The 1984 Archetype: China’s New Form of Human Civilization

Posted on October 8, 2025 by strategicdialogues

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

Interminable Wars

George Orwell’s “Nineteen Eighty-Four” depicts a dystopian society in which the super-state of Oceania is steeped in totalitarianism and perpetual war. In Oceania’s state of ceaseless conflict with either Eastasia or Eurasia, the ruling Regime holds a monopoly on violence and its unending wars are a part of a mechanism to maintain control over its citizens. This persevering condition unifies the population in the face of a common enemy, justifies unquestioningly the need for strict government regulation and diverts resources away from bringing about changes in the lives of the people. Reality itself is pliable, in a fluid sense, and exists only in the mind; and therefore the core axiom of the state was bending and manipulating the mind. Additionally, the regime’s efficient use of the secret ‘thought police’ for guileful suppression of its citizenry, structuring a bureaucracy that not only monopolises facts but also determines the past to model a present and a future of its fabrication while its agencies desensitise generations of citizenry to accept a reality of its making by continuously changing it. As George Orwell put it, “by a lack of understanding they (the citizenry) remained sane”. As for the interminable wars; there never was intended to be any winner or loser, no pitched battles, no blunders, no surrender; just an instrument to enable a miserable war economy and a reason for mind-bending oversight.

By constantly altering historical records and presenting false information as fact; a world is created in which the objectivity of truth ceases to exist. This manipulation allows the regime to shape citizens’ beliefs and perceptions according to their agenda. The theme of language-engineering and therefore constriction of ideas is enforced by the creation of “Newspeak” that highlights the power of language and rhetoric to shape perceptions and control thought. In the novel, ‘Newspeak’ is designed to limit expression and eliminate dissent by restricting vocabulary and simplifying grammar. Similarly, in contemporary politics, language can be used to manipulate public opinion; through the ubiquitous tweet, frame debates, and obfuscate the truth. Politicians and public figures may employ euphemisms, Doublespeak, and carefully crafted messaging to influence people’s dogmas and actions. The novel underscores the manner in which these linguistic tactics can shape the mind of the listener.

Reality, censorship and control of information in 1984 strike a dangerous harmony with contemporary issues of media management and peddling “fake news.” In the novel, the establishment constantly bridles facts to create and maintain its current version of reality. Similarly, in today’s world, the spread of misinformation, biased reporting, and outright falsehoods through social media and other channels can mould public opinion, undermine trust in institutions and indeed, change the idea of actuality itself. Transformation of reality, as E.M. Forester put it, was “at the turn of the kaleidoscope”; much as leadership of a current superpower has so vividly shown.

In Nineteen Eighty-Four, propaganda and indoctrination are central to the Government’s ability to maintain control and suppress dissent. The State uses various methods, including controlling media, and promoting an overarching ideology that justifies its actions. This portrayal is relevant to contemporary concerns about the influence of ideologies and radical beliefs on society. Today, we see the rise of various extremist groups and the spread of their beliefs through online platforms and social media. These groups often employ spin-doctoring and brainwashing techniques to recruit members, gain influence and motivate them even to the extent of suicide bombing.

War and the perversion of its significance from “extension of politics by other means” is refined to denote a stable state of conflict that ensures the perpetual churning of the wheels of military industry in Oceania’s interminable yet finely tuned wars against the other two super states of Eurasia and Eastasia. The aim is to achieve a balanced condition of disorder that neither seeks gains nor strives for victory; but pursues relentless power and control of their citizenry. The goal is to impress upon the populace the persuasion that “War is Peace”. The concept of perpetual war in 1984, serves as the prime mechanism for the Regime to maintain its sway over the populace. In today’s world, we can see parallels with on-going global conflicts and the manner in which war is used as a means of control and manipulation by those in power.

In order to understand the complicated foreign relations between Oceania, Eastasia and Eurasia; one has to note the tacit agreement between the states not just to keep the public immersed in the war effort to destroy any surplus generated by their economies but to ensure that the inhabitants are suspended in a mind numbing, wasteful yet enduring circle of want. While alliances shift, like dunes in a desert, what remains steadfast is the motivation for perpetual war to not just maintain the status-quo, but to uphold the promise of security and the preservation of the hierarchical society. Disputed expanses formed by the equatorial region provide the necessary resources of expendable material and manpower to power the war making effort.

Two plus Two Will Make Five: the Piety of Order

Nineteen Eighty-Four, borrowed generously for its belief in control of a state’s citizenry from the rise of Fascism in Europe and from Cold-War Soviet Union for its dystopian description of a future three and a half decades after the author had penned his novel. Yet, it is not the year of its setting that is significant; what is – is, how often authoritarian and so too ‘democratic’ leaders alike; have since emphasised the central theme of the book that by convincing the citizenry through their “lack of understanding they remained sane”; for it is understanding which brings with it an acute sense of responsibility and the urge to defy. It has been the object of contemporary oligarchs to contradict and mask this very sense of responsibility till all feeling for it is abandoned; this is the state when ‘two plus two will make five’.

Historical conclusions that are drawn, redrawn and again recast from contrived struggles of the past provide the canvas for composing principles, beliefs and ideals that are fluid in their interpretation and form. And since these endeavours were achieved through, “naturally”, extreme hardship and at monumental cost, they provide the right path to realize not only greatness, but also give to the Regime legitimacy and the right to control and perpetuate for society a rosy vision of the status-quo.

At the heart of Nineteen Eighty Four, is the tragic menace of not just the totalitarian State but even so called democracies that place power above the citizen. Tragic, for its universally terrifying influence on the other nations; and menacing, for the crimes of the State masked in the piety of order.

Contemporary Conflicts through the Prism of 1984

Major conflicts and crises, in recent times, are incessantly unfolding around the world with West Asia and Europe being particularly affected. The Russia-Ukraine war and the on-going conflict in Israel, Gaza and Iran are significant drivers of global instability. Additionally, conflicts in Sudan, Syria, Myanmar, Pakistan, Sahel, Ethiopia and the Democratic Republic of Congo are causing widespread anxiety over their purpose and the motive of the sponsors thereof. So much so that the unremitting conflict level is at it’s highest since World War II. Not only have these wars caused major humanitarian crises through their barbarity but their complex nature suggests complicity of the major players of the day. The purpose is clearly, for power, control and pecuniary benefits. One notes the bedeviled fact that the source of munitions that fuel these conflicts and indeed profit from them are the same few promoters of the wars. After all, the most successful corporate enterprise in contemporary times is the arms industry; underscoring the monetary mainspring for interminable wars. Shades of 1984?

The conflict in Vietnam brought into sharp relief the West’s institutional outlook towards war and peace when haloed establishments like the Norwegian Nobel Committee stood up to recognise the talent of the likes of Henry Kissinger in 1973 for waging “peace” on that hapless peninsula. War and Peace, to the lofty standards of the Committee, were astoundingly, seen as occupying the same domain that marks humanity, in other words the cycle of arms production is consistent overall with the logic that more military expenditure equals more arms exports and therefore more wars resulting in more peace!? While others would suggest how on earth the Committee could hold two such contradictory ideas simultaneously unless they were doing an exercise in “Double Think”. The script is out of 1984.

When Nineteen Eighty-Four is viewed from a historical distance leaving Nazi Germany, the Soviet Union and the Cold War behind, we see the novel and its ideas of interminable wars, omnipresent-surveillance, Newspeak, Thought Police and Double-Think take form in any ideology or system of governance.

The post-Cold War era witnessed the war in Iraq that began in 1991 continued through that decade in various forms sometimes euphemistically called enforcement of the no-fly zone; non-compliance of UN sanctions; UN Resolution to destroy Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD); western media worked overtime to, first convince themselves and then the world, of the imminence of the use of WMDs by the ruling dispensation in Iraq. A narrative was spun of the looming threat of release of biological, chemical and nuclear carnage. A case for invading Iraq in March 2003 was built on three basic premises: that Iraq had WMDs; that it was developing more of them; and that it was failing to comply with its disarmament obligations under a series of United Nations Security Council resolutions. All of these premises were based on scraps of unreliable and fabricated information. None of them was true. The web of chicanery culminated in full scale invasion of Iraq in 2003 only to expose the falsehood of the very premise of the existence of WMDs. There were no stockpiles of WMDs nor was there a programme to produce WMDs. Nevertheless the country was occupied; the existing dispensation was toppled while a vicious insurgency developed. American and coalition forces eventually withdrew from this “interminable war” in 2011 with nothing to show other than over half a million casualties, a demolished nation and a festering insurgency; the only end it seemed to have served was to keep the wheels of the Western arms industry in motion to fuel a war that filled the coffers of several corporate entities. Concurrently, a war on terror was announced post the appalling terror attack on the World Trade Centre in New York and two other locations in Washington DC and Pennsylvania on 11 September 2001. The war took America, along with a coalition of forces to invade Afghanistan and topple the existing dispensation of the Taliban. The conflict meandered through the next two decades as objectives of the invaders kept changing without tangible outcomes. It ended with an ignoble withdrawal of the coalition force and ironically the Taliban back in power. There is also a network of security think tanks located in the main decision-making centres of the world (In Brussels alone) there are hundreds of arms industry lobbyists, who influence politicians and officials globally as they develop policies related to the logic of ‘more arms translates to more peace’ . Their objectives include pushing for arms manufacturing, sale, promotion and publicity to respond to a seemingly limitless number of threats.

A New Form of Human Civilization

When Premier Xi Jinping addressed the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) at the centennial of the Party on 01 July 2023, he took a page out of 1984 as he institutionalised the manipulation of reality in order to build a “new form of human civilization”. For humanity, it has pretensions of being the new world order; based on value assertions of the CCP’s leadership and, importantly, the aspirational beliefs that serve China’s strategic interests internationally. It is significant to observe that the claim made for the “new” refers singularly to the supposed difference between China’s value propositions and those of the rest of humanity.

Civilizations do not evolve by decree. Rather, the growth, expansion and, in some cases, the eventual waning of civilizations follow a long process comprising elements beginning with individuals who through proximal circumstances and necessity, form cultural groups and societies. Members of the group applied their intellect to make viable economic existence and prosperity of the community. Often this led to a division of labour and the time it afforded, to some, gave rise to beliefs that evolved and were institutionalised in the form of cultural practices unique to that community. Through adaption and intercourse with peripheral societies across geography and belief systems these cultural practices were codified into religions. From this stage to politics and the evolution of security structures was a natural development. With further expansion the civilization encountered new communities and even civilizations at various levels of development; this either resulted in assimilation and the creation of a larger universal empire or the challenge brought about decline and disintegration (as Arnold Toynbee has suggested). The process of civilization is slow; its development, growth, flourish and decline, takes several millennia.

Premier Xi’s call for his ‘new form of human civilization’ stressed the deep historical strengths of the “Sinic Civilization”, and also upheld and defended the contemporary relevance of Marxism against the backdrop of problems in current global affairs. How the strengths of the Sinic Civilization and Marx’ theories were to be reconciled, is clearly another futile exercise in ‘Double Speak’; for ultimately, China’s “new form of human civilization” only makes sense if the CCP leadership hopes to pack a set of value claims that legitimize its totalitarian leadership at home, and project a coherent set of aspirational values abroad that serve China’s strategic interests.

The Paradox of Reconciling Contradictory Values

In sum what is suggested, claim Beijing scholars (who have since burnt midnight-oil to make sense of the ‘new civilisation’) is that China had improved its hard power, such as the economy and the military, but was weak in soft power. By soft power was meant ideals such as a cultural value system that from the CCP’s stand point was the moving force of ‘the new form of human civilization’ add to that was the need for a legitimate political system widely recognized by the international community. For its cultural values, Beijing has dug deep into its history to the period of the ‘Warring States’. Yet in order not to lose sight of the fact that Communism in China is a far more recent importation, classical values had somehow to be fused with Marxist beliefs to introduce modernity and legitimacy to the muddle.

The period of the Warring States, that was to source ‘classical values’ extended from 425 BCE to 221 BCE; it was an era of derangement, war and transformation that led to the establishment of the Qin Dynasty and a partial unification of the seven major antagonistic states. Significant in that era were the proliferation of thought and the development of ideas such as Confucianism, Daoism (Taoism) and Legalism or the fa tradition through the works and oral teachings of philosophers of the likes of Confucius, Mencius, Laozi and Sun Tzu. These three schools of thought were the wellspring of Chinese classic values. Beliefs that may be distilled from the teachings of Confucius and Laozi of the period are those that are common to civilizational states; they include social order along with the natural order of things, morality, harmony with nature, virtue, education and the importance of knowledge; Taoism complements and enriches Confucianism. While both these philosophies were denounced by Chairman Mao’s dispensation, they remain a dormant and arcane part of Chinese life.

In contrast to Confucianism and Taoism, the fa tradition was a philosophical principle that sought to bring a harsher order of governance. It was developed by a Chinese thinker of the same period named Han Feizi and suggested that human actions were, in the main, driven by selfish motives and had a propensity to choose wrong over right unless deterred by strict laws; significantly, it ushered in a preference for centralised control and the subservience of the individual. The insistence was on rule-by-uniformity as advantageous over reliance on human factors in politics. The far reaching effects of this tradition through history to this day appealed more to the mandarin’s sense of order and manifested in the modern day resurrection of Legalism and the fa perspective on power and control.

Marxism, in the meanwhile, justifies and predicts the emergence of a classless global society without private property. This global society, as Marx predicted, would be preceded by the violent seizure of the state and the means of production by the proletariat, who would rule in an interim dictatorship. Its values are marked by the tendency to relate the abstract to material significance; therefore values in the Marxist ideology with a sprinkling of “Chinese characteristics” are restricted to the labour value, utility value and exchange value with emphasis on patriotism at its core.

Values, therefore, from the CCP’s perspective, are a reflection of labour, utility and transactional significance of an undertaking as modified by the “spirit-of-the-times”. Reforms and innovations may be deemed necessary by the Party when it chooses to bring about changes. Variations are determined by the threat posed by the vicissitudes of time, technology and circumstances. The eventual validity of transformation is subject to four critical features; the collective over the individual, negation of the profit motive, adherence to the laws of the CCP and abhorrence of hedonism. Put together this engineering of elements, ideas and behavioural characteristics constitute the basic contents of the Party’s core value system. In all this is the absence of the idea of culture that permeates soft power, defined as a “Country’s ability to influence others without resorting to coercive pressure. In practice, that process entails countries projecting their values, ideals, and individual discernment across borders to foster goodwill and strengthen partnerships” (Joseph Nye, 1980).

Given the inherent confutations that erupt when developing soft power in repressive conditions, the creation of a political system that is both legitimate and acceptable to the larger mass of humanity appears an arduous ask.

Whole-Process Peoples Democracy

In an effort to bring about reconciliation of such vastly contradictory value systems, the CCP in 2019, developed a perplexing concept of governance called “whole-process democracy”, which by 2021 was re-christened whole-process people’s democracy, the introduction of the word ‘people’s’ was more to retain the Maoist flavour of the masses. Under this design, Premier Xi suggested that democracy was an ethical view by which the morality of an act is judged by the intrinsic value of the outcome, in which the most important criterion for evaluating the success of democracy is whether democracy can “solve the people’s real problems. Real and effective socialist democracy, he declared, was to be removed beyond dogma to an instrument of positive consequences; its litmus test was whether it enabled the people to follow the guidance and will of the CCP “. More than anything else, this ‘new’ conception serves to establish the absolute authority of the Party on all political, social, civic and matters of international relations the supremacy of the Party over all else was assured; democracy, as Chairman Xi goes on to proclaim, “is not an ornament to be put on display, but an instrument for addressing the issues that concern the people”.

‘Whole process people’s democracy’ in the Chinese political lexicon, integrates law-based elections, consultations, decision-making, management, and oversight through a series of regulations and institutional arrangements; the controlling elements of this characterisation are italicised to underscore the paramountcy of the Party. Power and Control at the centre is very suggestive of the 1984 archetype.

In the World to Come

The world, through the lens of the CCP, is a “competition between two ideologies and two social systems”; between Marxist Communism and democratic ideology that has embraced capitalism. History, Xi Jinping suggested, should be interpreted through “the fundamental point of view of historical materialism”; that is, all institutions of human society are the product of its economic activity. Consequently, social and political change occurs when those institutions cease to reflect how the economy functions. The problem arises when we note that history is not solely the function of economic activity but a complex outcome of human actions, events both natural and man-made, international relations, technological changes, social dynamics, nature of demography and a host of other factors and forces that make the overall course of human history unpredictable rather than a foreseeable discipline.

The declarations emanating from Beijing are amply clear of what their global ambitions are. Whether it is Premier Xi’s persistent reference to the China Dream or its goal of Rejuvenation and the realisation of a ‘new human civilisation’; CCP’s clear goal is a systemic change of the international order with China at its centre.” World leaders are unanimous on one count; China’s diplomacy and military posture demonstrate a “determination to promote an alternative vision of the world order”.

The USA as leader of the western world, in the meantime, has unhinged the very institutions that it had created to put in place the idea of global order and has unilaterally rejected the post Second World War system that governed global trade and adopted a protectionist approach to economics declaring trade wars against all its partners. These measures encompassing tariffs, export controls, and strong-arming strategic investments by allies aimed at ‘reversing decades of industrial decline and restore American pre-eminence in technology and manufacturing’. However, economists predict that the long term effect of these protectionist measures would serve only to shrink the overall size of the global economy rather than give it a fillip. While on the international security front, an irresolute America has been reluctant to stabilise the situation in the protracted Russia-Ukraine war or bring an end to the genocide in West Asia. In this geopolitical climate marked by the absence of competent global guardianship, it is difficult to portray China as the main disruptor of stability, despite the CCP’s vision of a “New World Order” as a unified system with China’s “superior” civilization in leadership role.

Sensing its time is nigh, Beijing, on its part, has seized the opportunity to make known its intentions to don the mantle of global stewardship; in March 2023, China surprised the world by achieving a rare and unexpected diplomatic breakthrough. Chinese leader Xi Jinping brokered an agreement between long time antagonists Iran and Saudi Arabia to restore diplomatic relations that could reshape the Middle East. On the economic front, President Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), whose scope and scale is staggering, recorded over $70 billion in construction contracts and $5 billion in investments in 2024, setting a new peak for the program. Since its inception in 2013, the BRI has facilitated $1.18 trillion in funding worldwide, primarily through loans from Chinese banks and development institutions directed toward infrastructure projects. Last year, West Asian countries were the biggest recipients of BRI investment and lending at $39 billion, followed by Africa at $29.2 billion and Southeast Asia at $25.1 billion. Perhaps most significant when looking forward, China has positioned itself as a leading force in AI through a distinctive approach to vertical innovation.

It was also this instant that was chosen to unveil two Chinese initiatives; the Global Security Initiative (GSI) and the Global Development Initiative (GDI). The former aims to guide discourse on global governance; while GDI’s goal is to arrogate the international dialogue on global development, place it under the CCP’s sponsorship and infuse it with Chinese ‘Values’. These twin initiatives are China’s “blueprint” for transforming the global order. They form a part of a body of ideas meant to reinforce Premier Xi’s concept of the ‘New Form of Human Civilization’. In this world-to-come, the CCP will be in the lead and the democratic value system, hitherto at the centre of the rules based order, will be given an insignificant role in global governance.

Clash of Disquieting Policies

The White House, in the face of Beijing’s relentless urge for control and domination, appears inadequate from all perspectives, to come to grips with the impending challenge that China poses. Whereas the need of the hour is to strengthen existing economic and military partnerships; the inexplicable protectionist policies adopted, the on-going war in Ukraine and the unending carnage in Gaza have come together to derange global trade and put the international security system in disarray. The US from a guarantor of the global trade system has, overnight, morphed to operating a global protection racket! While global trade and commerce may well find alternatives at the expense of economic growth; it is the latter turmoil in the international security system that has an enduring impact on global stability. The lack of focus on Beijing and its geopolitical manoeuvres even suggests an arguable reliance on the CCP’s military and economic overreach to bring about a, knock-on-wood, collapse in its global designs and an implosion within that society.

A significant economic move that China has made is to decouple its supply chains from dependence on the west, rather than the other way around. Chinese policymakers have doubled down on their commitment to become technologically independent, especially in strategically critical sectors like semiconductors. It also works to Beijing’s advantage in realising its vision of ‘rejuvenation’ and the creation of a ‘new human civilization’ driven by ‘Chinese Values’. We may remind ourselves that there is nothing benign about Beijing’s vision for it has not been reluctant to coerce, use military force and use all its ‘agencies’ to back its diplomacy and shape global governance. The agencies alluded to are the United Front Work Department (UFWD) and the International Liaison Department (ILD) that provide teeth to realise China’s foreign policy objectives and to influence the will of people to conform to China’s point of view. This is done through the instrument of distortion of facts, disinformation, indoctrination and indeed manipulating and falsification. It not only shapes narratives about China in foreign media, targets Chinese government critics abroad and co-opts influential overseas figures; but also indulges in clandestine operations. As Sun Tzu in his treatise on “The Art of War” suggested: “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting”. This is just what the UFWD and the ILD are all about.

Indo-Pacific littorals and in particular the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD) partners are perplexed by the capricious US policies on regional security commitments raising lingering doubts over the integrity of their defence structures, and fears that Washington may well barter off the objectives of the QUAD for a grand deal with Beijing. While Pacific allies of the US were swayed by the thought of their strategic importance in the region in the face of an assertive China would naturally place them in a more favourable position than their NATO counterparts; this has proven to be a false premise. On the contrary, precisely because of their role in the US–China competition, it is amply clear that the former’s assurances to its Indo-Pacific partners now come with a higher price tag and inconsistent demands.

Questioning the Credibility of Extended Nuclear Deterrence

Driven by a desire to deter China and preserve the balance of power in favour of the US, the ‘transactional nature’ of Washington’s misshapen policies makes apparent that it now gauges collaboration with partners on the basis of two questions: in what way does the alliance benefit the US and how does the partnership enhance America’s security interest? And, will military entanglement serve to deter China? While the real question ought to be; what is the credibility of extended deterrence and what if in a crisis it is breached? Will the US take the next step? Particularly if the ‘next step’ is to raise the crisis to the nuclear dimension; will the US balk at the prospect of taking action that runs contrary to their own strategic interests? Contemporary global nuclear circumstances are marred by deep fissures in both; nuclear disarmament structures and the absence of rationality in nuclear postures of nuclear armed states. Add to this is the escalating global tensions; the re-emergence of a nuclear arms race; the heightened risks of proliferation; the aggressive spread of terrorism and retreat from globalisation that have catalysed the breakdown of the existing rule of international law. Seen together these factors have enhanced the probability of a nuclear exchange.

Challenges to the nuclear deterrence security framework take various forms. One notable problem is increasing multi polarity. The US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War were for the most part principally concerned about each other. However, the contemporary geopolitical balance is skewed as the number of nuclear-armed states has increased to nine, and yet nuclear doctrines have remained stratified in the Cold War mould. Strategies have to adjust, instead of an assumed binary confrontation; this has led to affected nations doubting whether in a situation between a non-nuclear state and a nuclear armed one, is there any reliability that a third power is likely to intervene on the side of the non-nuclear state with nuclear weapons and in doing so invite a nuclear confrontation?

There are today potential strategic chains of nuclear-armed states. With other technologically advanced nations such as South Korea, Japan, Germany, Indonesia and others contemplating the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The Anglo-French Northwood Declaration of July 2025 puts the final nail in the coffin of the US sponsored commitment to assurances of protection against a nuclear attack. Unfortunately the first casualty in this new multipolar circumstance is the diminishing credibility of the very idea of “Extended Deterrence”.

Making Light of the Use of Nuclear Weapons: Enhanced Case for “No First Use”

Most countries long held the view that nuclear weapons are exceptional and represent a dramatic type of escalation if used, and that such use would drive a distinctly different and unpredictable set of responses compared with the use of non-nuclear assets. The inability to predict or control escalation in nuclear war was held as an article of faith and was a critical aspect of nuclear weapons’ deterrent effect.

There is, however, a growing perspective that the use of low yield nuclear weapons is integral to large scale conventional war-fighting as it is at the lowest rung of the nuclear escalatory ladder. From this standpoint the blurring of conventional and nuclear deterrence that involves integration of conventional and nuclear war-fighting in concepts throws up an absurd solution as to how specific conflicts may be resolved, and therefore what constitutes effective deterrence in such scenarios. “Integration of low yield nuclear weapons to further a conventional campaign, or increasing reliance on nuclear weapons, implies that conventional operations be planned and executed in a manner that factors the possibility of the adversary resorting to a first strike with nuclear weapons”. This statement made in 2016 by the Assistant Secretary of Defence, Robert Scher, before the US Senate Armed Services Sub-Committee on Strategic Forces is irresponsible, since the policy claims to be able to forecast the response of the adversary. Unfortunately the release of a weapon of mass destruction sets into motion an uncontainable chain of events that rapidly overwhelms the very purpose for which conflict was fought.

Regardless of one’s posture, it is undeniable that contemporary geopolitical circumstances cast doubt on the overall credibility of nuclear deterrence in its Cold War manifestation; and that there is a strong case for re-examining and reviewing existing assumptions and approaches to nuclear deterrence; a first step is global adoption of a “No First Use” irrespective of weapon yield. After all war is an extension of politics by other means, and it can be no nation’s case to pursue it to destruction of the very purpose of polity!

A Return to Interminable Warfare: The Principle of Universality

Stepping back for the moment to take a long view of the globe from the standpoint of on-going major conflicts we note with some alarm that there are more than 50 armed struggles currently playing out that cover the entire spectrum of conventional warfare ranging from territorial annexation to anti-terrorist operations and wars against drug cartels. The co-existence of these conflicts, some destructive in the extreme, that girdle the globe in a wide belt of unabating violence poses a credibility problem vis-a-vis large geographic masses of material prosperity. In some cases we defend what is termed as fundamental principles of humanity being transgressed; while others we view by double standards based on clashing interests and the revenue these very wars generate for a politico-military-industrial complex. We note, with some disillusionment, countries that make up the NATO alliance have been ordered to increase their defence expenditure quite summarily by the White House to 5% of their GDP, at a time when their defence expenditure is less than 2%. At the same time other countries like Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Afghanistan, Somalia, Mali, Libya, Yemen and Sudan wilfully cultivate and sponsor terror groups as instruments of policy; and all the while the UN looks on. Murderous Conflicts that have raged on over the years particularly in Africa, and West Asia; for ‘known’ reasons, do not register on the global conscience. The wars in Gaza and Ukraine have been characterised by the fact of not only their protracted nature, intensity, intractability and their mass casualties but also being internationalised to an extent when many nations have had to take sides; all along the wars are fuelled by a steady supply of munitions just enough to sustain the purposeless wars. The reader will not fail to note the likeness to the wars in 1984.

New forms of technology, political narrative-control and cyber warfare threaten a country’s chosen path of governance, manipulate entire populaces and indeed beguile people into doing the controller’s wishes. Hegemonic powers have accorded themselves the right to wage wars at will under a self-professed doctrine of “anticipatory self-defence” with unstated bounds as exemplified in the conflicts in Ukraine, West Asia, Africa, Central America and the Indo-Pacific. International laws, treaties, rules of world order are militarily coerced on other nations with much self-righteous posturing, but the same laws are dismissed as irrelevant to the hegemon on account of their self-appropriated ‘exceptionalism’; the USA’s continued support for the war in Gaza despite being declared as genocide by the UN and Beijing’s scant regard for the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) while making sweeping claims of sovereignty over the South China Sea within its contrived ‘Nine-Dash LIne’ and arrogating rights to the sea’s abundant resources, despite the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague rubbishing the Nine Dash Line entitlement. China, however (having ratified the UNCLOS); rejects the Court’s authority.

These are some of the many cases in point. And as Naom Chomsky points out “the most elementary of moral truisms is the principle of universality: we must apply to ourselves the same standard as we apply to others”.

A Conclusion: The Refusal to Understand

There are many malevolent geopolitical crises currently confronting humanity. Not forgetting effects of climate change which most of the world, including China, is squarely confronting while the White House is in denial of it. It is in such tempestuous times that the world is being presented an escape in the design of Beijing’s ‘new form of human civilization’; an egress from the nature of contemporary reality and the impact of overwhelming power on the growth and development of nations and its people. Political views, notwithstanding no differentiation can be made between conservative autocracies and the authoritarianism of the Left when exercising unqualified power as we note the effects of an elected overlord sitting in the White House upending an established world order without a thought given to an alternative or an authoritarian in the ‘Forbidden City’ shaping a ‘new form of human civilization’. And yet, in this unsettling world, we see no evidence of societies or global institutions, confronting the forces of anarchy that the very same order placed on the seat of power; if it is because modern society and the systems it put in place are far too grounded in the short term partisan pre-occupations, then must it also be said of these institutions: By the refusal to understand they remain sane?

Triggering Nuclear War: Hazards of Husbanding Wargames

Posted on July 19, 2025 by strategicdialogues

Vice Admiral (retired) Vijay Shankar

Busting the canard that, between India and Pakistan the nuclear overhang is so fragile that a terrorist provocation by Pakistan cannot be met by a conventional response, for fear of triggering a nuclear exchange.

Wargaming

The roots of wargaming trace back to ancient India and China. The former refined the art to the classic board game of Chaturanga which in time evolved to the modern game of Chess, where a campaign was waged between two opponents through manoeuvres by the two arrays alternately; each piece had intrinsic abilities limited in their facility to engage the adversary. Much like the dynamics that drive a nation state whose comprehensive power is the aggregate of its individual strengths as defined by indices that take into account military, political, economic, cultural and leadership factors. So the game was played between two equivalent forces pitted against each other. The skills of a player was determined by his dexterity to manoeuvre, thrust, balance and out-think his adversary through deception and by attaining a stronger strategic posture within the rules of the game. Loss of the king led to what, in geopolitical terms, is referred to as the end of a regime.

Both China and India also gave to the world the classic texts “The Arthashastra” by Chanakya and “The Art of War” by Sun Tzu emphasizing the importance of strategic thought as a critical feature of statecraft. The two texts form a compilation of aphorisms and principles that outlined the framework for wielding power and, indeed, waging armed conflict. They also prescribed the determinants of good national politics and defined the groundwork for use of modelling and wargaming as a training and decision-making tool. As history progressed, various cultures, including the Greeks and Romans, developed their own wargames, demonstrating their utility in honing military strategy.

The 19th century marked a significant transformation in the field of wargaming, particularly with the Prussian Army. Theorists such as Carl von Clausewitz translated their experience in the field to formalizing the concept, recognizing that military decision-making could benefit from structured simulations of battle scenarios. This in turn led to the development of Kriegsspiel, a table top wargame that allowed officers to practice operational and tactical decision-making.

The essence of the wargame is in discerning the thought processes of a Planner in arriving at a strategic, operational or even tactical decision; and analyse how best to arrive at an optimal outcome that could serve the purpose of enriching the art of state craft, developing war fighting doctrines or even honing skills of a tactical Commander. The intention was not to steer the wargame in a direction that served to fulfil or satisfy a preconceived argument.

The South Asian Stability Wargame

In March 2013, the Centre on Contemporary Conflict at the US Naval Postgraduate School conducted a strategic wargame, euphemistically called the ‘South Asian Stability Workshop’. The event was scheduled in Colombo Sri Lanka.

The Wargame was politico-military in nature; its stated objective was to “examine crisis escalation dynamics in South Asia”. It involved the creation of a setting that was steered through events and three sequential response moves for which the country teams developed political and military directives. The directives for each move were analysed and adjudicated by Control setting-up specific situations for the next move. The third move was to lead to a possible decision to use nuclear weapons. Events were triggered by a planned Pakistan sponsored terrorist attack in a crowded sports stadium in India that resulted in the indiscriminate killing of a very large number of spectators including several VIPs. The entire process that shaped and drove the wargame was controlled within the rigid parameters of the following structure:

A scenario design that put in place the geographical setting, forces involved and the objectives of each side. This left little planning elbow room.
Country teams were assigned, however the participants neither had exhaustive domain expertise nor the behavioural bent of extant leadership.
Game mechanics which included rules, parameters, and decision-making processes were established to govern how players could interact with the scenario.
Gameplay followed a rather inflexible path of decision making, issue of orders to forces, and engagement in strategic and operational discussions. The game in effect yo-yoed from the tactical to the Strategic levels with unreal rapidity.
The use of conventional forces in response to the terrorist provocation at once saw the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons by Pakistan in the tactical battle area where Indian Independent Combat Groups (ICG) launched rapid retributive thrusts to strike at terror infra-structure and their supporters.
Analysis: Observers or analysts monitored the game, collecting data on the decisions made, outcomes, and the impact of those decisions on the scenario with only one purpose; to initiate a nuclear exchange.

As the game proceeded, the intention of Control became more than apparent; it was to compress the existing nuclear overhang to an extent where it provided the space for acts of State sponsored terror but none for a conventional kinetic response. The Game turned out to be a not so convincing argument for the tendentious notion that, between nuclear armed nations, there was no space for retaliatory action by conventional forces to terror attacks planned, armed, trained and sponsored by one of the States that had adopted the use of terror as an instrument of foreign policy.

Launch of a Nuclear Canard that Persuaded a Strategy of Restraint

After the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan in 1989, there was a surge in tensions along the Indo-Pak Line of Control in Kashmir which constituted, as interpreted by US ‘experts’, an imminent nuclear flash point. Two contributory factors provoked this ‘narrative’ said the American interlocutors; firstly, the antagonists involved were undeclared nuclear armed states and secondly, events of 1989 that led to the withdrawal of Russia from Afghanistan had released the victorious Mujahidin for deployment elsewhere and in Kashmir; it also set in motion a hubris in the Pakistan ‘deep-state’ that translated to a brutal insurgency in the Indian state of Kashmir. The latter resulted in genocide and mass exodus of Kashmiri Pandits out of the State leading to the shoring-up of Indian security forces in the State. To substantiate the American narrative a dubious report was released by the US State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research titled “India-Pakistan Relations: A Delicate Balance” that suggested (rather contrarily) that in the unlikely event of “hostilities, India may escalate the conventional war by triggering events to take out all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons (ironically, as recent as end 1989, the Bush Sr administration had signed off the fact that Pakistan did not possess nuclear weapons) facilities in coordinated surgical strikes.” This document was further addled in May of 1990, when the then Deputy NSA Robert Gates, came scurrying to the sub-continent on a covert Quixotic mission to defuse a mythical nuclear war.

And thus began a long saga of misinformation and half-truths that emphasised the canard that between India and Pakistan the nuclear overhang was so fragile that a terrorist provocation by Pakistan must not bring about a conventional response by India for fear of triggering a nuclear exchange. Unfortunately, from the 1993 Mumbai bombings, hi-jacking of IC 184 in 1999, through the Kargil ‘invasion; to the assault on the Indian Parliament in 2001, the 2008 three day carnage in the financial capital of Mumbai and a host of other terrorist onslaughts by Pakistan based terror outfits (Jaish-e-Mohammed, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Hizbul Mujahedin) the self-shackling mantra of denying conventional response to terrorist attacks took root in India as the inane ‘Strategy-of-Restraint’ which contributed in large measure to paralysis of military policy when confronted with incidents of cross border terror attacks.

To Bleed India by Inflicting a Thousand Cuts: Instrumentation of Terror Groups

Carl von Clausewitz’s unerringly wise counsel ought to have fallen on Indian ears, that even the “simplest” strategic decision making can be bewilderingly difficult. And so it must be with Pakistan’s threat of nuclear weapons usage in protraction of a terrorist attack sponsored by them in the first instance; despite there being no precedence of such action, nor incentive of benefit or even inclination to escalate to a nuclear exchange. The Pakistan Establishment’s doctrine has remained committed to two cardinal dogmas, firstly the instrumentalisation of Islam using jihadi proxies as tools of a policy (Fair Christine, Fighting to the End, Pg. 80-89) to “bleed India by inflicting a thousand cuts”; and secondly, to support the discredited ideology of the “Two Nation” theory in order to sustain popular appetite for unending conflict with India. In this frame of reference, the question of intensifying the conflict to the level when nuclear self-destruction is assured appears aberrant.

The link between sub-conventional warfare and nuclear war fighting is at best a tenuous one. Conceptually, no amount of tinkering or reconstitution of nuclear policy can deter a conventional response to terror attacks. Such a notion would appear far-fetched because of the very nature of the weapon involved. Pakistan has in its arsenal tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) with the stated purpose of countering an Indian conventional strike. Almost as if to suggest that they control the levers of nuclear escalation. This is an odd proposition since India does not differentiate between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons, (the bed rock of its “No First Use” policy).

In the end analysis, the use of nuclear weapons introduces a new and uncontrollable dimension. Logically, if a Pakistan sponsored terror attack is the triggering event of a sequence of reactions, then it must equally be clear that their nuclear red lines give space for a conventional response. After all, the premise that a terror attack is seamlessly backed by nuclear weapons is not only ludicrous but is not even the Pakistan case. For, when dealing with the threat of use of nuclear weapons, to suggest that ambiguity and First Use provide options, is to suggest that nuclear war fighting, almost in conventional terms, is an option. This is denial of the nature of nuclear weapons and statements that have emanated from Pakistan’s leadership support the idea that only a threat that jeopardises the very existence of that State can provoke the First Use of nuclear weapons, by which is implied;

Loss of vast territories
Substantial destruction of the military
Economic strangulation
Destabilising of the nation can provoke the first use of nuclear weapons.

Against the reality of conventional war with its limited goals, moderated ends and the unlikelihood of it being outlawed in the foreseeable future, the separation of the conventional from the nuclear is a logical severance. Nuclear weapons are to deter and not for use; intent is the key; transparency and an abhorrence of ambiguity are the basis of its credibility. These remain the foundational principles that a nuclear weapon state must adhere to. Given the politics of the region, historical animosities and the influence of jihadi principles on the military in Pakistan, the dangers of adding military perfidy is more than just a possibility; however, to link nuclear malfeasance appears fanciful.

And yet the bizarre hypothesis still persists that relations between the two nuclear armed neighbours are plagued by a nuclear nightmare; of Pakistan in possession of a hair-trigger, opaque, nuclear arsenal that has embraced tactical use under decentralised military control, steered by a doctrine seeped in ambiguity and guided by a military strategy that carouses and finds unity with jihadists, not forgetting that the effect of an enfeebled civilian leadership in Pakistan that is incapable of action to remove the military finger from the nuclear trigger only adds to this premise. But, it does not take a great deal of intellectual exertion to declare that this nightmare in the wake of Operation Sindoor stands busted.

The catch is, as Cohen so succinctly put it (The idea of Pakistan, Cohen Stephen, Pgs. 97-130) “Pakistan will continue to be a state in possession of a uniformed bureaucracy even when civilian governments are perched on the seat of power. Regardless of what may be desirable, the army will continue to set the limits on what is possible in Pakistan.” At the core of this outlook is the rather obsessive “utilisation of Islamist militant groups as tools of foreign policy” (Fighting to the end, Fair, Christine Pg. 85) and the fatal contradiction of neutralising some inconvenient jihadi groups while instrumentalising others to further their revisionist policies.

Operation Sindoor; Larger Impact of the 88 Hour War

From a long term war fighting perspective ‘Operation Sindoor’ signals a strategic metamorphosis in the nature and manner in which a nation’s military must reform in order to fight and win a modern conflict that is limited both in time and objectives.

On 22 April 2025, Pakistan sponsored terrorists killed, in a most barbaric manner, 26 tourists in the idyllic meadows of Baisaran near the hill station of Pahalgam in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. What was singularly heinous about the massacre was the identification by religion of the victims and selection of men only shot at point blank range in front of wives, women and children with instructions to carry their message of religious odium to the rest of India. This assault was not a random incident of terrorist violence but carried with it a diabolical urge to arouse large scale sectarian passions within the country. The Resistance Front (TRF) was quick to claim responsibility for the carnage. The Front is an offshoot of the UN proscribed terror organisation, Lashker-e-Taiyba. It claimed control and responsibility not once on 22April but again the very next day. However, TRF denial on 26 April came after the Pakistani security establishment pressured the LeT-linked terrorist group to distance itself from the mass slaughter; for the purpose of the terror attack had failed on three counts. Firstly, the objective of undermining normalcy returning to Jammu & Kashmir, particularly, to impact the mainstay of the economy, tourism (a record 23 million tourists visiting the valley in 2024) had come a cropper as the flow of vacationers was quickly restored. Secondly, anticipated sectarian passions were never aroused as massive protests by Kashmiris erupted across the Valley against the attack. And lastly, the international community’s widespread and unconditional condemnation of the attack along with expressions of sympathy towards the victims. The immediate Indian reaction to the massacre came on 23 April with the Indus Water Treaty (IWT) being held in abeyance followed by a promise of a kinetic response at a time and place of choice.

Operation Sindoor was more than a swift and precise military response to another cross-border terrorist attack. It marked a strategic inflection point. In just 88 hours, India used indigenous systems to strike hardened targets across the border with precision, speed, and overwhelming effect. No US systems. No foreign supply lines. Just BrahMos missiles, Akashteer air defence units, Rudram anti-radiation missiles, the Netra Airborne Early Warning & Control System (AEW&CS) and loitering munitions designed or assembled at home. The Operation was conducted in three distinct phases.

Phase I (Night 06/07 May), Operation Sindoor launched in retaliation for the Pahalgam massacre; targeted nine terrorist centres from Bahwalpur in the south, Muridke and Sialkot in the Lahore sector and Muzaffarabad along with 4 other sites in POK.
Phase II (08-09 May), Pakistan military response to the Indian attacks on terror sites with missiles, drones and UAVs, as it took ownership of the terror infrastructure.
Phase III (10 May), Indian suppression and counter-air operations aimed at destruction of select Pakistan air defence networks followed by crippling attacks on strategic Pak air assets, infrastructure and Command & Control networks. Pak DGMO calls for a ceasefire. India agrees for cessation of fire.

During Phase I, India targeted nine terrorist strongholds. Five in Pak occupied Jammu and Kashmir which included Sawai Nala camp in Muzaffarabad- a training centre for Lashkar-e-Taiba. Syedna Bilal Camp in Muzaffarabad- This was a staging area of Jaish-e-Mohammed. Gulpur camp in Kotli – This was a base camp of LeT that was active in Rajouri and Poonch areas of Jammu. Barnala camp in Bhimber. And Abbas camps in Kotli- Fidayeen of the LeT were prepared here. Targets within Pakistan included Sarjal Camp and Mehmoona Joya camp, both in Sialkot. Markaz Taiba Centre in Muridke – Terrorists who participated in the 2008 Mumbai terror attacks were trained here. Markaz Subhanallah in Bahawalpur; the HQ of Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM) where recruitment, training, and indoctrination of terrorists targeting India was undertaken. Significantly the last two were major centres of terror activities and housed the headquarters of the LeT and the JeM. Battle damage Assessment revealed that all these targets were hit with uncanny accuracy and minimal collateral damage. Phase II and III emphasised, with telling impact, the inviolability of Indian air defences and the effectiveness of Indian counter air and offensive air operations.

Neutral analysts have determined that India’s Operation Sindoor was a decisive triumph for India, because Pakistan could neither penetrate Indian air defences nor could they cause any disruption to the offensive action taken by the Indian military. Indian airspace was free of any Pakistan aggressive action, while Indian counter air operations had rendered Pakistan open to bombardment by Brahmos, UAVs, hovering munitions and other missiles.

Eleven Pak air bases had been struck to the extent of annulling their operational capabilities. Also, five air-defence systems of Chinese origin had been destroyed opening vast gaps in their air defence environment. While at least two of their AWACS had been destroyed along with several fighter aircrafts either in the air or on ground; the strikes were accompanied by large scale spoofing and deception manoeuvres. More importantly their command centres including the vital one at the Nur Khan air base that houses its nuclear command facilities along with strategic mobility control and communication networks was rendered dysfunctional.

Meanwhile, Pakistani air-defences—built largely around older Chinese systems like the LY-80, HQ-9/P, and FM-90—were powerless to detect, deter, or respond to the strikes. In the skies over Pakistan, India didn’t just dominate, but its counter-air operations redefined and placed awkward questions for regional deterrence.

Perspectives for Arm-Chair Strategists

The ‘88-hour’ engagement came as a breath of fresh air to strategists long entrenched in the belief that limited armed engagements could only be decided by the occupation of territories, weight of destruction and casualties rather than the impact of demoralisation, exposing vulnerabilities of defences and out manoeuvring of the adversary. In a reverse analogy, just as the machine gun and trench warfare provided the negative and bizarre logic for the clash of mass against mass resulting in a meat-grinder military doctrine; swift and complete counter air operations followed by targeted offensive air operations are the key to success in limited modern operations. Remember in Operation Sindoor counter air and offensive air operations followed in rapid succession of minutes rather than hours which had a paralysing and unbalancing effect on the adversarythat quickly resulted in the first calls for a ceasefire.

For the arm-chair strategist, some of who bewailed the fact that, cessation of operations came at a time when the Pakistan air space was wide open to an extent when a joint air-land thrust ought to have expanded their objectives to the occupation of territory and salients in POK. This is symptomatic of a lack of understanding of the nature of modern power, its application and its deterrent impact; that is, to prevent certain threats from materializing by posing an even greater threat. There is no inevitable symmetry between offensive and defensive power as both are influenced as much by resolve as by magnitude of power and immeasurable considerations such as surprise, geography, limitations on purpose and indeed the degree to which objectives are pursued. These characteristics of power will also determine the risks that the state is willing to take. Perils are heightened as offensive power gains the edge over the defense and penetrates to an extent when friction clutches-in. In operation Sindoor, objectives were limited, risks of getting embroiled in a drawn out slugging match of attrition particularly on land was to be avoided, remember the higher political directive “Samay seemit hai aur laksh bade” (Time is limited and our aims are large) almost as if to suggest that the engagement must be brought quickly to a decisive conclusion without jeopardizing our long term developmental agenda. Assessment of risks had to account for possible escalation and how far the adversary’s nuclear bluff could be called. Importantly, deterrence provided incentive for innovation, both political and operational to India that ran consistent with rapidly changing technology, as long as it was brisk in time and limited in space. The key consideration was that Sindoor was retaliation to an act of terror; so-much-so that had Pakistan chosen not to respond militarily, the operation would have concluded after Phase I.

As for the “narrative-war” which some severe critics of Operation Sindoor believe ‘India lost the plot’; is there really any such thing that has a lasting impact in this age of transparency? In the American lexicon ‘narrative’ implies “a story or account of events, or the like, whether true or fictitious”. Surely the final arbiter was the stark photo evidence of the demolition of the JeM headquarters in Bahwalpur, devastation of the LeT headquarters at Muridke and other terror camps and critically the suppression of the Pakistan air-defences and the neutralisation of their strategic air stations including the Nur Khan air base. After all it was the Pakistan Director General of Military Operations that sued for a cease-fire.

Legacy of Op Sindoor

A flawed strategic anti-terrorist doctrine will lead to not just advancing enticement for similar acts of terrorism but also absorb great energies and resources of the State in attempting to reconcile the act with advocacy of restraint; besides projecting an underlying softness of the State. In the absence of a doctrine, the case reduces to responding by determining the absolute rights and wrongs as determined without considering that the very sovereignty of the nation (by which is implied the ultimate authority of the State for the maintenance of order) is on trial. This makes for a recipe of inaction; unfortunately it was, to a great measure, the ill-conceived policy followed by India in the past.

Perhaps the compelling legacy of Operation Sindoor is the new norm it has set for the Indian government, the use of force against terrorist-linked targets in Pakistan proper has now moved from “anomaly” to the “rule”. Whereas past crises of similar nature would elicit symbolic action, future attacks on Indian soil – especially those traced to organizations and infrastructure across the border, will invite a response of equal or greater intensity to target and degrade entities enabling terrorist action; which includes support and financing elements.

Technology and Survivability of Nuclear Forces

There can be no absolute cure for war; yet in the absence of a total remedy for conventional war, there had to be hope to prevent catastrophe; from this developed the idea of deterrence, the instrument to enable deterrence was the nuclear weapon. And therefore the first and most vital condition from a nation’s security standpoint is to institute measures that provide a guarantee to the state (as well as the adversary) that a response to a nuclear attack will be a devastating retaliation in kind. As Churchill, in 1955, put it “…by a process of sublime irony, the world was facing a situation where safety will be the sturdy child of terror (balance of terror), and survival the twin brother of annihilation (MAD)”.

The question then arises; will emerging technologies raise expectations to enable the employment of forces that will significantly reduce the survivability of an adversary’s nuclear forces in a conflict? If not, then is the perspective that Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) remains a powerful reason for a deterrent relationship to hold valid? Also, if missiles today can perform all of the technical functions of the strategic nuclear bomber with greater speed and more precision, then are we witnessing the phasing-out of the manned air vector? But at the same time has adequate thought been given to the change in character and vulnerability of a nuclear second strike policy based entirely on the missile (ballistic or cruise) launched from mobile carriers and driven by Artificial Intelligence? Operation Sindoor, within a matter of hours had exposed the vulnerability of the Pakistan air-defences and their National Command Authority. Did this in turn expose their nuclear arsenal to counterforce action? Also, will not the reliability of a counterforce strategy decline with time, technology and transparency? These are complex questions for the political leadership for whom nuclear strategy may be but one of his concerns, excessive complexity may itself lead to paralysis as Clausewitz had noted.

Conclusion

We began with the propagation of an intricately fabricated canard that “between nuclear armed nations, there was no space for retaliatory action by conventional forces to terror attacks planned and sponsored by one of the States that had adopted the use of terror as an instrument of foreign policy.” Despite the fact of the disingenuousness of the sham; its plausibility lay in the proposition that linkage between Pakistan’s use of terror organizations as a tool of state policy to wage war on India has perverse consequences that link it to nuclear escalation. This bizarre correlation, Pakistan will have the world believe, comes to play if and when India chooses to respond with conventional forces to a terror strike puppeteered by their “Deep State.” Fatefully this policy has led to a self-destructive urge that has decomposed the diversity of Pakistan society. Not only are some terror clients at war against the state but some have led the persistent call to violence against Shias, Ahmedias, Barelvis, Agha Khanis, Borees, Baluchis and not forgetting Hindus and Christians. The Army has shown absolutely no predilection to eliminate these outfits; only because they serve their purpose in India and for fear that any act against their terror clients is acceptance that the ‘two-nation’ is misbegotten and indeed spurious.

At the heart of the matter is Pakistan’s, or at least its army’s, rejection of any separation of the Maulvi from the state. There are two critical reasons for this; firstly Muslims are seen to constitute a separate nation despite the fact of the creation of Bangla-Desh and the Muslim demography of India almost equalling that of Pakistan. Secondly, the army’s self-appointed role to defend the “two-nation” ideology. Six days before the carnage of Pahalgam, the Pakistan Army Chief, on 16 April 2025, ranted on this ludicrous theme at a public convention of overseas Pakistanis, notwithstanding the successive military defeats it has suffered at India’s hands or the political and diplomatic setbacks it has faced has convinced it to revise its defunct ideological dogma. Operation Sindoor is yet another case of having suffered crippling strikes to its terror infrastructure as well as its vital air assets and air defence networks in just 88 hours. Yet, defeat for Pakistan is only with the death of its ideology and this can only occur if the army wills it. No amount of economic hardships (the state has been to the IMF for a bail out on 25 occasions in its short existence) nor has the failure of its many dictatorships that ruled it for 34 of its 78 years of existence in any way prodded the army to surrender its power or even allow a political system to take root in that country. The improbable paradox is that Pakistan is a case of an army that depends on an interminable conflict with India, a failing economy, splintering society, rapacious politicians and geopolitics of international opportunism for its very existence.

So the question that begs to be asked is why the leading democracy in the West is so disinclined to bring about a revision in the politics of Pakistan. And why, indeed, has it so vigorously supported the nuclear canard even though terrorism is a common universal scourge? And does the US Government need to be reminded that during the twenty-year “War on terror” in Afghanistan the Pakistan state and its army played a treacherous and duplicitous role that milked the US administration of over $32 billion while all the time providing safe havens and logistics to the very groups that they were fighting the war against. And who can forget where Osama-bin-Laden had gone into hiding, before he was found and killed. The White House, historically, works with and through the Pakistani army to manipulate that state’s foreign policy; it served a strategic “Pentagon-led” purpose up to the break-up of the Soviet Union. Is there a reason why the US is unlikely to lose interest in the failing Pakistan and is that because of the rooted relationship that their deep states have nurtured and benefited from over the years? Or does the sustenance of the nuclear canard form a part of, a yet unseen, strategic scheme?

Posted on April 25, 2025 by strategicdialogues

The Merz Declaration

Vice Admiral (Retd) Vijay Shankar

Scramble for the Nazi Atomic Bomb: A Stunted Programme

In the years leading up to World War II, Germany was at the forefront of theoretical and experimental physics pertaining to atomic energy. By the winter of 1938, German physicist Otto Hahn had discovered the physical reaction of nuclear fission after bombarding Uranium with neutrons. This discovery showed the Nazi government that weapons of mass destruction could be created from relatively small matter, leading them to recognise the awesome potential for devastation of nuclear chain reactions when engineered for military application. Werner Heisenberg (a contemporary) regarded as one of the most important nuclear physicists in history calculated that nuclear fission chain reactions when slowed down and controlled in a “uranium machine” (nuclear reactor), generate energy; when uncontrolled, the outcome was a “nuclear explosion” many times more powerful than conventional explosives. After Heisenberg reported that the enrichment of U-235 in Uranium was the best and only way to create explosives exponentially stronger than any every seen before, Hitler launched his atomic weapon programme. However, months later Heisenberg told the Nazi Weapons Bureau that an atomic bomb could not be built until 1945 and even then would demand a massive amount of critical resources and investments be diverted to the project. The uncertainties involved and the strategic situation in 1942 relegated priority of the programme.

Despite availability of core intellectual theoretical resources, the failure of Germany to weaponize an atomic device may be attributed to three causes: the absence of a dedicated team of nuclear engineers resulting in the inability to rapidly realise the accessories; paucity of industrial support and significant investment to drive the project at the desired pace; lowering priority of the programme.

Restraints on German Nuclear Weapons Programme Post World War II

As part of the accession negotiations of West Germany to the Western European Union at the London and Paris Conferences, the country was forbidden (by Protocol No III to the revised Treaty of Brussels of 23 October 1954 and Article VII of the Brussels Treaty of 1948) to possess or manufacture nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction, with the proviso that the USA would stand guarantor of that nation’s security. However, West Germany was plagued by doubts of whether they would in fact be left defenceless should a nuclear threat arise from the USSR.

By 1967, relations between the United States and West Germany were difficult because Washington was urging Bonn to support the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), which many conservatives in the ruling coalition opposed on grounds that the treaty was discriminatory by permanently denying West Germany the nuclear option. Then Chancellor Kurt Kiesinger was troubled that even if Moscow did not “intend to use threats or blackmail against Germany, the situation could change” and Germany “must consider how we could defend ourselves.” Against West German protestations of their need for nuclear weapons was the determined stand of the USSR that “we will not allow the Federal Republic of Germany to possess nuclear weapon”.

Germany since the onset of the Cold War has been under the “Nuclear Umbrella” provided by the NATO Alliance, specifically by the USA. And Germany, on her part, has participated in the NATO nuclear weapons sharing arrangements and trains for strategic preparation and launch of nuclear weapons. United Germany is also restricted by the “Two plus Four Treaty” that supplanted the Potsdam Agreement of 1945. The Treaty prohibits nuclear rearmament of reunified Germany.

The Leaky Nuclear Umbrella

In February 1947, an exhausted, broke and heavily in debt Britain conveyed to the US State Department two diplomatic messages: one on Greece, the other on Turkey. Confessing that it could no longer continue its support for the Greek government forces that were fighting an armed Communist insurgency, Britain had announced plans to pull out of India and to wind down its presence in West Asia. The United States perceived an immediate threat of Greece and Turkey falling into Soviet control; and with it, potentially, the Suez Canal.

Almost overnight, the United States stepped into the vacuum left by the departing British. Declaring, “it must be a policy of the United States, to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressure.” It was the start of what became known as the Truman Doctrine. On the face of it was the idea that helping to defend democracy was vital to the United States’ national interests; however, the significance was, transition of leadership of the Western world from Britain to the United States, and so Europe has been protected by an American nuclear umbrella since the atomic blasts of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. It was the United States that promised NATO allies that any nuclear threat or aggression by the Soviet Union, and later, by Russia, would be deterred and, should the need arise, answered by the U.S. in kind. Today that partnership teeters on a razor’s edge as Trump’s America seeks rapprochement with Moscow. For with reconciliation between the two nuclear super powers comes a commitment to bring the Ukraine conflict to immediate closure, deny that hapless country membership of NATO; and in its wake stimulate a potential break-up of the post-World War II and post USSR order in Europe.

Reports are today emerging that Ukraine had survived the three years of a sapping war on account of an American partnership that was intricately enmeshed at the operational level and involved continuously in the planning process, providing real time intelligence and the movement of massive logistic support. The partnership at every stage not only controlled the progress of operations but also extended to clandestine specialised backup. In addition the Partnership also suggested that “Armageddon” would ensue should Russia contemplate nuclear use.

With the current US administration, the nature of the Partnership and with it, the bonds that held together NATO’s common posture towards the conflict, now lie cloven in tatters. The rift in the transatlantic security relationship has today ruptured to what appears an unbridgeable chasm.

Deepening Rift in Transatlantic Security Relationships

The Chancellor-in-waiting, Friedrich Merz government, rattled by the prospect of America withdrawing security guarantees in the wake of a possible Russia-Ukraine peace treaty, is preparing a fundamental readjustment of Germany’s defence posture. Declaring the US indifferent to the continent’s fate, Merz “questioned the future of NATO and demanded Europe boost its own defences. German’s sense of deep domestic insecurity prompted him to suggest that he’d look to France and Britain to form a European nuclear umbrella, to replace US guarantees”; despite knowing full well that both countries sorely lacked capability, commitment and control to provide such a shield.

In truth, no alternatives exist ever since both France and the UK disavowed the deployment of land or air based vectors outside their borders. Even their existing sea-based deterrent lacks credibility without US surveillance and support infrastructure; as a matter of fact the UK deterrent, based on the “Trident D5” SLBN, is critically dependant on arsenal and vital infrastructure located in the USA and the platform the 4xVanguard class of SSBNs were due for retirement by 2024; their replacement the “Dreadnought” class is not expected in service for another decade (first of Class keel laid in March 2025). As for the French Deterrent Force, it is based on 4xTroimphant class SSBNs and Rafale fighter bombers. It is therefore, a mistake for Merz, to assume that the Anglo-French nuclear arsenal could replace American guarantees.

Clearly, the suggestion was that the weight of the German economy could lend leadership and control to a potential joint nuclear deterrent. The indications are more than discernable that Merz is counselling a limited shared nuclear deterrent. Are we on the threshold of witnessing the emergence of Germany as the latest in a looming string of nuclear armed nations?

Collapse of a Nuclear Theology

Since 1946, a nuclear theology crafted on the argument, that “atomic weapons were useful only as a deterrent to prevent war” (Bernard Brodie, The Absolute Weapon: Atomic Power and World Order); a canonic conviction that laid the foundation of the nuclear deterrence theory is, today, in the throes of collapse. Is deterrence no longer a milestone on the road to nuclear disarmament? Is Germany embarking on the resurrection of a long buried programme that could sound the death knell for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and in its fallout expose the hypocrisy of “Extended Deterrence”? And what becomes of the assurance to non-nuclear allies, who having abjured nuclear weapons, find themselves denuded of U.S. nuclear security guarantees? What is equally astounding is the naïveté of the allies to hold faith in the belief that America would shoulder the responsibility of putting its own forces, population and territory, at risk on behalf of an ally with neither a quid-pro-quo nor castling arrangement. Are we missing something here?

Was the upholding of ‘extended deterrence’ the price of leadership and indeed, the ‘exceptionalism’ that the USA enjoyed since the end of World War II? Has the global hegemon abdicated its responsibility?

‘With NATO or With Nuclear Weapons’: Ukraine’s Delusional Defiance

Post the controversial tongue lashing that the Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky received in the White House on 28 February 2025 along with the stipulation that neither was there place for Ukraine in the NATO nor would there be a continuation of US weapons supplies; Zelensky has, reportedly, returned to his defiant declaration, ‘Ukraine in NATO or nuclear weapons’. Ukraine possesses the capability to build a nuclear bomb. It could utilise spent plutonium fuel from its civilian nuclear power reactors, estimated at approximately seven tons together with its longstanding expertise in nuclear physics dating back to Soviet times, Ukrainian scientists would face minimal technical barriers in developing nuclear weapons. However, the country lacks the necessary reprocessing facilities to extract and weaponise this material. Adapting existing Ukrainian missile platforms for nuclear delivery would, however, pose minimal technical challenges, as the country already manufactures several missiles that could be modified to carry a nuclear warhead.

An indigenous Ukrainian nuclear programme would face critical ramifications from its allies and expose strategic vulnerabilities. Loss of strategic support will be a reality if Ukraine pursues nuclear weapons; jeopardising both military and financial aid. There is also the near certainty of the Kremlin’s pre-emptive retaliation due to its stated hypersensitivity to nuclearisation of a bordering state.

Amidst this confounding situation, Poland stands out as Ukraine’s staunchest confederate. Is there a possibility that a nuclear axis builds between the two to generate an independent nuclear deterrent? After all, such a move involving a NATO member not only compounds nuclear risks but also holds the promise of invoking the principle of collective defence, dragging a reluctant Alliance into the conflict.

One of the possible fall-outs of the deepening rift within the transatlantic alliance and the collapse of the American strategic nuclear umbrella is the “folding up” of NATO.

End of a Nuclear Heresy

Alarmingly, as nuclear armed nations toy with the idea that, the hitherto doctrines of a limited nuclear war and nuclear coercion are no longer heretical policies; they fail to note the perilous impact it has on potential target nations. In the quest for security against nuclear coercion or the incipient menace of a looming ‘limited’ nuclear war, it will not be unusual for non-nuclear weapon states to consider developing arsenals of their own. Such action would undermine longstanding non-proliferation efforts and not only increase the chances of stumbling into a nuclear holocaust but, the absence of a credible nuclear hegemon would stimulate incessant anxiety of looming devastation.

In a chilling statement that captured sensitivity to the ominous signs of a breakdown of the existing nuclear order, the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists in January 2025 declared that the Doomsday Clock had moved by a second from 90 to 89 seconds to midnight. The Clock is a universally recognized indicator of the world’s vulnerability to global catastrophe caused by man-made technologies. Will the breakdown of extended deterrence and consequent nuclear proliferation be the tipping point that makes the likelihood of nuclear catastrophe not just a possibility but a probable reality?

America’s Liberation Day: Has Atlas Shrugged?

To add chaos to an already dangerously confused nuclear development; the early April 2025 pronouncement of Liberation Day in America sounded more a declaration of trade war against virtually the entire world. The notion of American exceptionalism that the US is a global exemplar of democracy, security and a convincing global nuclear regulator; is today precariously poised on very thin ice.

America’s “Liberation Day” may be seen from two perspectives; the first is that decades of open U.S. markets has provided an incentive for unbalanced foreign tariffs and other protectionist measures that prevented the import of U.S. goods. “Only aggressive retaliation can reverse the damage and bring manufacturing back to American shores” is the battle cry declared by the Trump administration; some countries have retaliated by corresponding increase in tariffs on American imports, while others have been more subtle in their response; such as Japan which is the largest holder of US treasury bonds and its largest investor, has transferred a large bulk of their capital investments from the US to markets in China, India and the ASEAN countries. And more importantly, it has also chosen to trade with other partners in bi-lateral currencies; renouncing the USD.

The second perspective is founded on the faulty premise of the first, that manufacturing will, in fact, return and as a natural consequence permit tax cuts within the US. Unfortunately what is being sought is a denial of the reality that, the deliberate move-out of labour intensive manufacturing to China and the other developing economies, was the primary cause of the dazzling growth of the US economy over the last half century. To illustrate, in 1970 the American GDP was $1tr and by 2023 rocketed to $27tr. It was this very reality that won America the Cold War; caused the collapse of the Soviet economy; propelled the surge of its economy as it rapidly transited from an industrial to a service and technology driven economy. To turn back the clock and reinvent a manufacturing economy will only result in the diminution of the world’s sole hegemon. The macro downside to “Liberation Day” as the US administration attempts to completely turn the world trading system topsy-turvy in order to bring about , what it perceives as reciprocity and justice; is the shrugging off the burden of world leadership.

An Understanding as a Conclusion

The ability to retract from the idea that nuclear weapons are a useable coercive tool of the state is linked to three larger concessions: the State will not be the first to use nuclear weapons; the State will neither aid nor abet the proliferation of nuclear weapons and lastly a firm belief in the larger idea of global nuclear regulation. The first two are based on the conviction that the weapon is an ultimate resort of dissuasion; while the third places a demand for ‘nuclear order’. This understanding flows from Brodie’s postulation that, the only purpose of nuclear weapons is to deter nuclear war. However, the global impact of recent policies relating to the on-going war in Ukraine and the emergence of new nuclear armed states; appear aimed at instilling fear and a willingness to persistently push the adversary to the nuclear brink. At a time when the end of an era of US led nuclear regulation signals the breakdown of the current nuclear order and a quick march forward of the Doomsday Clock.

Policy makers do not appear to recognise the need for avoiding a nuclear conflagration. Simultaneously the meltdown of a world economic order that gave space for a global hegemon lies vacant. This throws up a paradoxical question; will the possession of a nuclear arsenal make the world a safer place? It is true that the balance of nuclear arsenals have deterred a global scale catastrophe (thus far at least); yet it is equally true, that its coercive effect and the absence of a regulatory regime increase the probability of proliferation that may push nuclear war from catastrophic loss of life to existential closure.

The choice is clear.

Strategic Dialogues

On Geopolitics, Security and Strategy

Category Archives: Nuclear Issues

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