Category Archives: Geopolitics and Strategic Impulses

Access Denial Strategy – the Indian Variant

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To Shield the Shalmali Tree

In its life and death struggle with the divine wind, the fabled Shalmali tree severs its lush branches to leave itself skeletal, much like the Indian tree of State that has persistently denied itself a strategy whose purpose is to shield the State, while defining a willingness to confront and contend with the growing Chinese designs in the Eastern Oceanic spaces. [i]

By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

Keywords: Access Denial Strategy, China’s Security Narrative, Assassin’s Mace, Third Island Chain, Force Planning and Structures, Globalization and Nationalism, Phased implementation of the Access Denial Strategy

Download full article here: Shankar, Anti Access Denial

Excerpts:

 ‘They Have Broken, Over and Over Again, the First Principles of Strategy’ [ii]

 On 01 November 1914, in the early stages of the First World War, a strange engagement occurred off the west coast of Chile. The battle of Coronel was destined to be lost before the first salvo was fired on account of blundering and amateurish operational planning on the part of the British Admiralty. The plan was  in discord with their larger maritime strategy.

The British Empire for its war effort depended largely on the unimpeded flow of resources, man and material across the oceans from and to its near and far flung outposts of empire. Accordingly, the fundamentals of its global maritime strategy lay in ensuring that its Sea Lines of Communication (SLOC) were always under its control, giving it freedom of manoeuvre to strike at a challenging imperial power at points of its choice, endowing it with domination over the geography of conflict. To this end a vast support network of bases stretching from Hong Kong to Singapore to Aden and the British Indian Ocean Territories to the Falklands and to their Pacific possessions had been established; this was backed by a web of radio stations, coaling posts and transoceanic telegraph cables. All this was in addition to the primary colonial continental holdings. Implementation of this strategy demanded superior fire power, mobility, surveillance, intelligence and an omnipresence that permitted rapid concentration and decisive action; all of which was woefully lacking in-theatre and, in my analysis, actually precipitated the events.

At the outbreak of the War in August 1914, Admiral Graf von Spee, Commander of the German naval squadron in the Far East, found his command in a very tenuous position. Germany exerted very little power in Asia and the Pacific, precariously holding on to a naval station at Tsingtao, China, with no guarantee of logistic support from the Fatherland. Spee’s ships required large quantities of coal to operate, supply of which could not come from either German possessions or allies in the region. Due to the demands of re-coaling Spee felt compelled to either order his ships to operate individually as privateers or to stay together and attempt to disrupt and sever British sea lines of communications. Spee decided keeping his forces together could best achieve his mission to strike at British trade and bases in the vast area of the Pacific and the South Atlantic. His forces comprised of two modern and fast armoured cruisers, the Scharnhorst and the Gueisenau, along with three light cruisers. The British Commander in the South Atlantic in 1914, Rear Admiral Christopher Cradock was, reportedly, a fine seaman and an effective leader of men; but in contrast to Von Spee’s  squadron, Cradock’s two armoured cruisers and its consorts were old, slow, gunnery-wise inefficient and totally inadequate for the larger control assignment in the Pacific and South Atlantic Oceans or even for the engagement that awaited in the wings. To put matters in perspective the total weight of the British broadsides was 2,400 pounds – merely half that of von Spee’s ships.

On the afternoon of November 1, around 100 miles offshore of Coronel, Chile, the two squadrons sighted each other, closed and engaged. In the event the British were handed a crushing and humiliating defeat losing their Admiral and his flagship, the Good Hope and the Monmouth the two armoured cruisers and the remaining consorts in rout. In the final analysis it was hollowness of the strategic posture its worthlessness in terms of the forces allocated and the poor leadership at the highest level which failed to perceive the chasm between strategic intent and operational plans that obtained [iii]. Troop convoys and war material from Australia and New Zealand were held up until appropriate protection and escort could be guaranteed and the in theatre threat from von Spee’s surface raiding force neutralized. This was clearly a paradox since the strategic balance of maritime power remained heavily weighted in favour of the British both before and after the engagement. To some extent in the early stages of the war it may be said that German access denial strategy had worked; for in time the Royal Navy were able to bring to bear their superiority and in the absence of a network of support infrastructure the German squadron was hunted down and neutralized in the battle of the Falklands.

If at all there is a strategic lesson to be learned, then it is that, for an  Access Denial Strategy to prevail, not only must in-theatre superiority be maintained; but also the means and routes to buttress and support in-theatre forces must be denied for the duration for which the strategy is in play. To this end the role of cross spectrum surveillance, ability to disrupt command and control networks and the presence and vigorous deployment of decisive denial forces will be critical for the success of such a strategy.

 […]

The development of ‘Access Denial’ capabilities has shown impressive growth over the last decade and a half, not just in terms of material progress but also in terms of doctrinal foundations and operational precepts. China’s three modernizations, as mentioned earlier, along with their investments in cyber warfare, anti air, anti ship weaponry and anti carrier hardware in addition to the thrust on nuclear submarine, both strategic and nuclear powered attack submarines, a carrier group centered on the Liaoning (ex Varyag) aircraft carrier with its suite of SU30s all make for a force that is increasingly lethal in effectiveness and enhanced in reach. Operating from infrastucture that they have cultivated from Sittwe and Aan in Myanmar to Hambantotta in Sri Lanka, Maroa in the Maldives and Gwadar in Pakistan (collectively the so called string of pearls) would gives teeth to the long range access denial within the coming Third Island Chain.

Specific operational deployments may include one carrier group operating in the Eastern Ocean; a Jin class Ballistic Missile Nuclear Submarine (SSBN) on deterrent patrol; two Nuclear powered Submarines (SSN) on SLOC patrol with cooperating surface group and maritime patrol aircrafts; long range maritime strike air crafts operating from Aan or Gwadar; one amphibious brigade standby with transports on hand at one of the ‘string of pearls.’ Also one regiment of ASAT missiles along with cyber warfare teams to manipulate, black out, control and wage information warfare that will seek to paralyze operations in the Indian Ocean or Eastern Ocean.

In the absence of a security oriented cooperative impulse, the problem with such sweeping strategies (specifically the coming ‘Third Island Chain’ superimposed on a long range Access Denial Strategy), is its blindness to recognize that, as historically never before, we are in fact dealing with a sea space that, in Mahan’s words, is the busiest of all the “vast commons.”

[…]

Conclusion

While India may, with some justification, celebrate the ‘Gandhian Moment’ that Anna Hazare recently ushered in; the ultimate reality of the international system is the place that power, in all its dimensions, enjoys in the scheme of assuring stability in relations between nations. The strategy of Access Denial is one such defensive power tool which is available to a nation provided it nurtures and develops capabilities that serve to ‘contest and deny’ adversarial power projection. History has suggested that for the strategy to have impact not only must in-theatre force balance be tilted towards the rebuffer through asymmetricity, but also, the first salvo must be his. After all during the first Iraq war the die was cast when US forces began to build up in the Arabian Peninsula, it was also the time when they were most vulnerable and if at all access was to be denied, that was the moment.  The instant having been lost Iraq’s fate was a foregone conclusion unless it had chosen to sue for peace under any terms.

China takes the comprehensive national power approach; where it sees the effect of an event on its own endowment and its ability to control the occasion and its outcome as a primary virtue. In articulating its strategic objectives it has unambiguously identified three canons the first of which is internal and external stability; the second is to sustain the current levels of economic growth and lastly to achieve regional preeminence.  Gone is the ‘power bashfulness’ that marked the Deng era, in its place is a cockiness that is discernible.’ In the absence of a security oriented cooperative impulse, the problem with such sweeping strategies specifically the coming ‘Third Island Chain’ superimposed on a long range power projection strategy is its blindness to recognize that, we are in fact dealing with a sea space that is the busiest of all the “vast commons.” The reluctance for collaboration makes the potential for friction high.

Contemporary challenges in the Indian Ocean and Eastern Ocean (IOEO)  region are dominated by three currents. What direction China’s rise will take is a matter of conjecture, of significance is that the potential for a collision is a reality and the only consideration that could deter it, is the ability of India to attain a strategic posture in the IOEO that serves to stabilize. On the globalization-nationalism-non state actor conundrum, clearly plural societies with decentralized control are more likely to transform, adjust, adapt and tweak their systems than monolithic centrally controlled States such as China which are intrinsically brittle in form, the fallout on the region caused by a transformation inconsistency can only be traumatic. The third current is India’s relationship with the USA; it is here that some control exists in the hands of our policy makers. India has shown itself; through restraint, pluralistic and popular form of governance to be a responsible State that upholds the status quo yet invites change through democratic forces. Its rise, in the main, is not only welcomed but is seen as a harmonizing happening that could counterpoise China.  The next step would logically be to establish an Indo-US strategic framework in the maritime domain, if we are to resourcefully contend with the challenges that the IOEO presents.

Phased implementation of the Access Denial Strategy, from deployment through demonstration prior to a hot exchange is intrinsic to the scheme and essential to its mechanics if the interests of deterrence are to be served. The question of when or under what conditions the plan is to be brought to bear is a dodgy call for if PhaseIII is arrived at; it may well signify a point of no return. The paper has suggested four ‘red lines’ which when breached may enable our Access Denial strategy; it is the second of these which will challenge decision makers to the extreme for if a military build up at Hambantota, Gwadar or Sittwe is threatening then at what stage of the mobilization should the strategy be called into play? The obvious answer is “at an early stage” at which time we must find the will and resolve to translate rapidly from Phase I to Phase II. A focused 50 year technology and infrastructure plan in support of and in harmony with our Access Denial Strategy must be placed on the anvil and resolutely hammered out.

In the ultimate analysis it is about national will and determination. Much like the Shalmali tree (referred to earlier) India has all the trappings of potential power with a benevolent approach; what it must not lack is the wisdom and strategy to shield and protect this growing Shalmali.

[i] In the Mahabharata, Bhishma tutoring Yudhishtra explains to him that in this world for he who is endowed with the intelligence and strength nothing is impossible to achieve. The good and powerful do not show enemity to those who wish them ill, but quietly expose and demonstrate their capacity and power. To bring home this lesson Bhishma narrates the story of the magnificent but not very wise Shalmali tree and the Divine Wind. The ensuing contest is marked by a lack of intelligent preparation by Shalmali. As a result in a last minute knee jerk act of resistance and self protection he hacked away at his limbs, branches and struck off his vast trunk and now stood diminutive and shorn of all his glory. The Wind saw him now small and pathetic, amused he tells him you have inflicted upon yourself what I had intended to do to you, had your intelligence only matched your size! (Shanti Parva, Chap. 150)

[ii] Vice Admiral Sir David Beatty is said to have bitterly reflected on where the blame lay for the debacle in the battle of Coronel and the loss of Admiral Christopher Cradock, his ships and his men in the engagement “Poor old Kit Cradock has gone at Coronel. His death and the loss of the ships and the gallant lives in them can be laid to the door of the incompetency of the Admiralty. They have broken over and over again the first principles of strategy.”

[iii] Regan, Geoffery. “Book of Naval Blunders” Carlton Publishing Group, 2001 London., p 163-165. Much of the blame for this blinkered policy rested with the First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. Not content with his political role, Churchill constantly interfered with the working of naval planners often using his forceful personality to bulldoze professional opinion.

Download full article here: Shankar, Anti Access Denial

Kautilya’s Mantra Yuddha: Role of the Military in determining Comprehensive National Power of States

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      By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

Keywords: Comprehensive National Power (role of military), Kautilya’s Arthashastra, China Grand Strategy

Download full article here: Shankar, Role of Military in Determining CNP

Excerpts:

[…]

In his treatise, Arthashastra (4th Century B.C.E.), on war, politics, economics, diplomacy and statecraft, Kautilya, underscored the importance of dynamism in the growth of a state. To him passivity was outlandish[i] and the objective of a State was power not just to control outward behavior but also the thoughts of one’s subjects and one’s adversaries.[ii] He outlined eight precepts that governed the general power of a State[iii]:

Every nation acts to maximize power and self-interest.

  • Moral principles have little or no force in the actions amongst nations.
  • Alliances are a function of mutuality.
  • War and peace are considered solely from the perspective of what advantages they provide to the instigator.
  • The ‘Mandala’ premise of foreign policy provides the basis of strategic planning of alliances and a general theory of international relations.
  • Diplomacy of any nature is a subtle act of war in contrast to the Clausewitzian view of war being a continuation of polity.
  • Three types of warfare are upheld, the first is open hostilities, the second is war through concealment and lastly a war that is waged through silence and subterfuge.
  • Seeking justice is the last desperate resort of the weak. This sentiment would appear to be a common theme amongst the ancients for in Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War, when the Melians talk of justice and fair play confronted with the prospect of conquest by Athens, the latter contend that such tactics were the last desperate move of a nation facing defeat[iv].

The story of Horatius Cocles’ last stand on the northern bridge across the river Tiber in defense of Rome against its enemies, encapsulates the spirit of the Roman citizen. It won for them their commonwealth and empire that spanned from West Asia to the British Isles. In a short period of 53 years (219 – 167BC) this entire area was brought under the dominion of the single city of Rome. The story goes that Horatius standing at the head of the bridge, fearing that a large body of Rome’s enemies would force their way into the city, turned around and shouted to those behind him to hasten back to the other side and break down the bridge. They obeyed him and whilst the bridge came down he remained at his post obstructing the progress of the foe. The assault was reigned in. Cocles himself followed the bridge into the river. It was this enthusiasm for noble deeds and a lofty spirit engendered by Roman traditions in addition to their customs, institutional faith in the design of their political systems and their moral incorruptibility that made for Empire.[v]

One hears a similar message in the voice of Kautilya when he summarizes the wellspring of a King’s power. He states in the Arthashastra “A King’s power is in the end tied to the popular energy of the people; for not being entrenched in the spirit of his subjects, a king will soon find himself easily uprooted”.[vi] In this context the spirit of the people refers to their adherence to dharma, faith in the king and his leadership, their wealth generating capabilities and their belief in the general superiority that their way of life represented.

In as much as the decline in power of both the Mauryan and Roman empires are concerned, the words of Gibbon are equally applicable, “The decline was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness. Prosperity ripened the principle of decay; the causes of destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest; and as soon as time or accidents removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight”[vii]. There is also another school of thought that believes that it was the new religion that weakened the will to look for rewards in another world and not in this, that contributed disproportionately to the decline of empire; Buddhism in the instance of the Mauryan realm and Christianity in the case of Rome.

The Roman Moment [viii]

The diamond jubilee of Queen Victoria’s ascension to the British Empire’s throne was celebrated on 22nd June 1897. The jubilee stretched over five days on land and sea. A military procession of over 50,000 soldiers included troops from India, Nepal, Canada, its African possessions, Australia, New Zealand and Naples. At sea, 165 ships manned by 40,000 sailors and 3,000 heavy guns saluting Her Majesty gave teeth and ‘hard power’ to the fact that the realm was always, not just protected, but also had the capacity to vanquish any foreseeable opposition.  Eleven viceroys and premiers of Britain’s self governing colonies stood in prominent attendance alongside kings, princes, maharajahs, ambassadors and emissaries from the rest of the world. The event was celebrated in every corner of the Empire from Hong Kong to Singapore to Hyderabad, Bangalore, Zanzibar to the Table Bay and in Ottawa. In Fareed Zakaria’s words and as one historian covering the events wrote this was a ‘Roman Moment’. In sheer military strength, organizational and administrative excellence, in the virtues of its political systems, the self ordained legitimacy of their imperial systems and the superiority of their cultural and structural strengths there was no peer to this Empire.

In the present day environment it is difficult to even contemplate the extent, grandeur and the dominance of Queen Victoria’s bequest. From the time she wore the mantle of the Empress of India (1876) the Empire had been linked by a web of 170,000 nautical miles of trans oceanic cables and 662,000 miles of terrestrial cables creating a vast network of information highways that enveloped the globe, even a fledgling radio network; invention of which made its appearance in 1896 was included in this complex. Railways and canals were enlarged, deepened and pushed through volumes of commerce inconceivable hither to. The appeal of the Empire, its literature, its norms and sense of fair play, its emphasis on the outdoors and sporting activities, dressing habits, schooling and health programs provided the necessary soft power for dominance of British ideas and the universality of the English way of life; all of which long outlived the impact of their hard power.

[…]

Conclusion

At the heart of the matter lay power. Its quest, accretion and relevance have been the only
constant through all of history. It has provided a rationale for stability and, in its own right, been a regulatory agent. We have noted that given the international system that we are a part of and the realism that pervades it; of all the determinants of power, military muscle is explicit in its application and at the same time implicit as an expression of a country’s will to power. An attempt has been made to place this abstraction within the larger framework of the nation’s standing, or in Fukuyama’s words the ‘Stateness’ of the country. While the task of the international system has been to tame the exercise of power, it is a paradox that the same power provides the facility to regulate and control its exercise. Nuclear power takes the debate to its logical extreme of absolute destruction and in arriving at this macabre conclusion it provides the basis of drawing boundaries and limiting conflicts.
We have in the course of our debate examined the views of several scholars on the
subject and noted in some details the Chinese approach to the formulation of CNP and the manner in which they have transformed their centralized approach, which to some schools appear as a weakness, into strength. Decision making that is command and control and integration of our resources including civil military relations, technology adaptation and our propensity to operate in stove pipes are areas of weakness that we must remedy. Failing which our ability to rise beyond the tactical will remain an enduring impediment. The sage voice of Kautilya reminds us that the military power of a state is not just the mere counting of armed physicals, but also of ‘mantra yuddha’ the power of good policies, sound judgement, precision command, analysis and good counsel.

[i] Kautalya: The Arthashastra. LN Rangarajan (Ed., Rearranger and Translator). Penguin Classics, India, 1992.

[ii] Ibid

[iii] Ibid

[iv] Thucydides.History of the Peloponnesian War Penguin Books Ltd.1954 Pgs 400-8 ‘The Melian Dialogue’

[v] Polibius on Roman imperialism  Regnery Gateway Inc.1980, pp. 216-7

[vi] Kautilya: The Arthashastra. LN Rangarajan (Eds., Rearranger and Translator). Penguin Classics, India, 1992.

[vii] Gibbon, Edward. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Ed. JB Bury. Methuen & Co. London, 1896.

[viii] Zakaria, Fareed.The Post-American World, WW Norton and company, New York 2008, pp. 167-8

Download full article here: Shankar, Role of Military in Determining CNP

All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the author, except in the case of a reviewer, who may quote brief passages embodied in critical articles or in a review. Author’s email: snigir@gmail.com

The Course From Cyrus to “Taqqiya”

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By Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

This article is forthcoming in the Winter 2012 issue of the Tehran-based International Politics Journal. For a full copy of the article please contact author directly at snigir@gmail.com.

Abstract

The question of whether Iran will make the bomb is a vexed one. In balance are the unrelenting sanctions, the inexorable push to pariah status and the imminence of military action on the one hand, while on the other, is a chimerical power status that not only serves to satisfy civilizational urges but also fulfils its perceived destiny as the dominant regional player. This article examines the impact of Iran’s “national character,” as inferred through the prism of history and contemporary polity, on the current nuclear crisis and thereafter scans the larger strategic context that Iran is faced with. The article concludes with a short-term prognostication.

Keywords: Asymmetric warfare, Break-out capability, IAEA and Iran, Iran nuclear program and proliferation, Iran strategic context, National character, Persian vs. Islamic identity, US-Iran relations.

Excerpts

Introduction: The Weight and Substance of History

In 539 BCE, one of the most successful yet extraordinary sieges in the history of warfare was brought to conclusion when Cyrus the Great invested Babylon. Cyrus was an emperor of a mould that the ancient world had not witnessed. Rather than a head-on against an impregnable yet magnificent fortification, he chose not just the timing (to penetrate the city defences during a period of night long festivities and revelry) but also to harness nature by diverting the Euphrates as it coursed through the city and entering when the river level fell below its walls unchallenged. The city, historians report, fell without any significant resistance.

Babylon was the Jewel in Cyrus’s crown. His Achaemenid Empire now spanned from the Indus in the East to Sardis and Lydia in Asia Minor and Egypt in the West. What characterized Cyrus’ empire and gave it distinct features that set it apart from the empires of antiquity was its tolerance, its abhorrence of barbarity and pillage and most importantly the setting up of a humane organisational and administrative core. All this was embodied in training and Persian polity, which was sensitive to the historical and diverse cultural context within which the Empire flourished and drew sustenance.

[…]

And what of the other Gulf States and neighbours, particularly Saudi Arabia, which on 10th February 2012 gave notice of its elaborate nuclear programme and did not rule out a weapons agenda? While this may have a domino effect on regional proliferation, it could also develop into a deterrent relationship in-region through the removal of nuclear inequity (an idea whose time may well have arrived). The difficulty with a resolution that takes such a tack is the conflict that it will arouse with the status quo powers that are more than likely to ensure that the current balance is not upset even if it means resort to a conventional clash. The more pressing anxiety is the coming of the next nuclear age when erosion of proliferation regimes presents increased probability of clandestine networks delivering the bomb to non-state actors, at which time prevention and pre-emption, are the only rejoinders. Despite the Byzantine nature of things, Iran has persevered with the belief that the most credible way to counter and buttress non-intervention in regional affairs is to attain nuclear weapon status. Notwithstanding this conviction, she has skillfully avoided a head on situation with the USA. Iran has also observed certain clear redlines when supporting militias in the Middle East in terms of hardware supplied and the groups supported. In their nuclear policy, Iran has found the means to challenge the USA in the latter’s contradictory approach to countering proliferation; of invading Iraq, cutting a deal with Pakistan, imposing sanctions on Iran, seeking a regime change in North Korea and indeed, turning a blind eye to Israel. In this unpredictable setting, nuclear weapons or even an unambiguous break out capability not only provides balance to a strategic posture but would also extract more concessions and more incentives from America and the West. The fact that Iran has progressed uranium enrichment levels from 3.5% to near 20% and has stockpiled over 1000 kg of low enriched uranium,29 while within the stipulations of the NPT, would suggest that Iran may well build for itself an unremitting ‘break out’ capability stopping a step short of weaponizing and yet at the same time giving notice of a looming potential.

All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the author, except in the case of a reviewer, who may quote brief passages embodied in critical articles or in a review.