Category Archives: Geopolitics and Strategic Impulses

The Long Telegram: Ukraine, the Last Nail

Posted on by
3

byVice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar (Published in the IIRF Strategic Year Book 2024)

An Expiatory Offering

Stian Jenssen, director at NATO Secretary-General Jens Stoltenberg’s private office, stated that one solution to the on-going war could be “Land for Nato membership and peace”. Has the strategy of ‘Containment’, a lodestone dogma from the cold-war run its course and has the very ideology of a cordon sanitaire, to contain an expansionist Russia been put to rest?

 Jenssen is a senior figure who has worked at NATO for over a decade and rarely speaks in public. Jenssen, however, the next day appeared to backtrack on his comments. He said his statement was part of a broader discussion and, not very convincingly added, “it was a mistake.” It will be recalled that Stoltenberg at the NATO Summit on July 2023 said that Ukraine would be invited to join the alliance; remaining vague on how or when. President Biden, however, had been far more categorical when he earlier declared that Ukraine was not ready for NATO membership.  But was there a sense of remorse in the changed strategic direction that the proxy war in Ukraine was taking? Had Jenssen touched a true chord in the larger plans of the West?

Keenan’s ‘Long Telegram’

            In 1946 Mr George Keenan, the then American Charge d’Affaires in Moscow, responding to a query from Washington who were perplexed by the USSR’s obdurate approach to proposals that were to be the foundation of the post-war world order, had enquired “why the Soviet Union was opposed to the newly formed World Bank and International Monetary Fund.” Keenan, in a cable famously called the “Long Telegram” outlined, from a questionable perspective (it must be said), strategic motivations of the Soviet Union. His 5000 word narrative over-simplified a picture of an insecure State obsessed with the idea of expansionism and impervious to reason. He urged leadership to adopt a foreign policy the main element of which sought to belligerently “contain” Soviet imperialistic tendencies; almost as if it were pandering to a need to invent a new enemy to replace the Nazis. As we attempt to verify whether the Telegram lay at the core of the West’s policy and try and excavate some sane logic to its centrality one is up “against it” for the innermost chambers that are expected to hold secrets of that time are… bare. (John le Carre).

Containment provided an aggressive ideological framework to a strategic policy strapped administration that saw military power and mass destruction as the only arbiter to a war drained world. History today tells us, it led to a series of conflicts, near nuclear catastrophes, deliberate twisting of political narratives, disastrous WMD stockpiling and bizarre ‘witch hunts’ targeting left leaning polity.

This dogma conceived in 1947, continues in essence, into this millennium. The policy has been varyingly called a master stroke that sealed factional diplomacy; a strategic monstrosity blind to the complexity of geopolitics; a perverted belief that was to climax with the spread of capitalism, slanted democracy and free markets (Fukuyama). Much of its appeal was driven by creating manipulable elites in states of interest, fear, enticement and the inability to discern reality. Rather, ‘Containment’ gave the world, a self-extolling prophecy of morality and leadership; a curious sense that frustrating the spread of communism was an interest above all else; nurturing and militarily arming an array of pliant puppet states irrespective of their dictatorial and often tyrannical outlook; sponsoring of surrogate conflicts that split the world into persistent warring camps; subversion of legitimate governments and lastly regime changes in unyielding states. Its long-term fallout was the distortion of democracy on the altar of anti-communism.

Is the looming lack of success in the Ukraine proxy-war the last nail in the moribund policy of Containment?

The Last Nail

By oversimplifying the world into categories defined largely by ideology (and in later years) by culture and religion and declaring them inevitably hostile to one another (Huntington) Containment established an intellectual template for what began as an ideological siege which in recent years has transmuted to a civilizational one.

Clearly the development of social and political history of man cannot be so easily pigeon holed. Nations follow their own path of socio-economic development and pursue different forms of wealth generation, equitability, concepts of security and sovereignty; some of these are indeed at odds with the norm, yet it does not make a case for intervention unless such anomalies spill over borders in armed clashes. As the concept of Jus Ad Bellum (Just War)  suggests the war must have: just cause, being a last resort, being declared by a proper authority, possessing right intention, having a reasonable chance of success, and the end being proportional to the means used. When seen against this backdrop, it beggars belief to assume that powers of the day will readily embrace all aspects of a western-led international order. It seems more likely that rising powers will want to shape a global order that is inclusive of their own values and find place for their political agendas. It is this transformation that has provided the hammer to drive the last nail into Keenan’s telegram.

The Jenssen Testimonial in Retrospect; the Nuclear Factor  

There are several underlying issues that may have actuated Mr Jenssen’s testimonial; after all the statement was made and it was in the air extant and plausible before it was rescinded. So what triggered this account? While  there are several reasons, which include the all-round economic burden that the conflict has imposed and the consequent fatigue that has set in, the growing disaffection amongst a populace unwilling to cover the cost and perhaps most importantly the real dangers of the proxy war escalating and the EU being hauled into a catastrophic war. But chief amongst these is the inexorable push towards a nuclear calamity.

The breakdown of existing strategic nuclear checks and control regimes that have evolved over the last more than half-a-century between U.S. and Soviet/Russian leadership is perhaps the first symptom of the disintegration of whatever trust had been built up. The only agreement on Strategic Arms Reduction had been negotiated through a series of near calamitous nuclear incidents, progression of bilateral agreements and other confidence building measures to limit and reduce each other’s substantial nuclear arsenals. Indeed it was a slow but apparent understanding of the futility of a nuclear exchange.  Which would in time (it was hoped) become the norm with all states in possession of nuclear weapons. These optimistic prospects today amount to naught with the suspension of the New START arms control treaty. Since February 2022, Russian President Vladimir Putin has rattled his nuclear sabre in hopes of isolating Ukraine and intimidating it into submission. The US has responded by threatening Putin with terrible reprisals if he uses nuclear weapons, equipping Ukraine with long-range precision guided munitions and bolstering their air-power despite Moscow’s provocations. The deliberate nuclear risk-taking is both a throwback to Cold War-era superpower crises and a preview of what lies ahead.

The Treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (NPT, 1968) is now on thin ice. The big unwritten bargain amongst the signatories of the NPT (191 nations) was that nuclear weapon states will not only provide nuclear security and nuclear technologies to non-nuclear states,  but will also not attack a non-nuclear weapon state with nuclear weapons,  However, given the proceedings of the Ukraine war the nuclear security assurances of the NPT, today hardly sound very convincing.

Changed Outlook: Has the War Run its Course?

The unanimous New Delhi G 20 Leaders Declaration on the Ukraine War underscored “that all states must act in a manner consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the UN Charter in its entirety. In line with the UN Charter, all states must refrain from the threat or use of force to seek territorial acquisition against the territorial integrity and sovereignty or political independence of any state. The use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is inadmissible.” The declaration is symptomatic of a changed outlook to the war. The absence of an outright condemnation of Russia and recourse to the founding principles in the UN Charter are, debatably, a realisation of the disastrous economic burdens of the war, acceptance of the frozen state of the conflict and the nuclear perils of attempting to push the NATO verge up to  Russian borders has dawned on the USA and its allies.

Disarmament Structures in Tatters 

In 2007, Putin, at the Munich security conference accused the United States of creating a unipolar world “in which there is one master, one sovereign.” He added, “… this is pernicious.” This event had to have been seen by serious Russia watchers that Kremlin had reached its red-lines. At this stage for NATO to push for expansion appeared adventurous and contradictory to the spirit of the reassurances made by the then US secretary of state James A. Baker to former Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev during a meeting on 09  February, 1990. In a discussion on the status of a reunited Germany, the two men agreed that NATO would not extend past the territory of East Germany, a promise repeated by NATO’s secretary general the same year in Brussels. Also the NATO-Russia Council (NRC) established as a mechanism for consultation, consensus-building, cooperation, joint decision making and joint action on a wide spectrum of security issues of common interest never came to an understanding on enlargement other than on membership of the Baltic States. Russia’s case has been built on these two instances of “betrayal” and a lack of trust.

In the meantime, Moscow backed its words with actions by dismantling the structures designed to keep peace in post-Cold War Europe. Moscow formally announced its withdrawal from the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, rejected the principle of host-nation consent for its troop presence, annexed the Crimean peninsula and indeed now occupied the Donbas region of East Ukraine and the Kherson region that provides the continental bridge to the Crimea.

The Global disarmament structures today lie in tatters.

Ebbing Wages of this War

Poland has decided to stop transfer of military equipment to Ukraine. It will be recalled that Poland was Ukraine’s staunchest ally and its contribution to the latter’s war effort is amongst the largest in the EU, it has provided the maximum amount of immediate-use combat capability to the Ukraine. To give an example, all of NATO have reportedly provided about 100 tanks; Poland alone has contributed over 330 ready-to-use tanks. However, grasping realities of the Ukraine condition, the Polish Premier likened the situation to a “drowning person who could pull you down with it”.

There is a gnawing awareness that the West’s proxy war in Ukraine has run its geo-political design and fuelling it further can only result in ‘diminishing strategic returns’, degeneration of the NATO alliance and the return of an existential nuclear threat to Europe that lay dormant for near half-a-century. After all, are not the real challenges in the Indo-Pacific?

Distress in West Asia

A dramatic, overnight shift in the West’s policy towards Ukraine is potentially on the cards, as Israel’s war on Hamas escalates to a conflagration that engulfs all of west Asia. Western resources and stomach for the proxy war in Europe with nuclear dimensions has diminished. It has accelerated a process that could freeze the conflict in Ukraine, never mind that Russia may emerge ahead of the game. The alternative is a long and debilitating war in which the western allies appear to be holding the short-end of the stick without in any substantial way eroding the power of Russia.

 The War Will End on the Table

The debate over the future of the Russia-Ukraine war while, rhetorically, predicated on Ukraine re-establishing territorial control to the pre-2014 holding, it is clear today that the reality of the situation will neither tolerate nuclear escalation nor is there the will in the EU to endure further economic hardships and the perils of the conflict engulfing them.

Territorial reclamation, undoubtedly important to Ukraine, appears unlikely as their counter-offensive fizzled out. Add to that support for a protracted conflict that has prospects of degenerating to a Russia-NATO war does not appear to find favour in the western alliance. Avoiding such a war is higher priority. Enabling Ukraine’s territorial control is debatably the most thorny proposition confronting NATO for reasons mentioned earlier and besides they are not fighting the war.

President Biden has said that “this war will end at the negotiating table”. But no moves are apparent that push the parties toward talks. Although it is far from certain that a change in U.S. policy can spark such an outcome, adopting a reconciliatory one on the lines of the Jenssen testimony could freeze the conflict and make negotiations more likely. And with it, perhaps, a blood rimmed curtain will come down on ‘Containment’.

The Mantri, the Mercenary and Military Leadership

Posted on by
7

By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

(Published in the IPCS web journal in my column the Strategist available at http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5859)

Imbalance in Politico-Military Affairs

The First World War, within four months of its ill-conceived purpose, bungled to a bloody horrific grind on the Western Front. The Allies and their colonial armies had by that time suffered a million casualties. Britain’s 40-year-old First Lord of the Admiralty, Churchill, believed he had the solution to the noxious massacre in the trenches. He fancied himself a military strategist, abandoning his earlier capricious plan to invade Germany from the Baltic Sea, he now championed opening a second front against Turkey, seize Istanbul and gain control of the Straits linking the Mediterranean to the Black Sea and Russia, thus, knocking the Ottoman out of the war which in turn would persuade all Balkan states to join the Allies. This fanciful chain of desired events was neither backed by any serious analysis nor did it enjoy the luxury of overwhelming superiority in theatre. Even an understanding of the operational realities of an amphibious assault of the magnitude envisaged, was lacking. As for strategic assumptions made, there were none and therefore review of operations and possible alternative courses of action were non-existent. The ensuing campaign was driven more by hopes and revulsion at the carnage on the Western Front.

The ill-fated Dardanelles-Campaign began on 19 February 1915. In the event not only was a bulk of the British and French fleet lost in the action but over 65,000 troops were slaughtered in the Campaign and the Allies routed in a grisly bloodbath.  Our ‘Strategist’ was guilty of grossly overestimating the capabilities of his own force and underestimating the complexity of amphibious operations. He, fatally, derided the motivation of the Turks defending their homeland. Churchill was sacked for incompetence.  

Grand Theory and the Operational Art

War, as Clausewitz postulated, was the use of military force to achieve political aims. However, modern militaries during the process of developing military plans in support of policy  are loathe to take risks that do not hold high the probability of success. This in turn leads to a skewed situation when unachievable policy aims are set out. And here lies the intrinsic antagonism that exists in politico-military affairs; when a military solution is a product of compromises, the outcome leaves political objectives sorely wanting. Quite obviously, when both polity and military leadership are combined in one authority, the blend makes for disastrous consequences.

Waging war requires institutions that can address problems that lie along the politico-military interface. Politicians need to listen to the military and take heed that the “sweep of an arm in a scything arc across the width of a small scale chart (map) spanning mountains, rivers and seas with little insight of own and enemy capabilities; the elements; force readiness; morale, logistics  or indeed outcomes – does not a strategic offensive make”. This stark statement is a reminder of the disastrous gap between grand theory and the operational art. Instances abound in history when a politician steered-approach led to strategic blunders; conduct of World War II by Hitler, America in Vietnam, the 20-year conflict in Afghanistan are recent examples of wars when politico-military balance  had gone awry. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 is of particular significance for not only were political policies with external-security ramifications made without military involvement, but leadership surrounded itself with pliable and incompetent defence advisors. So-much-so that when the crunch came, the Army was routed; the Navy remained within its havens; while the Air Force contemplated torching its forward deployed fighter aircrafts.

In the run-up to war, civilian leadership must not only have superior authority but also the sagacity to entertain alternate ideas that provide decision-avenues short of armed conflagration. And if the recourse to arms is advanced then it must never be terminal. After all War is a political tool and not an end; its effectiveness must be judged in a politico-diplomatic-strategic context.

Enter the Mercenary

Limited armed interventions, since the Second World War, have often demanded deployment of light forces over short duration with a feature of dubiety in identity of aggressor. In such circumstances mercenaries have been hired and deployed for circumscribed tasks under ‘hard- hold’. They conduct military operations in foreign conflict zones to bring about a desired outcome. If the employer state fails to achieve the desired end, then…the event is denied. These delinquent methods, in this day and age, are not only internationally condemnable but also run the risk of starting an unintended and uncontrolled war.

There is no expert consensus on who exactly is a “mercenary.” Those in the industry, their clients, and some outside experts spurn the “M” word owing to the associated stigma, and give these private-sector fighters new labels: private military contractors, military service providers and even operational contractors. Since the re-emergence of this new ‘sham warrior’ class in Iraq, Afghanistan, Libya, Syria and elsewhere in the African continent one is at a loss to explain their purpose and efficacy in war, irrespective of the opposition or the perceived outcome.

The deployment of a mixture of conscription and mercenary services in the Russian military dates back to at least the 18th century (Parit, Makers of Modern Strategy, p 356) with a view to  ‘stiffen-the-spine’ of a poorly  motivated serf army. However, by the 20th century the idea of brutal press-ganged armies backed by a core of mercenaries gave way to professional and career oriented armies from the citizenry. The national military was subject to international accountability.

The Curious Case of the Wagner Group

The “Wagner Group” must be seen as a new phenomenon, primarily because their control or lack of it defies any formal structure, their mass is that of a regular army (reportedly, 50,000 strong) but allegiance questionable. Clearly the Wagner is more on the lines of a “have-army-will-travel”. The Group, a private Russian military company set-up in 2014 on terms that remain unknown, is led by its co-founder Mr Yevgeny Prigozhin a businessman, reportedly with connections and ambitions. Till recently tasked with fighting Kremlin’s land-war in the Donbas theatre of East Ukraine the Group had indefinite yet conditional access to the Russian military infrastructure. Enigmatic in concept and cloaked in a purpose that remains nebulous; it’s Command and Control structure remains utterly confused. What is clear is that relations between the Russian military and the Wagner is a tenuous one with exclusive control emanating from the highest political circle in the Kremlin (this inference comes in the wake of the manner in which their mutiny ended in a fizzle).

Despite its ambiguous existence, the Group has operated around the globe, from Syria to the Central African Republic; Nigeria and in West Asia in furtherance of Russia’s foreign policy and commercial objectives. Its commission includes clandestine armed missions and subversion; toppling ‘irksome’ regimes and security to private business interests. The group maintains close ties to the country’s intelligence services and it is probable that they work in tandem with the SVR (Sluzhba Vneshni Razvedkii) the Russian external spy agency. As for its legal status it obviously was created with the intrinsic capability to operate on the fringes of the constraints of the International Law of War.

The mutinous failure of the Group in eastern Ukraine, in particular in the Bakhmut sector, must have caused a total re-think of the employment of such an ill-disciplined army when pitted against a well-trained and motivated Ukrainian force. Most abidingly ludicrous was the rebellious media image of Mr Prigozhin, fully outfitted in an undersized combat helmet, bulging out of the seams of his bullet proof jacket fulminating over the lack of equipment and logistics that the Russian State had promised him to wage the land war. It spoke volumes of the motivation of a mercenary militia to fight.

Military Judgement and Leadership

Constitutional authority of the Supreme Commander will always be vested in civilian hands (in democracies), it is a matter of how this authority is made too pervasive and often assumed by agents below in the political hierarchy. Such armchair strategists are shielded from the professional simply because the latter is officially prohibited from entering into a public debate; leaving military leadership often saddled with half-baked strategic decisions, driven by “hopes, fears and ambitions” rather than by experience and seasoned judgement.

Prerogatives and duties of a political office in charge of the military must not enter the domain of “military judgement” where knowledge and motivations are at play; both assuredly a product of experience. Political savvy must essentially discern the line between strategic direction and the extent to which military means can aid in achieving that purpose. While, of the military leader, it is objectivity that is demanded; whether in pursuit of a strategic goal, attaining a desired posture, or indeed in weapons and platform selection. Military leadership first studies the nature of the threatening armed conflict and then seeks to rationalise an operational strategy that optimises means with effectiveness across the spectrum of warfare.

Chilling Trend of our Times

Modern strategic thought has no logic or grammar that gives description to private wars. The mercenary fights for any state or nation without regard to political interests, cause or even outcome…as long as the wages are good. The return of the mercenary and his access to the highest bidder; be he a politician, oligarch or a multinational corporation is one of the most dangerous and unpredictable trends of our times. Today, when the Mantri is engulfed by arm-chair strategists and ‘think-tanks’ preaching the need for interventions that invite low intensity “less-than-military” operations, the implications of a market for armed forces in global affairs is most perilous. For in an unregulated situation, the means of waging war being extended to entities that can afford-it, spells  anarchy to global order.

Epilogue :The Russian Mercenary Chief, Yevgeny Prigozhin was reportedly killed in a mid air crash on 23 August 2023. Prigozhin had led a brief armed mutiny against the Russian State earlier this year. The plane, a private “Embraer Legacy 600” crashed north of Moscow killing all 10 people on board.

The Road to a Not So Harmonious Rise

Posted on by
4

By

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar (published in the IPCS web journal in my column “The Strategist and may be accessed at the following link: http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5855)

 The Dream

When Xi Jinping took office in March 2013, he was “elected” President in a confirmation vote by the People’s Congress in Beijing; he received 2,952 votes in favour and one against. Replacing Hu Jintao, who retired after serving his two terms; tenure legislated to annul the possibility of the Mao-kind-of-excesses.

Most nations felt Xi’s “ascension” represented more continuity, persistence with tenure-based leadership, more liberal reforms and a closer draw into a globalised world. China’s declared goal was to achieve “Harmonious Rise”. But there was a dream for Rejuvenation and  of China’s Centrality. Much of the world dismissed this as rhetoric from the nationalistic fringe. But to Xi, his predecessors and the Party; Rejuvenation and Centrality were obsessions that had endured the mass carnage of the Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution and of Tiananmen.

Opening China; the Concept of ‘Shi’

In this milieu, looking back to the unabridged opening of China to the world emerges as a strategic-blunder. Was it conceived as a tactical artifice to benefit from the Sino-Soviet rift and checkmate Kremlin’s expansionism or was it a deliberate strategy to bring China permanently into the Western-Bloc? It began in 1972 and was based on three ‘rosy’ assumptions (Chap XXIV, Kissinger, White House Years):

  • Catastrophic failure of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution put China in a precarious political situation and ideologically ripe for change.
  • Beijing needed the West’s support to break out of its isolation. Engagement was the precursor to co-operation and joining the anti-Soviet-Bloc.
  • China had a deep seated desire to join in the prosperity of the West. Making it a stake-holder in the global order would set it on the path to liberal democracy.

The inability to understand Chinese strategists, their assessment of the existing balance of power and their application of Shi led to not just fuelling China’s dazzling growth but also promoting its grand strategy of “National Rejuvenation”. In classic terms ‘Shi’ comprised the use of deception to attain strategic advantage. It was Shi that triumphed.

The Shanghai Communiqué

The Shanghai Communiqué in theory promised rapid fruition of the three ‘rosy assumptions’. Of note was Beijing’s pledge “to abjure power politics, respect sovereignty of all regional states; and strive for peace, harmony and just competition”. Despite the West’s immediate gains of a modified Soviet outlook to the Cold-War; for Beijing, the calculus was on a grand-strategic plane. Three pronged in form, it was to deny Moscow and the West from geopolitically encircling China; to induct much needed technological, economic and military boost to bring about a seeming ‘Harmonious Rise’ and in time to challenge the lone super-power. Half a century later it is apparent which stratagem worked.   

The Communiqué today lies in tatters as nations have recognised the reality of China; particularly so where sovereignty, security and acceptance of international laws/conventions is concerned. While Beijing’s predatory mercantilism brand of economics has violated the very idea of security. Four considerations key in international law to our understanding of a sovereign state are: possession of permanent population, single government rule, ability to form diplomatic relations with sovereign states and critically, territory that is clearly defined. With China it is territorial definition that is intractable and stymies normalisation of relations. From claims of the so called “Middle Kingdom,” to the scything sweep of the 9-dash line; territorial demands cut through established boundaries of 17 sovereign nations and carve-out vast maritime space encompassed by the 9-Dash Line (despite having been struck down by the  International Court of Justice ).

As for Beijing’s pledges, they have long since been dumped. In this circumstance, it was never clear how the preyed-upon were expected to accept the Communiqué and the Chinese order of things.

The Pivot Rather than the Cog

In 1949, Mao ordered that the “Century of Humiliation” , be etched in peoples memory not just as a tombstone to past injustices, but as a promise for redemption. The 19th century had witnessed the dismantling of the Sino-centric order that had dominated much of the region. As a consequence of colonial avarice, China degenerated to a slave-economy. The roots of the Century of Humiliation have been traced back to defeat in the First Opium War (1839-1842). The conflict opened the flood gates for entry of other imperial powers and set in motion the common colonial pattern of the day.

Given the settings, it remains a geo-political inexplicability as to how Beijing in 1972 would not only be welcomed by “balance-of-power” enthusiasts, but also by a West that deluded itself that China would embrace an international system in which it would be another ‘Cog’ rather than the Pivot?

The Rude Awakening

The world expected a transformation of China from a repressive communist-state to a benign capitalistic one. However, half-century post the Shanghai Communiqué, we find a rich, expansionist and militaristic China in denial of established rules; led by an iron fisted autocrat in power for life, promoting predatory economic and revisionist policies. Add to all this is its proliferatory nuclear support to rogue states.

China’s Grand Strategy, is keyed to the attainment of three objectives: preservation of dispensation; creating a sphere of control in which its territorial expansion and its writ remains unchallenged; and lastly, attainment and maintenance of a geopolitical order in which China is the primary influencer. However, China’s territorial ambitions and rapacious policies in pursuit of these objectives have given impetus to the alignment of nations to confront and contain it.

Making Amends

The kind of nation, its place in the global order and the type of military China will command by 2049 are neither pre-destined nor beyond the impact of changes. Clearly, for China the idea of a multi-polar world is just a strategic milestone on the road to “Rejuvenation”(metaphor for  dominance in a unipolar world). How Beijing interacts with the international system in the intervening years will determine the realisation of its dream or otherwise.

In the absence of China adopting policies that promote co-operative engagement and a consensual approach to universal order; the formation of alliances and structures that regulate global order will be an inevitable consequence. The Quad and the AUKUS have already taken shape, both groupings bring major powers more closely into the Indo-Pacific; the former is a comprehensive model for the process of international engagement, while the latter is military in nature and is enabled by highly capable forces. The two together provide a strategic template in the Indo-Pacific for order.