Category Archives: China and the Pacific

Geopolitics of Securing the Maritime Environment

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Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

(The article has been published in the December 2023 issue of the DSA and is available at the following link https://www.dsalert.org/DSA-Editions/2023/December-2023_Vice_Admiral_%28retd%29_Vijay_Shankar%2C.pdf )

Understanding Geopolitics: A New Slant

The term ‘geopolitics’ has historically been employed in reference to a nation’s interests and stratagems adopted to secure them. This understanding is subjective; for  it does not account for the full significance of the term and even bears negative connotations. In the run-up to the Second World War, both Germany and Japan’s expansionist policies were justified using the ‘geopolitical’ argument garbed in bizarre concepts of Lebensraum and the Greater East Co-prosperity Sphere . More recently In the post-war era, America saw in its strategic doctrine of ‘Containment’ an instrument that assured its geopolitical dominance in world affairs.

In the 21st century, geopolitics aims at explaining how geography can impact politics and how states try to mitigate these effects.  Geography, in other words, contributes to defining the boundaries of what is possible to achieve in international relations along with economic and security advantages that may be leveraged. China In its South China Sea policy has shown just how ‘creatively’ this can be achieved.  

Integration of Maritime Power with Geopolitics: Survey of the Domain  

Thucydides, in the 4th century Bce, chronicled events of the Peloponnesian War (431-404Bce).  Aggressive moves by Athens to establish empire and control the geopolitics of the Mediterranean caused fear in Sparta and provoked war. The conflict bears so many similarities to wars waged through the ages across both the maritime and continental dimensions that it offers lessons to this day. Athens forged a maritime alliances, while Sparta led a coalition of continental powers. The years of fighting depleted manpower and financial resources on both sides. Eventually, the Spartans destroyed the Athenian fleet, leading to capitulation of an exhausted Athens. Three significant lessons emerge:

  • Wars of attrition between balanced alliances do not yield spectacular victories, rather, exhaustion and a blurring of lines between victor and vanquished.
  • Maritime superiority by itself does not win a war that is fought for influence over land.
  • Wars stimulated by overconfidence leave much to chance.

Towards the end of the 19th century it was thinkers like Mahan and Julian Corbett who set ablaze the maritime spirit of the new century. They saw the maritime domain as a medium through which a nation could not just project power, but also control the strategic direction of any conflict. In The Influence of Sea Power upon History, Mahan analysed the use of British naval forces to demonstrate that nations that exercised control of important parts of the maritime domain, dominate history. More specifically, it was the effect of sea power upon wealth and prosperity of nations that moulded the course of history and gave to Britain the heft to achieve global pre-eminence. Mahan’s significance was twofold: first, in the realm of grand strategy he asserted that power came from integration of maritime activities with geopolitics and colonial-economics. Second, command and decision making in war from a position of naval superiority gives to the advocate both a logistical highway and a flexible ‘avenue of approach and exit’. He emphasized that sea power was about commercial use of the domain in peace and its control in war; about profits and power projection. Mahan’s theory remains persuasive, in part, to this day.

Corbett, on the other hand, believed naval influence on the maritime domain to be a part of national policy which had sway over the non-military elements of state power. He saw the fleet not merely an instrument of control but as an accompaniment to assuring the “act of passage on the sea.” It was from this critical tenet that concepts of Sea Denial, Sea Control and Power Projection evolved. Perhaps his abiding legacy to contemporary maritime thought was the idea that “freedom of the seas was an irreducible factor” for the sea was not territory for conquest; nor the oceans defensible. What it constituted was a substantial determinant in the growth of a nation and prosecution of war (Corbett Julian, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy, Longmans, 1911).

Language of War

Within an international system that hovers between order and anarchy, differentiated pace of growth among states engenders rivalry over resources, technology, commerce and markets. Realists of the early 20th century, such as Halford Mackinder and Friedrich Ratzel suggested how power may transcend geographic realities making the threat of armed conflict a general reality. At the same time, abstractions of national honour, prestige and other national interests that often separate the state from its citizenry are at odds with the violence of, as Clausewitz phrased it, the “Language” of War. In this fray experience of wars of the second half of the twentieth century suggests that people faced with the “language” of war, prevail. Add to this the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction with their intrinsic menace of ending political purpose and we have the coming of indirect, relatively scaled down version of conventional wars albeit with high destructive potential fought in the penumbric shadows of a nuclear holocaust.

Rise and Fall of Powers: A Familiar Cadence

There is empirical evidence to suggest that the global economic crisis of the 1930s that in part set off the Second World War was responsible for thrusting the US into astonishingly favourable strategic circumstances. This situation not only triggered the Cold War but ultimately in the late 1980s, forced the melt-down of the Soviet Union and set into motion another ‘fall and rise’ in the global power structure. The characteristics of the economic crisis of the thirties rings a cadence now familiar to contemporary conditions – discontent as the basis that govern international economic systems, protectionism, unfair trade practices, one-sided competition, restricted access to resources, creation of proprietary mercantile routes and nationalistic policies; all in contradiction to the demands of an increasingly globalised world. Ironically they also characterize ‘Strategic Competitiveness’. And as long as it transpires within an international order that is influenced by uneven growth and shrinking natural resources; the quest for power will invariably be linked to the generation of military capabilities that can secure domination.

The Fragility of Power-Balances in the International System

The ultimate reality of the international system is the place that power enjoys in the scheme of assuring stability in relations between nations. Uncertainty in relations queers the pitch, in view of the expanded space for forces that can disrupt the status quo. For example, China has unambiguously articulated three canons that make for its strategic objective of ‘Rejuvenation’; revision of the existing order, sustained growth at any cost and by any means and regional pre-eminence. In the absence of a security oriented cooperative impulse, the problem with such sweeping strategies is its blindness to recognize that, we are in fact dealing with diverse regions, fast depleting resources and sea spaces that are the busiest of all the “vast commons”. The reluctance for collaboration on mutually acceptable terms makes the potential for friction high and the only consideration that could bring about change is the ability to attain a strategic posture that serves to deter and stabilize. Availability of full-spectrum military forces becomes central to any power equation and in consequence provides the foundation for order.

So, in our assessment of current geopolitics we note, the extinction of the “Cold War” was a temporary hiatus that after three decades has morphed the communist bloc to an autocratic and nationalistic faction comprising China and Russia that seek revision of world order on its terms. This refrain brings them in direct conflict with believers of unrestricted economic activity. At the same time the vision of unrestricted global economic activity has proven so fragile and subject to the many nuances of politics that, power deficient nations are left out.

The Challenge of China

Since inception in 1949, China’s strategic focus has shifted from ‘revolution-survival-recovery’ to an emphasis on ‘rejuvenation’. Both internal and external factors have shaped this vision. Internally the “century of humiliation” has given primacy to regime survival as the leading strategic goal, while rejuvenation expresses a quest for pre-eminence in world affairs on China’s terms. And thus, externally it has led to tensions over its revisionist and expansionist policies that have characterized its rise.

Militarily securing China’s overseas interests has increasingly become a part of its strategy, as articulated in their 2019 Chinese defence white paper . In the South China Sea Beijing is threatening control all within what it calls its “9 Dash Line”, which in 2016, the International Court of Arbitration at the Hague had unequivocally rejected.

The enigma of ‘the China-approach’ is that, having greatly benefitted from international systems, it has deliberately undermined the very same system by not fully supporting its governing elements; whether WTO, UN, IMF or the World Bank. Past complacency about Beijing’s predatory economic, military and ideological intentions have today crystallised to a danger that is real and may trigger an avoidable conflict. Even without war, tensions in the Indo-Pacific, along India’s northern borders and the slow weaning away from dependency on supply chains emanating from China have caused huge economic costs and deepened the chasm between the two blocs. An assessment of not just China’s strengths, but also of its vulnerabilities is, therefore of direct strategic consequence.

China, after four decades of military modernisation, has transformed to a formidable offensive force. With 2 million personnel and an annual budget of $225bn, it has the world’s biggest army, air force, navy and a vast missile force. By 2030 it could have 1,000 nuclear warheads. China believes it will have the capacity to invade Taiwan by 2027, at a time when their power projection ability extends to the Second Island Chain. Within the Tokyo-Guam-Philippines-Western New Guinea chain, China believes its strategic Anti-Access Area Denial (A2/AD) forces will be in a position to impede the movement of enemy forces while compelling them to operate further away from this protective Chain. It is strategies such as A2/AD that continue to intimidate global order by threats of control of the South China Sea.

China’s military has evolved from its roots in Soviet doctrines to a modern war machine capable (by its own assessment) of combined operations under conditions of intense cyber and information warfare. In philosophy, there has also been a shift from “Mass to Precision”. Recruitment is, however, hard ever since the one-child policy was enforced (1980-2016) and dazzling growth made the military a not so attractive career proposition. The PLA struggles to hire skilled technical manpower to man their modern platforms, maintain high-tech equipment and fight a technological war. And to top it all they are woefully lacking in combat experience. Although China has made scientific leaps, from hypersonic missiles to stealth fighters, its military-industrial complex trails behind in areas such as metallurgy, engines, design abilities and still relies on foreign fundamental research. Embargoes on semiconductors and components have made it harder to catch up with global scientific frontiers. Despite Mr Xi’s endless purges, corruption appears to be pervasive. It may explain why General Li Shang Fu was sacked as China’s defence minister this year after only a few months in the job.

China’s military infirmities exist alongside its deepening economic woes. A property crunch and the Communist Party’s growing hostility towards the private sector and foreign capital are impeding growth. China’s GDP will drop to 3.5% by 2028, projects the IMF. Investment by multinational firms into China has currently turned negative for the first time since records began in 1998, suggesting foreign companies are not reinvesting their profits in China, and rather they are moving money out of the country. China’s $18trn economy has slowed, perhaps irreversibly.

Behind China’s military and economic stutter lies a third, and deeper problem – an autocratic dominance of a system that no longer allows serious internal policy debate. Economists and technocrats have been side lined in favour of party loyalists. Given Premier Xi’s style of functioning there is real danger of strategic miscalculations; for, China is challenging not just today’s economic orthodoxy, but the world’s political and security framework as well without bringing about a change within her own political morphology.

Defining Strategic Space and Intent  

With uncertainty driving geopolitical dynamics, the first imperative for India is to bring about policy coherence between strategic space and security interests. It begins by defining the geographical contours within which a strategy can be developed to contend with challenges identified. The broad parameters of this definition must factor in the regions from where trade originates, logistic supply chains traverse, energy lines run, sea lines of communication span, narrows therein and potential allies with who mutuality exists. In this context the sea space encompassing the Indian Ocean and the Western Pacific provides the canvas within which our strategic interests will play out. This Oceanic body is dominated by ten important choke points and narrows. In essence the theatre gives to global trade efficient maritime routes that power the region’s growth. It accounts for over 70% of global trade, 60% of energy flow and is home to more than 50% of the world’s population; it also provides the context within which Indian maritime strategy must operate with the intent of assuring order, deterring upheavals and promoting mutuality. While our logistic chains traverse areas outside the Indian Ocean and Western Pacific these will need to be secured through partnerships, diplomacy and cooperative security measures.

Strategic Competitiveness   

The phrase “Strategic Competitiveness” mentioned earlier, first made its appearance in the 2018 National Defence Strategy of the USA . The document identified the revisionist states of China and Russia as strategic competitors. China for using “predatory economics” to intimidate lesser endowed nations while militarizing and persisting with its illegal claims in the South China Sea; and Russia as an “autocratic nationalistic state that eschewed the economic, diplomatic, and security aspirations of its erstwhile bloc”.

Strategic competitiveness has become one of the central preoccupations of governments. National wealth and economic prosperity are to some extent inherited but, in the main, created by the innovativeness of people. In this milieu the role played by the individual nation and partnerships in international relations have become more rather than less critical. Yet for all the writing on the topic, there is no theory nor is there an accepted definition of the term. It is amply clear that competitiveness amongst states develop when the existing status-quo is challenged, or indeed when a state or an alliance contests an emerging challenge. The tools of the contest are the combined “comprehensive national power” of one or more states pitted against the other.

Contestant Groupings

Ironically, Beijing’s recent White Paper titled “National Defence in a New Era” outlined its territorial ambitions in the South and East China Seas, Yellow Sea, Taiwan and Ladakh. It has warned regional powers of its willingness to use force and use it first if its ambitions are threatened. On cue, in response to China’s aggressive manoeuvres; the formation of a trilateral alliance between Australia, UK and the US (AUKUS) and the continuing Strategic Security Dialogue between Japan, Australia, India and the US (Quad) have made it amply clear that “countering China’s assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific” is number one priority. AUKUS’s mission is complemented by the Quad; the latter presenting a new security architecture that combines both military and economic prowess amongst nations that share a common vision of a free and rule-based order. The resolve to strategic confrontation against revisionism is thus emphasised. Such a visible demonstration of collective resolve is, perhaps, the only way to dampen Beijing’s aggressive expansionism, for through the waters of the Indo-Pacific over 70% of China’s energy flow and 60% of trade ply. It is China’s “growth-jugular” and it is here that like-minded states must develop strategies that potentially signal the ability to stymie Xi’s dream of “rejuvenation.” 

That these initiatives have made China “edgy” is clear from their declarations that “China will certainly punish Australia with no mercy”. Fearing forced unification, Taiwan is tightening its ties to the U.S.; Japan, is engaged in its largest military build-up since the Cold War; India is readying forces along its borders, developing strategies to occlude vital sea lanes in the Indian Ocean and has engaged partnerships that threaten China’s vulnerabilities; Australia is opening up its northern coast to U.S. forces. France, Germany, and the UK are sending warships into the Indo-Pacific to assert their rights. Clearly,  nations have become less enthused by China’s market and more worried about its disturbing intent.  

 Challenges in the Maritime Domain

China’s rising comprehensive power has generated an internal impulse to military growth and an external push for unilateral expansionism in the South and East China Seas and its extended regions of economic interests. It has developed strategies that target the maritime domain to assure a favourable outcome to what it perceives to be a ‘strategic competition’ for resources and control of the seaways.

The consequences of China activating artifices such as the Anti-Access and Area Denial strategy, unilateral Air Defence Identification Zones and geo-political manoeuvres to collar sources of raw materials, ports of dispatch and control of routes euphemistically called the maritime silk route and the establishing the String of Pearls in the Indian Ocean Region are clear to see. Debt traps that have been set by China to inveigle some of the hapless littorals of the Indian Ocean of their maritime facilities are symptomatic of a new form of colonial adventure. The paradoxical effects of China’s contrivances are to undermine its own strategic standing, hasten counter balancing alignments and urge a global logic of cooperative politics over imperial strategies.

The Maritime Environment: Considerations

In today’s context there emerges an all-encompassing concept of what is implied by “securing the maritime environment” and how it brings to play the comprehensive national power of a State particularly to forge partnerships and be willing to back consensual policies with military power. The safety and economic security of the nation depends upon the secure use of the near and far oceans in times of peace, tensions and during conflict. In order to develop a Strategy to secure the domain the need is to persistently integrate and synchronize existing means. Challenges in the maritime environment are centred on the following three considerations:

• Domain awareness through maritime Intelligence Integration.

• Operational Threat Response founded on wide area coordination strategies.

• Maritime Commerce Security Plan.

The quest for strategic leverage in domain is founded on an oceanic vision backed by the development of a posture that characterizes our resolve to fulfil the quest. Inspiration may take the form of a policy declaration in relation to a geographic region such as the ‘Act East Policy’, the ‘India Africa Forum Summit’, alliances and partnerships; or indeed the emergence of a power that threatens to revise the status-quo. Policy provides a frame of reference that not only has wide-ranging application but will remain central for purposes of force planning to develop posture.

Current membership of the original ten ASEAN grouping plus 6 is symptomatic of the shifting centre of gravity of geopolitics to the East. From a security angle, the inclusion of India, USA, Russia, Japan and South Korea in addition to China provides the rationale for strategic equilibrium. India and China along with ASEAN are set to become the world’s largest economic bloc. The grouping is expected to account for about 27 per cent of Global GDP. The buoyancy of the Indo-ASEAN relationship is backed by surging trade figures which is slated to hit USD 100 billion in the current year. With such burgeoning stakes strategic rebalancing in the region comes as a natural consequence. The expansion of the ASEAN and the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum are suggestive of the littoral’s aspirations to counter balance the looming presence of China. Having thus brought about a modicum of coherence between security dynamics, strategic space and growth, we have the makings of a template to contend with the challenges that are present particularly the emerging unrelenting thrust by China for an exceptionable proprietary mercantile empire stretching across the region.

Force Planning to Secure the Maritime Environment

A fourfold classification of maritime forces has dominated contemporary naval thought. The grouping is largely functional and task oriented. It comprises of aircraft carriers, denial forces (including surface, air and sub-surface strike units), escorts and surveillance elements. Auxiliaries including logistic and other support ships and tenders provide distant and indirect support. While the ready availability of out-of-area bases, intelligence and strike elements become an imperative when devising cooperative operations.  In addition current thought has given strategic nuclear forces a restraining role to define and demarcate the limits within which conventional forces operate.

The make-up of the fleet must logically be a material and technological articulation of strategic concepts that prevail. India has for long aspired to attain a strategic maritime posture that would permit control and make safe oceanic spaces that serve to promote its national interests. And in times of hostility, influence the course of conflict. Partnerships such as the QUAD and the AUKUS provide the much needed basis for domain awareness, wide area strategic response and control mechanisms.

In this perspective, the fundamental obligation in times of tensions is therefore to activate means to first deter and if deterrence fails, to seize and exercise control over the ‘strategic space’ (it must come as no surprise that China develops forces necessary to realize its A2/AD policy). Pursuing this line of argument, it is the Aircraft Carrier Group and its intrinsic air power assisted by strike, surveillance and denial forces that sea control and security of control can be achieved. It is here that the true impact of the Aircraft Carrier is felt. Control and security of control is the relationship that operationally links all maritime forces with the Aircraft Carrier. In the absence of the latter, naval operations are reduced to a series of denial actions limited in time, space and restricted to littoral waters with little impact on the progress of operations on land. It is also for this reason that the Indian aircraft carrier programme today envisages a minimum force level of three Fleet Carriers at all times in order to meet the diverse tasks that the Navy may be charged with across geographically separated areas of interest under circumstances of change and uncertainty.

To Navigate the Crisis Ridden Stream

Bismarck suggested that great powers travel on the “Stream of Time” which they can neither create nor direct but upon which they can “steer with more or less skill”. How they emerge from that voyage depends to a large degree upon the wisdom of leadership. Bismarck’s sombre thoughts lead us back to our fundamental inquiry – whether the quest to secure the maritime environment lies in the turbulence of the ‘Stream of Time’  is a moot question, but how India navigates the crisis ridden stream is what leadership will have to contend with.

The Road to a Not So Harmonious Rise

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Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar (published in the IPCS web journal in my column “The Strategist and may be accessed at the following link: http://www.ipcs.org/comm_select.php?articleNo=5855)

 The Dream

When Xi Jinping took office in March 2013, he was “elected” President in a confirmation vote by the People’s Congress in Beijing; he received 2,952 votes in favour and one against. Replacing Hu Jintao, who retired after serving his two terms; tenure legislated to annul the possibility of the Mao-kind-of-excesses.

Most nations felt Xi’s “ascension” represented more continuity, persistence with tenure-based leadership, more liberal reforms and a closer draw into a globalised world. China’s declared goal was to achieve “Harmonious Rise”. But there was a dream for Rejuvenation and  of China’s Centrality. Much of the world dismissed this as rhetoric from the nationalistic fringe. But to Xi, his predecessors and the Party; Rejuvenation and Centrality were obsessions that had endured the mass carnage of the Great Leap Forward, Cultural Revolution and of Tiananmen.

Opening China; the Concept of ‘Shi’

In this milieu, looking back to the unabridged opening of China to the world emerges as a strategic-blunder. Was it conceived as a tactical artifice to benefit from the Sino-Soviet rift and checkmate Kremlin’s expansionism or was it a deliberate strategy to bring China permanently into the Western-Bloc? It began in 1972 and was based on three ‘rosy’ assumptions (Chap XXIV, Kissinger, White House Years):

  • Catastrophic failure of the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution put China in a precarious political situation and ideologically ripe for change.
  • Beijing needed the West’s support to break out of its isolation. Engagement was the precursor to co-operation and joining the anti-Soviet-Bloc.
  • China had a deep seated desire to join in the prosperity of the West. Making it a stake-holder in the global order would set it on the path to liberal democracy.

The inability to understand Chinese strategists, their assessment of the existing balance of power and their application of Shi led to not just fuelling China’s dazzling growth but also promoting its grand strategy of “National Rejuvenation”. In classic terms ‘Shi’ comprised the use of deception to attain strategic advantage. It was Shi that triumphed.

The Shanghai Communiqué

The Shanghai Communiqué in theory promised rapid fruition of the three ‘rosy assumptions’. Of note was Beijing’s pledge “to abjure power politics, respect sovereignty of all regional states; and strive for peace, harmony and just competition”. Despite the West’s immediate gains of a modified Soviet outlook to the Cold-War; for Beijing, the calculus was on a grand-strategic plane. Three pronged in form, it was to deny Moscow and the West from geopolitically encircling China; to induct much needed technological, economic and military boost to bring about a seeming ‘Harmonious Rise’ and in time to challenge the lone super-power. Half a century later it is apparent which stratagem worked.   

The Communiqué today lies in tatters as nations have recognised the reality of China; particularly so where sovereignty, security and acceptance of international laws/conventions is concerned. While Beijing’s predatory mercantilism brand of economics has violated the very idea of security. Four considerations key in international law to our understanding of a sovereign state are: possession of permanent population, single government rule, ability to form diplomatic relations with sovereign states and critically, territory that is clearly defined. With China it is territorial definition that is intractable and stymies normalisation of relations. From claims of the so called “Middle Kingdom,” to the scything sweep of the 9-dash line; territorial demands cut through established boundaries of 17 sovereign nations and carve-out vast maritime space encompassed by the 9-Dash Line (despite having been struck down by the  International Court of Justice ).

As for Beijing’s pledges, they have long since been dumped. In this circumstance, it was never clear how the preyed-upon were expected to accept the Communiqué and the Chinese order of things.

The Pivot Rather than the Cog

In 1949, Mao ordered that the “Century of Humiliation” , be etched in peoples memory not just as a tombstone to past injustices, but as a promise for redemption. The 19th century had witnessed the dismantling of the Sino-centric order that had dominated much of the region. As a consequence of colonial avarice, China degenerated to a slave-economy. The roots of the Century of Humiliation have been traced back to defeat in the First Opium War (1839-1842). The conflict opened the flood gates for entry of other imperial powers and set in motion the common colonial pattern of the day.

Given the settings, it remains a geo-political inexplicability as to how Beijing in 1972 would not only be welcomed by “balance-of-power” enthusiasts, but also by a West that deluded itself that China would embrace an international system in which it would be another ‘Cog’ rather than the Pivot?

The Rude Awakening

The world expected a transformation of China from a repressive communist-state to a benign capitalistic one. However, half-century post the Shanghai Communiqué, we find a rich, expansionist and militaristic China in denial of established rules; led by an iron fisted autocrat in power for life, promoting predatory economic and revisionist policies. Add to all this is its proliferatory nuclear support to rogue states.

China’s Grand Strategy, is keyed to the attainment of three objectives: preservation of dispensation; creating a sphere of control in which its territorial expansion and its writ remains unchallenged; and lastly, attainment and maintenance of a geopolitical order in which China is the primary influencer. However, China’s territorial ambitions and rapacious policies in pursuit of these objectives have given impetus to the alignment of nations to confront and contain it.

Making Amends

The kind of nation, its place in the global order and the type of military China will command by 2049 are neither pre-destined nor beyond the impact of changes. Clearly, for China the idea of a multi-polar world is just a strategic milestone on the road to “Rejuvenation”(metaphor for  dominance in a unipolar world). How Beijing interacts with the international system in the intervening years will determine the realisation of its dream or otherwise.

In the absence of China adopting policies that promote co-operative engagement and a consensual approach to universal order; the formation of alliances and structures that regulate global order will be an inevitable consequence. The Quad and the AUKUS have already taken shape, both groupings bring major powers more closely into the Indo-Pacific; the former is a comprehensive model for the process of international engagement, while the latter is military in nature and is enabled by highly capable forces. The two together provide a strategic template in the Indo-Pacific for order.

China: Foreign Policy, Disinformation and Propaganda Warfare

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By

Vice Admiral (Retd) Vijay Shankar

Published in Salute Magazine available at https://salute.co.in/chinas-foreign-policy-disinformation-and-propoganda/

The United Front Work Department … is an important magic weapon for strengthening the party’s ruling position … and an important magic weapon for realising the China Dream of the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation.

                                      —Xi Jinping, at the 2015 Central United Front Work Meeting

To Influence the Balance of Power

In 2015 when Xi Jinping made the above declaration it was bemusing as to what exactly the United Front Work Department (UFWD) was and how exactly it would serve to realise China’s dream of the “Great Rejuvenation”. Was it an internal tool of governance or did its mandate extend outside its borders? In its central role the “UFWD was the key to determine the ‘cause’ of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) for which the People were to influence the Balance of Power.” This muddled statement serves more to confuse than clarify; unless, one were to interpret this to mean that the UFWD was an organisation that not only served to ensure the solidarity of the citizens of China with the aims of the CCP but also had an external role that tilted the global balance of power in favour of the PRC. So not only was it primacy of the UFWD in domestic politics but also its critical assignment in shaping foreign policy and influencing overseas Chinese affairs.

In this perspective the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) does not make or even implement foreign policy, other than of a proforma nature, but provides the logistical framework for operationalizing policies. So much so, that today the Foreign Minister is neither a member of the seven-man Politburo nor is he the top foreign policy maker. Premier Xi, created in 2018, the Central Foreign Affairs Commission placing it directly under the Standing Committee of the Politburo which he led. There is a third organ related to the advancement and rendering of foreign policy goals that bears mention, and that is the International Liaison Department (ILD) which is charged with developing policies that create support for Chinese foreign initiatives and supress opposition. It specifically targets influential personalities and even conducts discreet propaganda, preparation of pliant politicians, society elites, media members and influencers.

The Paramount Leader

The troika of the UFWD, the MFA and the ILD thus make up the foreign policy institutions of China. Together they serve to firstly, legitimise and cement the rule of the CCP within and secondly, to formulate, support and promote foreign policy initiatives without.  The instruments used range from armed subversion to disinformation campaigns.  

Xi Jinping is the General Secretary of the CCP, chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC), leader of the Standing Committee of the Politburo and indeed the President of the PRC; he has assumed the mantle of Paramount leader and by 2022 had extended his rule by an unprecedented third term (Mao was the last Chairman to do so). He has thus consolidated his grip on all aspects of the Chinese power structure; particularly so it’s internal and external manifestation.

Quiet Diplomacy: Propaganda, Subversion and Information Warfare

              As mentioned earlier, China’s MFA conducts the pro-forma traditional state-to-state diplomacy and provides the logistical framework for enabling policies. The lesser-known more recent UFWD and the older ILD working under the direction of the Standing Committee of the Politburo, conduct “Quiet Diplomacy”. Historically, such diplomacy almost exclusively meant foreign communist parties, but today it includes parties of varying ideologies, the process of cultivating potential support and supressing opposition to Chinese interests. 

Both the UFWD and the ILD have expanded their activities to include financing, recruiting, indoctrinating and arming subversive groups that promote Chinese interests. To further the foreign policy goals, the two organs use their foreign contacts to build support and advance its projects and mobilise opinion in target countries. In the lead-up to the 100th anniversary of the CCP’s founding (2021), the Party published a lengthy article outlining the core missions of their foreign enterprises in the modern era. While the obligatory CCP slogans and bromides were employed, it centred on gathering intelligence, influencing and garnering opinion for its initiatives through “consultative mechanisms”. The only overt project referenced was (for obvious reasons), the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). These ‘consultative mechanisms’ do not just include communist and socialist parties, but political elites, media celebrities and, without stating it, every group or agency that could directly or indirectly influence the desired outcome.

Enter the BBC Documentary

              A two part documentary on Prime Minister Narendra Modi was released by the BBC on 17 and 24 January 2023. The first part covers Modi’s early political career and the period when he was the Chief Minister of the state of Gujarat, specifically during the 2002 communal riots and the part he played in the event as it unfolded. This is also when the producer parts way from the facts; conveniently forgetting the reality that the Supreme Court of India upheld the Special Investigation Team’s (SIT) clean chit to PM Narendra Modi and dismissed the case observing that the plea was devoid of merit. This was after a period of 16 years. The Producer, a Mr Mike Bradford and Director Dick Cookson choose rather to base their narrative on a little known report authored by the then Foreign Secretary of the UK, Jack Straw (of “WMDs in Iraq” fame). The makers of the film neither consider it necessary to make clear as to who invited Jack to conduct his enquiry nor why or when. Certainly it was not the Government of India.The second part of the film deals with the period of Mr Modi’s re-election for a second term as India’s Prime Minister. It makes a very jaundiced examination of select policies of his administration with more than just a cavalier approach to the historical reasons, constitutional considerations and the factual outcomes.

              Clearly the two-part so called documentary (after all, a documentary is expected to document facts) lost its way somewhere between fact, selective amnesia and fiction; so questions that beg to be asked are: why was it made? Who was to benefit? Clearly, it was not the British Government, Prime Minister Mr Rishi Sunak, without any reservation “disagreed with the characterisation” of Mr Modi in the ‘documentary’. Countries such as the USA denied having anything to do with it while Russia quite bluntly suggested that it was pure “propaganda’.

The Propaganda Theory

Digging deeper into the propaganda theory, was there a larger movement to peddle influence and to what effect and by who? The Institute of Chartered Accountants England and Wales (ICAEW) pointed out in 2021: “The BBC faces significant financial challenges as it seeks to deliver on its public broadcasting mission in the context of a competitive and fast changing environment. The withdrawal of government funding for licence fees for the over-75s and insufficient commercial income have resulted in losses that have eaten into the BBC’s reserves”. This fact has also been substantiated by a National Audit Office Report of 25 January 2021 that suggests that BBC must develop a strategic response to its financial challenges. The BBC has funded the losses arising in recent years from a combination of its reserves and a sale and leaseback of its estate, but this is not sustainable in the long run. To supplement the licence fee the BBC seeks to generate revenues through commercial activities, which generated £1.5bn in external revenue in 2019-20. Unfortunately, the contribution to the bottom line was less than 6% of its licence fee income. Licence Fee in their 2019-20 balance sheet contributed 65% of their total income of £4.9 billion.  Income was £100 million short of expenditure. The BBC’ financial woes are clear for all to see.

There are also unconfirmed reports of the BBC’s financial interlocking with Chinese state funding agencies. Could these funding agencies be the very same organs of China’s foreign policy, the UFWD or the ILD that are tasked with “Quiet Diplomacy”? It is equally apparent that China would be the chief beneficiary of any disruption or upsets that may occur in the upcoming 2024 Indian general elections; their motive being the installation of a weak, left leaning and pliable government in the Indian Parliament rather than a strong, progressive right wing party such as the BJP. This is not beyond the realm of probabilities as the Chinese Communist Party have already been allegedly involved in election tampering in the USA and other nations.

Conclusion: Kindling the Nascent Arena for Defence

Sun Tzu in his treatise on “The Art of War” suggested that: “the supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting”. This is just what the waging of “Quiet Diplomacy” (at least the Chinese variant) is all about. The United Front Work Department and the International Liaison Department provide the teeth to realise China’s foreign policy objectives, to influence the will of people to conform to China’s point of view. This is done through the instrument of distortion of facts, disinformation, indoctrination and indeed manipulating and falsification.

While the government should continue to monitor and disrupt Chinese influence activities, its top priority must be restoring health of the Indian information ecosystem. Disinformation flourishes due to deep-seated currents in politics, society, economy, and law. Its carriers and methods include the TV, online data collection, social media micro-targeting, political party dynamics and student vulnerabilities. Large-scale progress in combating disinformation would require profound national reforms in these and other arenas. The aim being to disincentivize the production, amplification, and consumption of disinformation from all sources.

True reform would be an extremely daunting task. The government’s role in combating disinformation is poorly defined and heavily constrained by laws, norms, and political obstacles. Its tools are often tactical in nature and oriented toward foreign threats. Overreach by the centre could actually worsen political distrust or create harmful precedents.

The task of countering disinformation is a nascent area of defence that the government could either implement or help to coordinate. These measures include strengthening regulation of online platforms, reforming and monitoring electoral campaign finance and advertising. Funding media literacy education and facilitating research in influence operations. Without undertaking this mammoth assignment the spirit of India will remain susceptible to the emaciating effects of disinformation.