Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons: An Essential Consort to a Doctrine of No First Use

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By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

This article was first published by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, in January 2014.  

Keywords: Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons, Doctrine of NFU, Indo-Pak-China Nuclear stability, Non-State Actors, Counter-force strike

Politico-Military thought often harbours a puzzling phenomenon when it organises concepts and institutions in a mosaic of sometimes antithetical notions. Contrary ideas are indeed intrinsic to the art of political sagacity, but when form is defined by a belief, in apparent conflict with content, then there appear distortions more illusory than what logic would suggest. So it is with the emergence of strategic nuclear weapons. They are destructive to the extent that the purpose of warfare is itself obliterated, underscoring a compelling theory of war avoidance. By its side are strategic non-nuclear weapons whose intent is to target nuclear weapons that, ironically, seek a (precarious) stability.

Conventional savvy will first suggest that non-nuclear weapons can neither deliver the requisite high explosive payload to assume a counter-force role against silo-based or caverned nuclear systems; nor do they come with the probability of kill that is demanded with such a role. But just around the technological corner lurks high impact penetration and shaped charges that make a mockery of hitherto simple overpressure reckoning. Second, nuclear pundits will insinuate that a partially successful counter-force strike may in point of fact catalyse escalation to a full blown nuclear exchange; both contain candour of their own.

But strange is our circumstance when on the one hand Pakistan presents us with a nuclear nightmare which when articulated is a hair-trigger, opaque deterrent conventionalised under military control, steered by a doctrine obscure in form, seeped in ambiguity, and guided by a military strategy that carouses and finds unity with non-state actors. The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into the battle area further exacerbates credibility of their control. It does not take a great deal of intellectual exertions to declare that this nightmare is upon us. However, the very nature of the power equation on the subcontinent and the extent to which it is tilted in India’s favour will imply that any attempt at bringing about conflict resolution through means other than peaceful is destined to fail. In this context it is amply clear that the threat of use of nuclear weapons promotes only one case and that is the Pakistani military establishment’s hold on the nation. On the other hand is a Janus-faced China which, in collusion with Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme, has not just entrenched proliferatory links, but also doctrinal union that permits a duplicitous approach to the latter’s declared No First Use (NFU) posture and an option to keep the South Asian nuclear cauldron on the boil. Also significant is the alliance bucks the existing global non-proliferation structure.

What may be derived from the current state of affairs, with any conviction, is the political and military unpredictability that prevails. This denies hope for stability and the expectation of fitting conditions into a convenient model, let alone providing for security guarantees. Governments faced with such a conundrum more readily prepare for a worst case scenario than try and reconcile the true dimensions that uncertainty introduces. It is preparedness, therefore, that endows the only tool that can deter possible confrontation of a nature that has earlier been designated as nightmarish.

India today is in a position to impress upon its adversaries a deterrent relationship based on nuclear war avoidance, with the proviso that the rationale of nuclear weapons as a political tool and a means to preclude a nuclear exchange are recognised and adhered to. China’s galloping entwinement with the rest of the world makes this proposition a real probability; contingent upon our resolve and policies of seeking mutuality with like-minded nations to rally around the single point of preventing reactionary overturning of the status quo. This despite the unilateral tensions that China has precipitated in the East and South China Sea over sovereignty, air defence identification zones and the right to control fishing.

Pakistan is, however, a different cup of tea for it portrays a perilous uncertainty, as would any nation under military control that perceives in nuclear weapons the ultimate Brahmastra. As with that weapon of mass destruction, answers lay not just in the promise of disproportionate retaliation but also in the credible ability to prempt and counter its use. India has in place nuclear weapons driven by a doctrine of NFU and massive retaliation. What its strategic forces must now equip itself with is select conventional hardware that tracks and targets nuclear forces (all under political control). This would provide the pre-emptive teeth to a deterrent relationship that leans so heavily on NFU.

China’s Air Defence Identification Zone: At Variance with the Principle of Adherence

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This article was first published on the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies website in December 2013.

By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Shankar

Keywords: Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ), East China Sea, Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), Rise of Chinese Hegemony, “Line of Actual Control”

An Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) is space over land or water within which identification, location, and routing of aircrafts are controlled. It is enforced by a state in the interest of security and safety. While ADIZs usually extend into what is universally acknowledged to be international airspace, even by the countries that maintain them, they in no way confer sovereignty. Its extent is determined by the reaction time to respond to foreign and possibly hostile aircrafts. The authority to establish an ADIZ is not given by any international treaty nor prohibited by international law and is not regulated by any international body. The first ADIZ was established by the United States soon after World War II. As surveillance technologies improved, the scramble for security reached a frenzied peak during the early stages of the Cold War when the fear of a sneak nuclear airborne first strike was a strategic fixation amongst protagonists. The extent of paranoia is exemplified by the American ADIZ off Southern California that stretches more than 400 nautical miles out to sea. Air defence zones should not be confused with information structures which are used to manage air traffic worldwide.

Several countries currently maintain ADIZs including Norway, Britain, USA, Canada, Japan, Pakistan, India, South Korea, Taiwan and China. Three conventional criteria preside over such zones, these are: the Zone cover undisputed territory, Zones do not apply to foreign aircraft not intending to enter territorial airspace, Zones do not overlap. Since states have the right to regulate air traffic only over their land, countries are not legally obliged to comply with another States ADIZ requirements in international airspace, but commercial traffic tend to do so because of the promise of security and safety.

So, on 23 November 2013, why did China establish its East China Sea ADIZ? Despite the knowledge that the central three criteria were breached, it covered the disputed Islands of Senkaku/Diaoyu; the Zone solicited information even if the foreign aircraft had no intentions of entering China’s territorial air space; and intriguingly, the new Zone intruded and overlapped the Japanese and Korean ADIZs. It also, cannot be coincidental that the inexact vesica piscis formed by the intersection of the Japan and China ADIZ along with the intersection of their disputed  Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) are centred on the Chunxiao gas fields (originally disputed but since 2008 overseen by a shaky joint development programme).

This discourse considers the three reasons that China’s establishment have fielded in vindication of their East China Sea ADIZ. First, the Surprise Attack Anxiety.  Surprise may be an essential feature of the “Principles of War”, and theoretical savvy suggest that the danger of a surprise attack is highest when one party to a conflict considers war inevitable and thinks that getting in the first blow would deliver a decisive military advantage; but, the reality is entirely in variance. For State initiated offensive military acts and follow up actions cannot today be masked, primarily because contemporary surveillance systems are designed to effectively discriminate hostile preparations and intrusions. Such technical measures are well known to China and appropriate devices are in place. ADIZs on the other hand are founded on the assumption of adherence and therefore in a state of war or military hostilities, it is inconceivable that one of the antagonists is going to adhere to the niceties of safety obligations. Tensions are undoubtedly high in the East China Sea region at the moment, but this is not Cold War. No country wants to target the heart of the global economy. The surprise attack formulation as articulated by China’s defence ministry is therefore on thin ice and has left China’s ADIZ more a question mark as to what their strategic intent is.

Second, the rationale that it is illicit trafficking of man, material and narcotics that is the object of the Zone is ludicrous since the region is neither a significant drug route nor is it a cognizable unlawful human trafficking corridor. Also the presence of multiple and overlapping maritime disputes and claims in area contributes to a surfeit of  zealous policing agencies which makes the trafficking theory implausible.

Third, the suggestion that the Zone was motivated by a desire to reduce the risk of midair collisions is hardly tenable since the most acute peril that airmen face is when there is duality of control without clear and unambiguous responsibility and power to regulate traffic. The underlying problem is not commercial air traffic, which is already under efficient regulation in the East China Sea, but the movement of military flights which have no obligation to abdicate control to the Zonal controller whilst in international airspace. Proclaiming the ADIZ and declaring the right to “emergency defensive measures”, it has put pressure on China to intercept foreign military flights increasing the risk of accidents. The move up an escalatory ladder jumped a few rungs when military aircraft from the US, Japan and South Korea challenged the ADIZ.

It is evident that China’s ADIZ neither qualifies the 3- conventional criteria test nor does their logic have any prospect of acceptance. It has, however roused a dangerous dilemma for there now exists a real possibility that a commercial plane in the area could receive conflicting instructions and face hazardous consequences. The Zone has also lowered the threshold for armed incidents. Which brings us back to our original question of why the Zone? History has repeatedly shown that the rise of a new hegemon is marked by resistance to the status-quo. China’s ADIZ in the East China Sea must be seen as a manifestation of its growing assertiveness. From the Indian perspective, planners must be prepared to confront similar proclamations over the Line of Actual Control particularly in the Arunachal sector. The riposte lies in defying any such unilateral decree.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Step Closer to the Abyss

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by

Vice Admiral (retd.) Vijay Shankar

This article was first published by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, On November 30th, 2013.

Keywords: Tactical Nuclear Weapons, South Asian Nuclear Doctrine, NATO Paradigm, Nasr, India-Pakistan LoC

The Futility of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

        In March 2013 a workshop was conducted under the aegis of the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, CA. It sought to examine the escalation dynamics in a South Asian crisis under a nuclear overhang. A scrutiny of the scenario suggested that a vertical escalatory spiral was central to the paradigm and therefore, intrinsic to its anatomy was an inexorable traction to extremes. First blood had been drawn by a  Pakistan State sponsored terror attack, it targeted leadership at a very large public gathering leading to extensive casualties; in most strategic lexicons this is an act of war. The demands of the Indian side, unfortunately, were given short shrift. Had some movement been made towards apprehending and handing over the terrorists, the situation could have been defused.

        Accordingly, a swift punitive military thrust was launched by Indian forces across the LoC and a Maritime Exclusion Zone was decreed. Forces primarily used were the less intrusive Air and Sea arms. This in turn escalated to action that was not restricted to the LoC. The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) into the battle area attained inevitability. To Indian Leadership the question posed was how would offensive Indian forces respond? In the event a deliberate decision was made to search out and strike the nuclear tipped Nasr batteries as with other tactical artillery pieces without discrimination; and should a nuclear Nasr launch occur on Indian Forces it would be regarded as a First Strike and India would reserve the right to launch massive retaliatory strikes to the dictates of her Nuclear Doctrine. The adversary balked from deploying TNWs.

What is it all about? The Essence of Stability

      Marshall Ferdinand Foch, one of the lesser of the meat grinding generals of the First World War when faced with the bewildering nature of the larger strategic situation is said to have countered with a fundamental question, De quoi s’agit-il?  – What is it all about? Indeed this poser if understood and answered in the context of nuclear stability would bring us to the complexities that face nations with the coming of a weapon that can obliterate the very purpose of warfare; in the circumstance the separation of the conventional from the nuclear is a logical severance. A major divergence from the Two-Bloc-Nuclear-Face-Off of the past is nuclear multilateralism. In this altered plurality the true enemy is the dynamic that rocks the equilibrium.

       The essence of stability is to find agreement on three foundational truths. Firstly, technology, while it provides for modernization it invites covertness whereas its impact demands transparency. Secondly, that the army in Pakistan is the real power centre, and therefore for India to engage an enfeebled civilian leadership is self defeating. Thirdly, TNWs make for a dangerously unconvincing deterrent correlation.

         Why would a nation turn its back on the prudence of the past six decades and deliberately reduce the nuclear threshold through the introduction of TNWs and in a situation of mortal internal collapse, invite the increasing probability of the breakdown of nuclear deterrence? After all it was the Pak foreign Minister Mr. Aga Shahi in dialogue with the American Secretary of State in 1979 who suggested that the “value of nuclear weapons lies in its possession and not in its use”. TNWs are marked by several features that prop up the illusion of control and the misguided belief that the adversary would, for some reason, abjure the opportunity to escalate response. Its deployment will attract pre emptive suppressive action and doctrine for employment follows conventional field axioms with the risk of accidental, unauthorized or mistaken use.  It therefore promotes only one cause and that is the Pakistani military establishment’s hold on that hapless state. Recognizing the politics of the South Asian region and the emasculated nature of civilian leadership in Pakistan; the dangers of adding nuclear violence to military perfidy, as recent proliferatory history and Jihadist terror acts have shown, is more than just a reality.

The NATO Paradigm

      Pakistan in defense of TNWs often cites the NATO analogy. However, by the 1980s NATO was doctrinally imbued with the idea of the irrelevance of nuclear weapons against less than existential threats. With this conviction, both Britain and France perceived the use of nuclear weapons (of any yield) as a failure of deterrence and therefore not a realistic alternative to conventional forces. Employment of TNWs through the doctrine of ‘flexible response’ did not provide the lever to control the escalatory ladder. The strategy, even in concept lacked conviction for limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms.

The Burden of God’s Gift

      The South Asian nuclear imbroglio is evolving under circumstances that are unique. A shared antagonistic history; geographic contiguity; a political and structural contradiction between a centralized de facto military leadership and a democratic dispensation; a yawning economic gap; and, awkwardly a self ordained military that (mis)perceives in antagonism an existential peril and a reason for self perpetuation. India also views the complicity of China in the Pakistan nuclear weapons programme as suggestive of doctrinal links that permit a ‘Janus’ faced approach to the latter’s  no first use posture.

      Pakistan contends that the articulation of a nuclear doctrine is unnecessary for the purpose of establishing deterrence.  Unfortunately, a nation that announced its nuclear weapon status and views it as “God’s gift”  must also realize that a deterrent relationship is essentially about mutual knowledge of purpose. Ambiguities, deception and carousing with non state actors can only serve to obfuscate.

The Challenge: Contending with Pakistan’s Perspective

     The impending introduction of a sea-based deterrent into the Indian arsenal, rather than being seen as an element of stability that will enhance credibility of the second strike, is perceived through a curious logic as an asymmetric trend that somehow adversely impacts crisis stability.  Given the opacity of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear underpinnings, descent to TNWs and duplicity of policies, it has become increasingly prickly for India to either understand nuclear thinking in Islamabad or to find coherence between a mania for parity, the rush for stockpiling fissile material and the loosening of controls over nuclear weapons.

       More puzzling is the strategic notion that the perceived conventional imbalance between the two countries may be countered by Pakistan exercising one of two options: firstly, secure an assured second-strike capability; secondly, place the arsenal on ‘hair trigger alert’ and then the argument goes, introduce TNWs as “another layer of deterrence” designed to apply brakes on India’s military doctrine of Cold Start (ala NATO’s discredited formulation). As Feroz Khan posits, “Pakistan’s flight-testing of the short-range, nuclear-capable rocket system Hatf-9 (Nasr), was introduced to add ‘deterrence value’ to Pakistan’s force posture.” The author in a bizarre contradictory temper adds “due to the proximity of targets, short flight times and the technical challenges of assuring information accuracy, the likelihood of inadvertence is high.” He further holds that “…central command and control will become untenable and the ‘Nasr’ with its marked footprint will attract punishing pre-emptive conventional attack. Thus, battlefield nuclear weapons such as Hatf-9 will pose a ‘use it or lose it’ choice, precipitating a nuclear exchange that may not be intended.”  The unbiased political examiner is left bewildered that if such be the imbalances in the power matrix, then why does Pakistan not seek rapprochement as a priority of their military, economic and political policies? The answer perhaps lies in asking, “Who stands to gain in this power play?”

Conclusion: The Quest for a Response 

       Pakistan espouses an opaque deterrent under military control steered by a doctrine obscure in form, seeped in ambiguity and guided by a military strategy that finds unity with non-state actors. The introduction of TNWs exacerbates credibility of control. It does not take a great deal of intellectual exertions to declare whose case lowering of the nuclear threshold promotes. Two options present themselves to the Indian planner; firstly to generate specialised forces that continuously track and mark TNWs and incorporates an airborne conventional capability to neutralise them. The second option is a soft one that aims at dispelling the veil of opacity that surrounds the nuclear deterrent. What may have impact is a combination of the two.

       Nietzsche astutely warned that “And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee”. Thus far nuclear relations in the region have been bedeviled by a persistent effort to combat the monsters that the shroud of covertness has cast; it has left us the unenviable task of out staring an abyss. Nietzsche in the circumstance would have advised an assault on the first causes – dispel opacity and engage the military through dialogue and from a position of total preparedness.