Kautilya’s Mantra Yuddha: Role of the Military in determining Comprehensive National Power of States

      By

Vice Admiral (Retd.) Vijay Shankar

Keywords: Comprehensive National Power (role of military), Kautilya’s Arthashastra, China Grand Strategy

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Excerpts:

[…]

In his treatise, Arthashastra (4th Century B.C.E.), on war, politics, economics, diplomacy and statecraft, Kautilya, underscored the importance of dynamism in the growth of a state. To him passivity was outlandish[i] and the objective of a State was power not just to control outward behavior but also the thoughts of one’s subjects and one’s adversaries.[ii] He outlined eight precepts that governed the general power of a State[iii]:

Every nation acts to maximize power and self-interest.

  • Moral principles have little or no force in the actions amongst nations.
  • Alliances are a function of mutuality.
  • War and peace are considered solely from the perspective of what advantages they provide to the instigator.
  • The ‘Mandala’ premise of foreign policy provides the basis of strategic planning of alliances and a general theory of international relations.
  • Diplomacy of any nature is a subtle act of war in contrast to the Clausewitzian view of war being a continuation of polity.
  • Three types of warfare are upheld, the first is open hostilities, the second is war through concealment and lastly a war that is waged through silence and subterfuge.
  • Seeking justice is the last desperate resort of the weak. This sentiment would appear to be a common theme amongst the ancients for in Thucydides History of the Peloponnesian War, when the Melians talk of justice and fair play confronted with the prospect of conquest by Athens, the latter contend that such tactics were the last desperate move of a nation facing defeat[iv].

The story of Horatius Cocles’ last stand on the northern bridge across the river Tiber in defense of Rome against its enemies, encapsulates the spirit of the Roman citizen. It won for them their commonwealth and empire that spanned from West Asia to the British Isles. In a short period of 53 years (219 – 167BC) this entire area was brought under the dominion of the single city of Rome. The story goes that Horatius standing at the head of the bridge, fearing that a large body of Rome’s enemies would force their way into the city, turned around and shouted to those behind him to hasten back to the other side and break down the bridge. They obeyed him and whilst the bridge came down he remained at his post obstructing the progress of the foe. The assault was reigned in. Cocles himself followed the bridge into the river. It was this enthusiasm for noble deeds and a lofty spirit engendered by Roman traditions in addition to their customs, institutional faith in the design of their political systems and their moral incorruptibility that made for Empire.[v]

One hears a similar message in the voice of Kautilya when he summarizes the wellspring of a King’s power. He states in the Arthashastra “A King’s power is in the end tied to the popular energy of the people; for not being entrenched in the spirit of his subjects, a king will soon find himself easily uprooted”.[vi] In this context the spirit of the people refers to their adherence to dharma, faith in the king and his leadership, their wealth generating capabilities and their belief in the general superiority that their way of life represented.

In as much as the decline in power of both the Mauryan and Roman empires are concerned, the words of Gibbon are equally applicable, “The decline was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness. Prosperity ripened the principle of decay; the causes of destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest; and as soon as time or accidents removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight”[vii]. There is also another school of thought that believes that it was the new religion that weakened the will to look for rewards in another world and not in this, that contributed disproportionately to the decline of empire; Buddhism in the instance of the Mauryan realm and Christianity in the case of Rome.

The Roman Moment [viii]

The diamond jubilee of Queen Victoria’s ascension to the British Empire’s throne was celebrated on 22nd June 1897. The jubilee stretched over five days on land and sea. A military procession of over 50,000 soldiers included troops from India, Nepal, Canada, its African possessions, Australia, New Zealand and Naples. At sea, 165 ships manned by 40,000 sailors and 3,000 heavy guns saluting Her Majesty gave teeth and ‘hard power’ to the fact that the realm was always, not just protected, but also had the capacity to vanquish any foreseeable opposition.  Eleven viceroys and premiers of Britain’s self governing colonies stood in prominent attendance alongside kings, princes, maharajahs, ambassadors and emissaries from the rest of the world. The event was celebrated in every corner of the Empire from Hong Kong to Singapore to Hyderabad, Bangalore, Zanzibar to the Table Bay and in Ottawa. In Fareed Zakaria’s words and as one historian covering the events wrote this was a ‘Roman Moment’. In sheer military strength, organizational and administrative excellence, in the virtues of its political systems, the self ordained legitimacy of their imperial systems and the superiority of their cultural and structural strengths there was no peer to this Empire.

In the present day environment it is difficult to even contemplate the extent, grandeur and the dominance of Queen Victoria’s bequest. From the time she wore the mantle of the Empress of India (1876) the Empire had been linked by a web of 170,000 nautical miles of trans oceanic cables and 662,000 miles of terrestrial cables creating a vast network of information highways that enveloped the globe, even a fledgling radio network; invention of which made its appearance in 1896 was included in this complex. Railways and canals were enlarged, deepened and pushed through volumes of commerce inconceivable hither to. The appeal of the Empire, its literature, its norms and sense of fair play, its emphasis on the outdoors and sporting activities, dressing habits, schooling and health programs provided the necessary soft power for dominance of British ideas and the universality of the English way of life; all of which long outlived the impact of their hard power.

[…]

Conclusion

At the heart of the matter lay power. Its quest, accretion and relevance have been the only
constant through all of history. It has provided a rationale for stability and, in its own right, been a regulatory agent. We have noted that given the international system that we are a part of and the realism that pervades it; of all the determinants of power, military muscle is explicit in its application and at the same time implicit as an expression of a country’s will to power. An attempt has been made to place this abstraction within the larger framework of the nation’s standing, or in Fukuyama’s words the ‘Stateness’ of the country. While the task of the international system has been to tame the exercise of power, it is a paradox that the same power provides the facility to regulate and control its exercise. Nuclear power takes the debate to its logical extreme of absolute destruction and in arriving at this macabre conclusion it provides the basis of drawing boundaries and limiting conflicts.
We have in the course of our debate examined the views of several scholars on the
subject and noted in some details the Chinese approach to the formulation of CNP and the manner in which they have transformed their centralized approach, which to some schools appear as a weakness, into strength. Decision making that is command and control and integration of our resources including civil military relations, technology adaptation and our propensity to operate in stove pipes are areas of weakness that we must remedy. Failing which our ability to rise beyond the tactical will remain an enduring impediment. The sage voice of Kautilya reminds us that the military power of a state is not just the mere counting of armed physicals, but also of ‘mantra yuddha’ the power of good policies, sound judgement, precision command, analysis and good counsel.


[i] Kautalya: The Arthashastra. LN Rangarajan (Ed., Rearranger and Translator). Penguin Classics, India, 1992.

[ii] Ibid

[iii] Ibid

[iv] Thucydides.History of the Peloponnesian War Penguin Books Ltd.1954 Pgs 400-8 ‘The Melian Dialogue’

[v] Polibius on Roman imperialism  Regnery Gateway Inc.1980, pp. 216-7

[vi] Kautilya: The Arthashastra. LN Rangarajan (Eds., Rearranger and Translator). Penguin Classics, India, 1992.

[vii] Gibbon, Edward. The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire. Ed. JB Bury. Methuen & Co. London, 1896.

[viii] Zakaria, Fareed.The Post-American World, WW Norton and company, New York 2008, pp. 167-8

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The Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang Corridor

The Crowning piece of  China’s Strategic Mosaic to its Africa and Middle East Undertaking

by

Vice Admiral (retd) Vijay Shankar

Keywords: Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang Corridor, Chinese commercial and military engagement of Africa and West Asia

Download full article here: Shankar, The Karakoram Corridor

Excerpts:

A Historical Fable Morphs into Actuality

The North and Northwest Passages were fabled sea routes conjured by adventurers, merchants and money chandlers over the last six centuries to link the Pacific with the Atlantic Ocean. The Route lay through the Arctic archipelago of what became Canada and the treacherous ice flows that frustrate passage across the Arctic Ocean. To discover, establish and control a commercial all weather sea line of communication that would have world wide economic significance was the quest of early explorers. Some of these voyages ended in disaster while others in failure in the search for a viable deep sea channel amidst drifting icebergs and trapping ice flows.   Not till 1906 when Amundsen made the transit over an arduous three year voyage was the feat achieved; and a feat it remained till Nature through global warming made the passage a distinct commercial and strategic verity. Today the route is a reality and in 2011 alone more than 18 commercial ships had made the now ice free crossing. To put matters in perspective, as a trade corridor the distance from China to markets in Europe has been cut down to less than 8000 miles from 14,700 miles. Significantly the route avoids two sensitive ‘choke points’ the Malacca Strait and the Suez Canal.

While a combination of strategic security considerations, geopolitical circumstances, commercial power rivalry, imperatives of economy in a globalised world and Nature made actuality of a fable; a very similar array of forces have set in motion another global quest. Only on this historical occasion it is China that  leads the charge to secure a strategic corridor serviced by a maritime terminal that would quench not just its thirst for energy but also provide a secure alternative conduit for the ‘fruits’ of its Africa and Middle East ventures to feed its resource guzzling growth programme.

 […]

Given the stakes that China has in her own development and her justified security concerns, there are adequate signals to suggest that India needs to pull out of the state of paranoia that she transits through every time that China collaborates with Pakistan, particularly so in the case of the Gwadar-Karakoram-Xinjiang energy cum raw materials corridor. It is true that there are very serious unresolved territorial disputes that plague Sino-Indian relations and the proposed corridor runs through some of this territory; but what is of greater significance is the burgeoning trade between the two which is expected to reach $100 billion by 2015. In this deepening of commercial relations lies the germ of friction resolution.

Download full article here: Shankar, The Karakoram Corridor

Strategic Posture in the Eastern Ocean

by

VAdm (retd.) Vijay Shankar 

Download full article here: Shankar, Strategic Posture in the Eastern Ocean

Keywords: India Maritime Strategy, Strategic Approach, Eastern Ocean,  China Comprehensive National Power, ASEAN, Look East Policy

Excerpts:

[…]

It was Clausewitz who first noted an area of darkness when it came to characterizing the complex relationship between national strategy and the military resources that were needed to muscle and enable that strategy. He perceived this region of obscurity as one caused by a lack of an understanding of the nature of power and the need to sculpt it in a manner that it promoted national strategy. Specifically within the framework of the military as a tool he identified this as a failure to distinguish between the maintenance of armed forces and their use in pursuit of larger objectives.[i] In Book II of Clausewitz’s On War, while discussing ‘The Theory of War,’ he notes,

“Even if we break down war into its various activities, we will find that the difficulties are not uniform throughout. The more physical the activity, the less the difficulties will be. The more the activity becomes intellectual and turns into motives which exercise a determining influence on the commander’s will, the more the difficulties will increase. Thus it is easier to use theory to organize, plan and conduct an engagement than it is to use it in determining the engagement’s purpose.”[ii]

This quandary was not unique to Clausewitz’s period as the dilemma continues to contemporary times when the momentum that propels the development of armed forces builds logic of growth that defies purpose and is often self fulfilling.

The absence of a cogent theory, which integrates the promotion, nurturing and maintenance of force with a convincing contract for use, is one of the first imperatives that the State must seek to reconcile. From this resolution emerges the concept of ‘Strategic Poise.’

[…]

A Hundred Battles: Chinese Security Perceptions[iii]

China published its sixth Defense White Paper in January 2008. Its contours were that of a self-confident China recognizing its own growing economic and military prowess. Unwritten was Beijing’s intention to improve her image the first step of which was to provide some clarity by the issuance of the White Paper. At the same time, the paramountcy of containment of the various social fissures that their development has precipitated was top of their agenda. Their appreciation of the security situation underscored the belief that the risk of world wide all-out war was relatively low in the foreseeable future, yet, the absence of such risk did not automatically imply a conviction that stability and peace pervades international relations. The paper critically points out that struggles for cornering strategic resources, dominating geographically vital areas and tenanting strategic locations have, in fact, intensified. Power as a natural currency for politics remains the preferred instrument. Under these circumstances the portents for friction are ever present and would therefore demand preparedness, modernization and orientation of a nature that would serve to neutralize the fall out of such friction.[iv]

[…]
Contemporary challenges in the Eastern Ocean in context of the Look East policy are dominated by three currents. What direction China’s rise will take is a matter of conjecture, of significance is that the potential for a collision is a reality and the only consideration that could deter it, is the ability of India to attain a strategic posture in the Eastern Ocean that serves to stabilize. On the ‘globalization-nationalism’ non state actor conundrum, clearly plural societies with decentralized control are more likely to transform, adjust, adapt and tweak their systems than monolithic centrally controlled States such as China which are intrinsically brittle in form, the fallout on the region caused by a transformation inconsistency can only be traumatic. The third current is India’s relationship with the USA; it is here that some control exists in the hands of our policy makers. India has shown itself; through restraint, pluralistic and popular form of governance to be a responsible State that upholds the status quo yet invites change through democratic forces and its rise, in the main, is not only welcomed in South East Asia but is seen as a harmonizing happening that could counterpoise China.  The next step would logically be to establish an Indo-US strategic framework in the maritime domain, if we are to resourcefully contend with the challenges that the Eastern Ocean presents.

End Notes

[i] Howard, Michael, Causes of War, Harvard University Press 1980, p.102.

[ii] Clausewitz Carl Von, On War, Howard and Paret (Eds.), Princeton University Press: New Jersey, 1989, p. 140

[iii] In Sun Tzu’s Art of War, Knowing the enemy and knowing oneself is the key to victory in a hundred battles. Sun Tzu, Art of War, Samuel B. Griffith (trans.) Oxford University Press, 1963.

[iv] Ma Cheng-Kun,  PLA News Analysis, “Significance of 2008 China’s National Defense White Paper” no. 15, pp. 49-60