that sought to prognosticate what future international relations and order held. Wide ranging theories were advanced from the emergence of one world in which harmony, democracy and an end to conflict were prophesized, and with it an end to a turbulent history of man’s ideological evolution with the grand terminal formulation that western liberal democracy had prevailed.[ii] Some saw the emergence of a multi polar order and the arrival of China not withstanding the warts of Tiananmen. Yet others saw in the First Iraq War, the continuing war in the Levant, the admission of former Soviet satellite nations into NATO and the splintering of Yugoslavia an emerging clash of civilisations marked by violent discord shaped by cultural, religious and civilisational similitude.[iii] However, these illusions were, within a decade, dispelled and found little use in understanding and coming to grips with the realities of the post Cold War world as each of them represented a candour of its own. Some of the symptoms that have emerged are an increased and vicious securing of spheres of power and economic influence as exemplified by China in Africa and her claims of the South China Sea; the competition between autocracy and liberalism; an older religious struggle between radical Islam and secular cultures; and the inability to regulate the anarchic flow of technologies and information. As these struggles are played out the first casualty in the post Cold War era is the still born hope of a benign and enlightened world order.

Endemic instability world wide is characterized by the number of armed conflicts that erupted between the periods 1989 to 2010 which total forty nine.[iv] The nature of these wars, more than anything else, reflected what I term the ‘Uncertainty Paradigm’ for they ranged from wars of liberation and freedom to insurgencies, civil wars, racial-ethnic-religious wars, proxy wars, interventions and wars motivated by the urge to corner economic resources. In all cases it was either the perpetuation of a dispensation, political ambitions, or the fear of economic deprivation that was at work below the surface. If that were not enough to underscore the fragility, gravity and self-centeredness of the international system, in the same period the United States of America alone has militarily intervened in foreign countries on 11 occasions; more often than at any time in history.[v]

So too when thinking of maritime affairs a touchstone only places in perspective the events that we are confronted with, provides a pattern and a context within which a strategy may be devised and force structures put in place to come to terms with an uncertain future. China’s quest to secure efficiently rights of passage on the sea to fuel her thirst for markets, energy, primary produce and commodities has led her to the ‘Northern Passage’[vi] as a trade corridor. The distance from China to markets in Europe has been cut down to less than 8000 miles from 14,700 miles. Significantly the route avoids two sensitive ‘choke points’ the Malacca Strait and the Suez Canal. Today the Arctic passage is a near reality, yet her resource and energy jugular that runs across the Indian Ocean continues to bulge and throb. China therefore theorises that the road to securing these sea lines of communication is through a strategy of ‘Access Denial.’[vii] The denial paradigm was founded on lessons of the 1991 Gulf War and security concern in relation to Taiwan. It saw in the Gulf War a reason for pre-emption against build up in-region of inimical combat potential. Logistic preparation was perceived as the first salvo of a conflict. During the 1995–1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, U.S. deployment of two carrier groups to the region remains in Chinese memory as an embarrassing infringement of sovereignty.[viii] The value and logic of an access denial strategy is obvious in reference to Taiwan. But enabling such a strategy when the intent of logistic preparations may be ambiguous and scope and space are enlarged must clearly tax strategists’ world wide and suggest the uncertainty of stability. It is these circumstances that impel the quest for a strategic posture that not only seeks to balance but also shape the future. Given the correlation of forces, for India it is the Ocean that holds the key.

 Oceans and Economic Power: China as the Strategic Competitor

Among the multifarious factors that characterize and influence the development of nations an ever increasing role is being played by its maritime power. The realization of such power is at the heart of making effective use of the world’s oceans. Higher the level of development of the economy greater will be the consequences assumed by the world oceans as an inexhaustible source of energy, raw materials, food and most critically as a medium for the movement of trade, materials, petroleum products and indeed of personnel; so also the portents for discord. Close to 90 per cent of global trade is borne by hulls at sea. It is no secret that to this very day, maritime power is a key catalyst of economic growth.

The change in China from a closed centrally planned system to a market oriented one from the late 1970s to the present must be seen as having been enabled, in good measure, by vigorous promotion of maritime power. So much so that by 2010 it became the world’s largest exporter, its economy at $9.8 trillion is only second to the USA and with an oil consumption of 8.2 million bbl/day she is the third largest consumer in the world (2009 estimates). When we look at the growth pattern of India since liberalization, (which can be pegged to have started on 24th July 1991 with the Narsimha Rao government’s package of industrial reforms along with a new open door policy on inward investment) we note a similar trend with respect to consumption patterns, energy demands, exports and trade. Indeed with one third of this growth being powered by trade to the East (in 2012 trade with ASEAN nations was pegged at $80 billion), the requirement to secure these interests become all the more vital. Already the 2011 figures make China our largest trading partner ($ 70 billion). Security of this trend will be a key to development of India. At the same instant, in the race to garner limited resources for the development of two very large economies the scope for friction looms large.

The reasons many countries view China with trepidation today are similar on the surface to their reaction to the rise of Japan in the 1970s and 80s and yet rooted in very different forces. China, too, uses a competing economic model, albeit with a difference (the very phrase used is an oxymoron) – “state capitalism” – that challenges conventional economic ideologies. In many ways, China also behaves in a mercantilist fashion. It keeps its currency controlled so its exports can out-compete those from other countries, and it corners natural resources for its insatiable growth by methods that are reminiscent of colonial dealings, not that the West did not in the past indulge in more vicious practices.  China is succeeding based on ideas that are anathema to those of the likes of the father of modern economics, Adam Smith, and his theories of the ‘invisible hand’ and the self regulating nature of the ideal economy.[ix] The concerns with China is provoked by its manifest urge to use comprehensive national power to challenge and change the existing global political, economic and security structures without bringing about a change within her own biological morphology. It is not as if these structures are not due for an overhaul but it is the knuckle duster methods that she has chosen to employ and the reluctance to participate in cooperative security and economic arrangements that provide the potential  for discord.

China’s claims on the South China Sea as a territorial sea; her handling of dissent within in Tibet and Tiananmen; her proliferatory carousing with rogue states such as North Korea and Pakistan are cases, amongst others, that do not inspire confidence in change occurring within that nation without turbulence. We also note with some foreboding, the emergence of China from out of its, largely, defensive maritime perimeters as defined by the first and second island chain strategies into the Indian Ocean region as a major stakeholder. To this end, it has through diplomacy and economic inducements established bases in Sittwe, Hambantota, Gwadar and Marao in the Maldives. The geographic and strategic significance of these posts were apparent in the past and are equally vital today, whether for purposes of control, regulating, providing havens or assuring security to energy and resource lines. Sittwe and Gwadar also provide the front end for piping energy into China. These long term strategic investments by China maybe seen as the coming of the ‘Third Island Chain’.

Articulating its strategic objectives in order of precedence China has unambiguously identified three canons, the first of which is internal and external stability to its own gauge; the second is to sustain the current levels of its economic growth and lastly to achieve regional pre-eminence. Gone is the ‘power bashfulness’ that marked the Deng era, in its place is a cockiness that is discernible in the contemporary conviction that “the world needs China more than China the world”. This frame of reference gives form to the ‘Access Denial Strategy’. When projected in consonance with the Third Island Chain, one cannot but note that denial would apply not just to the region of purpose, but also to the points of origin and to the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) along which energy, trade and resources are moved. The waters and littorals of the Indian Ocean and specifically the West Pacific Ocean and the Bay of Bengal (together here after termed as the Eastern Ocean) will now become the region where this strategy will be played out.  The Dilemma for planners is in the absence of a security oriented cooperative impulse, such sweeping strategies (specifically the coming ‘Third Island Chain’ superimposed on a long range Access Denial Strategy), is it’s blindness to recognize that, as historically never before, we are in fact dealing with a sea space that, in Mahan’s words, is the busiest of all the “vast commons.” The reluctance for collaboration makes the potential for friction high.

China, in the 18th century under the Qing dynasty enjoyed a golden age. It was a period of shengshi, an age of prosperity. Currently some Chinese nationalists say that, thanks to the Communist Party and its economic prowess, another shengshi has arrived.[x] In 2010 China became the world’s biggest manufacturer, a position that the US had held for most of the 20th century. By 2020, it has been forecast, that China could become the world’s largest economy. Significant to political influence is its matching economic and military growth. Power, changes the very character of nations and its people and of their standing in the comity of nations. It places primacy to their beliefs and interests in the international milieu giving it new drive to shape global affairs in a manner that is self promoting. This search for geopolitical space that the emergence of a new cognizable revisionist power precipitates, historically, global instability and tensions. Add to this that the principle of nationalism is inextricably linked, both in theory and practice, with the concept of war,[xi] then, we are faced with a situation when the military dimension of power will potentially throw up conflictual circumstances that will have to be contended with. Against this backdrop, when the politics of competitive resource access is put into the same pot as survival and development of State, to which is added the blunt character of military power, we have before us the recipe for conflict. It is against this canvas of competitive resource access and strategic uncertainty that the development and structuring of Indian maritime power must be gauged.  

[…]

India: A Theory of Maritime Warfare and a Basis for Structuring the Fleet   

            A fourfold classification of maritime forces has dominated naval thought since the Second World War. The grouping is largely functional and task oriented. The differentiation comprises of aircraft carriers, strike units and denial forces, escorts and scouts, and auxiliaries (the last include logistic and other support ships such as landing ships, mine layers, sweepers, tenders etc). In addition contemporary thought has given strategic nuclear forces a restraining role to define and demarcate the limits within which conventional forces operate.

Through the years there have been other concepts governing the constitution of the Fleet and its development, often driven by well reasoned logic and at other times motivated by nothing beyond the instantaneous intimidation. That being as it may, clearly the make up of fleets must logically be a material articulation of the strategic concepts and ideas that prevail. The principal demand of the theory of naval war is to attain a strategic posture that would permit control of oceanic spaces in order to progress and influence the course of conflict. Against this frame of reference the fundamental obligation is therefore to provide the means to seize and exercise that control (it therefore comes as no surprise that China develops forces necessary to realize ‘access denial’). Pursuing this line of argument, the rational formulation that remains consistent with our theory of naval warfare is that upon the escorts and scouts depends our ability to exercise control over the objective maritime space or of Sea Lines of Communication; while on the Aircraft Carrier group and its intrinsic air power assisted by strike and denial forces depends the security of control. It is here that the true impact of the Aircraft Carrier is felt. Control and Security of Control is the relationship that operationally links all maritime forces with the Aircraft Carrier.

It may be argued that the best means of achieving control is to incapacitate the adversary’s ability to interfere.  It would then appear that even in the maritime environment the doctrine of destroying the enemy’s armed forces reasserts itself as the paramount objective. This is what must concern the planner to the extreme; that is, should we not concentrate our maritime exertions with the singular aim of dealing that knock out punch. But the maritime environment and the vastness of the hydrosphere that we choose to influence is of a nature that force compromises will have to be made that depletes the escort forces in order to pull away the carrier group to seek out and destroy the adversary’s denial and strike elements. At the same time the antagonist may hardly be expected to be so accommodating as to expose his main forces in unfavorable circumstances. As Corbett so eloquently put it “the more closely he induces us to concentrate in the face of his fleet, the more he frees the sea for the circulation of his own trade, and the more he exposes ours to cruiser raids.”[xii]

Indeed, there is no correct solution to this dilemma of how best in time, space and most economically, can sea control be established as this would often be dictated by the relative strength, structure and constitution of the fleet, intentions and the geographic character of the theatre of operations which favors one or the other protagonist. However, we may draw a general conclusion that the object of maritime power is to establish control over a predesignated area for a desired period of time. The process may be preceded by strikes against the foe and actions to deny that sea space. The consequence of control may either be operations to secure the object on land or an assurance of passage on that sea area in order to further the war effort. To achieve this state efficiently it is necessary that maritime power be equipped with the appropriate mix of vessels specially adapted for the purpose.

We have thus far noted that our theory of maritime warfare is governed by the ability to control maritime space and put it to use that furthers the national effort. However it is the conditions of use of sea power and the nature of twenty first century conflicts  that is now of significance.

Why the Aircraft Carrier

We have thus far seen how geostrategic uncertainty, growth of China as a strategic competitor and its military posture have together precipitated a theory of military maritime preparedness that suggests the building of a capability that could deny and then control maritime spaces. But what is the real world answer to the question why the Aircraft Carrier? What value does a hundred year old operational concept have in an age of ballistic missiles, satellite surveillance, global drones and cyber warfare? How does the Carrier support a strategy that aims at wresting the initiative in the Indian Ocean in a competitive face-off? And how do a few squadrons of aircraft based on sea mobile platforms impact regional events disproportionately?

Maritime combat air operations in a century has transited from the first hesitant heavier than air flight to wide area domain transparency and control but this evolution was bumpy and far from convincing. The main stumbling block in the minds of strategists was, had gunnery, that had been the gauge of naval power for nearly five centuries, reached a state of decline that it could be unseated and supplanted by air power? At start the latter’s vulnerability, fragility and inefficiency did not inspire the same certainty that technology prophesised. The rise of airpower at the turn of the twentieth century was therefore neither obvious nor was it readily accepted as anything more than an insignificant power tool. While much of this line of thinking was driven by the traditional gunnery biases and the investments already made in the ‘Dreadnought’ programmes;[xiii] there remained the undeniable capability that the seaborne aircraft brought to the theatre of operations: they could deliver payloads further than naval guns could with greater mobility, rapidity and flexibility; at the same time the parent platform could more readily keep pace with combat technologies as represented by its suite of  aircrafts and tailor them for designated tasks. In the shipbuilder’s lexicon, the Aircraft Carrier is an open architecture weapon system with well-understood interfaces and parameters.[xiv]

It is tactically true that contemporary missile armed ships, submarines and shore based long range missiles including Anti Ship Ballistic Missiles pose a threat to the Carrier, as they do to all vessels. However, superior surveillance, cooperative engagement capability, mobility (a Carrier Group can move nearly 1000 kms in a day), range and payload of its aircrafts give it the upper hand in any tactical scenario. The Carrier, through the devise of its aircrafts, can hold an enemy ship or target at safe distances and then neutralize it by “standing off” and delivering a lethal strike.  It can, depending upon circumstances either degrade enemy surveillance and command and control or altogether inhibit the capability to counter attack. The impact of a Carrier Group on operations and the centrality that it assumes in control of maritime space may be summarised as follows:

  • Control of maritime space and assuring its security for any length of time is impossible without a standoff capability and this is provided by the Carrier Group.
  • Functional diversity that the Carrier Group can bring to bear include: deterrence, support of amphibious operations, land attack missions, wide area domain awareness, command and control of large forces and personnel evacuation.
  • The Carrier Group can sustain the conditions for long term offensive presence and power projection. It can, during the adversary’s preparation and build up phase deny free access to his bases.
  • The operational agility, firepower and flexibility that the Carrier Group provides to the Commander is unmatched by any other maritime force.
  • As opposed to land forces and ground based air forces, maritime power particularly the Carrier Group represents the most potent yet the least intrusive of military power because it operates in and from international waters.

[…]

Conclusion

The ultimate reality of the international system is the place that power enjoys in the scheme of assuring stability in relations between nations. Uncertainty in international relations queers the pitch, in view of the expanded space of possibles. China has unambiguously articulated three canons that make for its strategic objectives; stability, growth and regional pre eminence. In the absence of a security oriented cooperative impulse, the problem with such sweeping strategies specifically the coming ‘Third Island Chain’ superimposed on a long range power projection and access denial is its blindness to recognize that, we are in fact dealing with a sea space that is the busiest of all the “vast commons”. The reluctance for collaboration makes the potential for friction high.

Contemporary challenges in our areas of interest is dominated by what direction China’s rise will take, of significance is that the potential for a collision is a reality and the only consideration that could deter it, is the ability to attain a strategic posture that serves to stabilize. The ready availability of the Aircraft Carrier and its complimentary group is central to any power equation and in consequence to stability.

End Notes

[i] Mahan. Alfred T, The Influence of Seapower on History. Hill and Wang 1957. ‘Unity of aim directed upon the sea’ is a recurring theme that finds articulation in Chapters 1, 9 and 11.

[ii]Fukuayama Francis. “The End of History.” The National Interest, 16 (Summer 1989), pp 4, 18.

[iii] Huntington. Samuel, P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of  World Order, Penguin Books, India 1997, pp 30-39.

[iv] The World at War http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/index.html.The United Nations defines “major wars” as military conflicts inflicting 1,000 battlefield deaths per year. In 1965, there were 10 major wars under way. The new millennium began with much of the world consumed in armed conflict or cultivating an uncertain peace. As of mid-2005, there were eight Major Wars under way [down from 15 at the end of 2003], with as many as two dozen “lesser” conflicts ongoing with varrying degrees of intensity.

[v] Occasions of US military intervention 1989 – 2010 :

1989 – Panama, 1991 – Iraq, 1992 – Somalia,1994 – Haiti, 1995-96 –  Bosnia, 1998 – Iraq, 1999 – Kosovo, 2001 – Afghanistan, 2003 – Iraq, 2009 – Pakistan (Drones), 2010 – Libya .

[vi] Article by author titled “The Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang Corridor”, published in the September 2012 issue of the DSA. The Northern Passage was a fabled sea route theorised by adventurers, merchants and money chandlers over the last six centuries to

link the Pacific with the Atlantic Ocean. The Route lay through the Arctic archipelago the treacherous ice flows that frustrate passage across the Arctic Ocean.

[vii] Security analysts  have examined China’s efforts to develop weapons systems that can retard or even stop a potential adversary from entering an area of interest. Dubbed “access-denial,” the aim of such a strategy is to use weapons that deter and should the need arise challenge or indeed prevent inimical forces from operating in conlict zones or oceanic areas of interest . The teeth of this strategy is an anti-ship missile. Such a missile, fired from land, sea, underwater or air can cause tremendous damage to an enemy surface vessel. While such technology isn’t new, the effective ranges of such weapons have increased tremendously, along with their accuracy, speed of delivery and precision. Defending against such systems is therefore a major problem for planners

[viii] Lewis John Wilson and Litai Xue, “The Quest for a Modern Air Force” in Imagined Enemies China Prepares for Uncertain War,  Stanford University Press 2006, p237. General Liu Jingsong, a member of the 15th CPC Central Committee, he was also the PLA  Commander of the Shenyang and Lanzhou military regions and to him amongst others is attributed the opening of Equatorial Guinea 1995.

[ix] Smith Adam , The Wealth of Nations.

[x] The Economist, June 25th – July 1st 2011, special report China.

[xi] Howard, Michael. The Lessons of History, Yale University Press New Haven and London, p39.

[xii] Corbett, Julian. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Longmans, Green and CO, London 1911, p.115

[xiii] Friedman, Norman (1978). Battleship Design and Development 1905–1945. Conway Maritime Press p19-21.

[xiv] Clancy, Tom. Carrier, Berkeley Books, New York 1999, p 4.