Category Archives: South Asia

The Indian Submarine Force and its Impact on Maritime Strategy

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By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

Keywords: Indian Submarine Force, Indian Maritime Strategy,  Submarine technology, Submarine Tactics, Ballistic Missile Submarine

This article was first published in Geopolitics Magazine, May 2014 issue

Turtle vs Eagle: Development of the Submarine

In September 1776 at the height of the American revolutionary war, a curious offensive action was planned to scupper theEnglish flagship HMS Eagle while at anchor in New York Harbour. The attack was hatched employing stealth of a one man submersible called the “Turtle” to place an explosive charge on the underwater hull of the hapless surface ship.[i] The Turtle was manually propelled and manoeuvred; it had water ballast at the bottom of its ovular structure pumped in or out by a manual pump that permitted controlled submergence and hand operated planes to assure horizontal and vertical stability (Fig 1). A glass sighting port and a basic schnorkel completed the architecture. Its first Captain and crew was one Ezra Lee. In the event the assault had to be aborted due to visual detection and inability to undersling the explosive package. The charge had to be jettisoned, its timed detonation however, served to shake off pursuers.

Fig 1.   The Turtle

Turtle_submarine_1776

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

Source: “A History of Sea Power”. By William Oliver Stevens, Allan Westcott, Allan Ferguson Westcott Published by G. H. Doran company, 1920, pg. 294. Retrieved from Wikipedia on 4/30/2014.

The Turtle’s attack on the HMS Eagle, though a failure, was history’s first recorded submarine attack. While it highlighted the extreme combat potential of the craft, the purpose of this historical reference is to place in stark relief the fatal vulnerabilities that were intrinsic to a vessel of this nature.

For the next one and a half centuries of the submarine’s existence the creational principles of the Turtle remained in essence. The submarine travelled and fought on the surface, submerging underwater only to hide or when under attack. Even when dived, it never went deep; indeed it was not till the Second World War that they could dive, with any factor of safety, to a depth greater than their own length. Its getaway was always imperilled by the considerable speed advantage that the surface ship enjoyed despite the imprecision of the sonar and the ineffectiveness of underwater weapons. During the same period the development of ship and aircraft sonar and radar along with matching tactical doctrines that introduced operational research to provide a mathematical basis to the search problem forced the submarine to spend longer submerged periods. It also enhanced appreciation of the medium and the impact that hydrology had on detection. The appearance of the anti-submarine long range aircraft proved to be a particularly dangerous foe to the submarine, whether on the surface or submerged.

Indiscretion of the air dependent submarine caused by its regular forays to the surface for life support and propulsion (despite innovative technological changes such as the Stirling engine), only came to an end with the coming of age of nuclear power plants which gave to the submarine underwater endurance that was limited only by crew psychological and physiological factors. Nuclear technology gave to maritime powers a credible underwater weapon system capable of global deployment with speeds that could match surface ships. It also saw the combat role of the submarine mature from the role of a corsair to that of an essential element to enable a maritime strategy. The modern submarine is difficult to locate, fast, stealthy and carries a punch that gives it a central position in the constitution of any fleet that has blue water aspirations.

The Submarine’s Place in the Theory of Maritime Warfare    

 A fourfold classification of maritime forces has dominated naval thought since the Second World War. The grouping is largely functional and task oriented. The differentiation comprises of aircraft carriers, strike units, escorts and scouts, denial forces and auxiliaries. In addition contemporary thought has given strategic nuclear forces particularly the ballistic missile nuclear submarine a restraining role to define and demarcate the limits within which conventional forces operate. Through the years there have been other concepts governing the instruments that enable a military maritime strategy, often driven by a well reasoned logic and at other times motivated, unfortunately by nothing beyond the instantaneous intimidation. That being as it may, clearly the make up of fleets must rationally be a material articulation of the strategic concepts and ideas that prevail. The principal demand of the theory of naval war is to attain a strategic position that would permit control of oceanic communications. Against this frame of reference the fundamental obligation is therefore to provide the means to seize and exercise that control. Pursuing this line of argument, the formulation that remains consistent with our theory of naval warfare is that upon the aircraft carrier group and its intrinsic air power assisted by strike and denial forces such as the nuclear attack submarine (SSN) and conventional submarines depends the ability to seize control of a designated hydro space and ensure its security; while on the escorts and scouts depends our ability to exercise and maintain control over the objective sea area or of Sea Lines of Communication. It is in the process of seizing control and not as a “corsair” that the true impact of the modern submarine is felt. Seizing Control, Maintenance of Control and Security of Control is the relationship that operationally links all maritime forces.

It may be argued that the best means of achieving control is to incapacitate the adversary’s ability to interfere. It would then appear that even in the maritime environment the doctrine of destroying the enemy’s armed forces reasserts itself as the paramount objective. This is what must concern the planner to the extreme; that is, should we not concentrate our maritime exertions with the singular aim of dealing that knock out punch. However, the antagonist may hardly be expected to be so accommodating as to expose his main forces till he found a more favorable opportunity. As Corbett so eloquently put it “the more closely he induces us to concentrate in the face of his fleet, the more he frees the sea for the circulation of his own trade, and the more he exposes ours to cruiser raids.”[ii]

Indeed, there is no correct solution to this dilemma of how best in time, space and most economically, can sea control be established as this would often be dictated by the relative strength, structure and constitution of the fleet, intentions and the geographic character of the theatre of operations, which favours one or the other protagonist. However, we may draw a general conclusion that the object of maritime power is to establish control over a predesignated area of interest for a desired period of time. The process may be preceded by strikes against the foe and actions to deny that sea space. The consequence of control may either be operations to secure the object on land or an assurance of passage on that sea area in order to further the war effort. In order to achieve this state efficiently it is necessary that maritime power be equipped with the appropriate mix of vessels specially adapted for the purpose.

We have thus far noted that the theory of maritime warfare is governed by the ability to control maritime space and put it to use that furthers the national effort. However it is the conditions of use of sea power and the nature of twenty first century conflicts that is now of significance. If we were to look at the two defining characteristics of the international systems, it is apparent that instability and the concept of sovereignty play a disproportionate role in the roots of conflict and yet there are a host of other factors that influence relations between nations. Kissinger in his survey of the United States strategic problem pointed out that war was not just a continuation of politics but that politics and military strategy merged at every point. He, further in the same essay, underscores that the nature of power is such today that if the risks have become incomparably greater, the essential principles of strategy have remained the same, the characteristics of which are governed by offensive, defensive and deterrent power[iii]. It is therefore a combination of power and diplomacy that would in effect serve to, not just assure stability but also to act as a shield against conflicts.Theenduring part played by the modern submarine in not just the ability to impose military risks out of proportion to the aggressor’s objectivesbut also to remove the incentive for aggression through attaining a deterrent posture is the significant competence that it endows a fleet.

Technological Enhancements

The remarkable variety of submarine designs that have currently taken to sea is a reflection of the different roles that a submersible cylinder can be adapted to. The vulnerability of the craft is offset by its stealth, endurance and the ability to use the medium. In terms of construction and hull design there have been very few dramatic changes other than the move from basic long and slim surface ship type hull form to a return to the Turtle’s classic teardrop “Albacore”[iv] hull design. Variations such as dual pressure hulls anechoic acoustic absorbent coatings continue to provide hull efficiency and enhanced stealth. In propulsion, nuclear reactors have boosted the platform’s operational flexibility in terms of endurance, speed and payload carriage. The conventional submarine, however, has to make do with enhancements to the typical combination of electric batteries charged by diesel generators for underwater mobility. While nuclear-powered designs still dominate in terms of submerged endurance and deep-ocean performance, the new breed of small, high-tech non-nuclear attack subs using air independent and air cell technologies are effective in littoral operations and represent a significant denial capability in coastal waters.

The story of advancements in submarine launched weaponry is, however, a different matter. The advent of the micro chip and information technologies have added quantum capabilities to the submarines traditional weapon the torpedo by way of new and long distance autonomous and intelligent homing capabilities. In addition a whole slew of long range precision missiles, both land attack and surface attack have been added to the attack submarine’s arsenal and transformed its lethality. In the strategic arena the submarine’s relative invulnerability have made them the most credible repository of the nuclear deterrent as they may be expected to survive a nuclear counter force first strike that targets land based and air launched nuclear deterrent. Along with improvements to armament have come critical makeover to sensors, communication and command and control facilities; largely made possible by the power of modern computer systems.

As the envelope of capabilities of the modern submarine is under persistent pressure to deepen and extend its lethality, the hazards that the crew face in operational situations is proportionally multiplied. It places demands on competence, fortitude and leadership of a nature that is not to be found in any other calling.

The Nature of Inner Space

 The wide ranging notion that submarines, sometimes called the “denizens of the deep”, have since creation had total freedom to roam and dominate an underwater world from just below surface to the ocean beds. Nothing could be further from the truth. Even today contemporary military submarines barely penetrate inner space. While experimental bathyscaphes have known to have gone down to 10,000metres, operating depths of submarines rarely exceeds 600 metres (against this the average oceanic depth is in the region of 4000 metres).

The oceans topographic profile is divided into three main features: the continental shelf, the abyssal plains and the deep ocean trenches. The shallow sloping continental shelf accounts for about 12% of the earth’s surface extending from the coast to a few tens of miles seaward. The slope is gentle and permits restricted conventional submarine deployment despite hazards posed by shallow waters and intensive surveillance that may be mounted by the adversary. The shelf break occurs at about 130-150 metres when the slope becomes more acute some times vertical till the abyssal plains are reached, it is here that the combat submarine comes into its own; unfortunately geography more often does not complement operational demands. The abyssal plains lie at an average depth of about 3500-4000 metres; they have their own mountain ranges, deep trenches, basins, volcanic chains and channels with unpredictable currents and turbulences.

The convolutions of the hydrosphere are further aggravated by its dynamic nature characterized by fluctuating density, temperature, currents and organisms; all of which make the medium virtually opaque to all forms of radiated energy other than sonic energy. Even acoustic path is greatly influenced by the dynamics that pervade, which has considerable tactical significance for submarine operations. Sharp salinity inclines coupled with temperature gradients produce severe turbulence presenting a major hazard to the submarine. While the existence of periodic sound channels gives extended detection and communication ranges and irregular seabed contours provide acoustic shadows sheltering the underwater platform from surveillance. Knowledge of the ocean for the submariner therefore is not just the key to combat operations, but also the secret of survival.

Submarine Tactics

The modern attack submarine, whether nuclear ordieselelectric powered has, primarily, a denial role within a larger sea control operation. Its three main tasks are: to deny the use of a designated patch of hydro space to adversary naval units (both surface and underwater) and merchant ships through offensive action, to carry out precision missile land attack assignments and to enable clandestine operations. To achieve these objectives it is endowed with prolonged independent endurance, sufficient mobility, ability to use the medium to its advantage, long and discrete detection capability and crucially, weapons to be able to destroy the adversary with minimum risk to itself. In denial missions the attack submarine may be tasked for interdiction within a defined area or for scouting tasks to prevent hostile surface units from crossing a designated barrier line. Its land attack capability may be used to suppress enemy surveillance means that could hinder the larger control operations or may be dedicated to support land operations. The clandestine role has long been used to enable special operations or for exfiltration of Special Forces.

The strategic ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) plays a role that is unique. Strategic submarine based nuclear forces have only one role: to uphold a deterrent nuclear posture that is invulnerable to a counter force strike and provide an assured response to an enemy’s first nuclear strike. The second strike generally targets population centres and major industrial complexes (value targets). The theory being that the penalty for a first nuclear strike by an adversary far outweighs possible benefits. In deployment, having crossed the continental shelf the SSBN dives deep and seeks shelter in the most suitable layers of the oceans. The choice of a deterrent patrol area is dependent on range of the missile, possible targets, credible communications and the degree of immunity that hydrology and topography of the area provides.

The Need for a Theory

In evolving a vision for maritime military forces particularly the submarine fleet, their planning along with infrastructure and their conditions of use; of essence is an understanding of what-we-want and how we propose to reconcile the dominant geo-strategic currents that affect our chosen areas of interest. In our strategic context what-we-want is stability, by which is meant an absence of incentive to alter the status quo while an assessment of the latter would suggest there is no more an ascendant current than the rise of an assertive China.

In the broadest of terms our objective ought to be ‘To create a strategic frame work from which to deploy such forces which would establish and contribute to stability within these waters and should the need arise to deter hostile action, deny access to waters and littorals of interest or establish control over selected sea spaces’. It will be apparent that that the submarine’s role in the three elements of deterrence (both conventional and strategic), denial and control is as mentioned earlier; all pervasive. While our focus would be to concentrate on maritime forces, it would also be necessary to recognize that the other elements of national power would be required to realize objectives and contend with the shape that challenges may take in the long term. To state the obvious, force planning must be driven by articulated national policy; challenges that may arise; the nature of friction which conflicting interests may degenerate to and, importantly, an estimate of potential harm that inaction may cause to our interests.

Creation of infrastructure for long range operations to the East may be centred in the Andaman and Nicobar islands, while support facilities in Indonesia, Vietnam and Japan must also be sought. For operations in the South and West Indian Ocean, forward operating bases in like minded East African littorals and Indian Ocean Islands must be cultivated. Such focused development will endow us with the Mahanian logic of being able to provide the very “unity of objectives directed upon the sea”. Infrastructural back up would serve policy admirably; it would also call for diplomacy of a nature that we have not thus far seen practiced. The types of military maritime missions that the submarine force may be tasked with will encompass the following:

  • War fighting which includes sea denial operations and littoral warfare.
  • Strategic deterrence, a feature that would be consistent with our nuclear doctrine.
  • Co operative missions with like minded nations.

Force Planning and Development of the Submarine Force

The Indian Navy’s very first Force Plan formulated in 1947 envisaged the acquisition of four conventional diesel electric submarines. However there neither was progress in the development of a submarine arm nor was there an impulse from the naval staff to vigorously promote the case. Whether this was on account of a lack of conviction or pusillanimity of the Staff is not entirely clear.

Early in 1962 the Government agreed to take the first step towards submarine training without a commitment to acquisition, even this ‘accommodation’ was with binding caveats, that training was more to enable deeper understanding of anti-submarine warfare (!), and if at all acquisition occurred it was for training of surface units.[v] The military reverses of the border war with China the same year forced the government to undertake a major defence review. This however restricted itself to the operational level and did not (some say) quite wilfully address itself to higher defence decision making or for the need to adopt a strategic approach. It was the instantaneous operational intimidation of China that drove the plan in 1962 to acquire three submarines. The justification was to keep one submarine continuously on patrol at the Strait of Malacca 1500 nautical miles from its base, while one refitted and the other was on transit. The boat on patrol was expected to deny access to China into the Indian Ocean;[vi] a passing familiarity of the chart of the region would suggest exactly how bizarre the plan was with neither supporting operational infrastructure nor a clear assessment of what one submarine could do within a (say) 30mile x 30mile box. The absence of a cogent theory which integrated the promotion, nurturing and maintenance of force with a convincing contract for use was neither reconciled nor did the concept of a ‘Strategic approach’ evolve. Credibility of numbers, Command and Control or a long term programme was all tossed overboard in favour of a quick ready-to-show acquisition.

By 1965 after unsuccessful attempts to acquire any submarine (role or capabilities did not seem relevant) from the USA or Britain an agreement, albeit reluctantly,[vii] was signed with Russia for delivery of four Foxtrot class submarines. All four were inducted between 1968 and1970. The Foxtrot and its nuclear counterpart the November class were designed and equipped to attack hostile carrier task forces; whether such a combat role was envisaged for the Indian foxtrots was never made apparent. Also, why a simultaneous indigenous programme was not launched at this stage or a long term acquisition plan generated remains unclear. Was it that the planners themselves were not convinced of the priority or even the need? It was fortuitous that not only did the boats come without delay at friendship prices but also a submarine tender (INS Amba) joined them in 1968 along with shore based maintenance and the training infrastructure arrived in a one-size-fits-all knock down state without too much contractual fuss or even planning. They were accompanied by a large contingent of Soviet specialists.

The submarine arm formally came into being in 1967 with the commissioning of INS Kalvari the first boat of the Foxtrot class. This entire massive project ran with clockwork precision despite the very hesitancy at start and reservation of leadership; it is questionable whether it was on account of most of the planning having been done in the Kremlin. Even the four follow-ons of the Vela class contracted in 1973 were inducted with the same precision between 1973 and 1974.

By the 1980s the need to replace and modernise the fleet of eight Foxtrot class submarines became perceptible; consequently a plan was mooted to space acquisition to match obsolescence while at the same time open a production line to meet future requirements. Accordingly eight Russian origin Kilo class boats were slated for acquisition between1986 and 1990 while two German origin HDW type 1500 were to be built in their yards while another two and follow-ons were to be built at Mazagaon docks. By the 1990s the submarine fleet had expanded to eighteen boats with the Kalvari and the Vela class on their last legs. But a more serious event had overtaken force planning, the Soviet Union had imploded and with its collapse, logistic support for its hardware became capricious with adverse impact on submarine operational availability and a precarious downswing on combat preparedness. This coincided with the HDW production line being closed due to alleged financial misdealing. One may argue was it really in India’s interest to shut down a costly production line almost as if it was good policy to “cut ones nose to spite the face”.   At the turn of the millennium force levels began shrinking much faster than replacements could even be conceived.

Noting the looming submarine availability crisis, the naval staff initiated its “Project 75” and in 2005, India confirmed that it would buy 6 Franco-Spanish Scorpene state-of –the-art diesel-electric submarines, with an option for 6 more. The contract envisaged extensive technology transfer to facilitate in-house production. Unfortunately, 9 years after that deal was signed, the Project has yet to field a single submarine. The deal was embroiled in a bribery scandal which was later found baseless. Tardy procurement procedures, bureaucratic sloth and the lack of political will and understanding of the security penalties that are intrinsic to delays have blighted the project. The first Scorpene is not expected to be commissioned till 2016 when the average age of the thirteen strong submarine fleet will be 28 years and the Scorpene technology a decade and a half old.

Ballistic Missile Submarines

India launched her first nuclear submarine in July 2009, the 6000 dwt Arihant SSBN, with a single 85 MW PWR driving a 70 MW steam turbine. It carries a suite of 12 SLBMs. It is reported to have cost US$ 2.9 billion and the production line for several more Arihant class SSBNs has been enabled. The SSN construction program is also underway. India is, in addition, leasing a 7900 dwt Russian Akula-II class nuclear attack submarine for ten years from 2010, at a cost of US$ 650 million. It has a single 190 MWt VM-5/ OK-650 PWR driving a 32 MW steam turbine and two 2 MWe turbogenerators[viii]. While much of the programme remains under wraps the direction in which force structures are evolving is clear – the third leg of the triad of strategic nuclear forces is in the offing and a long overdue commitment to realizing effective denial forces in the form of the nuclear attack submarine is at hand.

In dealing with strategic nuclear forces the principles of control, deployment, targeting and weapon states are laid down in the doctrine. Three issues are of significance, firstly, is the availability of a SSBN on deterrent patrol persistently which would suggest a force level of 4 SSBNs; secondly, that strategic nuclear forces conform to the doctrinal principle of separating custodian from control thereby ruling out the option of ‘dual tasking’ and lastly control, tasking and targeting is Nuclear Command Authority (NCA) function. In our context the ‘Arihant” class of SSBNs with its suite of submarine launched ballistic missiles will primarily discharge this role. The option to rig other platforms with nuclear weapons will be weighed against considerations of survivability, vulnerability and control.

The nuclear powered attack submarine (SSN) with its suite of conventional payload and stealth features requires special mention. Its inception has reoriented and transformed the war at sea by its ability not only to deliver long range precision strikes but also to execute tasks over vast sea area with speed and utmost discretion. Their utility in denial operations, control tasks and marking of high value units such as carrier groups and SSBNs (all core missions in the maritime domain) is unparalleled.

The Man Behind the Periscope

No survey of the Indian submarine arm can be complete without a mention of the intrepid men who have made an unlikely career of voluntarily facing hazards that have essentially remained unchanged since the days of the Turtle and Ezra Lee. The Indian submariner has not only had to face the perils posed by the elements but has had to do so under the persistent axe of the budget which adversely impacts equipment credibility, timidity of political leadership and the absence of strategic planning. He has fought wars, been deployed on operational patrols incessantly under hostile conditions, undertaken tasks that would stretch the tolerance of the normal; no amount of training can accustom one to live, work and excel in a cylinder whose effective diameter is no more than 7 metres and length 70 metres sharing the space with equipment, payload, munitions, hazardous materials and 60 other crew members for extended periods of time without either sensing or feeling the warmth of daylight; yet the submariner does it with great aplomb. A man, in short who can withstand privations, claustrophobia, physical and mental pressures and yet put a buoyant construction on the duties he performs and indeed on his life.

Conclusion

The significant characteristics of a modern submarine are stealth, discretion, mobility and lethality. Theenduring part it plays in not just the ability to impose military risks out of proportion to the aggressor’s objectivesbut also to remove the incentive for aggression through attaining a deterrent posture makes it an effective instrument of stability. As the capabilities of the modern submarine is under persistent pressure to extend its lethality, the hazards that the crew face in operational situations is proportionally multiplied. It places demands on competence, fortitude and leadership of a nature that is not to be found in any other calling; it also puts pressure on the purse to ensure reliability of hardware.

In the Indian context the absence of a cogent theory to integrate the promotion, nurturing and maintenance of submarine forces with a convincing contract for use was neither reconciled nor did the concept of a ‘Strategic approach’ evolve; as a result it was always the instantaneous operational intimidation that drove force planning and earmarked budgets; no attempt was made to influence the strategic environment. Tardy procurement procedures, bureaucratic sloth and the lack of political will have imposed security penalties that are reflected in the poor availability of our fast depleting submarine fleet and indeed in our strategic standing as we persist in “punching below our rightful weight.”

______

End Notes

[i] Diamant, Lincoln. Chaining the Hudson: The Fight for the River in the American Revolution. New York: Fordham University Press P21. Sketch of The Turtle a contrivance invented by David Bushnell extracted from Rindskopf, Mike H, Naval Submarine League (U.S.), Turner Publishing Company staff Morris, Richard Knowles (1997). Steel Boats, Iron Men: History of the U.S. Submarine Force. Paducah, KY: Turner Publishing, P 30.

[ii]Corbett, Julian. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Longman Green and Company London 1911, pg. 115.

[iii] Kissinger, Henry A. American Strategic Doctrine and Diplomacy, an essay from the book “The Theory and Practice of War” edited by Michael Howard, Indiana University Press 1975, pgs 273-292.

[iv] The Albacore hull form: the US Navy in a post war programme developed a new hull design based on an airship. The USS Albacore was one of the significant milestones in hull construction. It was symmetrical around its long axis which gave the new shorter and fatter hull greater manoeuvrability in all three dimensions; the submarine, like an aircraft now made banked turns and was dynamically stable. Substantial increase in internal volume provided for greater payload and crew comfort.

[v] Hiranandani G.M. Transition to Triumph, History of the Indian Navy 1965-1975 Lancer Publishers New Delhi 2000, pgs 248-261.

[vi] Ibid pg 250-251.

[vii] Ibid pg 253.

[viii] All information from Janes Fighting ships and open sources

 

Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons: An Essential Consort to a Doctrine of No First Use

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By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

This article was first published by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, in January 2014.  

Keywords: Strategic Non-Nuclear Weapons, Doctrine of NFU, Indo-Pak-China Nuclear stability, Non-State Actors, Counter-force strike

Politico-Military thought often harbours a puzzling phenomenon when it organises concepts and institutions in a mosaic of sometimes antithetical notions. Contrary ideas are indeed intrinsic to the art of political sagacity, but when form is defined by a belief, in apparent conflict with content, then there appear distortions more illusory than what logic would suggest. So it is with the emergence of strategic nuclear weapons. They are destructive to the extent that the purpose of warfare is itself obliterated, underscoring a compelling theory of war avoidance. By its side are strategic non-nuclear weapons whose intent is to target nuclear weapons that, ironically, seek a (precarious) stability.

Conventional savvy will first suggest that non-nuclear weapons can neither deliver the requisite high explosive payload to assume a counter-force role against silo-based or caverned nuclear systems; nor do they come with the probability of kill that is demanded with such a role. But just around the technological corner lurks high impact penetration and shaped charges that make a mockery of hitherto simple overpressure reckoning. Second, nuclear pundits will insinuate that a partially successful counter-force strike may in point of fact catalyse escalation to a full blown nuclear exchange; both contain candour of their own.

But strange is our circumstance when on the one hand Pakistan presents us with a nuclear nightmare which when articulated is a hair-trigger, opaque deterrent conventionalised under military control, steered by a doctrine obscure in form, seeped in ambiguity, and guided by a military strategy that carouses and finds unity with non-state actors. The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons into the battle area further exacerbates credibility of their control. It does not take a great deal of intellectual exertions to declare that this nightmare is upon us. However, the very nature of the power equation on the subcontinent and the extent to which it is tilted in India’s favour will imply that any attempt at bringing about conflict resolution through means other than peaceful is destined to fail. In this context it is amply clear that the threat of use of nuclear weapons promotes only one case and that is the Pakistani military establishment’s hold on the nation. On the other hand is a Janus-faced China which, in collusion with Pakistan’s nuclear weapon programme, has not just entrenched proliferatory links, but also doctrinal union that permits a duplicitous approach to the latter’s declared No First Use (NFU) posture and an option to keep the South Asian nuclear cauldron on the boil. Also significant is the alliance bucks the existing global non-proliferation structure.

What may be derived from the current state of affairs, with any conviction, is the political and military unpredictability that prevails. This denies hope for stability and the expectation of fitting conditions into a convenient model, let alone providing for security guarantees. Governments faced with such a conundrum more readily prepare for a worst case scenario than try and reconcile the true dimensions that uncertainty introduces. It is preparedness, therefore, that endows the only tool that can deter possible confrontation of a nature that has earlier been designated as nightmarish.

India today is in a position to impress upon its adversaries a deterrent relationship based on nuclear war avoidance, with the proviso that the rationale of nuclear weapons as a political tool and a means to preclude a nuclear exchange are recognised and adhered to. China’s galloping entwinement with the rest of the world makes this proposition a real probability; contingent upon our resolve and policies of seeking mutuality with like-minded nations to rally around the single point of preventing reactionary overturning of the status quo. This despite the unilateral tensions that China has precipitated in the East and South China Sea over sovereignty, air defence identification zones and the right to control fishing.

Pakistan is, however, a different cup of tea for it portrays a perilous uncertainty, as would any nation under military control that perceives in nuclear weapons the ultimate Brahmastra. As with that weapon of mass destruction, answers lay not just in the promise of disproportionate retaliation but also in the credible ability to prempt and counter its use. India has in place nuclear weapons driven by a doctrine of NFU and massive retaliation. What its strategic forces must now equip itself with is select conventional hardware that tracks and targets nuclear forces (all under political control). This would provide the pre-emptive teeth to a deterrent relationship that leans so heavily on NFU.

Tactical Nuclear Weapons: A Step Closer to the Abyss

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by

Vice Admiral (retd.) Vijay Shankar

This article was first published by the Institute for Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, On November 30th, 2013.

Keywords: Tactical Nuclear Weapons, South Asian Nuclear Doctrine, NATO Paradigm, Nasr, India-Pakistan LoC

The Futility of Tactical Nuclear Weapons

        In March 2013 a workshop was conducted under the aegis of the Naval Post Graduate School in Monterey, CA. It sought to examine the escalation dynamics in a South Asian crisis under a nuclear overhang. A scrutiny of the scenario suggested that a vertical escalatory spiral was central to the paradigm and therefore, intrinsic to its anatomy was an inexorable traction to extremes. First blood had been drawn by a  Pakistan State sponsored terror attack, it targeted leadership at a very large public gathering leading to extensive casualties; in most strategic lexicons this is an act of war. The demands of the Indian side, unfortunately, were given short shrift. Had some movement been made towards apprehending and handing over the terrorists, the situation could have been defused.

        Accordingly, a swift punitive military thrust was launched by Indian forces across the LoC and a Maritime Exclusion Zone was decreed. Forces primarily used were the less intrusive Air and Sea arms. This in turn escalated to action that was not restricted to the LoC. The introduction of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) into the battle area attained inevitability. To Indian Leadership the question posed was how would offensive Indian forces respond? In the event a deliberate decision was made to search out and strike the nuclear tipped Nasr batteries as with other tactical artillery pieces without discrimination; and should a nuclear Nasr launch occur on Indian Forces it would be regarded as a First Strike and India would reserve the right to launch massive retaliatory strikes to the dictates of her Nuclear Doctrine. The adversary balked from deploying TNWs.

What is it all about? The Essence of Stability

      Marshall Ferdinand Foch, one of the lesser of the meat grinding generals of the First World War when faced with the bewildering nature of the larger strategic situation is said to have countered with a fundamental question, De quoi s’agit-il?  – What is it all about? Indeed this poser if understood and answered in the context of nuclear stability would bring us to the complexities that face nations with the coming of a weapon that can obliterate the very purpose of warfare; in the circumstance the separation of the conventional from the nuclear is a logical severance. A major divergence from the Two-Bloc-Nuclear-Face-Off of the past is nuclear multilateralism. In this altered plurality the true enemy is the dynamic that rocks the equilibrium.

       The essence of stability is to find agreement on three foundational truths. Firstly, technology, while it provides for modernization it invites covertness whereas its impact demands transparency. Secondly, that the army in Pakistan is the real power centre, and therefore for India to engage an enfeebled civilian leadership is self defeating. Thirdly, TNWs make for a dangerously unconvincing deterrent correlation.

         Why would a nation turn its back on the prudence of the past six decades and deliberately reduce the nuclear threshold through the introduction of TNWs and in a situation of mortal internal collapse, invite the increasing probability of the breakdown of nuclear deterrence? After all it was the Pak foreign Minister Mr. Aga Shahi in dialogue with the American Secretary of State in 1979 who suggested that the “value of nuclear weapons lies in its possession and not in its use”. TNWs are marked by several features that prop up the illusion of control and the misguided belief that the adversary would, for some reason, abjure the opportunity to escalate response. Its deployment will attract pre emptive suppressive action and doctrine for employment follows conventional field axioms with the risk of accidental, unauthorized or mistaken use.  It therefore promotes only one cause and that is the Pakistani military establishment’s hold on that hapless state. Recognizing the politics of the South Asian region and the emasculated nature of civilian leadership in Pakistan; the dangers of adding nuclear violence to military perfidy, as recent proliferatory history and Jihadist terror acts have shown, is more than just a reality.

The NATO Paradigm

      Pakistan in defense of TNWs often cites the NATO analogy. However, by the 1980s NATO was doctrinally imbued with the idea of the irrelevance of nuclear weapons against less than existential threats. With this conviction, both Britain and France perceived the use of nuclear weapons (of any yield) as a failure of deterrence and therefore not a realistic alternative to conventional forces. Employment of TNWs through the doctrine of ‘flexible response’ did not provide the lever to control the escalatory ladder. The strategy, even in concept lacked conviction for limited nuclear war is a contradiction in terms.

The Burden of God’s Gift

      The South Asian nuclear imbroglio is evolving under circumstances that are unique. A shared antagonistic history; geographic contiguity; a political and structural contradiction between a centralized de facto military leadership and a democratic dispensation; a yawning economic gap; and, awkwardly a self ordained military that (mis)perceives in antagonism an existential peril and a reason for self perpetuation. India also views the complicity of China in the Pakistan nuclear weapons programme as suggestive of doctrinal links that permit a ‘Janus’ faced approach to the latter’s  no first use posture.

      Pakistan contends that the articulation of a nuclear doctrine is unnecessary for the purpose of establishing deterrence.  Unfortunately, a nation that announced its nuclear weapon status and views it as “God’s gift”  must also realize that a deterrent relationship is essentially about mutual knowledge of purpose. Ambiguities, deception and carousing with non state actors can only serve to obfuscate.

The Challenge: Contending with Pakistan’s Perspective

     The impending introduction of a sea-based deterrent into the Indian arsenal, rather than being seen as an element of stability that will enhance credibility of the second strike, is perceived through a curious logic as an asymmetric trend that somehow adversely impacts crisis stability.  Given the opacity of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear underpinnings, descent to TNWs and duplicity of policies, it has become increasingly prickly for India to either understand nuclear thinking in Islamabad or to find coherence between a mania for parity, the rush for stockpiling fissile material and the loosening of controls over nuclear weapons.

       More puzzling is the strategic notion that the perceived conventional imbalance between the two countries may be countered by Pakistan exercising one of two options: firstly, secure an assured second-strike capability; secondly, place the arsenal on ‘hair trigger alert’ and then the argument goes, introduce TNWs as “another layer of deterrence” designed to apply brakes on India’s military doctrine of Cold Start (ala NATO’s discredited formulation). As Feroz Khan posits, “Pakistan’s flight-testing of the short-range, nuclear-capable rocket system Hatf-9 (Nasr), was introduced to add ‘deterrence value’ to Pakistan’s force posture.” The author in a bizarre contradictory temper adds “due to the proximity of targets, short flight times and the technical challenges of assuring information accuracy, the likelihood of inadvertence is high.” He further holds that “…central command and control will become untenable and the ‘Nasr’ with its marked footprint will attract punishing pre-emptive conventional attack. Thus, battlefield nuclear weapons such as Hatf-9 will pose a ‘use it or lose it’ choice, precipitating a nuclear exchange that may not be intended.”  The unbiased political examiner is left bewildered that if such be the imbalances in the power matrix, then why does Pakistan not seek rapprochement as a priority of their military, economic and political policies? The answer perhaps lies in asking, “Who stands to gain in this power play?”

Conclusion: The Quest for a Response 

       Pakistan espouses an opaque deterrent under military control steered by a doctrine obscure in form, seeped in ambiguity and guided by a military strategy that finds unity with non-state actors. The introduction of TNWs exacerbates credibility of control. It does not take a great deal of intellectual exertions to declare whose case lowering of the nuclear threshold promotes. Two options present themselves to the Indian planner; firstly to generate specialised forces that continuously track and mark TNWs and incorporates an airborne conventional capability to neutralise them. The second option is a soft one that aims at dispelling the veil of opacity that surrounds the nuclear deterrent. What may have impact is a combination of the two.

       Nietzsche astutely warned that “And if thou gaze long into an abyss, the abyss will also gaze into thee”. Thus far nuclear relations in the region have been bedeviled by a persistent effort to combat the monsters that the shroud of covertness has cast; it has left us the unenviable task of out staring an abyss. Nietzsche in the circumstance would have advised an assault on the first causes – dispel opacity and engage the military through dialogue and from a position of total preparedness.