Category Archives: Geopolitics and Strategic Impulses

FMCT: Questioning Mass Destruction as the Basis for International Order

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Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

This article was first published by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in June 2013.

Keywords: Pakistan nuclear doctrine, Indian Nuclear Doctrine, FMCT, Pakistan Foreign Policy and “India-centricity,” Deterrence Stability in South Asia.

Twenty eight years before Oppenheimer was stirred to note the significance of Krishna’s words from the Gita, “I am become death, the destroyer of worlds,” Tagore, in 1917, had expressed deep scepticism in the fortifying effect of weapons of mass destruction. He (Tagore was not a pacifist in the Gandhi mould) posited that bigger weapons invoked a proportionally more intense reaction that exposed the paradoxically weakening effect of escalating military power. His reasoning was based on the premise that a nation’s pursuit of armed might, beyond a definable threshold, actually increases the penalty of war dramatically.

Seen in this perspective, Pakistan’s FMCT debate would appear unidimensional. Pakistan’s stance is that a modest and austere equation exists between, on the one hand, its current position on the FMCT, and on the other, the sum of ‘organised hypocrisy’ of the international non-proliferation regime and India’s capability both conventional and nuclear. It is important then, to examine the coherence of their standpoint.

Rabia Akhtar in her essay “Pakistan: the FMCT debate within” has pointed out that the tri-condition that would catalyse that nation’s participation in the FMCT is that “the treaty first address the asymmetry in fissile material stockpiles; second, reduce the existing stockpiles of nuclear materials by each party as a disarmament measure; and lastly address Pakistan’s security concerns emanating from India’s growing nuclear and conventional capabilities.” Given the India-centricity of their nuclear posture (as stated in the essay), all three conditions are, presumably, directed at India notwithstanding the suggestion in the second, which if applied would advocate an unworkable comparison and proportionality with all nuclear weapon states. If this were the intent then consistency of the proposal is waylaid before the treaty can get underway.

The first rider proposes to bring nuclear parity by level pegging of fissile stockpiles which in a sense may be appropriate when comprehensive power equation is comparable, doctrine of intent is known, is compatible and transparent, and Controller and Custodian of the arsenal are embodied in two distinct and separate national entities. However, a No First Use (NFU) policy can find no matching urge when faced with an opaque doctrine of First Use under military control, predisposed to tactical nuclear weapons managed by indistinct decentralised control and stewardship. There is only one riposte to this precarious state and that is to assure massive nuclear retaliation in the eventuality of the first use of nuclear weapons. Noting the imbalance in comprehensive power which is weighted so much in favour of India (GDP almost ten times that of Pakistan), the demand for equivalence does not make sense—in the same vein, India neither demands equivalence with China or the USA, nor expects it. Macabre as it may seem, deterrence stability is better served by destructive assurance rather than mathematical equality in stockpiles. Under these circumstances lowering the nuclear threshold with the introduction of tactical nuclear weapons only serves to amplify the vulnerability that Pakistan has put itself in and undermines the cause of deterrence. The Tagore Conundrum would appear to be at play here.

The third precondition is their security disquiet arising from India’s conventional and nuclear capabilities. A nation’s security concerns are a function of history, geography, developmental and economic objectives, power equations and, most importantly, driven by the aspirations of its people. The key is often leadership’s ability to find and leverage opportunities within the international system to the larger benefit of the nation. However, in Pakistan’s case, given the omnipresence of the military, it ironically remains a security state driven in the main by military considerations and Indo-centric security paranoia both at the cost of and to the neglect of development. The very nature of such a siege outlook will demand that the India threat remains in perpetuity, so patently reflected in their stance on the FMCT.

If we were to pause and consider a situation when the military threat of war from India did not exist or was of a low probability, then by the logic of the Pakistan security paradigm the siege will lift giving way to establishing a relationship that may suggest stability; then again the same prudence will petition for civil control over the military. The current political conditions post the recent elections have, debatably, opened a glimmer of opportunity. At least the voices that we hear from across the border are ones of less tolerance of extremism, civil control over the military albeit diffident control, and an air of reconciliation; whether this translates to concrete steps only time will tell, but economic deprivation often has an earthy rationale.

The FMCT provides the elemental impulse to restrain and safeguard the spread of nuclear weapons by capping fissile stockpiles. It is a first step not towards bringing equity in nuclear arsenals but to question the basis of mass destruction as logic for international order.

Pakistan Elections 2013: On the Far Side

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Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

This article was first published by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in May 2013.

Keywords: Pakistan elections 2013, Pakistan political tradition, US withdrawal from Afghanistan, Pakistan military, Political Islam, Punjab-centricity, ‘One Unit Scheme’, ‘Ayub’s Basic Democrats’

Recently, in the run-up to the general elections in Pakistan, one of India’s more reputed TV channels hosted a panel discussion on its outcome and the wider ramifications of the vote. Strange was the readiness of the panellists to set aside the actualities of Pakistan’s situation. To every critical predicament that the Anchor pointed to, the debate slewed on how people-to-people (Indo-Pak) engagement and the youth surge would overcome all; forgetting for the moment that it was this already strained human relationship that had to be cultivated and nurtured beyond the jhappi-pappi rhetoric. As for the youth, the speakers did not think it of importance to either underscore the magnitude of the uneducated or the state of joblessness and therefore the lure of the radicalized Madrassa. Was it the ‘ardour’ bit of our enduring love-hate relationship with that country at play? The panellists would have appeared to have surrendered reality for unfounded romanticism.

So, what in this situation, consistent with the affairs of that State, sways and bears upon Pakistan polity? I would posit that four considerations will have disproportionate impact on Indo-Pak relations:

  • The nature and tradition of egalitarianism and political beliefs in Pakistan.
  • The emergence of a radical strain of Political Islam and the far reach of fundamentalists.
  • Impact of the impending American pullout from Afghanistan.
  • The invasive and persistent influence of the military.

Taking each in turn, the nature of polity in Pakistan since independence is one marred by a rapacious impulse to power, an unwillingness to cede predatory feudal structures to democratic principles, and a fractured dualism between Islamic conservatism and modernity. Its 67 years of existence has seen a formative disruptive decade that spent itself in the dismantling and transforming of constitutional structures, a ten-year flirtation with a ‘One Unit scheme’, ‘controlled’ democracy (Ayub’s Basic Democrats), three unsuccessful coups, non-party elections, military (ISI) rigged elections, constitutional coups, and thirty-three years of military rule, leaving less than a decade and a half of disjointed civilian dispensation of which five years preceded the current elections of 2013. The only unremitting feature during the period was the ominous persuasion, either overtly or from behind the scenes, of the military. In this frame of reference, neither could liberal beliefs flourish nor leadership emerge without the undertone of military concessions. The significant casualty in all this was the development of national structures that could not only realise past expectations but also leverage the potential global advantage that the youth surge offers. The idea of an overnight change to egalitarianism is therefore illusory in the absence of well entrenched independent liberal institutions.

In the immediate wake of independence, Pakistan tenuously held onto a Sub- continental identity and a secular outlook to nation building. This, however, was ephemeral both in its impact and the resolve to persist with the idea, to the extent that exactly the converse by design became the inspiration for the nation. So, through the revision of history and media manipulation, ersatz religious, distinct cultural and idealized historical links were established (in a curious turn of events this very distinctiveness has been refuted by the intelligentsia in the more populous West Punjab). A peculiar brand of Islamization took root. General Zia’s push for Islamic practices of Zakat, Ushr, Islamic Hadood and the Sharia Penal code were manifestations of the traumatic break from its past. This fetched with it a radical strain of political Islam that permeated society, denied Sufism and served the cause of the military bureaucracy in its bid to develop a consensus on its vision of the nation. The levels of violence that have disfigured the current elections and the disproportionate influence of extreme forces in proscribing inimical secular parties is symptomatic of the heavy hand and far reach of fundamentalists.

The impending withdrawal of American forces from Afghanistan will leave that nation much in the same state as when they invaded it: a weak centre; growing military influence of a resurrected and dominant Taliban; and an undermined Northern Alliance shorn of the steel of the US military. Further, an intensifying civil war will lead to loss of control of the South and East. Pakistan, with its unfinished and unpopular war against extremism, now more widespread than ever, exacerbates the volatile mix. In the absence of the US Army of Afghanistan, extremists will once again find safe sanctuary in the Taliban controlled areas, leading to either an expansion of the war across the Durand Line or of Pakistan cutting a deal with the Afghan Taliban (whose terms may well be active intervention alongside them). In the short term one may prognosticate a downward calibration of tensions in Kashmir, now left in the hands of Pakistan’s chosen extremists, and an intensification of operations in the West. The middle and long term, however, portends a continued amplified role for the military in the affairs of Pakistan unless the new dispensation in Islamabad is able rein in the military and, in an improbable act of control, thrust down a no-military-role Afghan policy.

The early years of Pakistan’s existence were imbued with political insecurity and uncertainty largely caused by the civil violence that preceded creation and the Western Wing’s urge to balance out the demographically weightier East. Both these dynamics wounded any stimulus towards a democratic slant. What did happen was the nurturing of a polity that enticed a greater role for the military in the internal as well as the external constituents of national security. The four disastrous wars with India, one of which resulted in the second partition of Pakistan, did not in any way serve to provide an altered perspective on national security issues, which remained a military one and the armed forces its core bastion. Internally, the loss of East Pakistan set the establishment on the course to Punjab-centricity and Islamization; both of which strengthened the hand of the army and the penetration of its ideology amongst the masses. The impending US retreat from Afghanistan is again seen as an abandonment of Islamabad, a condition which the military believe, only they could salvage the nation from.

Given the four realities that confront Pakistan and the state of their economy, the far side of the 2013 elections must see a path to deliverance beginning with civil control over the Army, letting go of grandiose schemes such as a military role in Afghanistan, and the government training their sights on societal enhancement to wean the youth from militancy.

Written as part of a compendium of views by several authors following the Pakistan Elections. To access the debate, visit: http://www.ipcs.org/article/pakistan/pakistan-elections-2013-on-the-far-side-3946.html

China’s Curious Carnegie Contention

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Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

This article was first published by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in May 2013.

The 15th Annual International Nuclear Conference held under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on 08-09 April 2013, brought under one roof over 800 delegates comprising politicians, scholars, students and bureaucrats from 46 countries with the purpose of edifying them on the nature of the contemporary nuclear narrative. The numbers gave the congregation a visibility that few in the past had succeeded in realizing. The account of nuclear power was viewed through the prism of its deterrent significance, proliferatory odds, disarmament prospects and civilian use.

What would appear to have passed muster is China’s incremental transformation of the idea of a nuclear weapon from one whose power lay in its non-use and which had enjoyed thus far, an admittedly, puerile yet tolerable and stable relationship with the world at large; into one of possible delinquency and deepening uncertainty. The Chinese formulation as articulated by their spokesperson General Yao Yunzhu, was that “it was the importance of uncertainty and opacity rather than transparency” (emphasis added) that lay at the heart of deterrence. This at once strikes a discordant note to nuclear orthodoxy and the theory of what principles better serve the cause of deterrence.

In an era shorn of paradigms that define the strategic context, (as did the all-embracing Cold War, ‘containment,’ ‘clash of civilizations’ or even the ‘end of ideological history’), ‘uncertainty’ makes for a curious strategic nuclear hypothesis. The demands of an indeterminate situation, particularly where nuclear weapons in the hands of ‘rational players’ are concerned, is for certainty and not uncertainty in nuclear policy and transparency and surely not opacity in material and technological intrusions into the nuclear arsenal. The uncertainty-opacity approach provides the potential adversary with the basis for embarking on a ‘speculative bulge’ in his arsenal and kicks off a nuclear arms race with the hazards intrinsic, much in the Cold War mould. This would appear in stark contradiction to a policy of nuclear war avoidance, No First Use (NFU) and the belief in minimalism of the size of arsenal all of which thus far remained the guiding determinants (so we perceived) of China’s nuclear strategy. The logic of the past lay in the credible assurance of massive retaliatory punishment, should the State be subjected to a ‘First Strike’, also evident while adopting a ‘punishment’ strategy, is that the imperatives of penetration and survival of the arsenal be assured. Since it was massive punishment that was sought to be imposed it was necessary that the penalty for First Use be unambiguous and patently apparent. In such a frame of reference, the inconsistency in China’s strategic nuclear orientation is clearly perceptible and the question that begs an answer is to what purpose and why has the past been negated?

To find some clues one turns to China’s White Paper on Defence released about the same time as the conference got underway (a coincidence?). To be fair, the Paper is economical in what it has to say with respect to nuclear force planning, arsenal stewardship, strategic underpinnings and the marrying of ideational issues and technological capabilities with operational practises. What it does proclaim, in a departure from the eight previous papers, is that the Peoples Liberation Army Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) combines precision nuclear and conventional missile forces aimed at carrying out nuclear counter attacks and precision strikes. Significant, is that while conventional missiles also form a part of the arsenal of the other arms of the PLA, the Second Artillery is under the Nuclear Command Authority vested in the Central Military Commission (CMC). It must therefore be surmised that China currently nurtures both a Counter Value capability as well as a Counter Force capability which may suggest the emergence of a nuclear First Strike potential. And then there is a cryptic statement in the Paper that asserts “If China comes under a nuclear threat (emphasis added), the nuclear missile force will act upon the orders of the CMC, go into higher level of readiness, and get ready for a nuclear counter attack to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China.” This at best suggests a continuation of the NFU policy or if one were to dissect the first two sentences, advocates the possible development of a Launch on Warning (LOW) capability in the extreme case.

National proclamations of such substance may explain to some degree the statement of General Yao of the importance of opacity and uncertainty in their strategic nuclear posture. The White Paper, predictably, has no declared stance on their hitherto policy of No First Use; in fact it makes no mention of it.

In passing, the Iranian delegate Mr Khajehpour’s avowal that “Iran’s greatest threat perception is a Talibanised Pakistan” should set our strategic planners thinking. Particularly when viewed in the nuclear perspective and at a time when Pakistan has taken the slippery descent down the tactical nuclear weapon route.

(Written as part of a compendium of views by several scholars following the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Conference, 08-09 April 2013). To access the debate, visit: http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/carnegie-nuclear-policy-conference-2013-chinas-strategic-nuclear-posture-3919.html)