Category Archives: South Asia

Coastal Security: To Keep the Homeland out of Harm’s Way

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By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

Abstract

Coastal Security is a harmonious extension of state policy whose purpose is protection against ingress of inimical man and material. Its progression is managed by unified control driven by global sharing of information, surveillance and a comprehensive interdiction system. The litmus test to ascertain credibility of the system lies firstly, in the extent to which we have a cohesive unified strategy in place and developed a joint surveillance and pre-emption capability; and secondly, whether we have made the local seas present an insuperable obstacle to every foe that seeks to penetrate. The Fortress of Murud Janjira did precisely so.

Keywords: Coastal Security, 26/11 Mumbai Terror Attacks, Nuclear Trafficking, Anti-terror legislation, Operational plans and communication, Murud Janjira.

Download full article here: Shankar_Coastal Security  

Excerpts

The Legend of Murud Janjeera

A little more than a nautical mile west of the coastal fishing village of Rajapuri in the Raigad district of Maharashtra stands the imposing Island fortress of Murud Janjeera. Built in 1490 by the local fishing community to ward off pirates, captured and enlarged by the Siddi mercenary Commander of the Ahmadnagar kings, the now brooding stone citadel was amongst the largest of that era. Repeatedly laid siege to by the Dutch, Portuguese, Marathas and the East India Company; its 19 bastions, 572 cannons and forty feet walls remained defiant and impregnable through history.[i] It was not till 1776, when the now independent Siddi’s led by Siddi Sat were defeated by the Marathas led by Chimnaji the brother of Peshwa Baji Rao I in the Battle of Riwas, that the unassailable fortress lost its doughty distinction. As a part of the battle reparations the Siddis were confined to this citadel. The immediate up shot was that the strategic significance of the fortress was annulled and the balance of sea power in the region disrupted. The legend will not be complete without deducing a theoretical abstraction that “the Fort, its eminence abroad and the resolve within had made the local seas present an insuperable physical obstacle to every foe that sought to penetrate”.

A Theory for Coastal Security           

As with any endeavour before we start upon an enquiry into coastal security in India, we seek a road map which will indicate to us at a glance what exactly are the waters we have to cover and what are its leading characteristics which determine its nature and general form so as to arrive at practical conclusions. The maritime domain is of such complexity that beyond the territorial waters of a state,[ii] only conventions exist to regulate, seize, search or even monitor the activities of vessels.[iii] Measures taken to sequester or impose control in international waters are normally unilateral and, predictably, run contrary to partisan interpretations of these conventions. Put pithily, what works on the high seas is that “might gives right”. Within the territorial seas what prevails are the laws of the State, to be put into operation by a plethora of disparate yet distinct agencies of government. But the predicament is that the medium that pervades does not tolerate distinction; both the high seas and the coast are washed by the same waters. So it scarcely needs saying that a segregated approach to providing comprehensive security across a fused medium is condemned to failure.

The second insidious feature that dominates the coastal arena is the effects of globalization and its hand-maidens the free flow of ideas, material and personnel. In addition to releasing entrepreneurial creativity and generating wealth it confers upon small groups’ disproportionate destructive and disruptive power. Access to this power and mobilizing it across the waters for illicit use involves exploiting the malgovernance of the High Seas and the fragmented nature of control within the Territorial Sea. A modus operandi which leaves frustratingly tiny footprints. The narrative of the assault on Mumbai on 26 November 2008 (26/11) and its chronology is well documented. What is not so well known is the evolution of the operational plan and the tell-tales that this process may have left for a discerning unified establishment to perceive and act upon.

Coastal security is firstly, about protection of the State from terrorists, non state actors and other dangerous people with violent intent (hereafter collectively referred to as terrorists) gaining access to the mainland using the sea route; and secondly, preventing the ingress of illicit hazardous material across territorial seas on to our shores. The fortifying process essentially begins with access to global information webs, establishment of wide area surveillance and intelligence networks and a three dimensional air-sea-land interdiction system. A pre requisite is for Command and Control of the entire process and the forces involved coming under a unified head irrespective of the Ministry of origin or the administrative department to which assets belong. Pursuits of diplomacy are obliged at all times be in harmony with the process.

So we arrive at our theory that Coastal Security is a harmonious extension of state policy whose purpose is protection against ingress of inimical man and material and its progression is managed by unified control driven by global sharing of information, surveillance and a comprehensive interdiction system. The American PATRIOT Act of 2001 provides a prototypical expansion of the Theory.[iv]

Sculpting the Approach: 26/11 as the Paradigm

Having now come upon a theory, it will be appropriate to fashion an exemplar and establish fundamental precepts that go into developing a counter to infiltration, penetration or assault plan in order to validate our theory. The events leading up to 26/11 provides a prime example of what could have gone into the planning and preparation of the assault founded on facts that are today available in the public domain. For it is out of such an analysis, that will emerge an approach to protect the State from the seaward ingress of inimical forces and illicit materials. It will also throw the spotlight on footprints and tell tales that our own intelligence and surveillance must stalk, and so also help define a strategy in order to defend and respond as we deter.

At the outset three assumptions are necessary. Firstly, for hostile ingress of any nature there are five essential steps that would have to be gone through by the perpetrators:

  • Planning and Reconnaissance
  •  Generation of an Operational Plan and Communications
  •  Logistics and Preparation
  •  Recruitment and Training
  •  Execution

Based on the extent to which the run up to the event can be reconstructed, experience tells us that these five steps, which may be called the Hostile Ingress and Terrorist Strike Process (HITSP), could be spaced over anywhere up to 18 months with Reconnaissance and the Provision of Logistics taking the bulk of time. Also, Planning is an individualistic activity restricted to a few and maybe conducted at a location distant from the target. The Second assumption is that between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ targets, there are no surprise targets and the Third assumption is that ‘wild cat’ unplanned assaults do not give the desired destructive benefit to the assailants.

A Footprint Matrix has been constructed below (Figure 1) with the 5-step HITSP as augments marked by red stars (Planning and Reconnaissance have been separated). On the X-axis the ‘Persistence’ of a footprint is graded on a scale of 1 to 5, while on the Y-axis, ‘Detectability’ is also graded on the same scale. The notional size of the footprint is determined in terms of these two factors, both of which are more cognitive than absolute. The smallest footprint is the least detectable and of least persistence, graded at (1, 1) and the most prominent at (5, 5).

Fig 1: The Detectability & Persistence Footprint Matrix[v] 

 Source: Author 

Slide1

The matrix tells us the areas we need to concentrate on in order to achieve the elusive goal of deterring, defending and responding to terrorist acts. As will be noted, four zones have been established, these are the Opaque Zone, the Transitory Zone, the Transparent Zone and the Murky Zone. The Process has been assessed for Persistence and Detectability levels and plotted within the four zones, which to the planner provide areas of focus. Obviously, when we deal with the Transitory Zone and the Murky Zone, the returns for effort are extremely small yet they provide early warning. Often due to long gestation periods and a high false alarm probability, the difficulties associated with maintaining prolonged states of vigil may cause the guard to drop, and vital footprints to be lost in a mass of information. These, therefore, are Zones well suited for electronic surveillance and computer aided collation, analysis and dissemination.

The Transitory Zone provides opportunities that are not present in the other quadrants, primarily because the period of reconnaissance, while sporadic, has not only to be comprehensive but at some stage must involve the leading protagonists, some of whom maybe quite alien to the area of operation (Abu Ismail, of 26/11 notoriety, hailed from Dera Ismail Khan in the North West Frontier province is a case in point). The Reconnaissance stage is an activity conducted very early in the plan and as in any operational plan, the scope for errors are the maximum at this stage and therefore surveillance that is kept by way of civil measures would in all probabilities record  footprints. The fact that David Headley (alias Daood Gilani, a Lashkar-e-Tayyiba (LeT) operative) had been a regular visitor to Mumbai since early 2008 is symptomatic of such tell-tales.

When confronted with the Murky Zone one sees a picture and a pattern that in hindsight is 6/6 and yet Persistence in the Murky Zone of the operational plan is most significant and therefore, had the fact that the Master of Kuber, Sri Amar Singh Solanki been profiled after his incarceration in Pakistan, so also the movements of Kuber kept track of, 26/11 could well have been nipped during the execution phase. Intelligence, however sketchy, provided on 18th November 2008, indicated the What, Where and When components (nautical parlance) that is, the position of the mother vessel and time; both parameters provided the basis for mounting scouting operations, yet this was not done on grounds that intelligence was not “actionable”. Consequently in the absence of deployed forces either at the point of divergence or convergence Kuber had a free run. Also, the most vulnerable period of movement from sea to shore observed by local fishermen at Colaba and reported to the police ought to have been given the due import that it deserved.

The Opaque Zone if exploited, gives us the maximum benefit for it not only deters attack but action in this zone is pre-emptive in nature; it demands comprehensive knowledge of, and information on man and material that potentially could be used for a strike. This must be backed by all-embracing intelligence networks, field operatives and most importantly, the will to take anticipatory action before a potential incident. Here we must also understand that such pre-emptive actions may have ramifications of an international nature and the State must be disposed to take that risk. Investments in the Opaque Zone will have to be based on steps initiated on a multilateral basis and through ruthless elimination of potential personnel who could pose a hazard. The complexities of operating in the Opaque Zone is there for a planner to see, it poses great challenges, it will demand heavy investments of both man and finances and will yield the best rewards.

Moving into the Transparent Zone, while both Persistence and Detectability are high, they necessitate an internal scheme that is not only comprehensive but transcends the travails of Centre-State relations, ill-defined demarcation between agencies and most significantly, the resolve to cut across boundaries that have been drawn for administrative rather than operational purposes. The movement of logistics, creation of safe havens, handling munitions and that too with great discretion is no simple task.  It is perhaps for this reason that the sea-route with back-up operating in international waters, can by the very nature of the medium, avoid check-posts and regulatory mechanisms that one finds on land. Of course the disadvantages are equally irksome since the environment is hostile, probability of failure due to a variety of reasons is ever present and movement from sea to shore is relatively slow and a vulnerable period. The Transparent Zone provides for not only early warning but exposes the militant operation over both space and time. Logistics and Preparation is neither momentary nor is it undetectable since it involves creation of safe havens, movement of munitions, hazardous material and hit personnel close to the target area. And yet their exposure is subject to the weakest link and least attended virtue of the defensive shield; that of municipal regulation, citizenry awareness and unrelenting deployment of patrols and scouts. The vulnerability of the execution phase lies in the fact that it conforms to a rigid plan; while in most terrorist strikes there is an element of flexibility, exercising the flexibility option would normally result in failure of the strike or marginal success. And therefore the very rigidity of the execution phase provides opportunity to detect and respond.

In the absence of a general theory of terrorism on account of its many roots, motivations, manifestations and intent it is a priori impossible. However, at the heart of terrorist activity lie two critical characteristics; firstly a total disregard to legality of method and secondly it is inspired by a sustained programme of large scale planned and premeditated violence. Intelligence gathering and analysis targeting events related to these two characteristics consequently plays a pivotal role in putting in place counters. It is this relationship in the intelligence scheme that will discern actionable intelligence from a mass of information.

[…]

Conclusion                                                                                                      

Our review of the current state of the coastal defence scheme and the security it provides would appear to project a disjointed image of a contrivance that depends more on a massed approach to security through the induction of numbers (in terms of human resources as well as surveillance means). While it is true that there is logic in numbers, yet the adversary is one who has perfected the art of visualising the cracks in the system. Obviously with more disparate elements involved, more cracks are there to slip in between. On 26/11, ten men with small arms came in two inflatable boats and held our financial capital to ransom for sixty hours.  The mayhem in terms of loss of lives apart, the Mumbai Stock Exchange closed down for the same period resulting in trading disruption of close to USD 9 billion per day. And this is the essence of the disproportionality that has been conferred. ‘Mass’ pitted against ‘Knowledge’ invariably results in victory to the latter.

The covenant between religion and the terrorist is a volatile one. It is neither appeased by bargains nor is it broken by modernity. Indeed it has fused the ideology that drives them with the source of their being (this may explain the suicide bomber). Under these conditions the only route that can succeed is the promise of failure for which, the answer lies in adopting a unified strategy both in form and content. The Footprint Matrix provides an instrument to channelize national effort. We concentrate on any one Zone at the peril of missing out on the others. Persistence is the key and adoption of large scale electronic means for profiling, surveilling, collating and analyses is a necessity.

The nuclear dimension is potentially, the most destructive present danger. While a nuclear strike may present a very complex planning task, our adversaries have shown themselves to be up to the most challenging, the most improbable and yes, the most diabolic. The establishments’ facility to deter, defend and respond will test its will to the extreme.

There appears to be an absence of a guiding national strategy and a coalescing doctrine which seeks to marshal all disparate resources controlled by State and Centre under integrated Command. If our primary strategic goal is to protect against dangerous people and the ingress of illicit hazardous material then this goal must serve to transform the existing organizational and material structures. The litmus test to ascertain credibility lies firstly, in the extent to which we have a cohesive unified strategy in place and developed a joint surveillance and pre-emption capability. And secondly, as the Fortress of Murud Janjira did, have we made the local seas present an insuperable obstacle to every foe that seeks to penetrate? Clearly the answers on both counts must remain in the negative.

End Notes

[i] Hoiberg, Dale & Ramchandani, Students’ Britannica India. Publishers Popular Prakashan 2000, p 403. http://www.maharashtratourism.gov.in/MTDC/HTML/MaharashtraTourism/Forts

[ii] Territorial Seas were first defined in the 18th century as 3 nautical miles, the maximum range of a cannon shot. A workable formula was found by Cornelius Bynkershoek in his De dominio maris (1702), restricting maritime dominion to the actual distance within which cannon range could effectively protect it. This became universally adopted and developed into the three-mile limit.

[iii] See United Nations Convention on the Laws of the Sea (UNCLOS) 1982. The Convention on the High Seas is an international treaty created to codify the rules of international law relating to the high seas, otherwise known as international waters. The treaty was one of four treaties created at the United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I). The treaty was signed 29 April 1958 and entered into force 30 September 1962. As of 2013, the treaty had been ratified by 63 states. Oceans, seas, and waters outside of national jurisdiction are also referred to as the high seas or, in Latin, mare liberum (meaning free seas).

[iv] A public law in the USA enacted in October 2001, Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (PATRIOT Act) to deter and punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.

[v] The matrix was first presented by the Author at “The Seminar on Coastal Security” hosted by the National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, in November 2009.

The War in Shadows

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By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

Download full article here: The_War_in_Shadows_Shankar

Abstract

A century ago it was Japan’s uncompromising and resolute political culture, superior operational savvy, doctrinal cohesion and tactical preparation that permitted comprehensive strategic success in a Fleet on Fleet clash over the Russian challenge, in the process upsetting the status quo. Today the emergence of China falls into a similar mould. It has the political will, the economic power and the selective military capability to challenge and revise the status quo. But the nature of War has changed. In this era calibrated escalation of power antagonisms, pressure diplomacy, economic influence and coercion as opposed to a destructive conflict find more favour as political tools. The current situation in Syria, Iran, West Asia, North Korea, weaponizing of space, disruptive control of cyber space, resource capturing and indeed the South China Sea imbroglio are marked by a ‘War in Shadows’ where the principal tools are persuasive in their threat to dent the adversaries comprehensive power. In all cases there is not just a compelling military posture that notifies antagonists but also one that reassures allies.

Excerpts:

Consequences of Strategic Enlargement: Battle of Tsushima 1905

            On 08 February 1904 Admiral Heihachiro Togo fired the first salvo in the Russo-Japanese War with a surprise attack on the Russian Far Eastern Fleet harboured at Port Arthur. In one strategic stroke the Russian Fleet was annihilated and the balance of maritime power in the North West Pacific careened in favour of Japan. The attack preceded a formal declaration of War. Termination of the conflict occurred under equally stunning circumstances when Russia’s Baltic Fleet, now seconded to retrieve the balance of power, was routed a year and a half later in the Battle of Tsushima.[i]

The war grew directly out of competing imperialism in Korea and Manchuria between, what was rated as, a first rate European Power pitted against a developing ‘second’ rate Oriental Power. What astounded the West was that the latter emerged victorious with consummate ease despite strong European alliances on both sides.  Unnoticed was Japan’s national tenacity driven by a deep sense of veneration of the State, the Samurai spirit and ethos of militarism which nurtured a fiercely nationalistic political culture. It also propelled its extension into “Greater East Asia” for strategic security and resource access. Few in Japanese government circles of that day dissented with Baron Hayashi’s severe resolve (so reminiscent of China’s contemporary status): “If new warships are considered necessary we must, at any cost, build them; if the organisation of the army is inadequate we must start rectifying it from now, if need be our entire military system must be changed. At present Japan must keep calm and sit tight so as to lull suspicions against her; during this time the foundations of national power must be consolidated; and we must watch and wait for the opportunity in the Orient that will surely come one day. When this day arrives Japan will decide her own fate.”[ii] Victory in the Russo-Japanese War announced Japan’s day for Great Power status had arrived.

But there was a more significant impact of Japanese enlargement of its sphere of influence which coincided with the draw down of European naval power from their many overseas commitments in the run up to the looming conflict in Europe. Of more than six major powers exploiting the geo political situation in the Far East during the period of the Russo-Japanese War, all but the United States and Japan remained in the ring to contend for mastery of the Pacific. This fact was not only recognised by the two protagonists, but also set in motion a phase of intense strategic engagement that sought to remedy the imbalance caused by the termination of Russia’s ambitions in the region. The Root-Takahari Agreement of 1908 between the United States and Japan went so far as to delineate spheres of accepted influence.[iii]

The world at large and navies in particular drew important lessons from the Russo-Japanese War and the Tsushima action. Consequences of the encounter were felt at three different levels which were to usher a new era in strategic thought and concepts in maritime war fighting. Firstly, at the politico-strategic level the emergence of a new power centre had to be accompanied not just by recognition but also with strategic engagement, realistic accommodation backed by balance if friction and hostility was to be avoided. Secondly, at the Operational level the pivot of maritime power had shifted to the all-big-gun fast and accurate Dreadnought type platform. Lastly, at the tactical level doctrines and training provided the key to success in engagement.

[…]

The War in Shadows

             Strategic maritime thought and its manifestations in the twenty first century have long supplanted the Mahanian concept of Command of the sea which envisaged a life and death fleet-on-fleet mortal struggle for domination.[iv] Corbett’s formulation, adapted for the present, of ‘Control-for-Causes’ is far more sophisticated and appropriate to contemporary geo political circumstances.[v] Its application will have far reaching relevance in an era when calibrated escalation of power antagonism, pressure diplomacy, economic influence and coercion as opposed to a destructive and economically debilitating conflict finds favour as a political tool.

The current situation in Syria, Iran, West Asia, North Korea, weaponising of space, access denial strategies, disruptive control of cyber space and indeed the South China Sea imbroglio are marked by just such a ‘War in Shadows’ where the principal tools are persuasive in their threat to dent the adversaries comprehensive power. In all cases there is not just a compelling military posture that notifies antagonists but also one that reassures Allies. Decisive action seen as the clash of battle fleets, which naval strategists of the late nineteenth and most of the twentieth century considered the key to all strategical problems at sea is today displaced by the interplay and competition of the comprehensive national power of states.

In concept, the comprehensive capability of a country to pursue its strategic objectives through freedom of action internally and externally defines its national power. In achieving this freedom of action, three core factors play a disproportionate part. The first and primary of these is strategic capability in all dimensions. Second, is the resolve of the nation to power as underscored by the will of its people and leadership. And lastly, is the state’s ability to face up to and manipulate strategic outcomes. Klaus Knorr, an American academic influenced greatly by the First and Second World Wars and the Cold War, while putting forth an analysis of the war making potential of states, went beyond the characteristics of economic and military potential to include such components as “the will to fight” and “administrative capacity.” He defined national power as the aggregate of a state’s economic capability, its administrative competitiveness in terms of the influence it was willing to bring to bear globally and its readiness to use its military in order to bring about favourable conclusions.[vi] The Ray Cline expression, though one that emerged during the height of the cold war, moves away from the Second World War mould and introduces soft power attributes. It placed before the statesman the natural subjectivity which arises, when dealing with strategic factors and the will and vigour of people; at the same time it did not lose sight of the hard objective factors that contribute to power. This blend of the abstract with the realist’s point of view is its most abiding virtue. The other significant feature of the latter paradigm is that it sees power through the eyes of the international system or a potential adversary.[vii] Dealing in abstract matters related to the correlation of power was a fresh and sophisticated approach.

This then is the nature of the ‘War in Shadows’. If, now, we search for a practical expression we need go no further than the current situation in Iran. The nature of war that we are currently witness to does not readily fall into any mould other than one in ‘Shadows’. Covert action, cyber attacks and political alienation sufficiently reinforced by economic sanctions and intrusive nuclear inspections on the one hand, has unleashed globally disruptive nationalism on the other. The South China Sea imbroglio is another manifestation of a ‘War in Shadows’; the rise of a new hegemon in China and the slow decline of the current Principal, the USA stimulates the former to develop forces and alliances necessary to realize its grand strategy which China has unambiguously articulated as: stability of dispensation, unimpeded resource access to spur growth and regional pre eminence.[viii]

[…]

 A Conclusion: Challenges and Policy Urge the Strategic Entente

            India’s interests in the region is strategic, enduring and diversifying just as China’s is while that of the sole superpower’s and her allies cannot be set aside. What form this strategic rivalry will take and the substance of it will perhaps only be clear when the dust of USA’s involvement in Iran, Afghanistan and Iraq settles down. However there is considerable congruence of interests between USA (and its Allies), Japan and India which provides a substructure for strategic entente.

The challenge before Indian Planners begins with an understanding of the significance of China’s rise. Just as Japan, a century ago in the post Tsushima era, propelled herself into “Greater East Asia” in the quest for strategic security, great power status and resource access; China’s move into the Indian Ocean may be seen as analogous. Divergences from the analogy lie in the fact that there are other competing stake holders (which includes India, Japan, Russia the USA and allies) in the region and significantly the change in the nature of warfare. The probability of a Fleet on Fleet conflict when there is balance in the correlation of power is low but friction and tensions are more than likely to take the ‘War in Shadows’ form. So the first task before the Planner is to ensure the building of an entente with like minded nations and the second is to structure and deploy forces such that the balance of power is not upset and the resolve to confront the ‘War in Shadows’ is not weak. From this strategic posture leadership may attempt to identify areas of common and overlapping interests with China and to enhance cooperation in these areas. The new found strategic Indo-US relationship provides leverage to promote the areas that lie in the domain of vitally common interest of the entente, such as guaranteed energy security, safety of production facilities, protection of transportation infrastructure and the right to unimpeded passage. The stake holders also share a common sensitivity to terrorism emanating from the Afghanistan-Pakistan area. Measures to arrest it may translate to joint naval patrols working in tandem with littoral states and the use of commercial and diplomatic clout to rein-in maverick states. The relationship that oil producers have with their consumers is a symbiotic one; this interdependence also provides the basis of a new framework which could be driven by action to promote security to both consumer and producer in such a manner that stability becomes of interest to all parties.

Participation of the stake holders in forums such as India Africa Forum Summits (IAFS) and the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium (IONS) would give relevance and substance to these institutions. After all not to include the main actors with governing stakes in the area, not withstanding the fact that China, Japan, Russia and the USA are extra regional powers, is to denude these associations of context. This may cue the next logical step to give regulatory teeth to these institutions. Given the stakes that China has in her own development and her security concerns, there are adequate signals to suggest that India needs to pull out of the state of paranoia that she transits through every time that China collaborates with Pakistan and replace it with  an understanding of and preparedness for the ‘War in Shadows’ on the one hand, while on the other a willingness to leverage its burgeoning trade with China which is expected to reach $100 billion by 2015. In this deepening of commercial relations lies the germ of friction resolution.

Download full article here: The_War_in_Shadows_Shankar

End Notes

[i] Chant, Holmes and Koenig, Two Centuries of Warfare-Tsushima. Octopus Books Ltd, London 1978, pp 187-209.

[ii] Kennedy Paul, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Vintage Books, New York 1989, pp 208- 209. Baron Hayashi Gonsuke a career diplomat from the samurai tradition was a career diplomat and the resident minister of Japan in the court of the Qing.

[iii] Gould, Lewis L. The Presidency of Theodore Roosevelt, University Press of Kansas 1992, pp 268.

[iv] Mahan A.T , The Influence of Sea Power on History the theme of Command of the Sea is a recurrent theme through the text.

[v] Corbett Julian. S, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Longmans Green and Co. New York 1911, pp 110-121.

[vi] Knorr, Klaus. The Power of Nations: The Political Economics of International Relations. Basic Books 1975. Definition and expansion of the National Power of a State is the central theme of the book.

[vii] Cline, S. Ray, ‘World Power Assessment: A Calculus for Strategic Drift’ Washington: Center for Strategic and International studies, Georgetown University,1975, pp 11.

[viii] Ma Cheng-Kun, PLA News Analysis, Significance of  2008 China’s National Defence White Paper No. 15,  pp 49-60.

 

The Paradox of Power: The Case for an Integrated Response Doctrine to Counter Cross Border Insurgency

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 by

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

This commentary was first published on the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies (IPCS) website in September 2013.

Keywords: Cross-border incursions, Proportional response, “Strategy of a Thousand Cuts,” Terrorism as an Instrument of State Policy, “focoism,” Indo-Pak border surveillance

Abstract:

It is no accident that Pakistan has learnt to exploit our traditional mode of politico-military analysis and response to border incursions. Apologists within India make a slanted argument that the problem of Pakistan sponsored insurgency is essentially political and  attacks on the Indian armed forces are more an effort to break the political process by provoking armed conflict, forgetting that it is the very institution that sponsors cross border insurgency that also controls the political process. Tragically inaction or inadequacy of response, as experience has shown, will cause the worst escalation. 

The Inadequacy of Proportional Response

The Pakistan army has relentlessly pursued its Politico-Military-Militant strategy of a “thousand cuts” to keep the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir on the boil and in consequence erode the will to federate. While success in this endeavour has been denied Pakistan, it has, for reasons not quite convincing, kept the response from the Indian side proportional, reactive and tactically restrained. This, Pakistan has achieved despite the fact of sponsoring the primary provocation. Ironically the balance of power is so heavily skewed towards India that it is a paradox that the “cuts” persist varying only in terms of gore.

Given the context and nature of the strategy that relies on bleeding India through the use of irregulars; the low risk, low cost and high return (to the Pakistan cause) of the stratagem and the enduring security predicament that it precipitates leaves the planner in a state of disquiet. In dealing with contrivance of this brand, leadership often makes flawed strategic choices because they are “misled by common sense”[1]. Attempting to restrict action through a one sided belief in the inviolability of the border or Line of Control (LoC) or defend it through a combination of diplomacy, economics and proportional reaction leaves the antagonist to decide where, when and how to inflict the fated forthcoming ‘cut’. Also, the sense of proportionality is hollow and often inconsequential since purpose and value are so distinctly in variance.

The Perpetual Imbalance

Normally in dealing with a conservative nation, strategic objectives do not present an existential peril and interests are governed by rationality, then a comprehensive strategy consists of sustained political, economic and diplomatic engagement backed by a military posture that supports the strategy. However, Pakistan is no normal conservative state; and, as Imtiaz Gul, the Pakistani journalist and author, has with so much distress emphasized “the perpetual imbalances in the civilian military equation continues to distort the political landscape.” The Army’s obsessive rivalry against India provides the reason for supremacy in affairs of state and the promotion of terrorism as an instrument of state policy. [2]

The dialectic of an asymmetric conflict is unique in that it is not just one of opposing wills, but, on the weaker side, of radical ideology and brutality in the application of force with protracted low level violence against civilian targets being the preferred tool. In these circumstances to restrain response from taking castigatory action is to effectively deny physical censure, concede the legitimacy of the assault and to invite the next ‘cut’. India’s counterinsurgency efforts in, not just Kashmir, but across India are not unlike the Latin American response to “focoism” [3] earnest, naïve, aggressive and impatient without an effective three pronged doctrine to challenge ideological inspiration, deter and punish the sponsor while at the same time eliminate the terrorist perpetrator. It must therefore come as no surprise that low intensity of conflict has endured in Kashmir for quarter of a century.

The Case for Escalation

Contemporary conditions in Kashmir are appropriate to enable the three pronged doctrine mainly because the ideological stimulant of an identity in religious terms rather than national is today, jaded. At origin, in the late 1980s when Pakistan’s strategy to equip, train and launch the indigenous Kashmiri militants began, the insurrection had a home brewed basis; today the fighters have been supplanted by itinerant and rootless Jihadists. These aliens neither share the ideology nor the beliefs of the Kashmiri. This single consideration must be taken advantage of vigorously through education and economic stimulants and is being done with some success, since the lure of Pakistan is hardly attractive, it’s politics lies in militant and sectarian tatters, it’s economic prospects uninviting and its fundamental beliefs exposed and universally objectionable. So much so that the prospects of an Indian political solution in Kashmir never seemed more bright while Pakistan’s involvement, never more vulnerable. However the problem lies not in the politics of that State but in the fractious control that the army exercises in the affairs of that nation.

It is no accident that Pakistan has learnt to exploit our traditional mode of politico military analysis and response to border incursions. Apologists within India make a slanted argument that the problem of Pakistan sponsored insurgency is essentially political and the attacks on the Indian armed forces are more an effort to break the political process by provoking armed conflict; forgetting that it is the very institution that sponsors cross border insurgency that also controls the political process. It is nobody’s case that military success must precede the political process for, indeed, the two are inseparable; however it is equally clear that political reconciliation cannot co-exist when strategies that seek to bleed are at play. The aim of the Response Doctrine is to bring about the ambience for a political process by raising the strategic cost (militarily, economically and diplomatically) to Pakistan of its maverick policies. Such being the case, the Indian military response must be so tuned as to introduce an escalatory factor that deepens the intensity of  response and enlarges the dimension of operations that in a calibrated manner emphasises the conventional weight that it carries and consequently deters intrusions.

As the function of military power in international politics undergoes fundamental change on account of its disproportionate growth in relation to most of the objectives in dispute,[4] so must the doctrines that drive it. There is often confusion in the establishment when instinctive conservatism controls the usage of an armed force dedicated to the principles of unlimited war fought by massive forces. Obviously such forces combating insurgents will result in poor efficiency of engagement. Under these conditions to persistently reason that escalation will invoke the philosophical abstraction of the Clausewitzian extreme is to deny an essential tool of state craft; that is, to develop integrated force response doctrines and reorganise specially equipped and trained personnel for the task of retaining focus, impact and precision of response.

Framework for Riposte

The Indian Army has absorbed and consolidated considerable experience in counter insurgency operations based on combating insurrection in the Punjab and the North Eastern states. But the nature of these operations was different since the dominant consideration was that you were dealing with your own citizenry and not foreign sponsored and trained elements being used as an instrument of an adversarial State’s policy. However the lessons of the past were that success against irregular forces depends on first class surveillance and intelligence; on effective coordination of political, administrative and military resources and training of local constabulary. These lessons remain true in countering the “strategy of a thousand cuts” with a distinctness introduced by the fact that the insurgents are in the main aliens, their sponsors a nation inimical to India and they operate from outside the territories of India.

This at once suggests a layered frame work for the riposte, it begins with the creation and enabling of an ‘Intelligence Region’ that concentrates its effort along the border, Actual Ground Position Line (AGPL) and LoC to a depth that covers launch pads, training areas, logistic and financial support and cover posts; this network is to be supported by national technical resources and global intelligence complex both national and international. The second layer is the ‘Surveillance and Tracking Area’ which extends from the border or LoC fencing and AGPL extending radially outward across the border and the LoC up to probable launch pads and cover posts, this Zone is to be under electronic and optical surveillance continually by airborne scouts, unmanned aerial vehicles and ground based cross spectrum means all operating from the Indian side of the frontier. The business layer is the ‘Kill Zone’ which starts at the LoC/border and extends inward to the fence and a little beyond which may be deemed to extend to a depth of three to five kilometres within which integrated force by air and land must rapidly be brought to bear. Beyond this Zone within the country, it will be left to ground forces to interdict the intruding insurgents. Coordination between the three layers must be swift and precise. Time in ‘Kill Zone’ will be short, between five to fifteen minutes demanding near immediate acquisition and brisk neutralization of targets. Engagements in this layer will be characterized by integration of forces, decisive command and control, speed and lethality.

Contours of a Response Doctrine: Conclusion

In framing a Response Doctrine the primary linkage is between executive actions on the frontier with the authority that has delegated these powers (the Cabinet Committee on Security, CCS, in India) to the Operational Commander. The doctrine must be guided by a set of principles governing armed action when two or more Services and other cooperating agencies are operating together in order to ensure impact and effectiveness of command in joint response operations. This body of response precepts is predetermined and established by the CCS. The doctrine must articulate guidance, directives, procedures, information flow and define command responsibilities in the three layered zones (mentioned earlier) and relationship within these zones for the conduct of integrated response operations. It must also address material issues earmarking forces available to the Commander including counter insurgency aircrafts, UAVs and Special Forces describing operational concepts and accomplishment of support tasks. Of essence to the response scheme and to assure doctrinaire credibility is time sensitivity of actions. To this end the agglomerate of operational/tactical knowledge will need be put into pre planned contingency matrices generating integrated execution plans in the ‘Surveillance and Tracking Area’ and the ‘Kill Zone’.

Devising its response, India has the entire spectrum of conventional and technical choices to deter cross border insurgency and bear down on the intruder; this is the only advantage that the victim enjoys. The resolve with which such a doctrine is enabled is the real challenge for it paves the way to political resolution. Tragically inaction or inadequacy of response, as Kargil, the Parliament assault and 26/11 have shown, will cause the worst escalation.

 

End Notes

[1] Shy, John.  Jomini, Makers of Modern Strategy P 168. Edited by Peter Paret Princeton University Press, 1986.

[2] Gul, Imtiaz. The Most Dangerous Place, Viking Penguin 2009, P 181, 183.

[3] Custers, Peter Dr. The Legacy of Che Guevara: Internationalism Today Sri Lanka Guardian, February 24, 2010. The central of principle Focoism  is that militancy and terrorist acts by cadres of small, fast-moving paramilitary groups can provide a focus (in Spanish, foco) for popular discontent against a sitting regime, and thereby lead a general insurrection.

[4] Kissinger, Henry A. American Strategic Doctrine and Diplomacy, The Theory and Practice of War,  P 276. Edited by Michael Howard, Indiana Unversity Press 1965/1975.