Category Archives: Nuclear Issues

Posted on by
6

The Merz Declaration

By

Vice Admiral (Retd) Vijay Shankar

Scramble for the Nazi Atomic Bomb: A Stunted Programme

In the years leading up to World War II, Germany was at the forefront of theoretical and experimental physics pertaining to atomic energy. By the winter of 1938, German physicist Otto Hahn had discovered the physical reaction of nuclear fission after bombarding Uranium with neutrons. This discovery showed the Nazi government that weapons of mass destruction could be created from relatively small matter, leading them to recognise the awesome potential for devastation of nuclear chain reactions when engineered for military application. Werner Heisenberg (a contemporary) regarded as one of the most important nuclear physicists in history calculated that nuclear fission chain reactions when slowed down and controlled in a “uranium machine” (nuclear reactor), generate energy; when uncontrolled, the outcome was a “nuclear explosion” many times more powerful than conventional explosives. After Heisenberg reported that the enrichment of U-235 in Uranium was the best and only way to create explosives exponentially stronger than any every seen before, Hitler launched his atomic weapon programme. However, months later Heisenberg told the Nazi Weapons Bureau that an atomic bomb could not be built until 1945 and even then would demand a massive amount of critical resources and investments be diverted to the project. The uncertainties involved and the strategic situation in 1942 relegated priority of the programme.  

Despite availability of core intellectual theoretical resources, the failure of Germany to weaponize an atomic device may be attributed to three causes: the absence of a dedicated team of nuclear engineers resulting in the inability to rapidly realise the accessories; paucity of industrial support and significant investment to drive the project at the desired pace; lowering priority of the programme.

Restraints on German Nuclear Weapons Programme Post World War II  

As part of the accession negotiations of West Germany to the Western European Union at the London and Paris Conferences, the country was forbidden (by Protocol No III to the revised Treaty of Brussels of 23 October 1954 and Article VII of the Brussels Treaty of 1948) to possess or manufacture nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, with the proviso that the USA would stand guarantor of that nation’s  security. However, West Germany was plagued by doubts of whether they would in fact be left defenceless should a nuclear threat arise from the USSR.

By 1967, relations between the United States and West Germany were difficult because Washington was urging Bonn to support the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which many conservatives in the ruling coalition opposed on grounds that the treaty was discriminatory by permanently denying West Germany the nuclear option. Then Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger was troubled that even if Moscow did not “intend to use threats or blackmail against Germany, the situation could change” and Germany “must consider how we could defend ourselves.” Against West German protestations of their need for nuclear weapons was the determined stand of the USSR that “we will not allow the Federal Republic of Germany to possess nuclear weapon”.

Germany since the onset of the Cold War has been under the “Nuclear Umbrella” provided by the  NATO Alliance, specifically by the USA. And Germany, on her part, has participated in the NATO nuclear weapons sharing arrangements and trains for strategic preparation and launch of nuclear weapons. United Germany is also restricted by the “Two plus Four Treaty” that supplanted the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. The Treaty prohibits nuclear rearmament of reunified Germany.

The Leaky Nuclear Umbrella

In February 1947, an exhausted, broke and heavily in debt Britain conveyed to the US State Department two diplomatic messages: one on Greece, the other on Turkey. Confessing that it could no longer continue its support for the Greek government forces that were fighting an armed Communist insurgency, Britain had announced plans to pull out of India and to wind down its presence in West Asia. The United States perceived an immediate threat of Greece and Turkey falling into Soviet control; and with it, potentially, the Suez Canal.

Almost overnight, the United States stepped into the vacuum left by the departing British. Declaring, “it must be a policy of the United States, to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.” It was the start of what became known as the Truman Doctrine. On the face of it was the idea that helping to defend democracy was vital to the United States’ national interests; however, the significance was, transition of leadership of the Western world from Britain to the United States, and so Europe has been protected by an American nuclear umbrella  since the atomic blasts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was the United States that promised NATO allies that any nuclear threat or aggression by the Soviet Union, and later, by Russia, would be deterred and, should the need arise, answered by the U.S. in kind. Today that partnership teeters on a razor’s edge as Trump’s America seeks rapprochement with Moscow. For with reconciliation between the two nuclear super powers comes a commitment to bring the Ukraine conflict to immediate closure, deny that hapless country membership of NATO; and in its wake stimulate a potential break-up of the post-World War II and post USSR order in Europe.   

Reports are today emerging that Ukraine had survived the three years of a sapping war on account of an American partnership that was intricately enmeshed at the operational level and involved continuously in the planning process, providing real time intelligence and the movement of massive logistic support. The partnership at every stage not only controlled the progress of operations but also extended to clandestine specialised backup. In addition the Partnership also suggested that “Armageddon” would ensue should Russia contemplate nuclear use.

With the current US administration, the nature of the Partnership and with it, the bonds that held together NATO’s common posture towards the conflict, now lie cloven in tatters. The rift in the transatlantic security relationship has today ruptured to what appears an unbridgeable chasm.

Deepening Rift in Transatlantic Security Relationships

The Chancellor-in-waiting, Friedrich Merz government, rattled by the prospect of America  withdrawing security guarantees in the wake of a possible Russia-Ukraine peace treaty, is preparing a fundamental readjustment of Germany’s defence posture. Declaring the US indifferent to the continent’s fate, Merz “questioned the future of NATO and demanded Europe boost its own defences. German’s sense of deep domestic insecurity prompted him to suggest that he’d look to France and Britain to form a European nuclear umbrella, to replace US guarantees”; despite knowing full well that both countries sorely lacked capability, commitment and control to provide such a shield.

In truth, no alternatives exist ever since both France and the UK disavowed the deployment of land or air based vectors outside their borders. Even their existing sea-based deterrent lacks credibility without US surveillance and support infrastructure; as a matter of fact the UK deterrent, based on the “Trident D5” SLBN, is critically dependant on arsenal and vital infrastructure located in the USA and the platform the 4xVanguard class of SSBNs were due for retirement by 2024; their replacement the “Dreadnought” class is not expected in service for another decade (first of Class keel laid in March 2025). As for the French Deterrent Force, it is based on 4xTroimphant class SSBNs and Rafale fighter bombers. It is therefore, a mistake for Merz, to assume that the Anglo-French nuclear arsenal could replace American guarantees.

Clearly, the suggestion was that the weight of the German economy could lend leadership and control to a potential joint nuclear deterrent. The indications are more than discernable that Merz is counselling a limited shared nuclear deterrent. Are we on the threshold of witnessing the emergence of Germany as the latest in a looming string of nuclear armed nations?

Collapse of a Nuclear Theology

Since 1946, a nuclear theology crafted on the argument, that “atomic weapons were useful only as a deterrent to prevent war” (Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order); a canonic conviction that laid the foundation of the nuclear deterrence theory is, today, in the throes of collapse. Is deterrence no longer a milestone on the road to nuclear disarmament? Is Germany embarking on the resurrection of a long buried programme that could sound the death knell for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in its fallout expose the hypocrisy of “Extended Deterrence”? And what becomes of the assurance to non-nuclear allies, who having abjured nuclear weapons, find themselves denuded of U.S. nuclear security guarantees? What is equally astounding is the naïveté of the allies to hold faith in the belief that America would shoulder the responsibility of putting its own forces, population and territory, at risk on behalf of an ally with neither a quid-pro-quo nor castling arrangement. Are we missing something here?

Was the upholding of ‘extended deterrence’ the price of leadership and indeed, the ‘exceptionalism’ that the USA enjoyed since the end of World War II? Has the global hegemon abdicated its responsibility?

‘With NATO or With Nuclear Weapons’: Ukraine’s Delusional Defiance

Post the controversial tongue lashing that the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky received in the White House on 28 February 2025 along with the stipulation that neither was there place for Ukraine in the NATO nor would there be a continuation of US weapons supplies; Zelensky has, reportedly, returned to his  defiant  declaration, ‘Ukraine in NATO or nuclear weapons’. Ukraine possesses the capability to build a nuclear bomb. It could utilise spent plutonium fuel from its civilian nuclear power reactors, estimated at approximately seven tons together with its longstanding expertise in nuclear physics dating back to Soviet times, Ukrainian scientists would face minimal technical barriers in developing nuclear weapons. However, the country lacks the necessary reprocessing facilities to extract and weaponise this material. Adapting existing Ukrainian missile platforms for nuclear delivery would, however, pose minimal technical challenges, as the country already manufactures several missiles that could be modified to carry a nuclear warhead.

An indigenous Ukrainian nuclear programme would face critical ramifications from its allies and expose strategic vulnerabilities. Loss of strategic support will be a reality if Ukraine pursues nuclear weapons; jeopardising both military and financial aid. There is also the near certainty of the Kremlin’s pre-emptive retaliation due to its stated hypersensitivity to nuclearisation of a bordering state.   

Amidst this confounding situation, Poland stands out as Ukraine’s staunchest confederate. Is there a possibility that a nuclear axis builds between the two to generate an independent nuclear deterrent?  After all, such a move involving a NATO member not only compounds nuclear risks but also holds the promise of invoking the principle of collective defence, dragging a reluctant Alliance into the conflict.

One of the possible fall-outs of the deepening rift within the transatlantic alliance and the collapse of the American strategic nuclear umbrella is the “folding up” of NATO.

End of a Nuclear Heresy

Alarmingly, as nuclear armed nations toy with the idea that, the hitherto doctrines of a limited nuclear war and nuclear coercion  are no longer heretical policies; they fail to note the perilous impact it has on potential target nations. In the quest for security against nuclear coercion or the incipient menace of a looming ‘limited’ nuclear war, it will not be unusual for non-nuclear weapon states to consider developing arsenals of their own. Such action would undermine longstanding non-proliferation efforts and not only increase the chances of stumbling into a nuclear holocaust but, the absence of a credible nuclear hegemon would stimulate incessant anxiety of looming devastation.    

In a chilling statement that captured sensitivity to the ominous signs of a breakdown of the existing nuclear order, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in January 2025 declared that the Doomsday Clock had moved by a second from 90 to 89 seconds to midnight. The Clock is a universally recognized indicator of the world’s vulnerability to global catastrophe caused by man-made technologies. Will the breakdown of extended deterrence and consequent nuclear proliferation be the tipping point that makes the likelihood of nuclear catastrophe not just a possibility but a probable reality?

America’s Liberation Day: Has Atlas Shrugged?

To add chaos to an already dangerously confused nuclear development; the early April 2025 pronouncement of Liberation Day in America sounded more a declaration of trade war against virtually the entire world. The notion of American exceptionalism that the US is a global exemplar of democracy, security and a convincing global nuclear regulator; is today precariously poised on very thin ice.  

America’s “Liberation Day” may be seen from two perspectives; the first is that decades of open U.S. markets has provided an incentive for unbalanced foreign tariffs and other protectionist measures that prevented the import of U.S. goods. “Only aggressive retaliation can reverse the damage and bring manufacturing back to American shores” is the battle cry declared by the Trump administration; some countries have retaliated by corresponding increase in tariffs on American imports, while others have been more subtle in their response; such as Japan which is the largest holder of US treasury bonds and its largest investor, has transferred a large bulk of their capital investments from the US to markets in China, India and the ASEAN countries. And more importantly, it has also chosen to trade with other partners in bi-lateral currencies; renouncing the USD.

The second perspective is founded on the faulty premise of the first, that manufacturing will, in fact, return and as a natural consequence permit tax cuts within the US. Unfortunately what is being sought is a denial of the reality that, the deliberate move-out of labour intensive manufacturing to China and the other developing economies, was the primary cause of the dazzling growth of the US economy over the last half century. To illustrate, in 1970 the American GDP was $1tr and by 2023 rocketed to $27tr. It was this very reality that won America the Cold War; caused the collapse of the Soviet economy; propelled the surge of its economy as it rapidly transited from an industrial to a service and technology driven economy. To turn back the clock and reinvent a manufacturing economy will only result in the diminution of the world’s sole hegemon. The macro downside to “Liberation Day” as the US administration attempts to completely turn the world trading system topsy-turvy in order to bring about , what it perceives as reciprocity and justice; is the  shrugging off  the burden of world leadership.

 An Understanding as a Conclusion

The ability to retract from the idea that nuclear weapons are a useable coercive tool of the state is linked to three larger concessions: the State will not be the first to use nuclear weapons; the State will neither aid nor abet the proliferation of nuclear weapons and lastly a firm belief in the larger idea of global nuclear regulation. The first two are based on the conviction that the weapon is an ultimate resort of dissuasion; while the third places a demand for ‘nuclear order’. This understanding flows from Brodie’s postulation that, the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear war. However, the global impact of recent policies relating to the on-going war in Ukraine and the emergence of new nuclear armed states; appear aimed at instilling fear and a willingness to persistently push the adversary to the nuclear brink. At a time when the end of an era of US led nuclear regulation signals the breakdown of the current nuclear order and a quick march forward of the Doomsday Clock.  

Policy makers do not appear to recognise the need for avoiding a nuclear conflagration. Simultaneously the meltdown of a world economic order that gave space for a global hegemon lies vacant. This throws up a paradoxical question; will the possession of a nuclear arsenal make the world a safer place? It is true that the balance of nuclear arsenals have deterred a global scale catastrophe (thus far at least); yet it is equally true, that its coercive effect and the absence of a regulatory regime increase the probability of proliferation that may push nuclear war from catastrophic loss of life to existential closure.

The choice is clear.  

‘Strategic Competition’ is War by Other Means

Posted on by
5

A Troubling Legacy of the Westphalian System

By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar (to be published)

A debate rages amongst western scholars and strategists of the significance and what elements of statecraft make for the essence of “Strategic Competition”. The argument is centrally about influence over the international system.

The phrase “Strategic Competitiveness” first made its appearance as a polcy touchstone, notably, in the 2018 National Defence Strategy of the USA. The document identified the revisionist states of China and Russia as strategic competitors. China for using “predatory economics” to intimidate lesser endowed nations while militarizing and persisting with its illegal claims in the South China Sea; and Russia as an “autocratic nationalistic state that eschewed the economic, diplomatic, and security aspirations of its erstwhile bloc”. The document further envisages challenges in every arena of human endeavour and the only answer it presents is to “field a lethal, resilient and rapidly adapting Joint Force. The Joint Force is combined with a robust constellation of allies and partners…aim being to achieve favourable balances of power that safeguard the free and open international order”.  

This understanding of the policy has indeterminate strategic significance, rather cramped relevance and harps on a chord reminiscent of the cold war in its quest for ‘Balance of Power’ and the carving out of two adversarial military Blocs. In a sense it entails substantial economic, political and military risks not just to the protagonists but to the world at large; and significantly excludes nations who may choose not to accept a confrontational posture or retain strategic autonomy.  

The Westphalian Paradox

The Peace of Westphalia, signed in 1648, ended long drawn out wars between feuding Christian societies in Europe. Its purpose was to consolidate a teetering Holy Roman (German) Empire that had been ravaged by wars, fragmentation and economic depredation. It created the “framework for relations” within West-Central Europe. Concepts of state sovereignty, new to Europe, and diplomacy find mention in the text of this Treaty.

While it was one of the attempts at codifying relations between states through an accepted set of laws, there was a looming threat that it provided a shield against. For, not only did it provide a basis to hold together Christendom as existed in West-Central Europe, but was an elemental collective pledge to confront the Ottoman Empire which was rampaging to its peak of power, wealth and expansion in South East Europe. What the Ottoman began as conquests in Asia Minor, led to the annexation of vast territories in Bulgaria, Greece and much of the Byzantine Empire. With the fall of Constantinople during the reign of Mehmed II (1432-1481), the Sultan’s dominion extended well into central Europe and was an ominous portent to the ‘Holy Roman Empire’.

Historical facts remind us that through the ages no International Order has ever been absolute nor has any one hegemon been endowed with the necessary power to control an Order in perpetuity. The emergence of rising powers provides the necessary dynamics for transformation of International Order; which in a way, mistakenly, provokes the mind to accept the simplistic axiom that “wars occur when the established order is challenged”.

The lamentable paradox is that the Westphalian System still remains the model for international relations, politics, concept of state sovereignty, basis of treaties/conventions and, critically, sets the criterion for “Global Governance”. This despite the arrangement not having space for emerging powers of autonomous bent. Just how pernicious the system can be was captured in  President George W. Bush’s confounding declaration to a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001 where he left the comity of nations with a Hobson’s choice, “…Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make, either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists.”

Contrarian states are recast as a threat to order; this crudely was the essence of the system. Competing powers within the fetters of the Westphalian Model are projected to be disruptive entities that seek to topple the balance of power and rebuff the institutions that are at the heart of Global Order extant. The system ironically was conceived to provide a security arrangement specifically for the Christian principalities of Germany (of the 17th century) while keeping some form of cohesiveness amongst believers of the faith within the ‘Holy Roman Empire’, significantly to serve as a bulwark against the rampaging Ottoman Empire to the South East. Its applicability was constrained by geography, race, identity, ethnicity and critically belief; its purpose was specific for Hapsburg control (1438-1740). Indeed, as a professor of military history at the National Defence Academy asserted …in this realm, command was neither “Holy nor Roman and not even was it an Empire!”   

The Post-Cold War Order

Global Governance is a post-Cold War concept (1995). Recognizing the new climate in international relations, former West German Chancellor Willy Brandt, in 1989, brought together a group of international leaders to explore new approaches to managing global relations.  His efforts laid the foundations for the establishment of an overdue Commission on Global Governance. Indeed the inabilities of the Westphalian Model can be seen in various modern international institutions including the United Nations which is a leading example of how civilizational experiences of diverse societies that make up the international milieu of the day are excluded. The UN in addition to its many spectacular failures —often as a result of indecision but more on account of its weaknesses is a case study in what ‘Global Governance’ ought not to be. There are neither binding rules to forge agreements nor can the power of veto be reined-in through the intellectual science of reasoning. What carries the day is which side is backed by brute power. As in the war in Syria; when agreement falls prey to selfish interests; or in Rwanda, where the genocide of 1994 is yet to find closure. Selectively applied international norms that suit privileged interests, is another agent, as in Iraq and in the Russia – Ukraine conflict; or more perilously due to finance driven bigotry, as during the recent Covid 19 pandemic. In all cases the very purpose of the UN to maintain peace and security, uphold human rights, provide humanitarian aid and put in place a model for sustainable development amounts to little else than empty talk, bereft of value and at times, an instrument to justify malfeasance.

Recognising the weaknesses of the Westphalian Model the Commission suggested the creation of “a multilateral regulatory system of management focussed on development of global independencies and sustainable development”. The idea has in its original form lost traction over time and wobbles on the edge of history’s garbage pail. Was this an act of geopolitical short sightedness or self-centredness of Western elites and influencers or was it a deliberate act that saw in the post-Westphalian world the need to cement a place for the Global Hegemon?    

The Focus; Sway over International Systems

The method of conducting international relations and the institutions that enabled the creation of alignments are pre-disposed to the idea of Realpolitik and are, consequently, interpreted in terms of the national interests of the resident hegemon. The coming of an emerging power, accordingly, sends out the call for an impending confrontation. One of three possible fallouts of such interplay is; assimilation into the Order, defeat by force of arms or advent of a new Order.

International benchmarks for accomplishment in Strategic Competition are five-fold: vitality of citizenry, technological prowess, strength of economy, demography and geographic endowment. These characteristics form the basis for determining two critical competitive priorities:  degree to which rivalry can be advanced and at what stage rivalry turns to “unfavourable-antagonism”, both priorities are driven by blinkered national interest, defy common understanding and border on brinkmanship. Since the struggle is, in many ways, over the essential character of the international system its institutions, rules and conventions; it is the individual perception of ‘universal application’ that prevails over the narrative. Morality, in the matter, plays a minor part. The key lies in how the anecdotal can be reconstituted to present a convenient reality. Indeed, it will also explain the power exertions that dominate this pursuit.  

The dangerous dichotomy lies in the divergent pulls that exist between a globalised world economy and exclusive state polity. While the world economy relies on a secure and stable system of governance for trade, communications and development for which organisations exist on land and in the air controlled and regulated by United Nations institutions such as the International Chamber of Commerce, the International Civil Aviation Organisation, the World Trade Organisation; and on the oceans it is built on the bedrock of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). UNCLOS lays out rules for everything from global shipping enterprise and management of offshore natural resources including fisheries, critical minerals, oil, and natural gas—all managed primarily through the convention’s authority. Yet, Strategic Competition is not about how best these institutions can collectively be governed; but about control of these very institutions.      

Outcome of Competition: Collapse, Capitulation or Compromise

Studies refer to the concept of strategic competition over a range of interpretations; from a tautological point of view as “the act of competing” to the more nuanced “attempt to gain advantage over a nation or group of nations that are believed to pose a threat through self-interested pursuit of power and influence.” Two phrases in the latter description that become significant are:  ‘…believed to pose a threat’ and ‘…pursuit of power and influence’, both of which remain open ended in their implication and substance. While the issue of what comprises a ubiquitous threat and what commonly is recognised as the object of power and influence remains masked. Indeed, for a nation to announce that it is embracing Strategic Competition says nothing about how it will do so—that is, what specific instruments of state power to achieve success it will employ—or what it will prioritize. 

A realistic scrutiny of the relationships involved conforms to the historical concept of ‘Great Power Rivalry’, which in the past determined foreign policy, economic rapacity and national security; all characteristics that underpinned domination. The question that begs an answer is ‘in what way does Strategic Competition differ from Belligerent Hegemony?’  If the former refers to the combination of one group of people or groups of people exploited by another group of people; then there is little difference. The process of competition is invariably a tussle of differentials in growth rates, technological prowess, ideology distinction and economic stability; which in turn impacts on political and ominously, military balance.

Our own experience of competitive rivalries since the age of colonial antagonism to the present, tend to ignore the critical question of outcomes as planners fail to occupy themselves with where ‘Competition’ is leading to. History of intense rivalries between nations, tell us, they end for one side, in one of three ways: Collapse, Capitulation, or Compromise. Outcomes that terminate in consequences other than these three often set the stage for a return to confrontation.

We are then faced with a strategic dilemma which Michael Howard (war and social change-an essay) underscored, “…there is no war without resistance; but without resistance and the possibility of resistance, there is no International Order.”

Strategic Competition in Ukraine; Hazards of Wavering Resolve

The downside of being a part of a group engaged in strategic competition is the danger of rapid escalation and ‘wavering-resolve’. The on-going conflict in Ukraine is an example of how rapidly the situation can escalate to armed conflict and how diffidence can queer the pitch when engaged in strategic competition. Jens Stoltenberg, the ‘On-Off’ NATO Secretary General, suggested Ukraine might today have to decide on some “kind of compromises”. The former Commander of the UK’s Joint Forces Command went a step further when he warned that Ukraine could face defeat by Russia in 2024. General Barrons is quoted as saying “there is a serious risk” of Ukraine losing the war this year. The reason, he attributes, is “because Ukraine may come to feel it can’t win”. “And when it gets to that point, why will people want to fight and die any longer, just to defend the indefensible?”

Why people will want to fight and die is very convincing logic, but to have reached this conclusion in a proxy war after two years of so much disruption, wasteful destruction and sapping of global economies is baffling, to say the least.   

Enervating Frailties and the Virtue of Biding One’s Time 

While the agitation continues with academics and think-tanks over whether there exists a red-line between ‘Competition’ and ‘Conflict’; China has embarked on its own discernment since the 1970s, of ‘What is’ and ‘How’ Strategic Competition is to be prosecuted. At its heart are two pivotal precepts: the first is that the accumulation of power, beyond a point, can turn on itself; for the essence of competitiveness is to recognise that ‘Power’ plays a covering role as a bulwark against precipitate recourse to arms. Targeting frailties of the adversarial system and measures taken to enervate them (over time) through the manipulation of information and undermining values; till decay and doubt sets in is the aim. Beijing believes they can wait. The second is to guard against reckless acts by the adversary that may compromise China’s festering debilities and, indeed, undermine their scheme of enervating the adversary. Not having put a time frame for their strategic plans has lent considerable credibility to China’s position as a major power. Going back over the last half century, it is apparent that Beijing has persisted with this policy of playing one superpower against the other and yet, often, acted in defiance of the two. Despite its vulnerabilities, it neither yielded nor has it been pliant to the entreaties of Moscow or Washington. For these very reasons and as a participant in the many political and military conflicts of the post-cold war era China has today attained a singular stature in the international system as a superpower.

As China’s power grows and the contours of its Grand Strategy of ‘Rejuvenation and Revision’ are fully unveiled, the four ‘Initiatives’ or instruments of its strategy can be seen from a perspective that is set on competing and overturning existing order:

  • The first is the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that poses to finance and boost infrastructure of dependent and client economies and in turn become the engine of Beijing’s geo-strategic military, financial reach and political clout.
  • Second, the Global Development Initiative (GDI) launched in 2021 at the UN General Assembly targets developing nations with small-scale projects that address poverty alleviation, digital connectivity, climate change, and health and food security; aim being to further their hold and reliance on Beijing. At its core is Beijing’s emphasis on economic development as the basis for human rights rather than equality and dignity.
  • Third, the Global Security Initiative (GSI), launched in 2022 seeks to promote China as the central arbiter to coordinate security needs of the region first, followed by global demands, through diplomacy contingent upon China.
  • Lastly, the Global Civilizational Initiative (GCI) introduced in March 2023, promotes a state-focused and state-defined values system that serves to eliminate universal values such as human rights and democracy. In a GCI-related address, Xi called “peace, development, equity, justice, democracy and freedom” “common aspirations”, and not rights, of humanity. The GCI argues that the perceptions of such “common” aspirations are “relative” and that countries must “refrain from imposing their own values on others.

Meanwhile globally nations in the West and Asia are determined to push back against what is seen as Chinese hegemonic designs and revisionism. Multilateralism in this milieu provides a tremendous advantage, particularly so when strategic interests converge when confronted with a Beijing that seeks ‘Rejuvenation’.

Beijing has emerged and has thrown the gauntlet to unsettle the existing status-quo. In strategic terms the greatest risks in the competition are that contestants develop policies and technologies that threaten existing critical economic networks and informational dependencies within the prevailing international structures. This provides the logic for preparations by the military to fight an indefinable and often elusory conflict through the formation of coalitions and arming to the teeth. Who then benefits from Strategic Competition?

The Indispensible Enemy

               Daniel Ellsberg, the late, well acclaimed whistle-blowing author of the Pentagon Papers, posed a query: ” In the current state of world affairs where, uncertainty and conflicts are the rule; who benefitted from war?” Certainly in Ukraine, the South China Sea and Gaza it cannot be the chief protagonists but the contrivers and puppeteers of conflict.

The proxy war in Ukraine benefits most the USA; for the conflict has turned back to history and revived a threat from an “alliance of authoritarian powers” working against Western democracies. It has paved the way for American growth and leadership, and fashioned an antagonistic bloc comprising Russia, China, Iran and North Korea. And so too potentially, has the brewing conflict in the South China Sea; the conflict in Gaza is complex for it has gone beyond retribution.

Israel’s war against Hamas may have been justified by the latter’s murderous assault of 07 October 2023, but for the battering of Gaza to be prosecuted with a perverse and unrelenting ferocity for over ten months begs an explanation that cannot be vindicated by the idea of ‘rightful-reprisal’. Indeed, is there more to this conflict? Could it be that carnage provides the opportunity to take the first step towards realising the long sought after alternative to the bothersome absence of control over the Suez Canal? The Ben Gurion Canal project proposes to connect the Gulf of Aqaba (Eilat) in the Red Sea with the Mediterranean Sea and would pass through Israel and end in or near the Gaza Strip (Ashkelon). And if this Canal became a reality the Suez moves to the background for it can handle deeper draught and greater volumes of traffic. Most critically the Canal would be under firm control of the USA, Israel and the Western powers.

The key to continuing Great Power status, as Ellsberg ominously suggested, was the incessant availability of an indispensible enemy and the will to competition with that foe.

Global Governance and the Quest for a Stable World Order

The ‘Authoritarian Bloc’ is in a perilous struggle to bring about the decline and collapse of its perceived rivals with the aim to don the mantle of world leadership. In such a calculus, international affairs of the day, presents a world in which it is not just the ‘balance of power’ that is sought to be toppled; but every element of society—economy, diplomacy, law, trade, cyberspace, social media, journalism, culture and indeed the very nature of peoples—have become tools in a strategic competition. States with political authority over the sources of power of a nation are uniquely positioned to impose costs on other states. They have the advantage, in the short term, since they can wield elements of ‘soft and hard power’ unquestioned and direct through central control of these instruments. This state of affairs can only last as long as citizens remain convinced of motivations and kept blind to hazards of such competition.

With proliferation of nuclear weapons and the growing inclination towards the use of low-yield weapons to salvage a troubled conventional campaign; balance of power has ceased to be a fully relevant and credible principle of global order. However, it still retains a presence in international relations, more particularly, in the sphere of regional relations among states. So it is neither balance of power nor the exercise of brute force or even the emergence of a global hegemon that will assure a stable world order. Global governance in its pristine form is order that emerges from institutions that recognise the equality of humankind, acknowledged processes, formal agreements, and informal time-honoured mechanisms that negate unilateral military action and regulates collective action for a common good.

Global governance encompasses activity at the international, transnational, and regional levels that transcend national boundaries. In this conception of global governance, cooperative action based on rights and rules that are enforced through a combination of financial and moral incentives and, should the need arise; collective military power that proposes to replace disruptive strategic competition. If not, as Willy Brandt in 1980 put it, “Are we to leave our successors a scorched planet, impoverished landscapes and ailing environment?”

The Putin Interview; Stoking of a Nuclear War

Posted on by
4

By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar (To be Published)

Putin’s History Lesson

On 06 February, 2024, Vladimir Putin breached his self-imposed hiatus on the Western media and offered a sitting to a Mr Tucker Carlson.  The reason and timing of the interview, the Western media will have the world believe, was an attempt to influence the forthcoming American presidential elections. ‘Naked and provocative propaganda against President Joe Biden’s Ukraine Policy,  claimed the detractors which included the so called “liberal” media. And yet, the session comes at a time when NATO is suffering from pangs of ‘Ukraine Fatigue’, burden of the conflict has globally stressed economies, drain on military resources of the West hollowing out their own preparedness, anxiety of nuclear escalation and indeed the third year of war and loss of lives has left the Ukrainian citizenry with fading appetite for the conflict.

In the meantime Putin, in his inimitably sardonic style, set about delivering a primer to Tucker on Russian history. Beginning with the first East Slavic state, Kievan Rus, that arose in the 9th century; through the influence of the Byzantine Church that gave to the state Orthodox Christianity, he arrived at the rule of Oleg the Wise (879 CE), a Varangian Prince who founded an empire which  over three centuries spread to cover the modern State of Belarus, Slavonic-Norse Russia and significantly, Ukraine. Putin appeared to emphasize that the unit of historical understanding was neither nations nor epochs but societies such as that which bound the Orthodox Christians together. This historical narrative, to Putin, established the civilizational connect with Ukraine and set the stage for Tucker’s and obliquely the West’s discernment of Russia’s title to territories inhabited by cultural brethren.

In dragging Tucker through the common attributes of shared civilizational institutions, what really was Putin’s aim? Was it to educate his viewers through Mr Carlson or was it to show conviction that the West and NATO could do little to alter the new reality of Ukraine other than to accept it. Intervention, as Putin warned recently, would lead to nuclear war.

The Perilous Balance of Terror

Even after the many threats of nuclear escalation during the course of conflict, few in the West subscribe to the view that Mr Putin will make an irrational decision to attack NATO states with nuclear weapons in retaliation for support to Ukraine. And yet, everything about this conflict whether it was the abrogation of the Minsk Agreements, President Yanukovych’s ouster, Zelensky’s bid to enter NATO, the purposeless sabotage of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, the self-blow to Western economies or even the stubborn support to a proxy war; are irrational in character and illogical in progression. The final astonishing contradiction is what the Western allies consider likely; Russia will use tactical nuclear weapons. Yet, they persist with supporting the war with munitions and training in the entrenched strategic belief that tactical nuclear weapons are far less damaging than city-destroying high-yield nuclear weapons and therefore (outrageously), more “usable.” In this disordered ambience, is there mass insanity in the belief that the risk of escalation by Western allies is not a certainty?

The hostile detonation of a nuclear weapon, of any yield, would be an unprecedented denial of the dogma of deterrence, a theory that has underwritten military policy for the past 75 years. The idea stipulates that adversaries are deterred from launching a nuclear attack because by doing so they risk an overwhelming counterattack. Possessing nuclear weapons isn’t about winning a nuclear war, the theory goes, it is about preventing one. It hinges, perilously, upon a balance of terror. But, one is at a loss to explain the brinkmanship that has persistently stimulated this line of thinking that the provocation for nuclear use in some absurd way advances the war-aims. The danger of nuclear use in Ukraine fluctuates. It waned after Ukraine’s counter offensive of the summer of 2023 proved a fizzle. But, if Kremlin feels threatened by increased NATO intervention or conflict losses, it could create more dependency on Russia’s nuclear arsenal; the threat could rise exponentially.

Back to the Putin Hearing; Mounting Logic for Nuclear War

Coming to the central issue of termination of the war in Ukraine, Putin made a revelation. A few weeks into the conflict, he disclosed that Ukraine was ready to sign a deal with Russia during peace talks in Istanbul (April 2022), until Western powers, led by the then British Prime Minister Boris Johnson, ordered Kyiv to scrap the deal. Negotiators had tentatively agreed on the outlines of an interim settlement: “Russia would withdraw to its position on 23 February 2022, when it controlled part of the Donbas region (Donetsk and Luhansk), and in exchange, Ukraine would promise not to seek NATO membership and instead receive security guarantees from a number of countries.” Putin then highlighted the impact of Boris Johnson’s surprise visit to Kiev on 09 April 2022; its purpose, he alleged, was to break off from talks and scuttle the deal for two key reasons “Putin cannot be negotiated with, and the West was not ready for the war to end.”

Efforts to obtain authentic facts on details of the Johnson-Zelensky meeting through Britain’s “Freedom of Information Act 2000” have thus far met with bureaucratic chicanery. While on ground, the British government has encouraged the continuation of the war through huge arms shipments and incendiary rhetoric. When read in conjunction with the US Secretary for Defence statement of the same period; that the Biden administration’s objective in arming Ukrainian forces is to “see Russia weakened to the degree that it can’t do the kinds of things that it has done in invading Ukraine”; lends credence to Putin’s revelation. In the meantime, the European Union goes into strategic dither as France turns Hawk from a Dovish posture of the past. French President Macron’s stance toward the war in Ukraine is at best, inconsistent. He has argued that Europe “must get prepared for a long war” in order to put Ukraine in the best possible position for negotiations. He also defended his decision to keep talking with Putin, arguing that “we must do everything to make a negotiated peace possible.” Differences over the response to the war have deepened between Paris and Berlin in recent weeks, after the German chancellor said long-range Taurus missiles would need German soldiers on the ground in Ukraine to look after them and that was a limit that he was not prepared to cross. President Macron has angered his NATO partners by suggesting that sending Western troops could not be ruled out. In this ambience of contrariety what may be deduced is the absence of resolve to either fuel the conflict towards a decision point or to sue for a negotiated peace. Macron’s logic for peace appears skewed when he warned that Russia was seeking to extend its power and would not stop now: “if we let Ukraine lose this war, then for sure Russia will threaten Romania, Poland and Moldavia;” forgetting that NATO is bound to defend the former two being members, while public opinion in Moldavia (over 60%) is against NATO membership.

NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, further muddied the waters when he warned recently that Ukrainians were “not running out of courage, they are running out of ammunition”. He said the shortage was one of the reasons why Russia had made recent advances on the battlefield, and he called on the allies to provide Ukraine with what it needed. He even suggested the possibility of deploying troops in Ukraine much to the astonishment of some allies. In the backdrop, the Trump-Biden tangle in the looming American general elections, has put on notice the (hither to) trusty US security umbrella.

What is becoming increasingly apparent is the lack of strategic solidarity in NATO’s approach to the conflict; but more importantly the inability to note that it is to the Kremlin’s advantage to make this a conflict against NATO; for it frees Putin’s strategic options. As the veil on the West’s proxy war falls away, the West’s rhetoric and discordant postures suggest the possibility of a  mounting logic for a full blown nuclear clash.  

Reopening Peace Talks

Putin’s exposé is the cause for several misgivings: Why did Western leaders want to stop Kyiv from signing a seemingly reasonable deal with Moscow? Did they consider the conflict a proxy war whose aim was the emaciation of Kremlin’s power? Why is the NATO rhetoric suggesting a more robust intervention in the war? And, most importantly, what would it take to get back to the table?

To restore peace talks is, debatably, very challenging. Particularly so, given that both Ukraine and Russia have (at least publicly) hardened their negotiating positions significantly in recent months. But there are some indications that could help in piecing together a deal. One possible track back to the negotiating table is to resurrect the “Black Sea Grain Agreement” of July 2022, in which Kyiv, Moscow, Turkiye and the UN agreed to restart wheat exports from Ukraine’s Black Sea ports. The deal had held strong despite continued hostilities, allowing more than one million metric tons of grain to enter the world’s “insecure food markets”. This accord broke down in July 2023. Today it is replaced by a precarious under-the-counter shipping corridor. The passageway is guaranteed by no nation other than a notional humanitarian acceptance by both belligerents of the embarrassing impact of the war on deprived neutrals. This common position if enlarged provides an opening to a more all-embracing peace talks.

The second track to a detente is centred on the Russian-held Zaporizhzhia nuclear power complex that continues to be threatened by artillery shelling from both sides. A monitoring committee of the IAEA has been tasked to ensure that the plant remains safe condition. Kyiv and Moscow have both shown by this concession that they want to diminish the co-lateral impact of the conflict, and are amenable to negotiate on this score. But, as long as this conflict does not find a truce, the spectre of a catastrophic event — whether through an unintended strike on the Zaporizhzhia complex or a deliberate escalation to nuclear war — will continue to loom. It’s time for Russia, Ukraine, and the West to recognize that there’s only one way to put an end to these risks; come to the negotiating table. Unfortunately, Putin is in no mood to make the first move ever since Boris Johnson’s ill-advised ‘April visit’.

The state of the conflict and loss of lives and resources, economic fatigue of western donors, the ebbing enthusiasm coupled with frustration of the Proxy and crucially, the looming danger of an unintended nuclear clash, all add up to and seem to advocate an urgent return to the Table.

Ramification on Nuclear Arms Control Structures as a Conclusion

Russia blocked a UN agreement aimed at shoring up the much delayed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review in August 2022, citing concerns about clauses related to the situation at the Zaporizhzhia. The move highlights the negative effect that the conflict has had on the non-proliferation cause. But despite the failure of the NPT Review there is a glimmer of hope in the endorsement of a framework for strategic arms limitation: “The framework for a U.S.-Russian arms control arrangement is not perfect and will require concessions from both Washington and Moscow. But this is part of the arms control bargain, and the benefits, like the non-use of nuclear weapons in warfare since 1945, have consistently outweighed the perceived costs” and indeed, geopolitical markdowns.

 The awkward strategic irony in all this is the status of Russian Uranium exports to The USA. A program, ironically, dubbed Megatons to Megawatts was part of a raft of non-proliferation efforts undertaken ‘cooperatively’ at one time by Moscow and Washington to sequester and dilute stocks of nuclear weapons and materials. The Program continues unabated, conflict or no conflict.