Ballistic Missile Defence: A Bulwark of Deterrence

by Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

This article is forthcoming in the March 2019 issue of Geopolitics http://www.geopolitics.in/

In the aftermath of the Six-Day war of 1967, there ensued a prolonged period of sporadic hostilities between Israel on the one hand and Egypt, Syria and Iraq on the other. On 12 October, 1967, the Eilat, an Israeli Destroyer on routine patrol, was engaged in a surface action by Egyptian missile boats off Port Said. A crew member on the deck of the Eilat apparently did not understand what he was looking at. It was not a rocket; it was a Styx missile, the first of four that slammed into and sank the hapless destroyer. Of the incident, the Captain of the Eilat recorded “I stood there transfixed, watching the missile”. The 1971 Indian missile strikes on Karachi port installations and warships defending the harbour evoked a similar distressed response. It was another reminder of the need for effective defence against missile attacks.

And just as the ‘Defence’ came to grips with the nature of missile assaults through a combination of deception, soft and hard kill measures, the ‘Offence’ wrested the initiative through enhanced ranges, precision, speed, cruise altitude, deception, unpredictable targeting and more significantly by adopting a sub-orbital ballistic trajectory with a multiple independently targetable re-entry vehicle payload containing several warheads, each capable of being aimed to hit a different target.

Approach to Ballistic Missile Defence: Effectiveness

While the debate on whether or not India should test and deploy ballistic missile defences (BMD) is now largely settled, the important question of how effective such systems are likely to be remains ‘iffy’. The answer to this question depends on considerations such as type of defence, characteristics of the attacking missile, desired kill probability, standards for measure of success and lastly the economics of induction which will determine how secure and gapless coverage can be achieved.

Indian backers of BMD argue that trials have already proven the system to be effective. Critics, however, maintain that these trials are too few, unrealistic and structured-for- success; contention being that they do not in any way attempt to mimic the ‘fog’ and unpredictability that generally envelopes operational situations which will eventually have a bearing on measure of effectiveness. The quandary is that there is not enough empirical data to arrive at an objective assessment.

Given the contrapositions in the debate, it is necessary first to understand the features of a ballistic trajectory in order to discern opportunities available to the Defence.

The Ballistic Trajectory and State of Play

Assuming the missile’s range is long enough that it leaves the atmosphere; a ballistic missile’s trajectory is typically divided into three phases.  First, the boost phase, when the missile is under powered flight using its rocket booster.  Second, the midcourse glide, in which the missile coasts on a ballistic trajectory through outer space.  Third, the terminal phase, in which the missile or warheads re-enters the atmosphere and plunge towards its target at hypersonic speeds.  Each phase presents different options and problems for the Defence.

Hard-kill systems (measures that physically counterattack an incoming missile destroying/altering path of  its warhead) that operate within the atmosphere or above it such as the U.S. Army’s Patriot system, the U.S. Navy’s Aegis system, the Russian S-400 system and indeed the Indian BMD, a double-tiered system consisting of two land and sea-based interceptor missiles, namely the Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) missile for high altitude interception, and the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) missile for lower altitude interception. All these systems use radar for guidance and homing and most are equipped with high-explosive warheads while some use kinetic impact for destruction of the incoming missile. Aero-dynamic forces enable interceptor manoeuvring and “atmospheric filtering” resolve ambiguity posed by countermeasures.  In the 1991 Gulf War, the Patriot or PAC-2 interceptor missiles, reportedly, attempted to intercept 44 Iraqi Scud ballistic missiles. The U.S. Army by their own estimates (which varies wildly), claimed kill percentage of about 61%. However, technical analyses suggest that the actual intercept rate was nearer to zero. In the 2003 Iraq War, the U.S. Army fielded the improved PAC3 BMD, evidence is mixed on whether the system actually performed since there had reportedly, been only two “kills” in seven launches.

Boost-Phase Interception

Boost-phase interception attempts to destroy missiles while they are still in powered flight.  This mode of defence, in concept, could use hard-kill interceptors, or beam weapons such as lasers.  Boost-phase defences have some significant advantages over midcourse or terminal interception. Importantly, destroying a missile during boost eliminates all of its warheads and therefore is most appropriate against missiles equipped with multiple warheads. In addition, the problem of countermeasures appears to be much less severe for boost-phase interceptors than it is in midcourse or terminal phase engagements. The difficulty facing boost-phase defence is, time for engagement that the hostile missile offers which at most is a few minutes; suggesting that a boost-phase interceptor be located relatively close to the attacking missile launch site. This consideration become critical when it comes to neutralising short ambit ballistic missiles which by virtue of limited range may have to be deployed in the tactical battle area such as Pakistan’s Nasr or their Hatf 1 and Hatf 2, missiles. The launch vehicle could be eliminated prior to missile launch by precision guided munitions or air to surface missiles.

Midcourse Interceptors

Long-range midcourse defence operates above the atmosphere (exo-atmospheric) and refers to that part of the target’s trajectory after its booster rocket has burned out but before it begins to re-enter the atmosphere. It aims at direct collision homing techniques during target travel through space.    Midcourse interception in principle provides wide area defence. At the same time exo-atmospheric mode of operation makes the Defence potentially vulnerable to a variety of countermeasures. A primary objective of such defences is countering nuclear-armed missiles. Very few nations have proven the efficacy of midcourse interceptors, for the real issue is not its theoretical viability or how well it works on a test range, but its operational effectiveness – that is, how well they can be expected to work given unpredictable circumstances in an environment where countermeasures are deployed. Unfortunately, very little open source information is available on the matter.

The Russian S-400 system would appear to have captured the wide area midcourse BMD market for reasons of effectiveness and economy. Its closest rival is the American Patriot PAC3; both systems claim a dual capability of shooting down aircraft and providing BMD. It would now help our analysis if consideration is given to the known attributes of the two systems. A comparison of technical parameters indicate that the S-400 can shoot down targets moving at a speed of 17 km/sec while the PAC-3 limit of target speed is 8 km/sec; in terms of simultaneous tracking and engagement the S-400 can track 160 targets and engage  72 targets simultaneously while the PAC3 can track125 and engage 36. Maximum tracking range for the S-400 is 600 km and kill range is 400 km while the PAC3 tracking and engagement range is far less at 180kms and 100kms respectively. The S-400’ altitude aperture is from a low of 10 metres to a high of 30 km while the Patriot’s altitude bracket is between 50 metres and 25 km. To achieve a kill probability of not less than 0.99, the S-400 will have to launch a salvo of 2 missiles while the Patriot, 3 missiles. It would now be apparent that in all vital attributes the S-400 outperforms the PAC3. Also, it is interesting to note that the Russian system has the capability to detect stealth aircrafts such as the US F-35 and Chinese J-20 which are characterized by a low radar signature. Five squadrons of the S-400 system are expected to be inducted into India’s inventory by 2020 at a cost of $ 5.43 billion.

India’s Rough Nuclearized Neighbourhood

A nuclear deterrent relationship is founded entirely on rationality. On the part of the ‘deteree’ there is rationality in the conviction of disproportionate risks of hostile action; and on the part of the deterrer rationality of purpose and transparency in confirming the reality of the risks involved in a manner that strategic miscalculations are avoided . The exceptional feature of this transaction is that the roles are reversible provided it is in the common interest to maintain stability in relationship. The rub when dealing with Pakistan is that political leadership is a charade that masks the real manipulators of power: the military establishment, who, as a rule do not expose themselves to diplomatic parleys and the tedium of negotiations.

India’s neighbourhood in nuclear security terms is significant for the two nuclear armed neighbours that quarter its Northern and Western borders. Both inimical to its interests; the former Machiavellian in its security relationship while the latter out-and-out pernicious and perhaps more alarmingly a nuclear surrogate whose arsenal and doctrine have been devised, tested and phrased in Beijing.

In all but two doctrinal precepts there does not appear to be great divergence between China’s and India’s Nuclear Doctrine. Where China deviates is on the subject of ‘the demonstration’ and ‘doctrinal dynamism.’ The former suggests, in the abstract, that nuclear weapons would be used, if credibility is ever questioned. This usage may not be against vital targets and yet will leave no doubts of intentions. While the latter opens up the nature of their alliances. In this frame of reference, the scripting of the Pakistan nuclear capability, transfer of nuclear technologies, developing their strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal, setting up of the Khushab I to IV weapon grade plutonium production reactors and the emergence of a first-strike capability becomes significant.

Thus, China’s doctrinal dynamism potentially permits a Janus-faced policy – the one that it presents to the world at large is that of the No-First-Use (NFU), minimalistic, rigid, restrained nuclear power while the other is to retain the First Use alternative through the Pakistan arsenal. This policy has placed nuclear force planners in a quandary; not to respond is to open India to a possible degradation of their Second Strike capability. China moulding Pakistan’s nuclear First Use facility, forgets the fact of an enfeebled Pakistan civilian leadership incapable of action to remove the military finger from the nuclear trigger; the active involvement of UN designated terrorists in military strategy and an alarming posture of an intention-to-use; all have the makings of a global nuclear nightmare.

Given the opacity of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear underpinnings, descent to tactical nuclear weapons (TNW) and duplicity of policies, it has become increasingly prickly for India to either understand nuclear thinking in Islamabad or to find coherence between a mania for parity, the rush for stockpiling fissile material and the loosening of controls over nuclear weapons. More puzzling is the notion that the conventional imbalance between the two countries may be countered by Pakistan introducing TNWs as “another layer of deterrence” (ala NATO’s discredited formulation). Clearly in this strategic framework, the generation of India’s BMD cannot come as a surprise to any pundit of nuclear security.

The Indian BMD

India is in the advanced stage of developing and deploying a multi-tiered BMD system designed to achieve exo-atmospheric interception of short, intermediate, and intercontinental range ballistic missiles during midcourse flight interfaced with an endo-atmospheric hit-to-kill interceptor. The system consists of a two stage, solid propellant Prithvi Defence Vehicle (PDV) missile in tandem with the Advanced Air Defence (AAD) Missile for high and low altitude interception, respectively. The PDV intercepts ballistic missiles at exo-atmospheric altitudes up to 150kms while the AAD missile achieves endo-atmospheric engagement within an altitude envelope of 15mtrs-30kms. The AAD is also effective against cruise missiles and short range ballistic missiles. The system is interfaced to a long range phased array tracking radar (Swordfish) which provides gapless surveillance up to 1500kms. The deployed system would consist of several launch vehicles, radars, Launch Control Centres grouped under a Mission Control Centre. All these are geographically distributed and connected by a secure communication network

The Russian S-400 Triumf BMD system to be inducted by India beginning 2020 (operational parameters discussed in some detail earlier) when married and deployed with existing endo-atmospheric systems such as the AAD or Barak 8 (joint Indo-Israeli production), will provide significant strategic performance upgrade to India’s BMD capability. Particularly in the face of China’s intermediate and intercontinental ballistic missiles of the JL2 and DF31A type; Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal of medium range ballistic missiles such as the ‘Ababeel’, cruise missiles such as the ‘Babur’ and tactical ballistic missiles of the ‘Nasr’ type. While capability to neutralise the ballistic missile threat from both India’s nuclear neighbours is credible, what may be questioned is the economics of the matter and how selective or otherwise can India be in providing BMD cover to counter force and counter value targets.

Impact on Deterrence

The point at issue that planners will raise is: in what manner does the Indian BMD serve the cause of deterrence? Cold-war theology that drove the bi-polar deterrent relationship between USA and the USSR hinged on an axiomatic logic of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) and the strategic rationality (that both protagonists subscribed to) which provoked ‘predictable behaviour.’ Thus, in that era, the BMD became a de-stabilizing factor as it undermined the shared hostage situation that was central to MAD. Also, it set into motion dynamics for modernising and enlarging nuclear arsenals. It is in this sensibility that the Anti-Ballistic Missile treaty of 1972 was considered ‘the bedrock of strategic nuclear stability.’

Answers may be found in the changing shape of geopolitics at the turn of the 21st century that not only fractured the former bi-polar equilibrium to multi-polar uncertainties, but also introduced reprobate nuclear armed states into the milieu, some of whom are not so readily convinced of the logic of MAD or the strategic rationality of ‘predictable behaviour.’ Pakistan finds itself in this category. The deterrence of such states poses a dilemma never faced before, for reasons of their often repeated capricious nuclear threats and intent-to-use policy, decentralized control of TNWs and their military strategy that finds unity with terrorists; all of which places pressures on states with stable and reposeful nuclear doctrines such as India. Consequently, for India, deterrence is not just a function of strategic rationality but, of persistent emphasis on credibility of the power to deny and the immense and exacting shock of response. It is to further this precept that the Indian BMD finds expression.

 

Xi’s Disquieting Dream of National Rejuvenation

By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

In the run up to the First World War, Germany pursued a combination of overbearing diplomacy and brinkmanship to achieve policy goals, despite the risk of war. Demanding a review of international order that would confer on it a dominant political position in keeping with its self-perceived economic and military prevalence, Germany saw little issue in war being a natural corollary to its creating crises and then manoeuvring through them. In the event security tolerance of rival powers was persistently stretched. And, when war did break out, it was fought with colossal military ineptitude and a bizarre inability to match military design with political purpose (sadly, a recurring malaise to this day). An observer of contemporary geopolitics cannot fail to notice the remarkable similarities in the circumstances of China’s dazzling economic growth, military build-up and its twenty first century realpolitik instincts.

The world, from an era of unipolarity and then multipolar uncertainty, that dominated the three decades between the breakdown of the Soviet Union and Russia’s annexation of Crimea, has moved to what may be termed as “penumbric competition”—conflicts that lack definition the nature of which is rivalry between major powers over mercantile domination. China has made palpably clear that the instruments of influence are financial inveiglement, military coercion, and exploiting instabilities.

Mearsheimer’s “offensive realism,” the realist international-relations theory, holds that in “an anarchic world with no sovereign to provide law and order, states will tend to amass as much relative power as they can and will never find security other than in accretion of power at the expense of competitors…the best defence (in this milieu) is good offense.” Revisionist China is today an avowed devotee of just such strategic logic. And therefore, to China a global economic order governed, largely, by a single set of rules not of its bidding, is repugnant.

China has announced sweeping claims to sovereignty over the South China Sea and sought to ratify them by creating and fortifying artificial islands in flagrant defiance of existing international laws and conventions. A network of Chinese naval bases, port infrastructural developments and atypical shipping control centres has been secured from the South China Sea to the East African Coast. This includes ports of Sittwe in Myanmar, Hambantota in Sri Lanka, the port of Gwadar in Pakistan, Port Sudan, port Lamu in Kenya and port Bagamoyo in Tanzania. Historically and in terms of contemporary significance to the existing maritime flow of trade, these harbours are of no weighty consequence; however from a geo-strategic standpoint they suggest springboards for sea control and envelopment of India rather than mercantile ascendancy or commercial profitability.

Chinese Military outposts in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa and Gwadar have mushroomed to challenge unwelcome maritime control presence and safeguard their extensive investments in Africa. These investments have thus far resulted in either generating equities or enmeshing the victim states in a debt trap that force them to surrender sovereignty over assets being created. Learning from “colonial experience” of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, China has put in place a strategy that emphasizes relatively superior organization, technological interventions, and unscrupulous financial mobilization to exploit and divide the weaknesses of the political and military systems in the host state. And if China’s growth seeks new markets and primary resources in Africa, then exclusive control of these is at its core, regardless of friction that may erupt.

Both India and China in their quest for growth with security must find ways and means to avoid threatening each other’s interests (as is happening) and advance the nous for security even if that implies establishing a ‘restraining balance.’ In the past, leadership coped with the coming challenge more by knee jerk rather than policy responses. In changed circumstances of India’s ‘Act East’ and ‘Neighbourhood First’ policies, the impact that the military will have on the developing correlation is the moot question. A scrutiny of the problem from these two distinct levels of strategic policy and military force will also precipitate several questions, answers to which hold the key to the future. First, from the strategic viewpoint, is India focussing on what comprises the strategic centre of gravity of China’s power and mercantile ‘putsch’?  Second, from the military perspective, would our forces, either singularly or in alliance, be able to balance Chinese military activities prejudicial to our interests? Clearly the answer to the first is: China’s compulsion for unremitting growth while to the second the answer lies in developing a ‘China restraining strategy’ best tempered by an appropriate alliance.

Given the slowdown of China’s hitherto stunning economic growth (a recent BBC estimate puts China’s annual growth rate as low as 5.6%), the trade and tariff war with the USA which has begun to bite, and the countries of the ASEAN eyeing markets and resources elsewhere as demand in China falters, would suggest an adverse impact on China’s current military modernization and strategic infrastructural plans (such as the Belt and Road Initiative). The other problem which may hobble China’s ambitions is the amount of debt in the economy – by some estimates close to 300% of GDP.

Two options present themselves to China’s planners as they attempt to manage these predicaments: retard pace of projects, cut back on military modernization, strategic infrastructure building and accept moderation of Xi’s “Dream of national rejuvenation, securing expanding interests overseas and developing capabilities to degrade core operational and technological advantage that influence the region ” (China defence White Paper 2015 , recalling that leadership have for long characterized the initial two decades of the 21st century as a period of strategic opportunity). Or, perceiving the window of “strategic opportunity” rapidly closing, continue to run down their strategic objectives with far greater vigour even at cost of international friction and disruption of their internal circumstances.

In either of the two options the development of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad); a security organisation which includes the USA, Japan, India and Australia must be viewed as a timely ‘China restraining alliance’ to counter China’s unrelenting power surge for an exceptionable proprietary mercantile empire stretching across the Indo-Pacific. The Charter of the Quad is yet to be fleshed out; but conceivably, it will have three objectives. The first, to reinforce a rule-based regional order that rejects nationalistic militarism. Second, to promote a liberal trading regime and freedom of navigation essential to secure passage of close to 60% of global trade through the Indo-Pacific. Third, to provide security assurances.

However, just as behind the scenes machinations from Beijing splintered the Quad at inception, the entente faces similar fragmenting stresses that threaten the whole. India is locked in a long standing border dispute with China. Similarly, Japan has maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas while China’s new Air Defence Identification Zone provides the recipe for mutual interference in the air. In the meantime the US is engaged in a self-destructive move to renege on its larger strategic responsibilities; Australia on the other hand depends on China for approximately 22 % of trade. And there are China’s assignees, the maverick nuclear armed states of North Korea and Pakistan whose disruptive influence cannot be set aside. And yet the opportunity that the current state of China’s economy presents must be grasped if the Quad is to have ready impact.

The question is, does leadership recognize that Chinese realpolitik is at play and that only a determined system based on pragmatic rather than ideological considerations can confront it? The current moves by Japan, USA and India to develop Trincomalee in Sri Lanka to stave off China’s aggressive push in Hambantota will suggest that the entente has not been altogether unsighted to events in the region.

Strategic Maritime Challenge of China: To Steer the Stream of Time

By

Vice Admiral (retd.) Vijay Shankar 

This article is forthcoming in the December issue of Geopolitics

The Language of War

Within an international system that hovers between a facade of order and anarchy, differentiated pace of growth in national power among states engenders rivalry over access to resources, control of technology, flow of commerce and entry to markets; resulting in friction amongst competitors and making  the threat of armed conflict  a reality (Mackinder). At the same time, abstractions of national honour, prestige and other national interests that separate the state from its citizenry are often at odds with the violence of, as Clausewitz so brilliantly put it, the “Language” of War. Experience of the wars in Korea, Vietnam, Bangladesh and of the other conflicts of the second half of the twentieth century will suggest that perceptions of the people, that come face-to-face with the “language” of war, prevail. Add to this the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with their intrinsic menace of ending political purpose and we have the coming of indirect, relatively scaled down version of conventional wars albeit with high destructive potential fought in the penumbric shadows of a nuclear holocaust.

Verge Powers

The targeting of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with atomic bombs in August 1945 marked a watershed in the history of warfare, for it placed in doubt viability of the human race should a war with atomic weaponry ever be fought (Kennedy, Paul). And as the decades that followed witnessed  transformation in the ebb and flow of national power, former great powers such as Britain, France, Italy, Germany and Japan gave way to the rise of the Soviet Union, a military giant  economically deprived and unbalanced; and the United States of America. The surge in the latter’s economy due wartime production and expenditure was of a magnitude near 100% in GDP. While a bi-polar world had arrived, it was abundantly clear that there was only one economic super power. For in a matter of less than half a century the grinding politico-socio-military confrontation (not forgetting the ever-so frequent nuclear brinkmanship) left a fragmented and exhausted USSR vanquished by the ‘cold war’ it’s national power in tatters while it’s relegation to the ranks of the second rate seriously dented Rodina-ma (mother Russia’s) pride.

What is emerging today is a fluctuating plurality of on-the-verge-great powers. These Verge Powers are counselled at times and coerced at others, by the lone super power, the USA. In this setting the United States retains dominant influence over its European and Pacific allies, but finds itself in confrontation with China and Russia; while Germany, Japan, Australia and India; also Verge Powers, find an intuitive affinity towards the democratic covey led by America.

Power Transformations: Familiar Cadence

There is empirical evidence to suggest that the global economic crisis of the 1930s that in part set off the Second World War was at conclusion responsible for thrusting the US into astonishingly favourable strategic circumstances. This situation not only triggered the Cold War but ultimately in the late 1980s, forced the melt-down of the Soviet empire and set into motion another fall and rise in global power structure. The characteristics of the economic crisis of the thirties ring a cadence now familiar to contemporary conditions – discontent at the biases that govern international economic systems, protectionism, unfair trade practices, one-sided competition, restricted access to resources, creation of proprietary mercantile routes and nationalistic policies; all in contradiction to the demands of an increasingly globalised and networked world.

And those that subscribe to the belief that nations having had their fill of globally ruinous violence cannot be so irrational as to embark on power politics that increase the probabilities of more devastating wars, have only to study the strategic trends of the last three decades of the post-Cold War era to determine that power transformations will continue to occur and as long as it transpires within an international order that is influenced by uneven growth and shrinking natural resources, the quest for power will invariably be linked to the generation of military capabilities that can secure this mechanism.

Challenges in the Maritime Domain

The maritime domain has not been sequestered from change. It is discernable by the disorderly expectations of Verge Powers and the increasing tensions between the demand for economic integration and the stresses of fractured political divisions. These nations are persistently confronted by the need to reconcile internal pressures with intrusive external impulses at a time when the economics of raw military power and its efficacy to engineer desired political outcomes is in question. While most of the Verge Powers have sought resolution and correctives within the framework of the existing international order, China and to some extent Russia are anomalies that have angled for and conspired to re-write the rule book. India’s primary challenge comes from China.

China’s rising comprehensive power has generated an internal impulse to military growth and unilateral expansionism in its immediate neighbourhood in the South and East China Seas and its extended regions of economic interests. It has developed and put in place strategies that target the maritime domain to assure a favourable outcome to what it perceives to be a strategic competition for resources and control of the seaways. The consequences of China activating artifices such as the Anti-Access and Area Denial strategy and geo-political manoeuvres to constitute proprietary sources of raw materials, their ports of dispatch and control of routes euphemistically called the maritime silk route and the establishing the String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean Region evokes increasing shared anxieties and resistance by players in the same strategic settings. Debt traps that have been set by China to inveigle some of the hapless littorals of the Indian Ocean of their maritime facilities are symptomatic of a new form of colonial adventures. The paradoxical effects of China’s contrivances are to undermine its own strategic standing, hasten counter balancing alignments and urge a global logic of cooperative politics over imperial strategies.

The Challenge of China

In the 18th century, China under the Qing dynasty enjoyed a golden age. It was a period of shengshi, an age of prosperity. Currently some Chinese nationalists say, thanks to the Communist Party and its economic prowess, another shengshi has arrived. Power, historically has changed the very character of nations as it transforms their outlook towards the world and places primacy to their beliefs and interests giving it new drive to shape global affairs in a manner that promotes their well-being. This search for geopolitical space that the emergence of a new revisionist power precipitates has been the cause for instability and tensions. Add to this that the principle of nationalism is inextricably linked, both in theory and practice, with war. We are, in the circumstance, faced with a situation when the military dimension of power will throw up conflicts. In this context the slogan of the Qing “the dream of a prosperous country and a strong army” has new connotations.

China’s most recent Defence White Paper and current strategic posture announces the arrival of a self-confident China recognizing its own growing economic and military prowess. It perceives the first two decades of this century of being a period of strategic opportunity which China has sought to capitalize on through its loaded economic policies, financial enticements, and military coercion. Beijing’s intended strategy of “a more active defence” places a premium on managing regional disputes, maritime combat preparedness and a thrust to attain first rate cyber warfare capability. At the same time, criticality of containment of various internal fissures that growth has precipitated remains on top of the agenda. Their posture significantly points out that struggles for cornering strategic resources, dominating geographically vital areas and tenanting strategic locations have, in fact, intensified. In this context the ‘one belt one road’ initiative provides the strategic sinews to their larger geopolitical ambitions. Control of proprietary maritime routes backed by vast economic investments in Africa, Pakistan, Maldives, Sri Lanka South East and Central Asia furnishes the framework within which resources of the region could be cornered and secured. Beijing goes on to underscore Power as a natural currency for politics and suggests that portents for friction are ever present and would therefore necessitate military preparedness, modernization and an orientation that advocates strategic readiness.

China’s claim to sovereignty over the South China Sea; her territorial aggressiveness; her handling of dissent within Tibet and Sinkiang; her proliferatory carousing with maverick states such as North Korea and Pakistan are cases, amongst others, that do not inspire confidence in change occurring within that nation without turbulence. Progressively, China appears to be challenging not just today’s economic orthodoxy, but the world’s political and security framework as well without bringing about a change within her own political morphology.

Defining the Strategic Space

With uncertainty driving geopolitical dynamics, the first imperative for India is to bring about policy coherence between strategic space, growth and security interests. It begins by defining the geographical contours within which a strategy can be developed to contend with challenges identified. The broad parameters of this definition must factor in the regions from where trade originates, energy lines run, sea lines of communication pass, narrows therein and potential allies. In this context the sea space encompassing the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific provides the canvas. This Oceanic body is dominated by ten important choke points and narrows. In essence the theatre gives to global trade efficient maritime routes and sea lines of communication that power the region’s growth. It accounts for over 70% of global trade, 60% of energy flow and is home to more than 50% of the world’s population; it also provides the context within which Indian maritime strategy must operate.

Determinants of Force Planning

The quest for strategic leverage in the maritime domain is founded on an oceanic vision backed by the development of a posture that characterizes our resolve to fulfil the quest. Inspiration may take the form of a policy declaration in relation to a geographic region such as the ‘Look East (and now) Act East Policy’, the ‘India Africa Forum Summit’, ratification of the UNCLOS and formation of alliances. Policy provides a frame of reference that not only has wide-ranging application but will remain central for purposes of force planning to develop a strategic posture.

Current membership of the original ten ASEAN grouping plus 6 is symptomatic of the shifting centre of gravity of geopolitics to the East. From a security angle, the inclusion of India, USA, Russia, Japan and South Korea in addition to China provides the rationale for strategic equilibrium. India and China along with ASEAN are set to become the world’s largest economic bloc. The grouping is expected to account for about 27 per cent of Global GDP and will very quickly overtake the EU and USA economies. The buoyancy of the Indo-ASEAN relationship is backed by surging trade figures which is slated to hit USD 100 billion in the current year. With such burgeoning stakes strategic rebalancing in the region comes as a natural consequence and provides the settings for establishing strong and stable security ties. The expansion of the ASEAN and the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum are suggestive of the littoral’s aspirations to counter balance the looming presence of China. USA’s presence will dominate activities in the region in the immediate and middle term. Flash points such as territorial claims both in the maritime and continental domain will remain a source of friction that would necessarily demand military capabilities and an orientation that assures mutual restraint. Having thus brought about a modicum of coherence between security dynamics, strategic space and growth, it would now be appropriate to derive objectives of a Denial Strategy as applicable to the larger Indian Maritime Military Strategy.

A Denial Strategy

Denial seeks to contest and discredit the ability of regional or extra regional countries to unilaterally project military power to secure their interests either through aggression or through other destabilizing activities. The instrument to achieve denial is by convincingly raising the cost of military intervention through the use or threat of use of methods that are asymmetrical in form and decisive in substance. The strategy’s first impulse is to avoid a hot conflict. To ‘contest and discredit’ would suggest a clear understanding of where the centre of gravity of power projection forces lie. In China’s case, it is the triumvirate of the Aircraft Carrier; nuclear attack submarine force that provides teeth to their denial capability and security of the narrows and of its ‘string of pearls’. Lastly the threat of ‘use of force’ must not only be credible but also the ‘value exchange’ in terms of potential losses must weigh against the power projecting force. At the heart of the Denial Strategy is deterrence and cooperative security.

The Quadrilateral Cooperative Security Dialogue                                                                                                

India, through restraint, pluralistic and popular form of governance has established itself as a responsible State that upholds the status quo yet invites change through democratic forces. Its rise, in the main, is not only welcomed but is seen as a harmonizing happening that could counterpoise China. But, of the uncertainties that influence regional stability, it is China a stated revisionist autocratic power that will impact globally. Particularly so, in the maritime domain where it appears to be challenging global political and security order.

The next step would logically be to establish a strategic framework in the maritime domain which includes the concerned Verge Powers and the USA if we are to contend with the challenges that are present. The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) has evolved in response to increased Chinese revisionist trends and the need to lend stability in the Indo-Pacific. The founding countries United States, Japan, India and Australia driven by a concept of co-operative security, launched the idea in 2007. The alliance however appeared a non-starter with early withdrawal of Australia. It has been recently revived to counter China’s intrusive military power and its unrelenting thrust for an exceptionable proprietary mercantile empire stretching across the region.

The only historical parallel to the Quad is the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Established to contain Soviet expansionism, counter the revival of nationalist militarism and uphold advocacy of European integration, three remarkable articles are at the core of its Charter:  Article 2, lays the under structure for non-military cooperation. Article 3, provided for cooperation in military preparedness while  in Article 5, the new allies agreed “an armed attack against one or more of them be considered an attack against all”. The Charter of the Quad is yet to be fleshed out; but conceivably, it will have three objectives. The first, to reinforce a rule-based regional Order that rejects nationalistic militarism of the kind that has emerged . Second, to promote a liberal trading regime and freedom of navigation, essential to secure passage of close to 60% of global trade. The third, to provide security assurances; however, just as behind the scenes machinations from Beijing splintered the Quad at inception, the entente faces similar fragmenting stresses that threaten the whole. India is locked into a long standing border dispute with China. Similarly, Japan has maritime disputes in the South and East China Seas while China’s new Air Defence Identification Zone provides the recipe for mutual interference in the air. Australia on the other hand depends on China for approximately 22 % of trade. And there is China’s assignee, the nuclear armed North Korea whose influence cannot be set aside.

As the Quad pushes to get their initiative to fly, success will likely hinge on how they hold their ground against pressure from China, nature of the security architecture and an understanding of the peril-to-the-whole. Key to the structure will be the constitution of Charter in terms of identifying the geographic entity within which it would operate, investments in cooperative security and apportioning responsibilities.

To Steer the Stream of Time

Bismarck suggested that great powers travel on the “Stream of Time” which they can neither create nor direct but upon which they can “steer with more or less skill”. How they emerge from that voyage depends to a large degree upon the wisdom of leadership. Bismarck’s sombre thoughts lead us back to our fundamental inquiry – whether motivation for conflict lies in the turbulence of the ‘Stream of Time’ or in the quest for power or piety is a moot question, but how India and the Verge Powers steer the stream is the crisis that leadership will have to contend with.