China’s Curious Carnegie Contention

By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

This article was first published by the Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies in May 2013.

The 15th Annual International Nuclear Conference held under the auspices of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace on 08-09 April 2013, brought under one roof over 800 delegates comprising politicians, scholars, students and bureaucrats from 46 countries with the purpose of edifying them on the nature of the contemporary nuclear narrative. The numbers gave the congregation a visibility that few in the past had succeeded in realizing. The account of nuclear power was viewed through the prism of its deterrent significance, proliferatory odds, disarmament prospects and civilian use.

What would appear to have passed muster is China’s incremental transformation of the idea of a nuclear weapon from one whose power lay in its non-use and which had enjoyed thus far, an admittedly, puerile yet tolerable and stable relationship with the world at large; into one of possible delinquency and deepening uncertainty. The Chinese formulation as articulated by their spokesperson General Yao Yunzhu, was that “it was the importance of uncertainty and opacity rather than transparency” (emphasis added) that lay at the heart of deterrence. This at once strikes a discordant note to nuclear orthodoxy and the theory of what principles better serve the cause of deterrence.

In an era shorn of paradigms that define the strategic context, (as did the all-embracing Cold War, ‘containment,’ ‘clash of civilizations’ or even the ‘end of ideological history’), ‘uncertainty’ makes for a curious strategic nuclear hypothesis. The demands of an indeterminate situation, particularly where nuclear weapons in the hands of ‘rational players’ are concerned, is for certainty and not uncertainty in nuclear policy and transparency and surely not opacity in material and technological intrusions into the nuclear arsenal. The uncertainty-opacity approach provides the potential adversary with the basis for embarking on a ‘speculative bulge’ in his arsenal and kicks off a nuclear arms race with the hazards intrinsic, much in the Cold War mould. This would appear in stark contradiction to a policy of nuclear war avoidance, No First Use (NFU) and the belief in minimalism of the size of arsenal all of which thus far remained the guiding determinants (so we perceived) of China’s nuclear strategy. The logic of the past lay in the credible assurance of massive retaliatory punishment, should the State be subjected to a ‘First Strike’, also evident while adopting a ‘punishment’ strategy, is that the imperatives of penetration and survival of the arsenal be assured. Since it was massive punishment that was sought to be imposed it was necessary that the penalty for First Use be unambiguous and patently apparent. In such a frame of reference, the inconsistency in China’s strategic nuclear orientation is clearly perceptible and the question that begs an answer is to what purpose and why has the past been negated?

To find some clues one turns to China’s White Paper on Defence released about the same time as the conference got underway (a coincidence?). To be fair, the Paper is economical in what it has to say with respect to nuclear force planning, arsenal stewardship, strategic underpinnings and the marrying of ideational issues and technological capabilities with operational practises. What it does proclaim, in a departure from the eight previous papers, is that the Peoples Liberation Army Second Artillery Force (PLASAF) combines precision nuclear and conventional missile forces aimed at carrying out nuclear counter attacks and precision strikes. Significant, is that while conventional missiles also form a part of the arsenal of the other arms of the PLA, the Second Artillery is under the Nuclear Command Authority vested in the Central Military Commission (CMC). It must therefore be surmised that China currently nurtures both a Counter Value capability as well as a Counter Force capability which may suggest the emergence of a nuclear First Strike potential. And then there is a cryptic statement in the Paper that asserts “If China comes under a nuclear threat (emphasis added), the nuclear missile force will act upon the orders of the CMC, go into higher level of readiness, and get ready for a nuclear counter attack to deter the enemy from using nuclear weapons against China.” This at best suggests a continuation of the NFU policy or if one were to dissect the first two sentences, advocates the possible development of a Launch on Warning (LOW) capability in the extreme case.

National proclamations of such substance may explain to some degree the statement of General Yao of the importance of opacity and uncertainty in their strategic nuclear posture. The White Paper, predictably, has no declared stance on their hitherto policy of No First Use; in fact it makes no mention of it.

In passing, the Iranian delegate Mr Khajehpour’s avowal that “Iran’s greatest threat perception is a Talibanised Pakistan” should set our strategic planners thinking. Particularly when viewed in the nuclear perspective and at a time when Pakistan has taken the slippery descent down the tactical nuclear weapon route.

(Written as part of a compendium of views by several scholars following the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Nuclear Conference, 08-09 April 2013). To access the debate, visit: http://www.ipcs.org/article/china/carnegie-nuclear-policy-conference-2013-chinas-strategic-nuclear-posture-3919.html)

The Evolution of a New Triple Entente

By

Vice Admiral (retd.) Vijay Shankar

Keywords: “A New Triple Entente,” India-China relations, Anti-Access Denial Strategy, China Maritime Strategy, China-USA relations

Download full article here: The Evolution of a New Triple Entente

Excerpts:

“The only check on the abuse of political predominance has always consisted in the opposition of an equally formidable rival, or of a combination of several countries forming leagues of defence. The equilibrium established by such grouping of forces is technically known as the balance of forces.”[i]

The Alliance System

The history of armed conflicts in the twentieth century may not have brought about any deep seated changes to contemporary understanding of the true nature or rationality of power and its application. But, there is an instinctive grasp amongst nations that a conflict between an assemblages of States can only lead to immeasurable catastrophe which could and would serve to repudiate the purpose of military action. This discernment was central to the theory of balance of power. Up to the turn of the twentieth century it was this system of alliances that sought stability within the power equations of the era. The existence of an international order whose stability was predicated on a system of  grouping of States not only influenced the nature and intensity of wars that were fought but made transparent the conditions under which these may occur and also, ironically, presented a template for resolution. Seen in this perspective, the same circumstances that held the promise of stability additionally carried with it the calamitous prospects of horizontal and vertical expansion of the intensity of war. The two World Wars exemplified the limits of intensity and its expansion. At the heart of the arrangement lay four dominating impulses; politics, imperialism, territory and economics. If one or even two of these stimuli were to be detached, it would be interesting to see what nature of balance would emerge and whether it would find relevance in the contemporary milieu that obtains in the East Indian Ocean and the West Pacific region.

In the run up to the First World War, two treaties of alignment were central to order. These were the ‘Triple Alliance’ between Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy on the one hand; while the ‘Triple Entente’ between France, Britain and Russia sought equilibrium in a world that was threatened by subjugation unless an equally imposing opposition coalition could challenge and maintain the status quo. This context not only laid down the broad contours for strategic planning by both Unions but also had the potential to set into motion a significant chain of irrevocable military actions if one or the other perceived a threat of war. Consequently a crisis invariably tested the politician’s ability to restrain the military. Underscoring the dilemma that confronted the dual alliance was; “how effectively could an alliance designed to cope with the contingency of war serve interests in the day to day diplomacy of peace.”[ii]

The Fear of Nations and the Death of an Enlightened World Order

Some of the symptoms of the anarchic nature of things are a vicious securing of spheres of power and economic influence as exemplified by China in Africa; the competition between autocracy and liberalism; an older religious struggle between radical Islam and secular cultures; and the inability to regulate the chaotic flow of technologies and information. As these struggles are played out the first casualty in the post Cold War era is the still born hope of a benign and enlightened world order. The endemic instability world wide is characterized by the number of armed conflicts that erupted between the periods 1989 to 2010, which total 49.[iii] The nature of these wars, more than anything else, reflected what I term the ‘Uncertainty Paradigm’ for they ranged from wars of liberation and freedom to insurgencies, civil wars, racial-ethnic-religious wars, proxy wars, interventions and wars motivated by the urge to corner economic resources. In all cases it was either the perpetuation of a dispensation, political ambitions, or the fear of economic deprivation that was at work below the surface.

In this era the fears and anxieties of nations are driven by four vital traumas. At the head of these is the perpetuation of the State and its dispensation. In second place is the fear and understanding that impedance to the nation’s ambitions of growth and development may come about due to internal or external stresses or a combination of the two. The third trauma is that the remaining interests that the State considers critical must be recognized and accepted by the International system; this distress places the system in a quandary, particularly so when interests overlap at which time there is a real potential for friction and conflict. Lastly, is a conundrum faced by all major powers that is, does military power prevail?

It will not fail anybody’s notice that both India and China fall into this very same cast ensnared by the ‘four traumas’, with one very critical difference, and that is the cooperative stimulus along with an egalitarian tradition is strong in India’s case, while China has not displayed respect for either. Against this backdrop, when the politics of competitive resource access is put into the same pot as survival and development of State, to which is added the blunt character of military power, we have before us the recipe for friction and conflict. It is against this canvas that the development and structuring of Indian engagement with like minded powers must be contextualised.

[…]

The New Triple Entente and Concept of Anti-Access Denial

As the curtains fell on the twentieth century the character of strategic alliances had transformed in two of its earlier facets. Gone were the imperialist motives that readily recognized and accepted the risk of war and the urge to territorial conquest and expansion. In its place was a fresh premise; one that was governed by political compatibility, economic mutuality and collective security. The emerging convergence of interests in both the political and economic arena between India, Japan and the USA makes the prospects of a new ‘Triple Entente’ strategically of the essence.

Having also brought about a modicum of coherence to the need to contend with and normalize China’s aspirations (which it has so clearly spelt out), it would now be appropriate to define and derive objectives of the concept of Anti-Access Denial as applicable to the larger regional Maritime Military Strategy. Anti-Access Denial by the Alliance will seek to contest and deny China’s ability to unilaterally project military power to secure her interests either through aggression or through other destabilizing activities. The instrument to achieve denial is by convincingly raising the cost of military intervention through the use or threat of use of methods that are predominant in form and irresistible in substance. The strategy’s first impulse is to avoid a hot conflict.

To ‘contest and deny’ would suggest a clear understanding of where the centre of gravity of power projection forces lie. In China’s case it is the triumvirate of the Aircraft Carrier; security of the narrows and of the ‘string of pearls’ that would be needed to assure sustenance of forces (on which is founded the integrity of the Third Island Chain). Use of aggressive means is clear enough, but prying open faults that could destabilize and therefore distract the main exertions, are not at all patent. The Alliance will have noted that in China’s case both internal as well as external stresses obtain that could be leveraged in order to undermine their primary thrust to contest, deny and to project power; more importantly the envisaged Alliance too has fissures that China not only has the resolve and capability to exploit but also has a willing ally in Pakistan and North Korea to queer any pitch.

‘To raise the cost of military intervention’ is a matter that resides in the mind of political leadership, yet there will always be a threshold, the verge of which is marked by diminishing benefits of intervention or power projection. It will be noted that it was a similar calculus that must have come to play in the 1995 Taiwan Strait crisis that inhibited and forced China to reconcile to humiliation in the face of a possible debilitating confrontation. Also the logic of weakening out-of-region motivation sets in, diluting the efforts of the intervener. Lastly the threat of ‘use of force’ must not only be credible but also the ‘value exchange’ in terms of losses must weigh against the power projecting force. The objectives of an ‘Anti-access Denial’ Strategy may therefore be summarized as follows:

  • To devise operational and material Alliance doctrines and strategies to deter, threaten, (and should the need arise) strike and neutralize Chinese aircraft carriers that may menace Alliance interests in the IOEO.
  • To deploy denial and control forces that effectively exclude the ‘string of pearls’ ports. Platforms of  choice would be conventional submarines, maritime strike aircrafts supported by long range surveillance efforts.
  • To disable operational networks through ASAT and active cyber action.
  • To surveil and seed the straits with seabed sensors, surface and air scouts.
  • To disable energy and resources traffic through non lethal methods and to ensure that own escorts keep open Alliance right of passage on the sea.
  • To raise the cost of military intervention will suggest a strategic posture that by disposition, demonstration, marking and resolve, declare our orientation, will and intent that the cost of intervention will far outweigh its benefits.

Leaving aside, for the moment, material aspects of generating capabilities, the most critical issue is one of timing, that is, what would be the enabling circumstances that would trigger an Anti- Access Denial Strategy.  While the short answer may be “when Alliance interests are threatened” this does not in any way assist the planner in resolving the quandary. Two factors must, however, lead; the first is that initial moves must be so calibrated that the intervener is made aware that a threshold is being approached and that the next rung in the escalatory ladder is a ‘hot’ exchange. This may take the form of ‘marking’ or through hotline communications. The second is by initiating demonstrative action which may serve to disable operational networks or even measures instituted in some other theatre.

A maritime Anti-Access Denial strategy unlike a continental standpoint, abhors ‘Lakshman Rekhas’ for there are no readily definable geographic ‘redlines’, what is of greater import is context, circumstances and events, which brings us back to the original dilemma of characterizing the conditions that would bring the strategy into play. In any event, we have in an earlier section noted China’s security narrative and the challenge that a rising China poses. Both advocate the centrality and compelling force of an aggressive drive to corner resources. Under this order of things, the Triple Entente may define ‘red lines’ as follows:

  • Any large scale military attempt to change the status quo in territorial configuration.
  • Large scale military build up either at Hambantota, Gwadar or at Sittwe.
  • Aggressive deployments that disrupt energy and resource traffic or dislocate networks.
  • Any attempt to provide large scale military support, covert or otherwise, to promote an insurgency.

In execution, Alliance Anti-Access Denial Strategy will be implemented in three distinct phases. The First will involve selective Anti-Access Denial deployment, surveillance and marking in the IOEO; the second will entail demonstration through cyber action and possible ASAT intervention; the third and last is hot action including sea control, enabling Exclusion Zones and SLOC severance.

Conclusion

The ultimate reality of the international system is the place that power enjoys in the scheme of assuring stability in relations between nations. Uncertainty in international relations queers the pitch, in view of the expanded space of possibles. China has unambiguously articulated three canons that make for its strategic objectives; stability, growth and regional preeminence. In the absence of a security oriented cooperative impulse, the problem with such sweeping strategies, specifically the coming ‘Third Island Chain’ superimposed on a long range power projection, and access denial is its blindness to recognize that, we are in fact dealing with a sea space that is the busiest of all the “vast commons.” The reluctance for collaboration makes the potential for friction high.

Contemporary challenges in the IOEO are dominated by what direction China’s rise will take. Of significance is that the potential for a collision is a reality and the only consideration that could deter it, is the ability to attain a strategic posture in the IOEO that serves to stabilize. India’s relationship with the USA and Japan provides the opening to establish a ‘Triple Entente’ that realizes political compatibility, economic mutuality and collective security in the region in order to counterpoise China.

Download full article here: The Evolution of a New Triple Entente


End Notes

[i] Gooch G.P. and Harold Temperley (eds). British Documents on the Origin of War 1898-1914, Vol III, London 1928 Appendix A, p 402-3.

[ii] Bridge F.R. From Sadowa to Sarajevo; The Foreign Policy of Austria-Hungary 1866-1914. London 1972, p 360.

[iii] The World at War http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/index.html.The United Nations defines “major wars” as military conflicts inflicting 1,000 battlefield deaths per year. In 1965, there were 10 major wars under way. The new millennium began with much of the world consumed in armed conflict or cultivating an uncertain peace. As of mid-2005, there were eight Major Wars under way [down from 15 at the end of 2003], with as many as two dozen “lesser” conflicts ongoing with varrying degrees of intensity.

Non-Alignment 2.0: New Wine into Old Wineskins or ‘Enlightened Alignment’?*

By

Vice Admiral (retd.) Vijay Shankar

(A critique of “Nonalignment 2.0: A Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the Twenty First Century” (2012) jointly authored by Shyam Saran et al.)

Keywords: Nonalignment 2.0, India Foreign Policy, China Comprehensive National Power, Look East policy, strategic autonomy, ‘Uncertainty Paradigm’

Non-Alignment, a Tryst with Utopia

Jawaharlal Nehru, addressing Parliament on his policy of non-alignment, articulated what he considered the inner compulsions that obliged India to embrace this course of action thus, “What I have done is to give voice to that policy (non-alignment), I have not originated it. It is a policy inherent in the circumstances of India, inherent in the past thinking of India, inherent in the whole mental outlook of India, inherent in the conditioning of the Indian mind.”[i] Undoubtedly, such a lofty Utopian understanding of national conditions and national psyche could only have come from a man of Nehru’s stature, yet for all his erudition, to build policy rooted ideationally in the past would suggest that the present was no more than a re-creation of that past which did not see the future as a distinct idea where the strength of a new nation could be brought to bear to harmonize with a rapidly changing modern world. The need was not to live the present as the past but to orient it towards a future which in essence would capture the spirit of modernity. Non-Alignment in its first avatar suffered from this malaise.

Being a Universalist, Nehru’s view of national interests saw no incompatibility with the interests of other nations, a concept at the core of non-alignment.[ii] Casting aside for the moment the exaltedness of the idea, three main historical impulses were central to belief in the policy: firstly, anti- colonialism; second, consciousness of an Asian identity; and lastly, a denial of the economic rationale that energised imperialism. Between the ideas of mutuality of interests of nations, geo-political circumstances on the collapse of imperial powers, the emergence of a world order held hostage to the Cold War and an appraisal of national imperatives, lay not just the reality of India’s economic impoverishment, but also the impracticality of lifting the economy without leveraging global capital and the market system. And this was the problem with non-alignment, to attempt to democratise international relations in a milieu that first and foremost respected power and then sovereignty, leaving adherents to choose between opportunism and pliability. The failure of the policy to bring stability in the neighbourhood or to remove India from the list of ‘basket cases,’[iii] stands in mute testimony to the upshot of the policy. Non-Alignment, when viewed by a world in the throes of a mortal power struggle, was seen more as policy of self seeking expediency and a recourse taken by the weak.

By the end of the 1980’s the policy lay in tatters, its members had stomped time and again over non-alignment’s founding canons aligning blatantly with any and every cause that promoted self interests. The end of the Cold War brought in its wake prognostication of the emergence of one world, in which harmony, democracy, an end to conflict and of man’s ideological evolution with the grand formulation that western liberal democracy had prevailed.[iv] Some saw a multi polar order and the arrival of China; others forecast a clash of civilisations.[v] However, these conjectures found little use in understanding the realities of the post Cold War world as each represented a candour of its own. The paradigm of the day, I would posit, is ‘uncertainty,’ as marked by the tensions of multi polarity; tyranny of economics; anarchy of expectations; and a polarisation along religio-cultural lines, all compacted in the cauldron of globalization. It is against this backdrop that the document “Non-Alignment 2.0, a Foreign and Strategic Policy for India in the twenty first century” must be viewed.

            The authors of the document Non-Alignment 2.0 have, in the preface, emphasised their conviction that “the success of India’s own internal development will depend decisively on how effectively we manage our global opportunities in order to maximize our choicesthereby enlarging our domestic options to the benefit of all Indians.” This opening statement is clearly an affirmation of the need to link and leverage the global environment in order to achieve self centred growth. This at once is a refreshing departure from the past for it suggests deflating the idea of finding compatibility between national interests and the interests of other nations.  It continues, “The purposes of the present strategy document are three-fold: to lay out the opportunities that India enjoys in the international sphere; to identify the challenges and threats it is likely to confront; and to define the broad perspective and approach that India should adopt as it works to enhance its strategic autonomy in global circumstances that, for some time to come, are likely to remain volatile and uncertain.”[vi] In purpose also, the aim of conditional strategic autonomy at once discredits the central theme of non-alignment. At which time the question that begs to be asked is, why does this policy document carry the sobriquet “Non-Alignment 2.0” at all?

The document comprises seven chapters an introduction and conclusion. The Chapters include: The Asian Theatre, India and the International Order, Hard Power, Internal Security, Non- Conventional Security Issues, Knowledge and Information Foundations, and State and Democracy. The order in which the chapters appear do not contribute to either a logical flow of ideas or coherence in the process of developing a national strategy. The fragmented manner in which opinions and perceptions appear are more symptomatic of distinctive individual notions that defy synthesis and  remain inconsistent with the concept of a Strategic Approach.[vii]  The Strategic Approach, a phrase popularised by Julian Corbett,[viii] intended to put in place the means of achieving one’s national objectives given the contrary pulls and pressures of the international system. It derives from two critical characteristics of the international system. The first of these is the prevailing instability of protagonists involved in the system; whether it is their politics, national interests, alliances or even their historical antagonisms which when interacts with the larger global settings causes’ friction, a sense of deprivation and generates a chemistry of volatility. The second is the function of a state as a sovereign entity that is charged with guardianship of certain specific and at times unique set of values sometimes contrary and at others in opposition to the macro system. Therefore a pre-requisite to adopt a strategic approach is to have a cogent theory of how power in all its dimensions (both hard and soft) may provide a context to formulate a policy oriented towards achieving national goals, which would, in turn, enable the development of a national strategy. It is the absence of theory that makes the generation of strategy rapidly devolve to reacting to global impulses rather than attempting to shape those very impulses. Unfortunately the document fails to convincingly articulate such a theory. There is an outline of global trends impulses and a run through of some deficient and at times imperfect proclamations and assertions. These deal with the times being auspicious for change and reconstitution; the passive nature of India’s power and the need to enhance it; that economic matters will dominate the calculus of power; China being prematurely given the mantle of a superpower without debate; and the need to enhance State capacity in order to enjoy both legitimacy and credibility.[ix] The Introduction to the document serves poorly in the role of a theory.

To Develop Strategy from Policy and Establish Power Equations

Chapter One concerns the ‘Asian Theatre’ and the document rightly contends that “Engaging with the Asian Theatre will be a key concern for India’s Foreign and Strategic Policy.” Yet, for reasons best known to the authors, Japan, Russia and Central Asia have been left out of the calculus. In addition, the linkage of the Asian Theatre with the rest of a globalized world and the dynamics generated by the actions of the USA both in and out of theatre are conspicuous by omission, which disappointingly leaves the analysis fractional. A passing mention is made of India’s ‘Look East Policy’ without even an attempt at expanding on how the policy ought to develop and propel strategy. The inability to come to grips with the hierarchal relationship between Policy and Strategy is a fault line that runs through the document. There is a suggestion that the Asian Theatre is also one that hosts “competition in ideological hegemony as well,” though what it implies or even entails remains a mystery.

Moving specifically to China, the prescription made is to “hold the line in the North, but maintain and, if possible, enlarge India’s edge in the maritime South.” While this makes strategic sense, it clashes with the logic and idea of having awarded China the status of a ‘super power,’[x] which in turn throws up the query, how will the edge be maintained without a security contract of alignment (to the credit of the authors they have suggested a security network); and then what becomes of a foundational canon of non-alignment? This forlorn intellectual muddle unfortunately pervades the paper; perhaps the document may have been better branded as ‘Enlightened Alignment 1.0’. Once again the same dilemma comes up when addressing China’s perception of India as a “swing state” for the significance of a swing state (not a very complimentary appellation) is one that aligns!

Analysis of the Sino-Indian economic relations is credible and the identification of a strategy that balances competition with cooperation would appear to be the course to chart. However no rational scrutiny of China as a potential competitor is complete without an insight into their understanding of power if at all a strategic approach is to be adopted. The Chinese believe that the purpose of Comprehensive National Power (CNP) is to render the adversary (or the international system) powerless to stop its will. In this definition there are shades of an expanded Clausewitz, when the latter defines ‘war as an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.’[xi] Clausewitz, in his understanding of the application of national power, perceived two inseparable factors that had to be overcome, the first of which was the total means at the disposal of the adversarial state to pursue their interests and the second the strength of their will to resist. The rub in this knowledge is that as a combination while the former is measurable, the latter is much less easy to determine and can only be gauged by the strength of motivation.[xii] In a conflict this form of calculations will invariably lead to an upward spiral of power application against increased resistance till one or the other breaks, at which point an extreme would have been reached. In dealing with the Chinese one must, therefore, factor such an eventuality. China perceives CNP as the single most critical indicator and measure of the aggregate economic, political, military, and technological prowess of a nation. In its mathematics the nature of power is made up of two ingredients; the first and the primary is that set of dominance that manipulates and forces desired outcomes, termed as Command Power; while the second are ideational virtues (soft power) that serve to influence and mould finales with no great certainty. Professors Hu Augang and Men Honghua, in their paper on CNP and grand strategy[xiii] identify three core factors that establish the CNP of states: Strategic Resources, Strategic Capability and Strategic Outcomes. They go on to add that while the latter two are a function of the former; CNP, is in fact a summation of the total Strategic Resources of a nation. Such a form of reckoning brings in objectivity to establishing power equations and may have complemented persuasiveness of the arguments in the document.

The authors appear, in the main, to view the South Asian region as the proverbial albatross around India’s neck despite acknowledging it as a vital region that would determine India’s progression. At which time the document would carry far more weight if it had addressed itself to the issue of devising concrete transformatory policies to convert the burden into an opportunity. It remains inadequate to state subjectively that “by engaging with Asia more broadly, it can put South Asia in a larger context, serving as the region’s platform to globalization.”[xiv]

In dealing with Pakistan, the absence of a strategic theory is never more apparent then when the arguments in the paper descend to the operational level. The narrative favours an incremental process to improvement in Indo-Pak relations (whatever that means!). However, a long term assessment of past relations would suggest that the trend has actually been going downhill since the 1950s, which would insinuate incremental animosity rather than goodwill. Its manifestations may be noted in the induction of Tactical Nuclear Weapons which has taken relations a step closer to a nuclear conflagration; Pakistan military strategy in collusion with active Jihadist terrorism targeting India (26/11 the more recent episode) has increased the provocation for finding an armed solution; the inability of an emasculated civilian leadership to rein in the military leaves the question: Who is in charge in that country and who does one negotiate with (remember Lahore and Kargil)? Under these circumstances the suggested negative and positive levers are purely operational in both form and content.[xv] The document may have done better to place before decision-makers, strategies and a set of options that considered alignments and pressures that would compel reconciliation. After all, if by 2050 India along with the USA is slated to be the second largest economy,[xvi] this would represent a wholly changed perspective that can be creatively leveraged.

A broad brush treatment of West Asia in spite of recognising it as one of the areas in which India has primary interests, leaves the serious reader with an awkward poser; if a vital region is not to merit a well defined strategy, then either the basic premise of the stakes being critical is misplaced or the fragmented approach to the document has resulted in our concerns falling between the cracks. The main factors that ought to influence the development of a strategy have been identified, but what does not emerge is a strategic inference other than a need to diversify our sources of energy. The fact that the region is a hotbed of terror activities, that 16 per cent of our oil imports come from Iran, that Israel provides us with a technological window to the West, that China has stepped up its strategic engagement with the region and that several wars are ongoing in the area have all been given short shrift for reasons that beg clarification.

Security and Economic Growth Two Sides of the Same Coin

Chapter Two deals with India and the international order and is devoted to the integration of India into the global economy; it is the largest section of the document suggesting that it is economic power that will dominate in the international order. But what is missing is an analysis of what the current world order is about and what it takes to thrive in it. The paradigm of the day, as mentioned earlier, is ‘Uncertainty.’ Against this canvas and with the belief that economic growth and security are two sides of the same coin, it would have been in order had the document analysed the security ramifications of the main economic precepts of globalization and of India’s global economic engagement.

Development of Force Structures and Outlining a Contract for Use

In dealing with hard power, Chapter Three astutely points out the need to harmonize with political objectives. However, in the absence of defining policy and designating political objectives in the face of the myriad challenges that confront the nation, there appears a gap between the development of forces and outlining a ‘contract’ for its use. Even where policy has outlined political objectives such as in the “Look East Policy” no endeavour has been made to delineate a military strategy to support policy.

Also, the transformation to a maritime power, as Mahan reminded us, is not just about geography it also includes character of people and of the government, intrinsic to the latter is the nature of national institutions. The generation of a maritime strategy that dominates the Indian Ocean, as the authors propose, neither takes into account the correlation of forces, nor the existence of both intense mutuality and divergence of interests there; all of which is symptomatic of a further lack of understanding of the nature of maritime power and the principal demand of a maritime strategy which is to attain a strategic position that would permit control of oceanic spaces.

As far as structural changes are concerned (p. 42, paragraph 179), these are very much in order and have been on the table since the Kargil conflict and would demand urgent implementation.

The Ideal of What a District Officer Should Be

Internal Security, as the Achilles heel to India’s development is, precisely, seen as a political matter. The Chapter summarizes three imperatives that make for internal stability: security of the citizen, empowerment of the population and a political culture that serves to unite. What appears to have been left out is the corrupt and ponderous state of the delivery mechanism. There is no dearth of noble political intentions; where things disintegrate is when it comes to the administration for implementation. What is profoundly needed is, as Wavell so eloquently put it after he left India, “the English would be remembered not by this institution or that, but by the ideal they left behind of what a district officer should be.”[xvii] The document’s value would have increased manifold had they strategized to reform the administrative system.

Energy Security and Nuclear Weapons Policy

Both energy security and nuclear weapons policy have a central place in the larger comprehensive national power of the state, what is incredulous is that they are clubbed under one head. The unconvincing nature of the grouping lies in the distinction that energy security complements economic growth while the nuclear weapons policy circumscribes and puts limits on the extent to which conventional military power can be applied. After all, the aim is not to use nuclear weapons as they tend to destroy the very purpose for which military power was intended.

That being as it may, the issue of a policy and then a strategy to provide for energy security remains unattended, in the absence of which access to global energy resources will remain hostage to dynamics that we would not be in a position to influence unless we adopt policy.

Knowledge, Information and Democracy

The last two Chapters are devoted to the creation of a knowledge society and an introspection of the nature of the democratic Indian State. Clearly the elements that go to make a knowledge society are well known, what is not is the strategy that awakens the innovativeness, generates seamless cooperation and kindles creativity of the mass of the citizenry to efficiently deliver. The document does not undertake to outline a roadmap to achieve an information and technology enabled society, that is both innovative and creative, such that they are on a platform that could fully grasp and exploit the various elements of comprehensive national power could be accomplished.

In as much as the nature of the Democratic Indian State, its institution and their ability to harmonize with the times and deliver to meet economic goals is concerned, Chapter Seven is more a prescription of how they ought to function and not a design of reforms that would compel them to perform towards the desired objectives. Also, the fact that the Preamble to the Indian Constitution lays down in the broadest terms the objectives of the State, it would have been in order had this chapter devoted itself to elaboration of a strategy of attainment. This segment would have been more appropriately located as a preamble to the document.

Summary of Appraisal

Addressing the structure of the document, the order in which the Chapters appear do not contribute to either a logical flow of ideas or coherence in the process of developing a national strategy. The fragmented manner in which opinions and perceptions appear are more symptomatic of distinctive individual notions than of a Strategic Approach.

The absence of a theory makes strategy reactive to global impulses rather than an attempt to shape these very impulses; unfortunately the introduction segment of the document serves poorly in the role of a theory. In form there is also an inability to come to grips with the hierarchal relationship between policy and strategy, they are not synonymous; it is policy that provides a theory which in turn generates Strategies. This fault line runs through the paper and manifests itself as a gap between the development of forces and the outlining of a contract for their use.

In dealing with the Asian Theatre, for reasons best known to the authors, Japan, Russia and Central Asia have been left out of the calculus. In addition the linkage of the Asian Theatre with the rest of a globalized world and the dynamics generated by the actions of the USA are conspicuous by omission, which disappointingly leaves the analysis fractional. The intellectual muddle that pervades the paper is often caused by its title, for some of the precepts formulated are brazen alignments; perhaps the document may have been better branded as ‘Enlightened Alignment 1.0’.

Any appraisal of China and its potential power is incomplete without a reference to its CNP since it perceives it as the single most critical indicator and measure of the aggregate economic, political, military, and technological prowess. A broad brush treatment of both South and West Asia leaves the reader wondering why these two vital areas did not merit the importance that they deserved.

While suggesting a transformation to a maritime power, there is an apparent lack of understanding that it is not only geographic and material factors that would bring about transformation, but also a change in the character of people and the governmental institutions involved, this as will be appreciated requires a very long term and detailed road map. Also the principal demand on a maritime strategy is not to dominate oceanic spaces but to control or to challenge control of those spaces.

In dealing with internal security, the document’s value would have increased manifold had it identified the rot in the administrative system and strategized to reform it. Chapter Seven on the subject of State Democracy would have been more appropriately located as a preamble to the document. It would have done well to have leaned on the directive principles of the Indian Constitution which lays down in the broadest terms the objectives of the State, and been in order had this Chapter devoted itself to elaboration of a strategy of attainment.     


[*] This article is forthcoming in the March 2013 issue of Defense and Security Alert. All rights reserved. No part of this article may be reproduced in any form or by any electronic or mechanical means, including information storage and retrieval systems, without written permission from the author, except in the case of a reviewer, who may quote brief passages embodied in critical articles or in a review. Author’s email: snigir@gmail.com

End Notes

[i]Jawaharlal Nehru speech in Parliament 09 December 1958.

[ii] Rao, Narasimha PV. Nehru and Non Alignment from Nehru: The Nation Remembers, 1989.

[iii] The phrase “a basket case” in origin had a physical meaning. In the grim slang of the British army during World War I, it   referred to a quadruple amputee who could only be moved in a basket due to the hopelessness of his condition. This term was then applied to an emotionally or mentally unstable person and later to anything that failed to function particularly to economies. From the American heritage dictionary of idioms, Anmer Christine. Houghton Mifflin Company 4th edition April 1997.

[iv]Fukuayama Francis. “The End of History.” The National Interest, 16 (Summer 1989), pp 4, 18.

[v] Huntington. Samuel, P. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of  World Order, Penguin Books, India 1997, pp 30-39.

[vi] “Non-Alignment 2.0, a foreign and strategic policy for India in the twenty first century”, p iii.  A document published by the Centre of Policy Research, New Delhi 2012.

[vii] Ibid p8.

[viii] Corbett Julian S. Some Principles of Maritime Strategy. Longmans, Green and Co. NewYork 1911, p8.

[ix] Non-Alignment 2.0, p1to11.

[x] Ibid, p 9 para 17.

[xi] Clausewitz, Carl Von. ‘On War’ Princeton University Press, 1976, pg75.

[xii] Ibid, pg.77.

[xiii] Prof Hu Augang and Associate Prof Men Honghua. ‘The Rising of Modern China CNP and Grand Strategy’. A paper presented Strategy and Management, No.3, 2002. http://www.kiep.go.kr/inc

[xiv] Non-Alignment 2.0, p17 paragraph 53.

[xv] Ibid p19-21, paragraphs 62 to 75.

[xvi] Wilson and Stupnytska Goldman Sachs global economics paper, 153, of 28 March 2007, pp 8-9. Projections of size of national economies in 2050, China will be the largest at $ 70 trillion while India and the USA would be in second place at $ 37 trillion.

[xvii] Mason, Philip. The Men Who Ruled India. Pan Books London 1985, p 399.